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[No. 1.

CRITICISM OF KANT.

TRANSLATED FROM THE GERMAN OF PROF. DR. KUNO FISCHER, BY W. S. HOUGH.

CHAPTER IV.

EXAMINATION OF KANT'S FUNDAMENTAL DOCTRINES.

By fixing and uniting Kant's fundamental doctrines, we have won the right conception of the system, as it was present to the mind of its author. It contains themes enough, which Kant has only sketched in outline, or not developed at all; problems enough, which he partly left unsolved, partly declared incapable of solution. To discover and supply the deficiencies is the task of scholars who wish to fill out and complete the work of the master without touching upon its principles. On the other hand, the attempt to extend the system beyond its original limits, and to advance where Kant remained stationary and commanded philosophy to halt, is a problem which leads for its solution to a transformation and development of the Kantian doctrine. But, in order to determine such a problem, we must ascertain whether the principles of Kant's doctrine, in their authentic form, are permanent principles, and whether they are fundamentally consistent in themselves and harmonious with one another.

I. Examination of the Doctrine of Knowledge.

1. The Contradiction in the "Critique of Reason."

We fasten our eye, first of all, upon the doctrine of knowledge, which constitutes the real theme of the "Critique of Reason." And our first question is: Does Transcendental or Critical Idealism, the founding of which won for Kant the fame of being the Copernicus of philosophy, stand uncontradicted in the "Critique of Reason" itself? The fundamental recognition of this principle of doctrine is unquestionably not the same thing as a logically consistent adherence to it. Here, as the special student will at once notice, we touch upon the point which involves the much-controverted difference between the first and second editions of the "Critique of Reason," a point which we have already made the subject of a very careful and exhaustive discussion, to which we here take occasion to refer.¹ The present problem, which is concerned with the criticism of the Kantian doctrine, obliges us to return to this very important point.

It will be well to put the question itself as briefly and precisely as possible. Transcendental idealism teaches: all our phenomena or objects of experience are *mere ideas*, and nothing independent of the latter. That subjective phenomena are such, is beyond question. We are concerned, therefore, only with the objective phenomena; these are the things external to us, the phenomena in space, hence bodies or matter. Kant must necessarily have taught, and has taught in the most unambiguous manner in the "Paralogisms of Pure Reason," as they appear in the first edition of the "Critique," that matter is a mere idea. In the second edition of the "Critique" he added a "Refutation of Idealism," in which he declared that matter was not a mere idea. This is the point we are here concerned with. We have before us a contradiction, which no ingenious interpretation can explain away from either the spirit or letter of the original passages.

In the first edition of the "Critique"—to cite these passages—in the "Paralogisms of Pure Reason" and the "Observations on the Result of the Pure Doctrine of the Soul," we read the following: "We have undeniably shown in the 'Transcendental *Æs-*

¹ Fischer, "Gesch. d. n. Philos.," vol. iii, pp. 558-576.

thetic' that bodies are mere phenomena of our external sense, and not things-in-themselves." "I understand, under the *Transcendental idealism* of all phenomena, that principle according to which we regard phenomena as a whole as mere ideas, and not as things-in-themselves." "Since he (the Transcendental idealist) recognizes matter, and indeed its inner possibility, merely as phenomenon, which is nothing apart from our sensibility, matter is with him only a sort of ideas (perception) which are objective, not as if they were related to objects *in themselves external*, but because they refer perceptions to space, in which everything external is, while space itself is in us. To this Transcendental idealism we have already given our adherence at the beginning." "Now, external objects (bodies) are merely phenomena, hence nothing other than a sort of my ideas, the objects of which only have existence in virtue of these ideas; apart from them, however, they are nothing." "It is clearly shown that if I should take away the thinking subject, the entire material world would disappear, since it is nothing but the appearance in the sensibility of the subject, and a sort of its ideas."¹

According to Kant's doctrine, substance is only knowable through its persistence, and persistence only knowable in the phenomenon which at all times fills space. Hence *matter* is the only knowable substance, since it alone among objects persists. Now, the second edition of the "Critique of Reason" declares, in its disproof of idealism: "Thus the perception of this persistence is only possible through a *thing* external to me, and not through the mere *idea* of such a thing."²

Accordingly, as to what concerns the things external to us—i. e., bodies or matter—Kant teaches in the first edition of the "Critique" that *external objects (bodies) only have existence in virtue of our ideas, but apart from them they are nothing*; in the second edition, on the other hand, that *the perception of matter is only possible through a thing external to me, and not through the mere idea of such a thing*. There he teaches that things external to us are mere ideas; here, on the other hand, that they are *not* mere ideas. There he teaches that things external to us have existence merely in virtue of our ideas, but that

¹ Kant, "Kritik der reinen Vernunft." Vid. "Werke," vol. ii, pp. 667, 675, 676, 684.

² *Ibid.*, p. 224.

they are nothing independent of the latter; here, that they have existence, by no means in virtue of our ideas, but independently of them. Hence our ideas of things external to us, and these things themselves are different from one another, and external things must, consequently, be objects independent of our ideas—*i. e.*, things-in-themselves. Since, now, things external to us are in space, space also must be something independent of our thought. But this means as much as utterly to abandon Transcendental idealism and to return under full sail to the old dogmatism. In his establishment of Transcendental idealism, Kant appears as the Copernicus of philosophy; in his refutation of “psychological idealism,” on the contrary, as Ptolemy, or rather as Tycho Brahe, who confounded both systems.

The inconsistency of the two editions is perfectly obvious. The second, in which the text of the “Critique” should presumably have received its definitive form, contains the establishment of Transcendental idealism, and at the same time a disproof of idealism, which directly contradicts the original doctrine. Accordingly, the Kantian “Critique of Reason,” or doctrine of knowledge, is here at variance with itself, and indeed in *literal* statement.

2. The Origin of the Contradiction.

The new refutation of idealism in the second edition of the “Critique,” as well as the notes and appendix to the “Prolegomena,” was called forth by the misconceptions which arose with the very first review of the Kantian masterpiece, the transcendental idealism of the new doctrine being confounded with the old dogmatic idealism, and especially that of Berkeley.

Kant wished to shield his work from such misapprehensions, and therefore undertook radically to distinguish the new idealism from the old by a logical and convincing proof. The former establishes phenomena and experience; the latter, on the contrary, bases itself upon the facts of inner experience. Hence Kant designates this dogmatic idealism as the “*empirical*” or “*psychological*.” He found this developed in two principal forms. Upon the ground of our inner experience, which furnishes nothing but ideas in us, empirical idealism had declared the existence of things external to us to be either doubtful or impossible. The former position was taken by Descartes, the latter by Berkeley. Hence

Kant called the doctrine of the one the "*problematic*," that of the other the "*dogmatic idealism*."

Berkeley had a radically false idea of space, which, like color, taste, etc., he ascribed to our sensations, and, consequently, regarded a space idea independent of impressions as something impossible and wholly imaginary. He took as the matter of thought what is the form of thought. Hence he denied the existence of external things. Kant rightly said: "The ground for this idealism has already been destroyed in our '*Transcendental Æsthetic*.'"¹

Thus it only remained to disprove Descartes. To do this, it was necessary to show that our inner experience was only possible under the presupposition of outer experience, which consists in the idea of external things. But since all ideas are in us, even those of things external to us, it had to be shown that these ideas were only possible under the presupposition of the *existence* of things external to us, or that "the idea of matter is only possible through a *thing* external to me, and not through the mere *idea* of such a thing." Precisely this course was taken, and for this reason, by the "Refutation of Idealism" in the second edition of the "Critique." In order to prove the existence of things external to us, Kant made inner experience dependent upon outer, and outer experience dependent upon the existence of external things; that is, he made the existence of external things independent of our thought, and the latter dependent upon the former; he thus made things external to us—bodies and matter, *things-in-themselves*. And so Kant subverted, in this particular, his own doctrine of Transcendental idealism, while seeking to vindicate it, and to secure it against being confounded with empirical idealism. In order fundamentally to differentiate the one from the other, he tore them asunder in the very point in which they agree; for they agree in holding all our objects of knowledge to be phenomena or ideas, and as such in us. In order, now, to show that he could demonstrate what Descartes had been unable to prove, he brought forward a proof which Descartes had already made use of, and, indeed, in the same way, that, namely, our idea of bodies was only possible under the condition of the existence of bodies independent of our ideas. In like manner Descartes had shown that

¹ *Ibid.*, "Refutation of Idealism." Vid. "Werke," vol. ii, p. 223. Cf. 1st ed., pp. 67, 68. Note.

matter or extended substance was a thing in itself, entirely independent of thought, and that space was the attribute of this thing, and likewise independent of thought.¹

Certainly, this refutation of idealism is a very noteworthy illustration of how easily, in the *vindication* of his cause, even so powerful a thinker as Kant could surrender his own position in order to avoid the mere appearance of agreement with certain related standpoints which he opposed. Kant and Berkeley both teach that space is in us, and that things external to us are our phenomena or ideas, and nothing independent of the latter. In spite of this agreement, however, their doctrines are fundamentally different. According to Berkeley, space is a sensation, like color and taste; according to Kant, it is a perception which is independent of all sensation. According to Berkeley, space is a given material of thought, like all our impressions; according to Kant, it is a necessary form or fundamental law of thought. Thus Berkeley's idealism was overthrown by Kant's "Transcendental *Æsthetic*," and, consequently, the confusion of the two points of view was utterly unjustifiable and false. Kant rightly appealed to this refutation, and ought to have let the matter rest there. But he would have nothing in common with the dogmatic idealism of Berkeley, and so now he demonstrates that external things are by no means mere ideas, and that matter is something independent of our thought. Berkeley had declared matter to be a nonentity, so Kant now demonstrates its reality, as if it were a thing-in-itself. Berkeley had said, space is in us; so Kant now proves that it is external to us.

3. The Second Refutation of Idealism. Kant vs. Jacobi.

But Kant had not satisfied himself with having disproved idealism in the *text* of the second edition of the "Critique"; he felt also called upon to furnish the *preface* to this edition with a long note, which should renew and confirm most emphatically the former refutation, and drive from the field an opponent who had but just appeared. This opponent was *Jacobi*, in his "Letters on the Doctrine of Spinoza," and his "Talks on David Hume." The former appeared two years after the "Prolegomena" (1785), the

¹ Cf. Fischer, "Gesch. d. n. Philos.," vol. i (3d ed.), pp. 324-26.

latter in the same year as the second edition of the "Critique of Pure Reason" (1787), but some months earlier. Now, Jacobi had maintained that we can never demonstrate the existence of external things, but only be certain of it through *faith*, since such existence became apparent to us purely through immediate revelation. This standpoint opposed itself not only to all dogmatism, but also to all idealism, since the latter was obliged to hold external things to be mere ideas in us. This criticism also affects Transcendental idealism.

Of course, Jacobi understands, under external things, things independent of all our ideas, *i. e.*, things-in-themselves. Now, Kant wants to prove the contrary; he wants to demonstrate the existence of external things in the same sense in which Jacobi maintains its indemonstrability. Thus originates the *note* which he has inserted in his preface.¹ One sees in advance that he will abandon his standpoint a second time; he will show that external things are things-in-themselves. Really, the attack of Jacobi put Kant so beside himself that he let idealism fall with a word. "Idealism may be held to be, however, innocent (what it in fact is not) in respect to the essential aim of metaphysics, yet it ever remains a slander of philosophy and of common human reason to be obliged to take the existence of external things (from which we nevertheless receive the entire material of knowledge, even for our inner sense) merely on *faith*, and not to be able, if any one is inclined to doubt it, to confront him with satisfactory proof." He had, to be sure, already disproved idealism and cleared himself of the charge of it, but "certain obscurities" were found in the expressions of the proof which should now completely disappear. And this time the refutation of idealism takes such a form that we can no longer doubt that external things now figure as things-in-themselves; else also his disproof of Jacobi's philosophy of faith would be completely ineffectual.

We know that, according to the doctrine of Kant, all the material of our cognitions consists in our impressions or sensations, which we do not make, but receive—which are given to us—and, indeed, through things-in-themselves.² The new note now instructs us that it is the external things "from which we receive

¹ Kant: "Kritik d. r. Vernunft," preface to 2d ed. *Vid.* "Werke," vol. ii, pp. 31, 32.

² *Vid. supra*, Chap. I, Part III, Sec. II, on "The Thing-in-Itself."

the entire material of knowledge, even for our inner sense." Accordingly, external things figure as things-in-themselves.

According to the doctrine of Kant, *matter*, among all our objects of knowledge, is the only substance, since it is the only thing that persists; and as that which fills space, it is nothing other than external appearance or idea.¹ We are now told in the new note most expressly, and in italics, the diametrical opposite: "This persisting object, however, cannot be a perception in me, for all determining grounds of my being, which can be found in me, are ideas, and demand as such a persisting object distinct from them, in relation to which their change, and hence my existence in time, in which they change, can be determined." There is, accordingly, no doubt that in these passages, in order that all idealism be disproved, and the existence of external things demonstrated, matter must function as something independent of our ideas—*i. e.*, as a thing-in-itself.

It is likewise pointed out to us anew, that inner experience is dependent upon outer, and that the latter is dependent upon the existence of external things. For, the note continues, "To this the remark may still be added, that the idea of something *persisting* in existence is not tantamount to a *persisting idea*, since this may be very variable and inconstant, as all our ideas are—even those of matter—and yet it is related to something persistent, which must consequently be an external thing distinct from all my ideas," etc. The Kantian doctrine holds matter to be (1) the sole *persisting* object; and (2) a mere appearance or *idea*; it is accordingly the only *persisting idea*, and, as such, completely identical with the idea of something persistent in existence. If, now, this persisting something must be, as the new note declares, "an external thing, distinct from all my ideas," then matter is a thing-in-itself. And, if consistent, we shall now be obliged, in harmony with the "note," also to distinguish space and the idea of space, and to pronounce space an object wholly independent of and distinct from our idea of space—*i. e.*, a thing-in-itself, or the attribute of a thing-in-itself. And thus space becomes, once more, with Kant what it was with Descartes.

When thought is distinguished from the object of thought, as

¹ Cf. *supra*, Chap. IV, Part I.—1. "The Contradiction in the Critique of Reason."

was done by Kant in his disproof of idealism and in the "note," Transcendental idealism is surrendered, and, at the same time, the possibility of explaining the correspondence between idea and object—i. e., of explaining knowledge, and, as well, of understanding the "Critique of Reason." It was with this insight that Sigismund Beck declared such a distinction between thought and its object to imply a standpoint from which it was impossible to understand or rightly estimate the "Critique." For thought can only correspond with its object when its object also is thought. This point of view, which regards the object of thought, not as a thing independent of thought, but as its necessary product, Beck called "the only possible" one for comprehending and rightly appreciating the "Critique of Reason." From this point of view he wrote a commentary of Kant's work, and, indeed, as he expressly says on the title-page of his book, "*With Kant's Commendation.*" This is a very noteworthy fact, and one which must not be overlooked, when the question of the real teaching of Kant, and of passages that contradict it, is to be investigated and decided upon. Beck very well knew of the contradictions, but sought too lightly to explain them away, in permitting the philosopher to assume at times the language of dogmatism and the common consciousness for the sake of a pleasing intelligibility. He thinks that when Kant talks about the object of thought as a thing independent of thought, he speaks, say, as Copernicus might of the rising and setting of the sun; he simply speaks according to the common usage, without at all changing his standpoint. We find, however, that, in the passages we have examined, Kant exchanges his standpoint for that of the common consciousness, since he *teaches* that the existence of external things can be *demonstrated* in the sense in which such existence is denied by dogmatic idealism and presupposed by the common understanding.

Kant had shown the existence of external things in a manner perfectly consistent with Transcendental idealism, and, indeed, in such a way that the fact of the external world, as it appears to the common consciousness, was completely explained. He had pointed out that and why the existence of things external to us is *immediately* apparent to every human consciousness—a fact which would be impossible if external things were anything other than phenomena or ideas. "Now, all external objects

(bodies) are merely phenomena, hence nothing other than a sort of my ideas, the objects of which only have existence through these ideas, while apart from them they are nothing. *External things exist, therefore, just as well as I myself exist*, and both, in truth, on the *immediate* evidence of my self-consciousness, only with the difference that the idea of myself as the thinking subject is referred merely to the inner sense, while the ideas which designate extended beings are also referred to the outer sense. I am *just as little obliged to deduce* the actuality of external objects as the actuality of the objects of my inner sense (my thought); for they are on both sides nothing but ideas, the immediate perception (consciousness) of which is a sufficient proof of their actuality."¹ This lucid and highly significant declaration stands in the *first* edition of the "Critique of Reason"; in the second edition it is left out, and in the observations that take its place it is by no means compensated for by any equivalent statement, although, also here, at the close of the critique of rational psychology, it is noted that outer and inner objects "are distinguished from one another only so far as the one *appears* external to the other, and that which underlies the phenomenon of matter, as thing-in-itself, may perhaps not be so unlike in kind."² As if totally unconscious that he had already elucidated from the critical point of view the existence of the external world, and shown with transparent clearness that and why we are not obliged logically to *deduce* the actuality of external objects, Kant now gives in the second edition of the "Critique" a refutation of idealism in which the existence of external things is *sylogistically* proved. The syllogism runs, in brief, as follows: Our inner experience is dependent upon the outer; outer experience is dependent upon the existence of external things; therefore external things are independent of our inner experience, and are not mere ideas.

4. Review of Objections.

Emil Arnoldt has shown himself, by a series of instructive inquiries, such a thorough and scholarly critic of both the life¹ and

¹ Kant, "Kritik der reinen Vernunft" (1st ed.). "Critique of the Fourth Paralogism of Transcendental Psychology." (*Vid.* "Werke," vol. ii, p. 676.)

² *Ibid.* (2d ed.), "Conclusion of the Solution of the Psychological Problem," pp. 326, 327.

¹ By his recent biographical studies he has, among other things, shown, *for the first*

doctrines of Kant, that his investigations are deserving of the most careful attention. In his commendatory review of my work he has also brought forward the points in which he does not share my views. The most important among them concerns the contradiction stated to exist in the Kantian doctrine of knowledge. Respecting the character and fundamental import of Transcendental idealism we are agreed. Arnoldt, too, is "not disposed to explain away the philosophical difference between the two editions of the 'Critique of Reason.'" He grants that the second edition might give rise to a false conception of the Kantian doctrine, and indeed, as a matter of fact, has done so; and that the first edition, owing to the energetic and unambiguous manner in which it teaches the ideality of the material world, is to be preferred to the second. On the other hand, he contends that the difference between the two editions does not affect the *fundamental principles* of Kant's doctrine of knowledge, and that, in particular, the "Refutation of Idealism," which Kant developed in the second edition, is not inconsistent with Transcendental idealism. The rather, Kant here sought to show, as a refutation of Descartes only, that our inner experience is dependent upon and mediated by the outer; he had succeeded in proving it, and this constituted the special service rendered by his new "Refutation of Idealism."¹ I must oppose Arnoldt's pointed arguments for the following reasons: 1. Transcendental idealism teaches the full and direct immediacy of inner and outer experience. This doctrine is contradicted, when outer experience is regarded as the means and condition of the inner. Outer experience can not be such a condition, since it is itself also inner experience; it is a part or special and necessary sphere of inner experience. 2. To show that our inner experience is dependent upon and mediated by the outer was not the *end* of Kant's new "Refutation of Idealism," but merely a stadium of the

time beyond doubt, that Kant was *never* enrolled in the theological faculty, and that his pedagogical and social relations to the Count Kayserling's house in Rautenburg and Königsberg are to be determined according to family relations hitherto unknown. *Vid.* E. Arnoldt, "Kant's Jugend und die fünf ersten Jahre seiner Privatdocentur (Königsberg, 1882), pp. 26, and 54-57. I mention this incidentally, in order to correct my own exposition in reference to Kant's theological studies. *Vid.* Fischer, "Gesch. d. n. Philos.," vol. iii, p. 51. Cf. Pref., p. viii.

¹ E. Arnoldt, "Kant nach Kuno Fischer's neuer Darstellung" (Königsberg, 1882) pp. 31-42.

argument. The real end was to show the dependence of outer experience upon the *existence of external things*—i. e., to show that *external things are independent of our thought*. Then things external to us function as things-in-themselves; then phenomena are confounded with things-in-themselves; then Transcendental idealism and Kant's whole doctrine of knowledge are completely contradicted. This is the crucial point of the whole matter. I maintain, therefore, that the Transcendental idealism expounded in both editions of the "Critique," compared with the new "Refutation of Idealism," and the note to the preface of the second edition, is related to these latter positions, as A to non-A. In order to disprove this, one must consequently show that Kant has not denied throughout the first edition of the "Critique" that external things (bodies) are independent of our ideas, and that he has by no means affirmed and sought to demonstrate the same in the passages cited.

Arnoldt denies that there is a contradiction in the two editions, and seeks to graduate their difference. "The first shows with greater explicitness that bodies, but with less explicitness, that souls are phenomena; it approximates spiritualism. The second shows with greater explicitness that souls, but with less, that bodies are phenomena; it vindicates, as opposed to spiritualism, which it sets aside, the relative justification of materialism, which it likewise rejects." If one only knew in each case the degree of "the greater" and "the less explicitness!" For Kant declared with *all* explicitness, in the first edition of the "Critique," that bodies were mere phenomena, and denied with all explicitness, in both editions, that souls were phenomena or knowable objects at all.¹

In an excellent paper, evincing exact technical knowledge and a penetrating judgment, written upon my history of philosophy, and especially my work on Kant, Johann Witte has also touched upon the critical question with which we are at present occupied. He is of my opinion, that the "altered exposition of the second edition is *not* to be regarded as a change for the better," but denies that it contradicts the fundamental doctrine of the first edition, and would limit the difference of the two to the fact that "the second weakens the idealistic character of the first by *indis-*

¹ E. Arnoldt, "Kant nach Kuno Fischer's neuer Darstellung" (Königsberg, 1882), p. 32.

tinctness." I must object that this expression is too indefinite, and that Witte's further explanation is incorrect. What Kant seeks in the passages cited to show, as appears from both context and literal statement, is not, as Witte supposes, that external things are independent of subjective or individual thought, but of thought as such. Of that, the note appended to the preface of the second edition—which, in the intention of Kant, should confirm the "Refutation of Idealism" to be found in the text—does not leave the least doubt. Nor, indeed, does the "Refutation" itself, according to which "the perception of this persistence is only possible through a *thing* external to me, and not through the mere *idea* of such a thing." Now, Witte interprets "the perception of this persistence" as that "of my existence in time." This interpretation seems to me impossible for two reasons: because (1) "my existence in time" is not persistent, and because, (2) according to Kant's express teaching, no other existence, among all *knowable* objects, persists except *matter*. If Kant, as Witte holds, always understands under "thing" an "object thought," or the idea of a thing, then he in reality says in the above passage: "The perception of this persistence is only possible through a thing (*i. e.*, through the idea of a thing) external to me, and not through the mere idea of a thing external to me." It is evident that no sort of skilful exegesis can explain away the contradiction which I have pointed out and traced to its origin. And I ought certainly to be protected from the supposition, which surely would not be entertained by so acute and expert a critic as Witte, that any prepossession for the doctrine of another philosopher, as Hegel, has exerted the least influence upon my estimate of Kant.¹

It is always a thankworthy and profitable experience to receive the criticisms of thorough scholars, in order to be able either to correct one's own views, or, as I may have succeeded in doing in the present important question, to confirm them. But it is most disagreeable to be obliged to repel opponents who know nothing whatever of the matter in question, or of the method in which it is treated, yet who, with ignorant and over-confident loquacity, take part in the discussion, and affect to undertake a philippic,

¹ Joh. Witte, "Kuno Fischer's Behandlung der Geschichte der Philosophie und sein Verhältniss zur Kantphilologie." "Altpr. Monatsschr.," vol. xx, pp. 129-151, esp. pp. 145-148.

such as one of our weekly papers has granted an unknown writer against me.¹ Entirely objectively, as I am always accustomed to proceed, I investigate the contradiction between the two editions of the "Critique of Reason," which stands in question, and which affects the Kantian doctrine of knowledge. It is with this point—which an exposition of the Kantian philosophy cannot overlook—that we are here concerned, and not with my standpoint, nor with Fichte, nor Schelling, nor any one else. It indicates an uncommon amount of confusion, and a very deficient sense of truth, to confound things which have nothing whatever to do with one another, and to mix them up in a question in which they do not at all belong, and from which I myself kept them entirely distinct. But in this way, to be sure, the difficult task of investigation is avoided, and the barren toil of professional writing made much easier. The following sentences have nothing whatever to do with the matter: "It must be highly acceptable to every admirer of Kant that at length the great master of the history of philosophy begins to measure his strength with the master of philosophy in the matter of the real nature of knowledge." "With sadness the admirers of Kant have long beheld his most lucid expounder following the steps of a Fichte and a Schelling." "We regard it as important and necessary to enlighten our youth respecting the otherwise so great historian in the matter of the determinative fundamental truths, and to beg them to believe no teacher who maintains that Kant has really contradicted himself."² How touching and solicitous! It is to be hoped that our dear youth will hear his entreaties, and believe him rather than me, since he requests it so prettily. I have already shown, in an earlier section,³ that he does not know what Kant taught, since he makes him maintain, in reference to the thing-in-itself, the precise opposite of his authentic teaching.

It will suffice to point out, by a second striking illustration, what ignorance of the critical philosophy, and what complete incapacity for a comprehension of it, our anonymous critic exhibits with his empty bombastic phrases. Every one versed in the "Critique of Reason" knows that, and why, Kant regarded the

¹ "Die Grenzboten," No. 40 (1862); "Kant und Kuno Fischer," pp. 10-17.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 11 and 17.

³ Cf. *supra*, Chap. I, Part III.—2. "The Thing in Itself."

standpoints of transcendental idealism and empirical realism on the one hand, and those of transcendental realism and empirical idealism on the other, as necessarily belonging together; and that he united the first two in his doctrine, and claims to have disproved the other two, which belong to dogmatism. Transcendental idealism teaches the origin of our common phenomenal world; empirical realism teaches that there are, accordingly, no other objects of knowledge but phenomena, or sensible things. Therefore the two standpoints necessarily go together, and their names merely denote different sides of the same way of thinking. It is precisely the same with the other two. Transcendental realism teaches that things external to us are independent of our thought, or are things-in-themselves; empirical idealism teaches that precisely on that account we do not conceive external things immediately, but only mediately—i. e., by logical inference, and that therefore we can be less certain of their existence than of our own thought; or, what is the same thing, that the existence of our thinking being (soul) is alone certain, while the existence of external things is uncertain or doubtful. In other words, whoever is a transcendental realist must also be an empirical idealist. These two standpoints are not at variance with one another, but identical, and their names simply denote different sides of the same method of thought. If it is as the transcendental realist maintains respecting the existence of external things, then it must be as the empirical idealist teaches regarding our idea of things, and the certainty of their existence. The two points of view need no reconciliation, since they do not conflict with one another, but are complementary sides of the same thing, and together constitute the character of that dogmatic rationalism which was founded by Descartes, and overthrown by the critical investigations of Kant.¹ The matter stands so. And now the "Grenzboten" lets its philosopher announce the following nonsense, with that ridiculous emphasis which delights empty heads: "Kant exerted his *whole prodigious* power to *reconcile* the *contradiction* between empirical idealism and transcendental realism," etc. So Kant is (1) to have reconciled two standpoints which, according to his view, are completely *harmonious*; he is (2) to have reconciled two points

¹ Cf. Fischer, "Gesch. d. n. Philos.," vol. iii (3d ed.), pp. 450-456.

² "Die Grenzboten," No. 40 (1882), p. 16.

of view, both of which he *proved to be untenable*; and, in order to solve a contradiction which, according to his doctrine, is none, nor ever was one, he is (3) to have "exerted his prodigious power," and, too, the "whole" of it! It is impossible to utter more nonsense in fewer words. If our anonymous critic has anything further to beg of his readers, it is to be hoped that he will beg their pardon for his whole scribble, which is the most pitiable stuff ever written on Kant.

I come back to the result of my examination of the Kantian doctrine of knowledge, and must regard it as not invalidated. According to Kant's doctrine, things-in-themselves are to be distinguished from phenomena, hence also from things external to us, with the utmost precision, and every confusion of the two is to be most carefully guarded against. Notwithstanding, in the text and in the preface of the second edition of the "Critique of Reason," Kant has refuted idealism in such a way that things external to us are recognized as independent of our thought, hence as things-in-themselves, and consequently the latter are confounded with phenomena. It corresponds completely to the Kantian doctrine, both in its spirit and letter, to ascribe reality and causality to things-in-themselves. Yet it just as much contradicts this doctrine to attribute to them theoretical knowability (*empirical reality*) and *external* causality. They are the causes of our sensible impressions, or of the empirical material of our knowledge, but they are not external causes, since these are external things or phenomena, which originate from sensations, hence cannot create the latter. It is, accordingly, a radically false and inverted conception of the Kantian doctrine to regard it as holding things-in-themselves to be the *external* causes of our affections of sense. Such a conception is absolutely impossible with transcendental idealism, but with the later "Refutation of Idealism" it is not impossible—indeed, it is so far possible—that it soon became the customary one with Kantians of the ordinary sort. It is this view which Fichte, in his opposition to the Kantians, and later Schopenhauer, in his "Critique of the Kantian Philosophy," could not strongly enough condemn as anti-Kantian and contradictory. Fichte said: "So long as Kant did not expressly declare, *sensations are to be explained in philosophy from an externally present, in itself transcendental object*, so long I shall not believe what

these expounders tell us about Kant. But, if he makes this declaration, I shall sooner hold the "Critique of Pure Reason" to be the product of remarkable chance than that of a mind."¹ Yet it is just as false and inverted a view of the Kantian doctrine to hold that it denies all reality and causality whatever to things-in-themselves, since they cannot be the *external* causes of our sensations, and that it recognizes them as nothing further than mere inoperative notions. I have already shown in detail, both from the spirit and letter of the Kantian system, that our philosopher taught, and must have taught, the reality and causality of things-in-themselves, only this reality is not the empirical, and this causality not the sensible and external, but the supersensible and intelligible—namely, the causality of *will*. Is will and freedom, then, according to Kant, somehow not thing-in-itself, and at the same time reality and activity? The thing-in-itself is, according to Kant's explicit teaching, the cause of our sensations. The thing-in-itself is, according to Kant's explicit teaching, will. How can will be the cause of our sensations, of our sensibility, and of the constitution of our reason in general? *How?* This is the question. Kant regarded an answer to it as forever impossible. Schopenhauer saw in it the enigma of the world, which he sought to solve by his doctrine of the will. And to-day's organic history of development, which emanates from Darwin, employs, as appears from the intelligent way in which it grasps the relation of function and organ, this factor which Schopenhauer called the will to live.²

After I have shown that and why the Kantian philosophy maintains the reality and causality of things-in-themselves, it makes a singular impression upon me to read in a "prize-essay" on this philosophy: "Even Kuno Fischer is open to the charge of a mistaken interpretation of Kant, since he speaks of a reality of things-in-themselves." But as I see the author appeals for his support to the anonymous critic of the "Grenzboten," and himself informs his readers that, in the Kantian philosophy, "the thing-in-itself is always only the indistinct reflection of our understanding," I no

¹ J. G. Fichte, "Zweite Einleitung in die Wissenschaftslehre." *Vid.* "Werke," vol. i, p. 486.

² *Cf. supra*, Chap. I, Part III, 2, and Chap. III, Part I.

longer wonder at his "charge," but only at the awarder of his prize.¹

If Kant had not maintained the *being* of things-in-themselves independent of all ideas and phenomena, a man like Herbart, that pronounced opponent of all idealism and monism, would never have called himself a "Kantian," and have been convinced that "Kant possessed the true notion of being." He who had demonstrated the impossibility of the ontological proof for the existence of God, as Kant in the "Critique of Reason," was, in Herbart's view, "the man to overthrow the old metaphysics."²

(To be continued.)

HEGEL'S PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION.

INTRODUCTION COMPLETED.

TRANSLATED FROM THE GERMAN BY F. LOUIS GOLDAN.

This potential unity (an sich seyende Einheit), or, to express it more definitely, the human form of God, or His incarnation, is an essential element of religion, and must have its place in the determination of its object. In the Christian religion this determination is fully developed, but it is found also in lower religions, even in those where the manner in which the infinite appears united with the finite is, that the former is conceived as some individually present Being, as immediately present existence in the form of stars or animals. The other conception should also be mentioned here, in which God is represented as existing only momentarily in some human or other form of existence, whether He appears externally or manifests His presence internally through dreams or as the inner voice.

This is the phase of presupposed unity which is necessarily involved in the idea of God, so that the object of consciousness (i. e., God) may exhibit in its content the whole idea of religion, and be itself the totality. Each of the phases of the true Idea is

¹ K. Lasswitz, "Die Lehre Kant's von der Idealität des Raumes und der Zeit." *Vid.* his note on p. 132.

² Cf. *infra*, Chap. V, Part II, 2.

the same totality which is found in the whole. The determinations of the contents of the two phases are thus not different in themselves, but differ in form merely. The absolute object thus determines itself for consciousness as the totality in union with itself.

b. This totality exists also in the form of separation which constitutes another side of totality united in itself, and is in contrast with it. The component phases of the whole idea are here posited as separation or difference, or as abstractions. The first phase on the side of differentiation is that of potentiality or being-in-itself, of self-identity, of formlessness, of objectivity in general. This is **Matter**, which is indifferent, neutral existence. Form may become attached to it, but in such case it is as yet form in abstract potentiality. Then we call it **World**, which in relation to God appears as His Garment, vestment, form, or stands in contrast to Him.

The opposite of this phase of indifferent potentiality or being-in-itself is actuality, or being-for-itself—in other words, negativity or form in general. This negativity, in its first and indefinite form, appears as negativity in the world, while the latter itself is the positive, that which exists. The negation of this existence, of this self-consciousness, of being and stability, is the presence of evil in this world. In contrast to God, who is the harmonized union of potentiality and actuality (*des Ansichseins und Fuersichseins*), there appears differentiation. While the world is positive existence, there enter into it destruction and contradiction, and those questions arise which constitute part of every religion, whether its consciousness be more or less developed; one of these questions, for instance, is how the presence of evil can be reconciled with absolute unity of God, and how evil can originate. This negativity appears first as evil present in the world; but negativity is also found as returning into itself in the phase of self-identity, where it appears as the actualization (*das Fuersichsein*) of self-consciousness, or as finite spirit.

Negativity, when it thus returns into itself, becomes, in turn, something positive, since it thereby becomes simply self-related. As evil it appears entangled in positive existence. That self-existent negativity, however, which is for itself and not simply in the existence of something else, that which is self-reflecting, internal, infinite negativity having itself for its object, is simply the Ego.

In the self-consciousness of the latter and its inner movement appears finitude, and to it belongs the contradiction with one's self. Thus the disturbing element exists in it, in it the evil appears; this is the evil element in will.

c. Yet, I am free, and can abstract from all these [limitations]; this negativity and its rejection constitute my essence. The evil does not form the totality of the subject; the latter, on the contrary, has [the power of rising to] unity with itself, which forms the positive side (*i. e.*, goodness), the absoluteness and infinity of self-consciousness. The essential phase of the separateness of spirit consists in my ability to abstract from whatever is immediate or external. This separateness is exempt and free from time, change, and the vicissitudes of the course of this world, from evil and discord; this separateness, since it is the absoluteness of self-consciousness, is represented in the thought of the immortality of the soul. This implies, in the first place, most pointedly, the determination of perpetuity in time. This elevation above the power and the vicissitudes of change is represented as belonging to spirit inherently, and not merely as the result of reconciliation. Thus the second determination is added, that the self-consciousness of spirit is an eternal, absolute phase of eternal life, in which it is removed above time (which is the abstraction of change) and above diremption (which is the objective element in change) as soon as it has been received into that unity and conciliation which are presupposed to exist inherently and originally in the object of consciousness.

II. *Differentiation (Urtheil), or Determinate Religion.*

While in the first part we have considered religion in its idea and have discussed its simple idea as well as the determination of its content, the universal, we now must proceed beyond this sphere of universality and enter upon that of determination. The idea as such is not yet unfolded; it still contains its determinations or phases implicitly [as possibilities]; they have not yet become explicit or actual; they have not yet risen to the claim of differences or distinctions. This they can attain only through completed differentiation. Not until God, the idea, differentiates and the category of determination arises, shall we meet with exist-

ing religion, which is at the same time determinately existing religion.

The movement from the abstract to the concrete is based on our method, on the idea, but not for the reason that the latter has much of a special content. Our doctrine adopts this basis for an entirely different reason. Spirit, to which absolute and highest being must be attributed, exists as activity only; in other words, it exists only in as far as it posits itself, as it actualizes (*fuer sich ist*) and creates itself. In this self-activity, however, it acts knowingly, and, whatever it is, it is as a knowing principle. Thus it is essential to religion not merely to exist in its idea, but to be the consciousness of what the idea is. The material in which the idea, like a plan, realizes itself, which it makes its own, and shapes in accordance with itself, is the human consciousness. In a similar way (to quote an analogous example), Right has existence only in as far as it exists in spirit and occupies human will, or in as far as man knows it as a determination of his will. Thus the idea here realizes itself, whereas in the preceding, immediate stage it was posited only as the form of the idea.

Spirit is not at all immediate; only natural objects are immediate and retain such form of being. The existence of spirit is not immediate in that sense; it is self-creative; it makes itself for itself by negating its own subjectivity. Otherwise it would be substance only. The return of spirit back into itself is a movement, an activity, and is its own self-mediation.

A stone is immediate; it is a settled and finished fact. But whatever is living shows activity. The first existence of the plant involves the activity of the germ; it must develop out of it and create itself. In the end the development of the plant is summed up in the seed; the beginning of the plant is thus at the same time its last product. Similarly, man is a child in the first place, and, like all natural things, he must complete this round and create another existence.

In the plant there are two individuals; the seed in which it begins its life is another than that which forms the completion of its existence and into which it develops in its maturity. Since spirit is always life and animation, it is its nature to exist, in the first place, in itself [*an sich*—i. e., intrinsically or potentially] or in its idea. Its second stage is, that it steps out of itself into

[external or extrinsic] existence; it unfolds and creates itself, it ripens and creates the idea of itself as potential, or intrinsic. The actualized idea thus corresponds to that which was potential or intrinsic. The child is not yet rational man; it has possibilities, potentialities only; it is merely potential reason, potential spirit. It is only through his education or development that he becomes spirit [actually].

This, then, is the meaning of the expression "to determine one's self": namely, to step forth into existence, [to appear in] existence for another, to bring out its phases through differentiation, or to unfold itself. These differences are no other determinations than those which the concept itself contains.

The unfolding of these differences, and the tendencies which result therefrom, form the road along which spirit moves in order to arrive at itself; [for] spirit is its own goal and aim. Its absolute aim is to know and grasp itself, to become its own object in its potentiality, and to attain a perfect cognition of itself; in this aim alone spirit finds its true being. This process and course of self-creative spirit contains diverse phases; but the road is not yet the goal or aim. Spirit does not attain the latter before having run to the end of the road; it does not find itself near the goal, to begin with. Even what is most perfect must run its course to the goal in order to attain it. In the midway stations of this process, spirit is not yet perfect. It does not yet possess true self-knowledge or self-consciousness, nor has it become manifest or revealed to itself. Since spirit is essentially this activity of self-evolution, it follows that there must be midway stations or stages of its consciousness; the latter does not rise for the time being above the relative height of the stage which it has reached. These stages form the [various] determinate religions. There religion is consciousness of the universal spirit which is not yet absolute and for-itself. The consciousness of spirit on each of these stages is its determinate consciousness of itself, and constitutes the course of the education of the spirit. Thus we shall have to consider determinate religion, which is necessarily imperfect, since it is merely a stage or station in the course of spirit.

The various forms or determinations of religion are in one respect phases of religion in general; that is to say, of perfect

religion. But they have also an independent aspect, since it is in them that religion has developed in time or historically.

Religion, in so far as it is determinate, and has not yet moved through the circle of its determinateness, and is still finite religion, and exists as such, is historical religion, which forms a special aspect of religion.

Whatever has been determined by the idea exists by necessity, and religions and their mode of succession did not originate in accident. It is spirit which rules [the world] from within, and it is foolish to see nothing in this, in the manner of the historians, but accident or contingency.

The essential phases of the idea of religion become apparent on every stage of its existence; the difference of these phases from the true form of the idea lies in the fact that they are not yet posited in the totality of the idea. The [various] determinate religions are, indeed, not our religion, but they are nevertheless contained in ours because they are essential although subordinate phases, which are necessary parts of universal truth. In these religions, we are not dealing with what is foreign and strange, but with what is ours, and the cognition that such is the case is the conciliation of true religion with false religion. Thus, on the lower stages of development, the phases of the religious idea appear as forebodings or superstitions, which grow by accident like the flowers and other forms of nature. And yet, the prevailing determination [or characteristic] of these stages is the determination of the idea itself, which cannot be lacking or be omitted on any of the stages. The thought of incarnation, for instance, is found in every religion. The substantial elements of all ethical relations—as property, marriage, the defence of ruler and state, the last decision (ultimately based on subjectivity) as to what is due to the public good—all these elements exist in the undeveloped state of society as well as in the fully developed one; but the determinate form of these substantial elements differs according to the advancement of social growth. The main point here is, that the idea be truly known in its totality; according as such knowledge exists more or less perfectly the stage of religious spirit is high or low, rich or poor. Spirit may embrace something as its property or possession, without having a developed consciousness of it. Spirit *has* or *owns* its immediate, peculiar nature, its

physical, organic existence, but it does not *know* them in their determinateness and truth; it has but a vague, general idea of them. Men live within the state; they themselves are its life, activity, and reality; but for all that there may be no consciousness, no positing of what the state really is. It is the characteristic of the perfect state that whatever it involves potentially, or whatever is contained in the idea of the state, has been realized and developed in the form of rights, duties, and laws. In a similar way, the determinate religions contain the phases of the idea in the shape of intuitions, feelings, or similar immediate forms, while the consciousness of these phases has not yet been developed; leastwise, these phases have not yet been elevated to determinations of the absolute object, and God has not been represented under these determinations of the totality of the religious idea.

The determinate religions of the various peoples show us often enough, indeed, the most distorted and whimsical caricature of a conception of the Divine Being—of the duties and modes of worship or cultus. But it will not do to dispose of these views lightly, and to look upon these religious representations and rites as superstition, error, and fraud, or to see nothing in them except that they originate in piety and must therefore be admitted to be pious acts, no matter what their character is otherwise. Nor shall we find any satisfaction in the compilation or elaboration of the external and phenomenal details. We feel the higher need of cognizing [in these phenomena] their meaning and truth—their connection with the true; in short, the rational principle in them. Those that established these religions were human beings, and for this reason there must be reason in them; in all contingency there must be a higher necessity. This acknowledgment is but an act of justice to those religions, for what is human and rational in them is ours as well, even if for our higher consciousness it should seem but a single phase. To understand the history of religion in this sense involves a reconciliation with what is horrible, terrible, or absurd in lower religions, and a justification of it. This does not mean at all that we are to look upon these as right or true, as found in their original form. By no means. Nevertheless, we may recognize something human in the beginning or source from which they emanated. Therein lies the conciliation with this whole

topic, the conciliation which completes itself in the idea. The religions, as they follow upon each other, are determined by the idea; their determination is therefore not an external one, but brought about through the nature of spirit, which enters the world, self-impelled, in order to attain the consciousness of itself. The contemplation of these religions, according to the idea, is therefore the purely philosophical contemplation of that which is. Philosophy never considers what is not; it never deals with what is impotent and unable to give to itself real existence.

In the development itself, since it is a process and has not yet reached its end and goal, the phases of the idea are still separate and extrinsic to each other, and therefore the reality has not yet become adequate to the idea; the finite religions form the historical phenomena or manifestations of these phases. In order to understand such religions in the light of these truths, they must be considered in two aspects: first, in regard to the manner in which God is conceived, and, secondly, how the subject, through this conception, knows himself. The further determination of these two sides rests on the same basis, and the same determinateness extends through both. The conception which man has of God corresponds to that which he has of himself and of his freedom. If he knows himself in God, he knows also his imperishable life in Him; he knows the truth of his own being, and the idea of the immortality of the soul enters with this as an essential element into the history of religion. The concepts of God and of the immortality of the soul stand in a necessary relation to each other; when man has a true knowledge of God, he has also a true knowledge of himself: both sides correspond to each other. God is, in the beginning, an indefinite principle; in the course of development there is formed, more or less clearly, the consciousness of what God really is, and there is a corresponding growth of real self-consciousness. To the sphere of this development belong also the proofs for the existence of God, which have for their object the exposition of the necessary elevation to him. The diversity of determinations which are ascribed to God in this elevation is involved at the outset in the difference of the points of departure, and this difference again finds its basis in the nature of each of those historical stages of self-consciousness. The various forms of this elevation will show in each case the metaphysical spirit of the

respective stage, with which the real conception of God and the sphere of worship or cultus will correspond.

As a preliminary step, we shall attempt a classification of this stage of determinate religion; the basis of it will be the mode of Divine manifestation, or phenomenality. God is phenomenon, but he is not phenomenon in general; He determines himself as spirit and becomes phenomenon to Himself. In other words, He is not object in general, but object to Himself.

1. Phenomenality in general, or abstract phenomenality, is the same as naturalness in general. Phenomenality means: being for another, the externality of elements that are different from each other, an immediate and not yet self-reflected externality. This logical determination, which is here taken in its concrete meaning, is naturalness. Whatever exists for another is for this very reason a sensuous mode of existence. Even thought, when it is posited for another thought of an alien existence (that is to say, another thought which compared with the first is an independent subject), can be communicated to the latter only by the sensuous medium of gesture, speech, or some such physical mediation.

But, since God is essentially only His own phenomenon, the abstract relation of man to nature does not belong to religion; in religion the natural is but a phase of the divine, and when it exists for religious consciousness, it must necessarily possess the determination of a spiritual mode. It does not remain in its pure natural element, but receives the determination of the divine which dwells in it. Thus it can not be said of any religion that men pray to the sun, the sea, or to nature. When men pray to these, they are then no longer the every-day things which they are for us. While these objects are divine for their worshippers, they are still natural; but since they are also objects of religion, they are at the same time conceived in a spiritual manner. The contemplation of the sun, of the stars, as of mere natural phenomena, lies outside of the domain of religion. The so-called prosaic or every-day view of nature, which common-sense consciousness has, is a later distinction; to make its rise possible, deeper and more fundamental reflection was necessary. Not until spirit has posited itself independently for itself, as free from nature, can the latter appear to it as object and as external.

The first mode of manifestation or phenomenality—namely,

naturalness—has therefore for its central point subjectivity, or the spirituality of God in general. These two determinations have not yet entered into any relationship with each other through reflection. This relationship begins in our second division.

2. God in himself is spirit; this is our idea of God. For the same reason He must be posited as spirit—*i. e.*, the manner of His manifestation or His phenomenality must be spiritual in itself, and consequently be the negation of the natural. This makes it necessary that its determinateness (which is that side of the idea which we call reality) be identical with the idea; the relation of reality to the divine Idea is completed when spirit is spirit; that is to say, when both the idea and the reality are spirit. In the first place, we shall see that naturalness constitutes that determination of the idea of God which we have called the side of reality in the idea. The rise of spirituality, or subjectivity, out of naturalness appears first as a struggle between the two sides which, while struggling, are still involved in each other. This is the reason why also this second stage of determinate religion remains in the sphere of naturalness; it forms, together with the preceding one, the stage of natural religion.

While still within the course and process of determinate religion, the movement of spirit makes the attempt to render the determinateness adequate to the idea; this determinateness, nevertheless, appears as yet abstract on that stage, and the idea is as yet finite. These attempts, in which the principle of the preceding stages, the Essence, tries to comprehend itself within infinite inwardness, may be enumerated as follows: 1. The Jewish religion; 2, the Greek religion; and 3, the Roman religion. The Jewish God is the unique Being which remains an abstract unity not yet concrete in itself. This God is, indeed, God in spirit, but not yet as spirit; He is that non-sensuous abstraction of thought which lacks as yet the content by which it becomes spirit. The freedom into which the idea tries to develop itself in the Greek religion still stands under the rule of the necessity of [its] essence, and the idea, as it appears and strives after independence in the Roman religion, is as yet limited, since it is related to a confronting externality, in which it is to exist objectively only; it is therefore external utility (*aeusserliche Zweckmaessigkeit*).

These are the principal determinations which appear here as

modes of the reality of spirit. Since they are determinations they are not adequate to the idea of spirit, and are finitudes only; in this we must include also the infinite [thought] that there is One God, for this is here [merely] an abstract affirmation. If we were to look upon this determination of the phenomenality of God in our consciousness (where it appears as the pure ideality of the One and the concord of the multiplicity of external phenomena) as the true religion, and contrast it as such with natural religion, we should find that the former is but one single determination compared with the totality of the idea of spirit. It is as little adequate to this totality as its opposite is. These determinate religions are not yet the true religion, and in them God is not yet known in His truth, because the absolute content of spirit is lacking therein.

III. *Manifest or Revealed Religion.*

Manifestation, development, and determination do not continue to infinity, nor do they discontinue by accident. The true course consists in this: that the reflection of the idea in itself is interrupted by its own real return movement. Thus the phenomenon itself becomes an infinite one, the content becomes adequate to the idea of spirit, and the phenomenon becomes like the spirit in-and-for-itself. The idea of religion becomes objective for itself in [actual] religion. Spirit, when it has once realized its potentiality, deals in its further development no longer with the single forms and determinations of itself as spirit; it knows itself no longer in determinateness or limitation; it has conquered limitation and finitude, and is now actually and for itself what it was potentially and in itself. That spirit in its actuality should know itself as it is potentially, constitutes the potentiality and actuality (*das An- und Fuersichsein*) of knowing spirit; it is the perfect, absolute religion in which it becomes manifest what spirit or God is; this is the Christian religion. It is necessarily implied in the idea of religion that spirit must run its course in religion as in everything else; it is spirit only because it exists for itself as the negation of all finite forms and as absolute ideality.

I have representations and perceptions, a certain content, for instance, this house, etc. They are my percepts, representations within myself. I could not have these representations if I could

not comprehend this content within myself and posit it within me in a simple, ideal manner. The meaning of Ideality is, that we cancel external existence, space, time, materialness, externality; in the fact that I know them, they are no longer representations extrinsic to each other. They are comprised within myself in a simple manner.

Spirit is knowing; but, in order that it may be knowing, it is necessary that the content of that which it knows should have attained this ideal form (and in this manner have become negated); whatever spirit is, must in this way have become its own. Spirit must have moved through this circle, and it is necessary that those forms, determinations, and finitudes should have existed in order that it may make them its own.

This, then, is the road and the goal; spirit must attain its own idea, that which it is, potentially or in itself. It attains it only in the manner whose abstract phases have here been outlined. The revealed religion is also the manifest religion, because in it God has become manifest most completely. Here everything is adequate to the idea; there is nothing that remains secret in God. We find here the consciousness of the developed idea of the spirit of reconciliation—not in the form of beauty, or serenity, but in spirit. Religion was at first veiled and did not exist in its truth; but manifest religion arrived in due time. This was not a contingent time, dependent on arbitrariness or caprice; it was a time fixed in the eternal, essential counsel of God—that is to say, of eternal Reason or of God's wisdom. The idea of the thing itself, the divine idea, the idea of God himself, has determined itself in this development and has given to it time and goal.

This course of religion is the true Theodicy; it exhibits all the creations of spirit and every form of its self-cognition in their necessity—a necessity which is based on the reason that spirit is ever living and active, and that it is the impulse which seeks to penetrate through the series of its phenomena to the attainment of the consciousness of itself, which is the sum of truth.

LADY MACBETH: A PSYCHOLOGICAL SKETCH.

BY ROBERT MUNRO.

Timanthes, in the celebrated picture of the sacrifice of Iphigenia, asserted the skill of his art by veiling, instead of trying to depict in its inexpressible anguish, the face of Agamemnon, the father of the victim. What was not expressed was left to the imagination to portray, and, in every case, he who had any imagination at all would fill in such details as no painter could transfer to canvas.

It is something after the same fashion that Timanthes moved men more than twenty-two centuries ago that Shakespeare creates for Lady Macbeth such an interest and strange fascination. She does not often appear on the scene, and when she does she is invariably veiled. Excepting the few moments when, like a spectre, she flits before us in her night-vigil, she has on the mask, and it is not she we see, but her evil counterpart—that other self which the most of us, instead of showing to the world, seek to hide from its too curious gaze.

When we are first permitted to make the acquaintance of Lady Macbeth she is resident in her castle at Inverness. The best tradition—and there seems to be some foundation for it in scattered references in the play—speaks of her as being “fair, feminine, nay, perhaps, even fragile.” (Mrs. Siddons.) She was certainly no tall, muscular, Highland Amazon, as is vulgarly supposed, but she belonged to the true Celtic type of woman; she had a quick mind, a strong will, and a form beautiful as it was instinct with grace and animation. No wonder should her husband, the rough soldier, love her, and that, after his own way, tenderly to the last.

On our introduction to her she is alone, and has a letter in her hand. It is a message from Macbeth, in which he eagerly relates his meeting with the witches, and the supernatural sanction they seemed to give to his unhallowed ambition, as “the king that shall be.” But, to me, the most significant part of it is the closing sentence, in which, after rehearsing his story, he says: “This have I thought good to deliver thee, my dearest partner of greatness, that thou mightest not lose the dues of rejoicing by being ignorant of what greatness is promised thee. Lay it to thy heart, and fare-

well." Strong man, and full of courage as he was, he yet shuddered when brought face to face with "the swelling act" he knew must be done in order to the attainment of his hopes; and it was to her, as a last stay, he looked for inspiration and "a spur to prick the sides of his intent." *Lay it to thy heart*: little need had he for saying that. His ambition was already hers, and had burned itself into her very soul. She had looked at the matter in every aspect of it, and did not shrink from contemplating the way that must ultimately be travelled—the way of blood—that she might share with her lord the crown of Duncan.

We may be sure it was not all at once, or without a struggle, that she arrived at this terrible resolution. There is the agony of inward conflict as well as the notes of high decision in the awful invocation:

"Come, you spirits
That tend on mortal thoughts, unsex me here,
And fill me, from the crown to the toe, topful
Of direst cruelty! Make thick my blood,
Stop up the access and passage of remorse;
That no compunctious visitings of nature
Shake my fell purpose, nor keep peace
Between the effect and it! Come to my woman's breasts,
And take my milk for gall, you murdering ministers,
Wherever in your sightless substances
You wait on nature's mischief! Come, thick night,
And pall thee in the dunkest smoke of hell!
That my keen knife see not the wound it makes,
Nor heaven peep through the blanket of the dark,
To cry, 'Hold, hold!'"

Thus dominated by the same master thought, when they at length met, it was she who was the first to allude to the matter, as if she doubted his force of purpose, and wished at the outset to throw the whole weight of her influence into the opposite scale. With rare psychologic insight she read his soul as if it had been an open book. She knew his strength and weakness, his hopes and fears, and with a skill that is almost demoniac, and too horrible to conceive as existing in woman, the weaker vessel and ministering angel, she played upon his nature with as much ease as if she were fingering the strings of her native harp. It was, how-

ever, that last touch of hers that taunted him with cowardice that made him her slave, not only in thought—for he was that already—but in deed as well. He was a genuine Celt, to whom reputation for bravery was dearer than conscience, dearer even than life itself; and so he was goaded and lashed by the “valor” of his wife’s tongue into the doing of an act from which his soul otherwise utterly recoiled.

It is sometimes asserted that when a woman is bad she is ten times more a child of Satan than the most abandoned of men; but, though history records cruel enough things against her, the accusation is certainly not true. She, no doubt, “feels the future in the instant,” and acts not so much from calculation as from the instinct or emotion strongest for the moment; yet for all that she is so constituted as to lack the muscular and nerve power needed for being such a great and persistent criminal as her brother man. Her intentions may be equally bad, perhaps even more subtle and diabolic, still she cannot carry them through as he can. The case of Lady Macbeth, which—fictitious though it be—is often adduced as an illustration of the depths to which woman can sink, really proves nothing, for, in the hour of decision, when she tried to do the deed she ignominiously failed. But, besides this, there are elements in her supposed history which put her entirely out of the reckoning. In her opening speeches we can trace signs of that confusion of thought and moral conception that are, according to modern medical psychologists, the surest preludes to the awful malady with which, we know, she was afterward afflicted; and we may infer it was with the design of indicating that tendency she was represented at the outset as acting the extravagant part she did. Brooding too long over one idea, and being thrown too much on her own company, it was clearly the intention of Shakespeare to represent her, from the very first, in the attitude of one suffering from the effects of an ever-increasing monomania.

The deed, preceded by such conflict and passion, had at length been accomplished; and, in its turn, it became the starting-point for a new development in the character of each.

Macbeth had qualities which might, under other circumstances, have developed into a better life. He was a brave man, loved by his soldiers and trusted by his king; he was not insensible to kindness; he shuddered at the thought of violating the rites of hos-

pitality; and, above all, he had strong affection for his wife. But, in the step he took in murdering his kinsman and guest, he seemed to have put between himself and the possibility of better things a chasm which could not be crossed. From that day he began to drift away from all that was good. The evil of his heart became unreined, and it hurried him madly on in the dark pathway which now opened before him. Even as highly excitable persons often maintain a strangely impassive calmness when surrounded by the bustle of activity, so he sought, by heaping crime upon crime, not only to make sure his own position, but, by stifling every movement of what was noblest in his nature, to bring a kind of transient peace to his troubled spirit.

With Lady Macbeth it was far otherwise. She had no way of escaping from her own thoughts, no way of plunging into such a course of action as might help to keep away the remembrance of the past or to relieve the present. It was hers to suffer silently and alone. She had obtained the object of her desires, but it was, in the attainment of it, turned into fire and ashes on her lips. The crown was placed on her head, but it weighed upon her heavier than lead. Among all her gettings there were some things she did not count upon, and of these were remorse and its black train of crushing years.

When the crime was being enacted she spoke lightly of it :

“The sleeping and the dead
Are but as pictures; 'tis the eye of childhood
That fears a painted devil.”
“A little water clears us of this deed ;
How easy is it then !”

But see her now in her night perambulations—a very picture of woe—wringing her hands in anguish because the blood-spots will not out, and sighing her very heart away because “all the perfumes of Arabia will not sweeten her little hand.” She turns and looks, but she does not see, for, though her eyes are open their sense is shut; and it is an indescribably sorrowful face that meets ours—more sorrowful by far than that of Guido’s “Beatrice Cenci”—for it is the face of one upon whom the shadows of despair are lengthening out; and the darkness more to be dreaded still, the extinction of reason itself, is fast settling.

Signor Salvini objects to the walking scene being assigned to Lady Macbeth, and hints that originally it must have been intended for Macbeth, though afterward given to Lady Macbeth, possibly enough, at the request of some charming actress who did not find her part otherwise sufficiently important. The reason he adduces for this view is the necessity why Shakespeare should maintain the individuality of his personifications; up till now it was *he*, not *she*, who betrayed signs of weakness and remorse ("Impressions of Some Shakespearean Characters," by Tommaso Salvini).

It is strange that Salvini, one of the noblest scenic interpreters of our great dramatist, should have fallen into this mistake. Apart altogether from the incongruity of representing the brawny chieftain stalking about the stage in "the trappings and suits" of night, there is another reason—the psychological one—why this part should have been acted by Lady Macbeth. Macbeth had already, by his career of evil, paid the immediate debt of nature, and given play to his feelings even to the point of weariness; and there need be no doubt that, like many another criminal, he slept as soundly as if Innocence descended nightly to close his eyelids, and the angels of purity hovered around to defend him as he slept. But she had no outlet at all for the misery that was gnawing at her heart. She had to bear it in all its secret reality; and, as long as she could, she bore it with wonderful fortitude. She even tried to be cheerful and unconcerned, while all the time her heart was breaking, and her mind tortured past endurance. But she could not long hope to maintain this enforced cheerfulness; for nature, if prevented from having its normal course, will, like water that is damned, force its way through some other channel. Its "compunctious visitings" may be repelled for a season, but it is only that they may come again upon the soul with redoubled energy. So much is this the case that were there no walking-scene for Lady Macbeth, no representation of her as bowed under the weight of her woes, she would have been no woman, but a demon incarnate—worse than the weird sisters and a rival in wickedness of Hecate herself. It is only when she is asleep, when the will is bound, and the senses closed to all but the soul's dominant thought, that the mask is laid aside, and we see her for what she is—a veritable woman—our sister—for whom, as much as we may detest her crimes, we can still cherish feelings of pity and compassion.

Instead of there being a break in the life-development of *Lady Macbeth*, there is a marvellous consistency in all the parts of it. This is the more remarkable when we remember that little or nothing was known in Shakespeare's day of the physiological and mental conditions under which it is supposed to grow. As to somnambulism, the most incredible views were held. By some it was regarded as a prophetic or ecstatic state in which the subjects of it were believed to be under the influence of angels, and gifted with a true power of divination. Others, again, found a conclusive explanation of its origin in the imperfect performance of the baptismal ceremony. This is why, in that age, somnambulists were frequently called "the ill-baptized." Ideas equally crude and indefinite were current as to mental disease. Even Theophrastes Paracelsus (1493-1541), who has been so much extolled as the founder of modern Medical Psychology, could speak about insanity with less real knowledge than falls to the lot of any ordinarily intelligent reader of the present day. "That man," said he, "is sick in mind in whom the mortal and immortal, the sane and insane spirit do not appear in due proportion and strength." His method of cure was equally explicit: "What avails in mania except opening a vein? Then the patient will recover; this is the arcanum; not camphor, not sage and marjoram, not clysters, not this or that, but phlebotomy."

There is nothing of this unscientific vagueness in Shakespeare. With a knowledge of psychology which was far in advance of his time and which may be said to have anticipated the most recent findings, he always speaks of the abnormal conditions of mind with marvellous accuracy. The outlines of his picture of *Lady Macbeth* might, for that part of it, have been sketched by a Mandsley, or a Morel, or any nineteenth-century specialist. There is, first, the intellectual and moral disturbance, then the crime and the consequent depression, finding, by and by, expression in somnambulism—which is, in the words of Baron Feuchtersleben, "sometimes a precursor of dangerous neuroses, as of epilepsy, catalepsy, and the like"—and there is, lastly, the "mind diseased"—the permanent "sorrows" and "troubles of the brain" and heart—to which no medicinal balm or "purgative drug" can minister any deliverance.

The end of this weirdest creation of the poet's imagination is

alike touching and tragic, as it is in keeping with all that went before it. To Macbeth, life, though it had more than its meed of evil, was a thing to be desired, and he died bravely fighting in its defence. With Lady Macbeth, however, life was not outward but inward, not a thing of pleasure but a weariness and an intolerable burden, from which there was no hope of escape, and so she raised an unfriendly hand against it.

It is a fancy, but I cannot help thinking it was when asleep and in her night-vigil she did the deed. Dr. E. Mesnet relates (*"Archives générales de médecine,"* 1860, vol. xv) that he was witness to an attempt at suicide begun in one and continued in the other of two consecutive attacks of somnambulism. And so it may have been here. Life has its nightly side as well as the side that is to the day; and there was a kind of fitness in her case it should have been then. She who, when awake, restrained her will with such indomitable power, had, at last, when pressed by the shadows and the suggestions of the night, to yield, and throw off forever the mask she had worn so long.

LETTERS ON FAUST.¹

BY H. C. BROCKMEYER.

I.

Contents: Distinction between subjective criticism and objective criticism, the former stating merely the relation of the work criticised to the critic's feelings; the dangers of subjective criticisms of this kind; defects of criticisms based on biography; based on gossip; literary dish-water; the objective criticism that investigates the idea of the poem and sees the parts in relation to the whole.

DEAR H.—Yours of a recent date, requesting an epistolary criticism of "Goethe's Faust," has come to hand, and I hasten to

¹ The first nine of these letters are reprinted here from Volumes I and II of this Journal, where they appeared in 1867-'68. Having recently received Letters X to XX from the author, completing the series by a discussion of the Second Part of Faust, we have decided to reprint the first series in order to bring together, for the present readers of the Journal, this remarkable contribution to literary criticism. We have added to each letter an index to its contents.—EDITOR.

assure you of a compliance of some sort. I say a compliance of some sort, for I cannot promise you a criticism. This, it seems to me, would be both too little and too much; too little if understood in the ordinary sense, as meaning a mere statement of the *relation* existing between the work and myself; too much if interpreted as pledging an expression of a work of the creative imagination, as a totality, in the terms of the understanding, and submitting the result to the canons of art.

The former procedure, usually called criticism, reduced to its simplest forms, amounts to this: that I, the critic, report to you that I was amused or bored, flattered or satirized, elevated or degraded, humanized or brutalized, enlightened or mystified, pleased or displeased, by the work under consideration; and—since it depends quite as much upon my own humor, native ability, and culture acquired, which set of adjectives I may be able to report, as it does upon the work—I cannot perceive what earthly profit such a labor could be to you. For that which is clear to you may be dark to me; hence, if I report that a given work is a “perfect riddle to me,” you will only smile at my simplicity. Again, that which amuses me may bore you, for I notice that even at the theatre some will yawn with *ennui* while others thrill with delight and applaud the play. Now, if each of these should tell you how *he* liked the performance, the one would say “excellent,” and the other “miserable,” and you be none the wiser. To expect, therefore, that I intend to enter upon a labor of this kind, is to expect too little.

Besides, such an undertaking seems to me not without its peculiar danger; for it may happen that the work measures or criticises the critic, instead of the latter the former. If, for example, I should tell you that the integral and differential calculus is all fog to me—mystifies me completely—you would conclude my knowledge of mathematics to be rather imperfect, and thus use my own report of that work as a sounding-lead to ascertain the depth of my attainment. Nay, you might even go further, and regard the work as a kind of Doomsday Book, on the title-page of which I had “written myself down an ass.” Now, as I am not ambitious of a memorial of this kind, especially when there is no probability that the pages in contemplation—Goethe’s Faust—will perish any sooner than the veritable Doomsday Book itself,

I request you, as a special favor, not to understand of me that I propose engaging in any undertaking of this sort.¹

Nor are you to expect an inquiry into the quantity or quality of the author's food, drink, or raiment. For the present infantile state of analytic science refuses all aid in tracing such *primary* elements, so to speak, in the composition of the poem before us; and hence such an investigation would lead, at best, to very secondary and remote conclusions. Nor shall we be permitted to explore the likes and dislikes of the poet, in that fine volume of scandal, for the kindred reason that neither crucible, reagent, nor retort are at hand which can be of the remotest service.

By the by, has it never occurred to you, when perusing works of the kind last referred to, what a glowing picture the pious Dean of St. Patrick's, the *saintly Swift*, has bequeathed to us of their producers, when he places the great authors, the historical Gullivers of our race, in all their majesty of form, astride the public thoroughfare of a Liliputian age, and marches the inhabitants, in solid battalions, through between their legs? you recollect what he says?

Nor yet are you to expect a treat of that most delightful of all compounds, the table-talk and conversation—or, to use a homely phrase, the *literary dishwater* retailed by the author's scullion. To expect such, or the like, would be to expect too little.

On the other hand, to expect that I shall send you an expression, in the terms of the understanding, of a work of the creative imagination, as a totality, and submit the result to the canons of art, is to expect too much. For while I am ready, and while I intend to comply with the first part of this proposition, I am unable to fulfil the requirement of the latter part—that is, I am not able to submit the result to the canons of art. The reason for this inability it is not necessary to develop in this connection any

¹ In this connection, permit me, dear friend, to mention a discovery which I made concerning my son Isaac, now three years old. Just imagine my surprise when I found that every book in my possession—Webster's Spelling-book not excepted—is a perfect riddle to him, and mystifies him as completely as ever the works of Goethe, Hegel, Emerson, or any other thinking man, do or did the learned critics. But my parental pride, so much elated by the discovery of this remarkable precocity in my son—a precocity which, at the age of three years (!), shows him possessed of all the incapacity of such "learned men"—was shocked, nay, mortified, by the utter want of appreciation which the little fellow showed of this, his exalted condition!

further than merely to mention that I find it extremely inconvenient to lay my hand upon the aforementioned canons just at this time.

I must, therefore, content myself with the endeavor to summon before you the *Idea* which creates the poem—each act, scene, and verse—so that we may see the part in its relation to the whole, and the whole in its concrete, organic articulation. If we succeed in this, then we may say that we *comprehend* the work—a condition precedent alike to the beneficial enjoyment and the rational judgment of the same.

II.

Contents: The author can not avoid the use of general philosophical terms in treating of this poem; "the beautiful world," an expression used by the poet, is itself a term of universal import; classification of the contents of the two worlds (a) of nature; (b) of spirit.

In my first letter, dear friend, I endeavor to guard you against misapprehension as to what you might expect from me. Its substance, if memory serves me, was that I did not intend to write on Anthropology or Psychology, nor yet on street, parlor, or court gossip, but simply about a work of art.

I deemed these remarks pertinent in view of the customs of the time, lest that, in my not conforming to them, you should judge me harshly without profit to yourself. With the same desire of keeping up a fair understanding with you, I must call your attention to some terms and distinctions which we shall have occasion to use, and which, unless explained, might prove shadows instead of lights along the path of our intercourse.

I confess to you that I share the (I might say) abhorrence so generally entertained by the reading public, of the use of any general terms whatsoever, and would avoid them altogether if I could only see how. But in reading the poem that we are to consider, I come upon such passages as these:

(Choir of Invisible Spirits.)

"Woe! Woe!

Thou hast destroyed it,

The beautiful world!

It reels, it crumbles,

Crushed by a demigod's mighty hand!"

and I cannot see how we are to understand these spirits, or the poet who gave them voice, unless we attack this very general expression "The beautiful world," here said to have been destroyed by Faust.

I am, however, somewhat reconciled to this by the example of my neighbor—a non-speculative, practical farmer—now busily engaged in harvesting his wheat. For I noticed that he first directed his attention, after cutting the grain, to collecting and tying it together in bundles; and I could not help but perceive how much this facilitated his labor, and how difficult it would have been for him to collect his wheat, grain by grain, like the sparrow of the field. Though wheat it were, and not chaff, still such a mode of handling would reduce it even below the value of chaff.

Just think of handling the wheat crop of the United States, the four hundred and twenty-five millions of bushels a year, in this manner! It is absolutely not to be thought of, and we must have recourse to agglomeration, if not to generalization. But the one gives us general *masses*, and the other general *terms*. The only thing that we can do, therefore, is, in imitation of our good neighbor of the wheat-field, to handle bundles, bushels, and bags, or—what is still better, if it can be done by some daring system of intellectual elevators—whole ship-loads of grain at a time, due care being taken that we tie wheat to wheat, oats to oats, barley to barley, and not promiscuously.

Now, with this example well before our minds, and the necessity mentioned, which compels us to handle—not merely the wheat crop of the United States for one year, but—whatever has been raised by the intelligence of man from the beginning of our race to the time of Goethe the poet, together with the ground on which it was raised, and the sky above—for no less than this seems to be contained in the expression "The beautiful world"—I call your attention first to the expression "form and matter," which, when applied to works of intelligence, we must take the liberty of changing into the expression "form and content"; for since there is nothing in works of this kind that manifests gravity, it can be of no use to say so, but may be of some injury.

The next is the expression "works of art," which sounds rather suspicious in some of its applications—sounds as if it was intended

to conceal rather than reveal the worker. Now, I take it that the "works of art" are the works of the intelligence, and I shall have to classify them accordingly. Another point with reference to this might as well be noticed, and that is that the old expressions "works of art" and "works of nature" do not contain, as they were intended to, all the works that present themselves to our observation—the works of science, for example. Besides, we have government, society, and religion, all of which are undoubtedly distinct from the "works of art" no less than from the "works of nature," and to tie them up in the same bundle with either of them seems to me to be like tying wheat with oats, and therefore to be avoided, as in the example before our minds. This seems to be done in the expression "works of self-conscious intelligence" and "works of nature."

But if we reflect upon the phrases "works of self-conscious intelligence" and "works of nature," it becomes obvious that there must be some inaccuracy contained in them; for how can two distinct subjects have the same predicate? It would, therefore, perhaps be better to say "the works of self-conscious intelligence" and the "*products* of nature."

Without further rasping and filing of old phrases, I call your attention in the next place to the most general term which we shall have occasion to use—"the world."

Under this we comprehend:

- I. The natural world—Gravity;
- II. The spiritual world—Self-determination.

I. Under the natural world we comprehend the terrestrial globe, and that part of the universe which is involved in its processes; these are:

- | | |
|------------------------------|-----------------------------|
| (a) (1) Mechanic—Gravity, | } Meteorologic—Electricity. |
| (2) Chemic—Affinity, | |
| (b) (1) Organic—Galvanism, | } Vital—Sensation. |
| (2) Vegetative—Assimilation, | |

II. Under "The Spiritual World," the world of conscious intelligence, we comprehend:

- (a) The real world—implement, mediation.
- (b) The actual world—self-determination.

(a) The real world contains whatever derives the end of its existence only, from self-conscious intelligence.

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|---------------------------|--------------|
| (1) The family—Affection. | |
| (2) Society—Ethics, | } Mediation. |
| (3) State—Rights, | |

(b) The actual world contains whatever derives the end and the *means* of its existence from self-conscious intelligence.

- | | |
|----------------------------|-----------------------|
| (1) Art—Manifestation, | } Self-determination. |
| (2) Religion—Revelation, | |
| (3) Philosophy—Definition, | |

From this it appears that we have divided the world into three large slices—the Natural, the Real, and the Actual—with gravity for one and self-determination for the other extreme, and mediation between them.

III.

Contents : The genesis of spirit (or human nature) through three stages—manifestation, realization, and actualization ; art shows, religion teaches, and philosophy comprehends ; the self-consciousness of an individual, of a nation, of an age ; the ethical content of Homer's "Iliad," the ethical content of Faust ; the entire life of man affected by the Faust collision which denies that man can know truth ; hence three great spheres of conflict to be treated in the poem.

In my last I gave you some general terms, and the sense in which I intend to use them. I also gave you a reason why I should use them, together with an illustration. But I gave you no reason why I used these and no others—or I did not advance anything to show that there are *objects* to which they *necessarily apply*. I only take it for granted that there are some objects presented to your observation and mine that gravitate or weigh something, and others that do not. To each I have applied as nearly as I could the ordinary terms. Now this procedure, although very unphilosophical, I can justify only by reminding you of the object of these letters.

If we now listen again to the chant of the invisible choir,

"Thou hast destroyed it,
The beautiful world,"

it will be obvious that this can refer only to the world of mediation and self-determination, to the world of spirit, of self-conscious

intelligence, for the world of gravitation is not so easily affected. But how is this—how is it that the world of self-conscious intelligence is so easily affected, is so dependent upon the individual man? This can be seen only by examining its genesis.

In the genesis of Spirit we have three stages—manifestation, realization, and actualization. The first of these, upon which the other two are dependent and sequent, falls in the individual man. For in him it is that Reason manifests itself before it can realize or embody itself in this or that political, social, or moral institution. And it is not merely necessary that it should so manifest itself in the individual; it must also realize itself in these institutions before it can actualize itself in Art, Religion, and Philosophy. For in this actualization it is absolutely dependent upon the former two stages of its genesis for a content. From this it appears that Art *shows* what Religion *teaches*, and what Philosophy *comprehends*; or that Art, Religion, and Philosophy have the same content. Nor is it difficult to perceive why this world of spirit or self-conscious intelligence is so dependent upon the individual man.

Again, in the sphere of manifestation and reality, this content, the self-conscious intelligence, is the *self-consciousness* of an individual, a nation; or an age. And art, in the sphere of actuality, is this or that work of art, this poem, that painting, or yonder piece of sculpture, with the self-consciousness of this or that individual, nation, or age, for its content. Moreover, the particularity (the individual, nation, or age) of the content constitutes the individuality of the work of Art. And not only this, but this particularity of the self-consciousness furnishes the very contradiction itself with the development and solution of which the work of art is occupied. For the self-consciousness which constitutes the content, being the *self-consciousness* of an individual, a nation, or an age, instead of being self-conscious intelligence in its pure universality, contains in that very particularity the contradiction which, in the sphere of manifestation and reality, constitutes the collision, conflict, and solution.¹

¹ From this a variety of facts in the character and history of the different works of art become apparent. The degree of the effect produced, for example, is owing to the degree of validity attached to the two sides of the contradiction. If the duties which the individual owes to the family and the state come into conflict, as in the Antigone

Now, if we look back upon the facts stated, we have the manifestation, the realization, and the actualization of self-conscious intelligence as the three spheres or stages in the process which evolves and involves the entire activity of man, both practical and theoretical. It is also obvious that the realization of self-conscious intelligence in the family, society, and the state, and its actualization in Art, Religion, and Philosophy, depend in their genesis upon its manifestation in the individual. Hence a denial of the possibility of this manifestation is a denial of the possibility of the realization and actualization also.

of Sophocles, and the consciousness of the age has not subordinated the ideas upon which they are based, but accords to each an equal degree of validity, we have a content replete with the noblest effects. For this is not a conflict between the abstract good and bad, the positive and the negative, but a conflict within the good itself. So likewise the universality of the effect is apparent from the content. If this is the self-consciousness of a nation, the work of art will be national. To illustrate this, and, at the same time, to trace the development of the particularity spoken of into a collision, we may refer to that great national work of art—the “*Iliad*” of Homer. The particularity which distinguishes the national self-consciousness of the Greeks is the pre-eminent validity attached by it to one of the before-mentioned modes of the actualization of self-conscious intelligence—the *sensuous*. Hence its worship of the Beautiful. This pre-eminence and the consequent subordination of the moral and the rational modes to it is the root of the contradiction, and hence the basis of the collision which forms the content of the poem. Its motive modernized would read about as follows: The son of one of our Senators goes to England; is received and hospitably entertained at the house of a lord. During his stay he falls in love and subsequently elopes with the young wife of his entertainer. For this outrage, perpetrated by the young hopeful, the entire fighting material of the island get themselves into their ships, not so much to avenge the injured husband as to capture the runaway wife.

But—now mark—adverse winds ensue, powers not human are in arms against them, and before these can be propitiated, a princess of the blood royal, pure and undefiled, must be sacrificed!—is sacrificed, and for what? That all Greece may proclaim to the world that pure womanhood, pure manhood, family, society, and the state, are nothing, must be sacrificed on the altar of the Beautiful. For in the sacrifice of Iphigenia all that could perish in Helen, and more too—for Iphigenia was pure and Helen was not—was offered up by the Greeks, woman for woman, and nothing remained but the Beautiful, for which she henceforth became the expression. For in this alone did Helen excel Iphigenia, and all women.

But how is this? Have not the filial, the parental, the social, the civil relations, sanctity and validity? Not as against the realization of the Beautiful, says the Greek. Nor yet the state? No; “I do not go at the command of Agamemnon, but because I pledged fealty to Beauty.” “But then,” Sir Achilles, “if the Beautiful should present itself under some individual form—say that of Briseis—you would for the sake of its possession disobey the will of the state?” “Of course.” And the poet has to sing “Achilles’s wrath!” and not “the recovery of the runaway wife,” the grand historical action.

Now, if this denial assume the form of a conviction in the consciousness of an individual, a nation, or an age, then there results a contradiction which involves in the sweep of its universality the entire spiritual world of man. For it is the self-consciousness of that individual, nation, or age, in direct conflict with itself, not with this or that particularity of itself, but with its entire content, in the sphere of manifestation, with the receptivity for, the production of, and the aspiration after, the Beautiful, the Good, and the True, within the individual himself; in the sphere of realization with the Family, with Society, and with the State; and finally, in the sphere of actuality with Art, Religion, and Philosophy.

Now, this contradiction is precisely what is presented in the proposition "Man cannot know truth." This you will remember was, in the history of modern thought, the result of Kant's philosophy; and Kant's philosophy was the philosophy of Germany at the time of the conception of Goethe's *Faust*. And Goethe was the truest poet of Germany, and thus he sings :

" So then I have studied philosophy,
Jurisprudence, and medicine,
And, what is worse, Theology,
Thoroughly, but, alas! in vain,
And here I stand with study hoar,
A fool, and know what I knew before ;
Am called Magister, nay, LL. D.,
And for ten years am busily
Engaged leading through fen and close
My trusting pupils by the nose ;
Yet see that nothing can be known.
This burns my heart, this, this alone!"

Here you will perceive in the first sentence of the poem, as was meet, the fundamental contradiction, the theme, or the "argument," as it is so admirably termed by critics, is stated in its naked abstractness, just as Achilles's wrath is the first sentence of the *Iliad*."

This theme, then, is nothing more nor less than the self-consciousness in contradiction with itself, in conflict with its own content. Hence, if the poem is to portray this theme, this con-

tent, in its totality, it must represent it in three spheres: first, **Manifestation**—Faust in conflict with himself; second, **Realization**—Faust in conflict with the Family, Society, and the State; thirdly, **Actualization**—Faust in conflict with Art, Religion, and Philosophy.

Now, my friend, please to examine the poem once more, reflect closely upon what has been said, and then tell how much of the poem can you spare, or how much is there in the poem, as printed, which does not flow from or develop this theme.

IV.

Contents: The sphere of manifestation; the individual has receptivity for productive capacity, and aspiration for the True, the Good, and the Beautiful; the agnosticism of Faust strikes against all these; the German nation; Faust's culture negative; the conjuration of the earth-spirit by aspiration; the inadequacy of the individual to comprehend the universal; hence despair and suicide.

In my last, dear friend, I called your attention to the theme, to the content of the poem in a general way, stating it in the very words of the poet himself. To trace the development of this theme from the abstract generality into concrete detail is the task before us.

According to the analysis, we have to consider, first of all, the sphere of *Manifestation*.

In this we observe the threefold relation which the individual sustains to self-conscious intelligence, viz.: Receptivity for, and production of, and aspiration for, the True, the Good, and the Beautiful. Now, if it is true that man cannot know truth, then it follows that he can neither receive nor produce the True. For how shall he know that whatever he may receive and produce is true, since it is specially denied that he can know it. This conclusion as conviction, however, does not affect immediately the third relation—the aspiration—nor quench its gnawing. And this is the first form of conflict in the individual. Let us now open the book and place it before us.

The historic origin of our theme places us in a German University, in the professor's private studio.

It is well here to remember that it is a German University, and that the occupant of the room is a *German* professor. Also that

it is the received opinion that the Germans are a *theoretical* people; by which we understand that they act from conviction, and not from instinct. Moreover, that their conviction is not a mere holiday affair, to be rehearsed, say on Sunday, and left in charge of a minister, paid for the purpose, during the balance of the week, but an actual, vital fountain of action. Hence, the conviction of such a character being given, the acts follow in logical sequence.

With this remembered, let us now listen to the self-communion of the occupant of the room.

In bitter earnest the man has honestly examined, and sought to possess himself of the intellectual patrimony of the race. In poverty, in solitude, in isolation, he has labored hopefully, earnestly; and now he casts up his account and finds—what? “That nothing can be known.” His hair is gray with more than futile endeavor, and for ten years his special calling has been to guide the students to waste their lives, as he has done his own, in seeking to accomplish the impossible—to know. This is the worm that gnaws his heart! As compensation, he is free from superstition—fears neither hell nor devil. But this sweeps with it all fond delusions, all conceit that he is able to know, and to teach something for the elevation of mankind. Nor yet does he possess honor or wealth—a dog would not lead a life like this.

Here you will perceive how the first two relations are negated by the conviction that man cannot know truth, and how, on the wings of aspiration, he sallies forth into the realm of magic, of mysticism, of subjectivity. For if reason, with its mediation, is impotent to create an object for this aspiration, let us see what emotion and imagination, *without* mediation, can do for subjective satisfaction.

And here all is glory, all is freedom! The imagination seizes the totality of the universe, and revels in ecstatic visions. What a spectacle! But, alas! a spectacle only! How am I to know, to comprehend the fountain of life, the centre of which articulates this totality?

See here another generalization: the practical world as a whole! Ah, that is my sphere; here I have a firm footing; here I am master; here I command spirits! Approach, and obey your master!

"Spirit. Who calls !

Faust. Terrific face !

Sp. Art thou he that called !

Thou trembling worm !

Faust. Yes ; I'm he ; am Faust, thy peer.

Sp. Peer of the Spirit thou comprehendest—not of me !

Faust. What ! not of thee ! Of whom, then ! I, the image of Deity itself, and not even thy peer !"

No, indeed, Mr. Faust, thou dost not include within thyself the totality of the practical world, but only that part thereof which thou dost comprehend—only thy *vocation*, and hark ! "It knocks !"

Oh, death ! I see, 'tis my vocation ; indeed, "It is my famulus !"

And this, too, is merely a delusion ; this great mystery of the practical world shrinks to this dimension—a bread-professorship.

It would seem so ; for no theory of the practical world is possible without the ability to know truth. As individual, you may imitate the individual, as the brute his kind, and thus transmit a craft ; but you cannot seize the practical world in transparent forms and present it as a harmonious totality to your fellow-man, for that would require that these transparent intellectual forms should possess objective validity—and this they have not, according to your conviction. And so it cannot be helped.

But see what a despicable thing it is to be a bread-professor !

And is this the mode of existence, this the reality, the only reality, to answer the aspiration of our soul—the aspiration which sought to seize the universe, to kindle its inmost recesses with the light of intelligence, and thus illumine the path of life ? Alas, Reason gave us error—Imagination, illusion—and the practical world, the *Will*, a bread-professorship ! Nothing else ? Yes ; a bottle of laudanum !

Let us drink, and rest forever ! But hold, is there nothing else, really ? No emotional nature ? Hark, what is that ? Easter bells ! The recollections of my youthful faith in a revelation ! They must be examined. We cannot leave yet.

And see what a panorama, what a strange world lies embedded with those recollections. Let us see it in all its varied character and reality, on this Easter Sunday, for example.

V.

Contents: Faust's agnostic conviction leaves him with a mere avocation and youthful recollections to hold him back from suicide; goes with Wagner to see his fellow-men on the Easter festival and discover what it is that makes life worth living for them; his recognition by the people; Wagner thinks such recognition to be a great blessing; his motto: live to make a living; Faust despises undeserved honors, but sees that if he can not know truth, still he possesses power over his fellow-men, and that he can certainly obtain wealth and sensual pleasure; this conviction is the dog; one's avocation followed without higher ends than to make a living is a poodle; re-examines revelation; takes up the passage from St. John to translate; has to get the idea, has to understand the passage in order to translate it; but an agnostic can not understand the truth revealed to him, and revelation is therefore impossible; the dog gets restless as the conviction becomes clear that religion can not furnish truth; it swells to colossal proportions; Faust will renounce the pursuit of truth and turn to selfish gratification.

I have endeavored before to trace the derivation of the content of the first scene of the poem, together with its character, from the abstract theme of the work. In it we saw that the fundamental conviction of Faust leaves him naked—leaves him nothing but a bare avocation,¹ a mere craft, and the precarious recollections of his youth (when he believed in revealed truths) to answer his aspirations. These recollections arouse his emotions, and rescue him from nothingness (suicide)—they fill his soul with a content.

To see this content with all its youthful charm, we have to retrace our childhood's steps before the gates of the city on this the Easter festival of the year—you and I being mindful, in the meantime, that the public festivals of the church belong to the so-called external evidences of the truth of the Christian Religion.

Well, here we are in the suburbs of the city, and what do we see? First a set of journeymen mechanics, eager for beer and brawls, interspersed with servant girls; students whose tastes run very much in the line of strong beer, biting tobacco, and the well-dressed servant-girls aforesaid; citizens' daughters, perfectly outraged at the low taste of the students who run after the servant-girls, "when they might have the very best of society"; citizens dissatisfied with the new mayor of the city—"Taxes increase from

¹ *Avocation* is used in these letters in preference to *vocation*, the latter signifying one's calling as determined by inward character or aptitude, while the former (*avocation*) signifies the external occupation or business followed by the individual. This seems to be the present common usage both in England and in the colonies. See Murray's "New English Dictionary," *sub voc.*—EDITOR.

day to day, and nothing is done for the welfare of the city." A beggar is not wanting. Other citizens, who delight to speak of war and rumors of war in distant countries, in order to enjoy their own peace at home with proper contrast; also an "elderly one," who thinks that she is quite able to furnish what the well-dressed citizens' daughters wish for—to the great scandal of the latter, who feel justly indignant at being addressed in public by such an old witch (although, "between ourselves, she did show us our sweethearts on St. Andrew's night"); soldiers, who sing of high-walled fortresses and proud women to be taken by storm; and, finally, farmers around the linden-tree, dancing a most furious gallopade—a real Easter Sunday or Monday "before the gate"—of any city in Germany, even to this day.

And into this real world, done up in holiday attire, but not by the poet—into this paradise, this very heaven of the people, where great and small fairly yell with delight—Faust enters, assured that here he can maintain his rank as a man; "Here I dare to be a man!" And, sure enough, listen to the welcome:

"Nay, Doctor, 'tis indeed too much
To be with us on such a day,
To join the throng, the common mass,
You, you, the great, the learned man!
Take, then, this beaker, too," etc.

And here goes—a general health to the Doctor, to the man who braved the pestilence for us, and who even now does not think it beneath him to join us in our merry-making—hurrah for the Doctor; hip, hip, etc.

And is not this something, dear friend? Just think, with honest Wagner, when he exclaims, "What emotions must crowd thy breast, O great man! while listening to such honors?" and you will also say with him:

"Thrice blest the man who draws such profits rare
From talents all his own!"

Why, see! the father shows you to his son; every one inquires—presses, rushes to see you! The fiddle itself is hushed, the dancers stop. Where you go they fall into lines; caps and hats fly into the air. But a little more, and they would fall upon their knees as if the sacred Host passed that way!

And is not this great? Is not this the very goal of human ambition? To Wagner, dear friend, it is; for the very essence of an avocation is, and must be, "success in life." But how does it stand with the man whose every aspiration is the True, the Good, and the Beautiful? Will a hurrah from one hundred thousand throats, all in good yelling order, assist him? *No*.

To Wagner it is immaterial whether he *knows* what he *needs*, provided he sees the day when the man who has been worse to the people than the very pestilence itself, receives public honors; but to Faust, to the man really in earnest—who is not satisfied when he has squared life with life, and obtained zero for a result, or who does not merely *live to make a living*, but demands a rational end for life, and, in default of that rational end, spurns life itself—to such a man this whole scene possesses little significance indeed. It possesses, however, *some* significance, even for him! For it is indeed true that man cannot know truth—that the high aspiration of his soul has no object—then this scene demonstrates, at least, that Faust possesses power over the practical world. If he cannot *know* the world, he can at least swallow a considerable portion of it, and this scene demonstrates that he can exercise a great deal of choice as to the parts to be selected; do you see this conviction?

Do you see this conviction? Do you see this dog? Consider it well; what is it, think you? Do you perceive how it encircles us nearer and nearer—becomes more and more certain, and, if I mistake not, a luminous emanation of gold, of honor, of power, follows in its wake. It seems to me as if it drew soft magic rings, as future fetters, round our feet! See, the circles become smaller and smaller—'tis almost a certainty—'tis already near; come, come home with us!

The temptation here spread before us by the poet, to consider the dog "*well*," is almost irresistible; but all we can say in this place, dear friend, is that if you will look upon what is properly called an *avocation* in civil society, eliminate from it all higher ends and motives other than the simple one of making a living—no matter with what pomp and circumstance—no doubt you will readily recognize the *FOODLE*. But we must hasten to the studio to watch further developments, for the conflict is not as yet de-

cided. We are still to examine the possibility of a divine revelation to man, who cannot know truth.

And for this purpose our newly-acquired conviction that we possess power over the practical world, although not as yet in a perfectly clear form before us, comfortably lodged behind the stove, where it properly belongs, we take down the original text of the New Testament in order to realize its meaning in our own loved mother-tongue. It stands written: "In the beginning was the Word." Word? Word? Never! *Meaning* it ought to be! Meaning what? Meaning? No; it is *Power*! No; *Deed*! Word, meaning, power, deed—which is it? Alas, how am I to know unless I can know truth? 'Tis even so, our youthful recollections dissolve in mist, into thin air; and nothing is left us but our newly-acquired conviction, the restlessness of which during this examination has undoubtedly not escaped your attention, dear friend. ("Be quiet, there, behind the stove." "See here, poodle, one of us two has to leave this room!") What, then, is the whole content of this conviction, which, so long as there was the hope of a possibility of a worthy object for our aspiration, seemed so despicable? What is it that governs the practical world of finite motives, the power that adapts means to ends, regardless of a final, of an infinite end? Is it not the Understanding? and although Reason—in its search after the *final end*, with its perfect system of absolute means, of infinite motives and interests—begets subjective chimeras, is it not demonstrated that the understanding possesses objective validity? Nay, look upon this dog well; does it not swell into colossal proportions—is no dog at all, in fact, but the very power that holds absolute sway over the finite and negative—the understanding itself—Mephistopheles in proper form?

And who calls this despicable? Is it not Reason, the power that begets chimeras, and it alone? And shall we reject the real, the actual—all, in fact, that possesses objective validity—because, forsooth, the power of subjective chimeras declares it negative, finite, perishable? Never. "No fear, dear sir, that I'll do this. Precisely what I have promised is the very aim of all my endeavor. Conceited fool that I was! I prized myself too highly"—claimed kin with the infinite. "I belong only in thy sphere"—the finite. "The Great Spirit scorns me. Nature is a sealed book to me;

the thread of thought is severed. Knowing disgusts me. In the depths of sensuality I'll quench the burning passion."

Here, then, my friend, we arrive at the final result of the conflict in the first sphere of our theme—in the sphere of manifestation—that of the individual. We started with the conviction *that man cannot know truth*. This destroyed our spiritual endeavors, and reduced our practical avocation to an absurdity. We sought refuge in the indefinite—the mysticism of the past—and were repelled by its subjectivity. We next examined the theoretical side of the practical world, and found this likewise an impossibility and suicide—a mere blank nothingness—as the only resource. But here we were startled by our emotional nature, which unites us with our fellow-man, and seems to promise some sort of a bridge over into the infinite—certainly demands such a transition. Investigating this, therefore, with all candor, we found our fellow-men wonderfully occupied—occupied like the kitten pursuing its own tail! At the same time it became apparent that we might be quite a dog in this kitten dance, or that the activity of the understanding possessed objective validity. With this conviction fairly established, although still held in utter contempt, we examined the last resource: the possibility of a divine revelation of truth to men that cannot know truth. The result, as the mere statement of the proposition would indicate, is negative, and thus the last chance of obtaining validity for anything except the activity of the understanding vanishes utterly. But with this our contempt for the understanding likewise vanishes; for whatever our aspiration may say, it has no object to correspond to it, and is therefore merely subjective, a hallucination, a chimera, and the understanding is the highest attainable for us. Here, therefore, the subjective conflict ends, for we have attained to objectivity, and this is the highest, since there is nothing else that possesses validity for man. Nor is this by any means contemptible in itself, for it is the power over the finite world, and the net result is: That if you and I, my friend, have no reason, cannot know truth, we do have at least a stomach, a capacity for sensual enjoyment, and an understanding to administer to the same—to be its servant. This, at least, is demonstrated by the kitten dance of the whole world.

VI.

Contents : The dog becomes Mephisto ; if man can not know truth, his understanding, or Mephisto, can procure sensual enjoyment for him ; the intellect in the service of the body is Mephistopheles ; the world of reality, the institutions, family, society, and State, have no force to hold man back from sensual gratification with such convictions ; Faust will give up striving for the impossible ; theory is gray, but the tree of life is green ; they will travel on the quality of their cloth.

DEAR H.—In following our theme through the sphere of manifestation, we arrived at the conclusion : “Although man cannot know truth—has no Reason—he does possess a stomach, a capacity for sensual enjoyment and an Understanding to minister to the same—to be its servant.” With this conclusion, we have arrived at the world of Reality—for we have attributed objective validity to the Understanding. It also determines our position in that world. The Understanding—Mephisto—is our guide and servant ; the world of Reality a mere means for individual ends—for private gratification. Whatever higher pretensions this world might make, such pretensions are based upon the presupposition that man can know Truth, and are therefore without foundation. Hence this world of Reality—the Family, Society, and the State—have no right and no authority as against the individual inclinations and desires of man. The latter are supreme and find their limitation not in Reason, but in the power of the Understanding to supply them with means of gratification. It is true that these means are derived from without, and hence that the individual under this view is limited and determined from without, and that external determination is collision and conflict. Besides, whatever our conviction with reference to the world of Reality may be, that world, once for all, is extant with the bold claim of being on the one side the pledge and on the other the very embodiment of the rational existence of the race ; and it wields, moreover, in that existence, the power of the race. But this is *our* reflection, dear friend, which it may be well enough to keep in view, as a species of logical heat-lightning along the horizon, but which has no significance under the conclusion arrived at by Faust. Under it our individual desires and inclinations, however capricious, are the *end*, and whatever presents itself has value and validity in so far, and only in so far, as it is a means for this end.

These are the principles of the man before us, who,

“For idle dalliance too old,
Too young to be without desire,”

is still professor in the German University. His life falls in the historic period when a knowledge of the natural sciences is not as yet diffused, and many of the results remain *arcana* for individual profit. Possessed of such, and whatever may enrich the Understanding of man—convinced, circumstanced, and occupied as he is—what should be his future career? Shall he spend the remainder of his life in the same fruitless endeavor as hitherto, even after he is convinced of its futility and thus deprived of the poor solace of hope? Or shall he not rather “learn some sense” and look around for enjoyment before it is entirely too late?

“Away with this striving after the impossible! What though your body is your own, is that which I enjoy less mine? If I can pay for six brave steeds, are they not mine with all their power? I run as if on four-and-twenty legs, and am held to be of some consequence! Away, therefore; leave off your cogitating—away into the world! I tell you, a man who speculates is like a brute led by evil *genii* in circles round and round upon a withered heath, while close at hand smile beauteous pastures green. Just look at this place! Call you this living—to plague yourself and the poor boys to death with *ennui*? Leave that to your good neighbor, the worthy Mr. Book-worm. Why should you worry yourself threshing such straw?”

This, dear friend, is “common sense,” and hence the speech of Mephisto upon the situation, literally translated by the poet no less than by ourselves from the poet. Its extraordinary good sense is so apparent that it cannot be without immediate effect, which we perceive in the scene where the different studies are reviewed by the aid of its radiance concentrated into,

“All theory, my friend, is gray,
But green the golden tree of Life!”

as the focal point. With this final adieu to the past, we congratulate ourselves upon the “New career”!

“What about the immediate start—conveyance, etc.?” Well, I suppose Faust is not the only one that has travelled on the

quality of his cloth! "To fly through the air on Mephisto's cloak" sounds very poetic, but to pass in society upon the strength of appearance is such an every-day occurrence that it is quite prosaic.

VII.

Contents: The "new career" of Faust; analysis of the world of reality; the natural and rational phases of the family—sexual passion *versus* the social requirements; the collisions between these two phases constitute the contents of light literature, according to Shakespeare (*Romeo and Juliet*); the work of art requires that both sides of the collision be recognized as valid in the public mind; the old social requirements no longer valid in many particulars here in America; the collisions involved in *Macbeth*, *Hamlet*, *Romeo and Juliet*; nature *versus* society; the negative family (illegitimacy); Auerbach's Cellar; chemical science.

In our last, we saw our hero off—that is, we saw him enter upon a "new career," apparently furnished with all the requisites for his journey. Not equipped like him, it will be necessary for you and me to cast about for some mode of progression, lest we be left behind. Let us, therefore, proceed in our own way to examine the *locale*, the world of Reality into which we saw him enter with our own eyes, in order that we may duly appreciate the situation, entertaining no doubt in the mean time but that we shall meet him again in the course of our ramblings.

Setting aside, therefore, the conviction of Faust, which may be regarded as his vehicle, we have before us the world of Reality, characterized in our analysis as deriving the *end* but not the *means* of its existence from self-conscious intelligence, and, as comprehending the three institutions, the Family, Society, and the State. The disparity between the end and the means indicated in the characterization manifests itself in the family in the two factors or moments:

First, the natural moment: the affections of the parties.

Second, the rational moment: the social requirements upon which the family is to be founded.

The first is called *natural*, because it is unconscious, in the sense that it is not based upon any specific reasons, and hence Cupid is represented as blind by the truthful ancients.

The second is called *rational*, because self-conscious intelligence assigns the reasons for or against the contemplated union.

The fact of this duality renders a collision between the two ele-

ments possible, and, in consequence of the peculiar conditions of modern society which favor such collisions, this content has occupied modern art to a greater extent than any other.

“ Ah, me! for aught that ever I could read,
 Could ever hear by tale or history,
 The course of true love never did run smooth :
 But either it was different in blood,
 Or else misgraffed in respect of years ;
 Or else it stood upon the choice of friends ;
 Or, if there were a sympathy of choice,
 War, death, or sickness did lay siege to it,”

says Shakespeare when he epitomizes the content of what is now called light literature.

This collision, however, is a proper subject for Art only when both elements have validity in the public consciousness. Hence, only in modern times, and then only in certain localities.¹

Again, it is a proper subject for Art only when both parties attach this validity to both elements. For if this is not the case, then the collision admits of no solution except an external one—*i. e.*, through a *deus ex machina* as to the party denying this validity, and this is in violation of the great principle that Art is the Manifestation of self-conscious intelligence to man.²

¹ I apprehend that a true American, born in the free West—free in the sense that every man is master over his physical necessities, and not their slave—finds Art of this kind a foreign affair. Not because he is illiterate—the usual solution assigned for his want of appreciation—but simply because the content is *untrue* to him. What is a social inequality to him that he should snivel with Arthur or Harry because they could not marry the girls they loved? He has no personal experience in common with Arthur or Harry. If his parents oppose his marriage because Sally is too poor, he takes her and sings:

“ For Uncle Sam is rich enough to give us all a farm,”

and therewith ends the matter. Again, if he is poor and Sally is the daughter of a United States Senator, and her mother in consequence deadly opposed to the match, he quietly works his way into the legislature of his State, defeats the old man for the Senate, and asks the old lady how she would like to be his mother-in-law now. For he is a free American citizen, containing, by virtue of his birth, all the social possibilities between the gallows and the presidential chair. Social requirements can have no validity in his presence, in the sense that he should regard them as insurmountable obstacles to the accomplishment of any rational purpose.

² This is the principle of free art as recognized in all of its significance by Shakespeare. It is based upon the final assumption of absolute self-determination for the

Perhaps the extreme modification of this collision presents itself under the following form: Society promulgates its edict, based upon the necessity of its own existence, that man shall not be a father until he can protect, maintain, and educate his offspring—*i. e.*, guarantee to it a rational existence. But *Nature* declares that he shall be a father when he can propagate his species. Now, the period when the individual may comply with both of these behests does not coincide with the period when he can comply with either; for the command of *Nature* may be fulfilled on his part several years earlier than that of *Society*, and during all this time we have *Nature* urging and *Society* dissuading and prohibiting the individual from fulfilling the peculiar destiny of his individuality—its annihilation in the generic act. This eventuates in what might be called the "Negative Family"—a generic relation of the sexes utterly devoid of all positive or rational elements.

As a concomitant, and sharing with it a common origin, is that peculiar social phenomenon which we witness in "*Auerbach's Cellar*," where it appears we have arrived in happy time—to find our hero joining in the chorus,

"We are as happy as cannibals,
Nay, as five hundred hogs";

or, if not our hero, Mephisto for him (for you will notice that Faust says only, "Good evening, gentlemen," and "I should like to leave now," during this whole scene), the very leader of the crowd in wit, song, and wine. Nay, as to the latter, he cannot refrain from giving them a little touch of his chemical science, which can dispense with the old grape-wine process, and still give

individual. Macbeth spurns and demands loyalty at the same time. What wonder, then, that it comes home on the sword of Macduff?

Hamlet arms Doubt; and Accident, the proper person of Doubt, slays Polonius and thus arms Laertes against Hamlet, who returns Laertes his own by *Accident*.

Romeo loves, he knows not whom, and dies, he knows not why; while Juliet—

"Go ask his name; if he be married,
My grave is like to be my wedding bed."

The Moor of Venice violates the generic conditions of race through physical courage: "She loved me for the dangers I had passed," and moral cowardice destroys both him and Desdemona.

Compare with these the works of Calderon and the contrast will render apparent what logic has but indicated.

perfect satisfaction to his customers—a fact of some importance, one would suppose, to the landlord. And thus it would appear that our hero is not left to trust entirely to the quality of his cloth for the practical wherewithal. But the little “Feuer-luft,” which one would at first have been inclined to interpret *Flame*, resolves itself into “fire-water,” or rather the art to make this—to work the miracle of the Wedding-feast at Galilee on the principles of natural science.

VIII.

Contents: Faust's age; necessity of stimulants to arouse passion; the Witches' Kitchen a brothel.

There is one thing, dear friend, in the character of Faust to which I have not called your attention heretofore, and that is, the age of the man and the practical inconvenience he may experience therefrom in his new career.

“For idle dalliance too old,
Too young to be without desire,”

he would find it, no doubt, convenient to decrease the one and increase the other. For in this new career the strength and number of his desires are an essential element, especially when there is every prospect of ample means for their gratification. As regards external appearance, that can be readily managed by a judicious use of cosmetics, the tailor's art, and kindred appliances. But the physical desires, the sexual passions, for example, require youth to yield full fruition. Proper culture, however, not to mention aphrodisiacs, will do much, even in this direction. The modes for this are two, but for practical purposes only one; and although not exactly to our taste at first, still, since there is no other alternative presented, we must to the “Witches' Kitchen,” named the “Negative Family,” if I remember correctly, in a former letter. The popular name for this is somewhat different, but since I have given the genesis of the thing in the letter referred to, I may be permitted to omit the more definite designation, for

“Who dares to modest ears announce
What modest hearts will not renounce?”

If, however, you should find any difficulty in discovering what is meant by the Witches' Kitchen, and where to find it, all that

is necessary is to disregard the name and pay attention to what transpires.

First, the servants, employed, as the poet assures us, in stirring a very strange dish, Beggar's Broth—a kind of broth, perhaps, not so well calculated to feed as to make beggars. You will also perceive the strong propensity to gambling which possesses these creatures. Next, observe the ecstasy of Faust over the image of a woman which he sees in a mirror—with this strange peculiarity:

“Alas! if I do not remain upon this spot, if I dare to approach nearer, then I can only see her as in a mist!” No doubt this beauty will not bear close inspection! Still it is very beautiful! “Is it possible? Is woman so beautiful? Must I see in this moulded form the very comprehension of all that is in heaven? And such an object is found upon this earth?”

Of course it is, and quite attainable, too, says Mephisto. But, above all, pay attention to the scene between Mephisto and the witch herself, not omitting the mode in which he identifies himself as belonging to the nobility. This latter is based upon a satirical saying quite current in Germany, but which will not bear translation.

By paying attention to these things, instead of to the name by which the poet calls the place, you will readily detect the original.

I cannot dismiss this scene without calling your attention to the manner in which a poet treats his theme. The scene just examined may, at first glance, appear to flow less freely or necessarily from the content, the idea of the work, even for those who can recognize the negativity of the conclusions of Faust, and trace that negativity through the various forms in which it presents itself in society. And yet, aside from this logical necessity, there is another, a physico-psychological necessity for this scene, contained in the theme, thus:

“So, then, I have studied Philosophy,
Jurisprudence, and Medicine,
And, what is worse, Theology,
Thoroughly, but, alas, in vain.”

Who says this—a young man of twenty or twenty-five? If so, what significance can there be attached to his words? What

could he be expected to know of such subjects at that age? But mark :

“ And here I stand, with study hoar,
A fool—and know what I knew before.”

Ay, more—

“ Am called Magister, nay, LL. D.,
And for ten years am busily
Engaged to lead through fen and close
My trusting pupils by the nose.”

You will see, my friend, what an essential element the age of Faust is, to give weight to his conclusions. Without this, the whole would sink into utter absurdity. But now comes the question: How is this LL. D., hoary with study, professor in the university for the last ten years, to enter into a conflict with the family, so necessarily contained in his conviction? The lessons taught and appliances furnished in the Witches' Kitchen are the poet's answer to this question. Of these, advantage has been taken, and such benefits reaped, that at the end of the scene we are assured, upon the very best authority, that he is now in a condition to “see a Helen in every woman.” The means used, it is sufficient to know, were produced under the special directions of the devil, although the devil himself could not make them, and were therefore quite natural.

IX.

Contents: Gretchen's family; the church the guardian of the sacredness of the family; the individual's selfishness first cancelled in the family wherein there is mutual self-sacrifice; the family relation impossible with Faust's conviction; the destruction of the family results from Faust's deed; but the destroyer is preserved because the collision that produces the destruction is not one peculiar to the family, but a general one that attacks all institutions; agnosticism, whose first result is sensual indulgence, is therefore not solved in the First Part of Faust.

We are now prepared, my friend, to witness the results of the elements and powers so carefully elaborated by the poet. In order to do so, however, with satisfaction, it may be necessary to recall, in their simplest logical forms, the agents involved. On the one side, therefore, we have the family relation, with its natural and rational moments, and on the other the conviction that this relation has no validity as against the individual desires and conclusions of man. Imbued with and swayed by the latter, we

have Faust, a man prepared "to see a Helen in every woman"; as the simple bearer of the former in its potential perfection, a young woman—"not so poor but that she enjoys the respect of her neighbors, nor yet so rich that she may defy their opinion." For under these social conditions, if anywhere, that which the Germans call "*Sitte*," and the ancients called "*Ethica*," and what we, with our usual obliquity of expression, call "public morals," must be sought. This young woman, clad in purity and faith, is met at the temple of the living God—at once the primary source and the still existing refuge of the sacredness of the family relation. The severely realistic character of Gretchen, therefore, is determined by the theme; and the scene where she relates her daily occupation of cooking, washing, sweeping, etc., besides the exquisite motive which the poet employs to transfigure its prosaic commonplace, ought not to be wanting. While this gives the potential, the real side of the family relation must be presented. This is supplied by the family of which Gretchen is a member. If we desire to determine further the elements of the latter, it is necessary only to reflect upon the peculiar mediation involved in the relation.¹ From this it would appear that the essential ele-

¹ The individual is born. His existence depends upon the constant victory of his individuality over every *opposing* individuality, particularity, or process. To this he owes his existence, both prior and subsequent to his birth. And yet the existence of that individual is dependent in its origin upon the cancelling of individuality in the generic act. The affirmative solution of this contradiction rests with the Family.

Let us watch the process for a moment. Take a young man of twenty or twenty-five—one who pays his way, *i. e.*, makes himself valid in the material, social, and political relations of life. He depends upon himself, has no wife or child, pays what he owes, and earns what he eats. His success depends upon "looking out for number one"—his own individuality is the beginning and the end of his exertion. But see, he has looked into that woman's eyes, and now, lo! with a peculiar gratification, he pays for her subsistence also! She was nothing to him—he owed her nothing—and yet the delight of his life seems to be to labor early and late to provide for her. Her garb is his delight, her food his enjoyment; for he is no longer a mere man, but a husband; no longer a mere individual, but a rational somewhat, whose individuality reaches beyond himself, and finds itself in another. Nor does it stop here; the two become three, five, ten. And this individuality, which was centred in and upon itself, had itself for its sole end and aim, has lost itself, and stands the husband of a wife and the father of a family. It enjoys itself no longer, save through this assemblage of individualities; it exists for them. Again, if we look upon this assemblage, we find a kindred process: the individuality of each member is modified by the relation which it sustains to all the rest. The brother is the lover of the sister, her champion and protector, if the father fail. This prepares them for the kindly glance of strangers, etc., and the process begins

ments of that mediation are presented in the mother, the son, and the daughter, uniting at once the highest possible degree of potentiality with the reality of fact. For the son is brother and father, the daughter is sister and mother, and the mother becomes grandmother.

From these elements, thus determined as to number, character, and social position, the scenes flow with logical necessity to the final solution—the destruction of the Family.

These evolutions are so simple, and their logical import is so generally understood, that it is not necessary to dwell upon them in detail. The only point which might, perhaps, require attention is the artistic side—the true nature of the collision presented and the mode of its solution. That the family relation is impossible under the conviction of Faust, or that an existing family should be destroyed (the mother poisoned, the child drowned, the brother slain, and the sister stand before the judgment-seat of God as the self-acknowledged author, cause, or whatever name you may give to the connection which she had with these effects), by a man's giving practical effect to the convictions of Faust, is acknowledged and realized by the general consciousness of the age, as is abundantly proved by the effect which the part of the work under consideration has produced. But the nature of the collision presented, and the artistic character of the solution, have given rise to some doubt. It may, therefore, be well, at the conclusion of this letter, to recall to your mind some of the facts and principles formerly alluded to, which, in my opinion, are well calculated to remove whatever difficulty may have arisen on this point.

If my memory serves me, I called your attention, in a former letter, to the collisions inherent in the family relation, and also to the conditions under which they might be used for artistic purposes—namely, that both parties should give full validity to both elements of the collision. Now, if from great familiarity with the themes derived from this source we regard the part of the work under consideration as presenting one of these collisions, then we meet with difficulty as regards the solution, or rather want of solution. For the destruction of the family and the preserva-

anew. Thus an affirmative solution is wrought out, or, what is the same thing, the contradiction has an affirmative result—the perpetuation of the Family and, through it, of the Race.

tion of the destroyer will hardly pass for a satisfactory solution, either logical or artistic. To regard the poem, however, in this light, would be our own act and the consequent difficulty one of our own creation; for this would be an attempt to make rather than to read the poem. And whatever merit or demerit might attend the undertaking, it would hardly be fair to attribute either the one or the other to the author of *Faust*; for in this poem we have for our theme "The self-conscious intelligence in conflict with itself—with its entire content." Not the content with itself, but the self-conscious intelligence on the one side and its content on the other. Included within this content we have the institution of the family. Hence, the collision presented is one not inherent in this institution (for that involves as its presupposition the valid existence thereof), but between the family and its negation. It is, therefore, not an independent but a subordinate collision. The Family is a part of the content of self-conscious intelligence, and as such a part it is drawn into the conflict posited between that intelligence and its content in the proposition: "Man cannot know Truth." But since it is only a part of this content, the conflict is not exhausted by the destruction of the Family, any more than it was exhausted at the end of the subjective collision which resulted in the destruction of the rational vocation of *Faust* and delivered him over to the guidance of the Understanding and its finite aims—sensual indulgence. Hence, no solution is presented or as yet possible, and those who regard the destruction of the Family as the solution of the collision presented, and thus substitute one of the moments [factors] for the totality, ought not to wonder if they find in the end that, after all, the poem has no further unity than what it derives from the art of the bookbinder, and that its solution is very inartistic and immoral. Nothing is more natural than such a conclusion.¹ As the result of the sub-

¹ The only point to be remembered in this connection by you and me is this: that in all critical labors—this humble attempt not excepted—there may be observed to exist some slight analogy to the works of the taxidermist. Not merely because the operation in either case fills the external form of the given subject with such substance as he may have at hand—stubble, chaff, or bran—but especially because the object and purpose of their respective labors is nearly the same—namely, to assist the appreciation of the beautiful, in Art or Nature. And that as the one would not be permitted to present you with a specimen of a bird of Paradise with neck, wings, and tail removed, simply, perhaps, because he found it inconvenient to fill them with his stubble, so you should refuse

jective collision we had the conclusion: that if man cannot know truth he can enjoy sensual pleasure. Taking this for the principle of our action, we entered the world of reality, and lo! it crumbles under our feet. We clasp the beautiful, pure, and confiding girl, but, as all rational end is ignored, our embrace is death. Not life, not perpetuity of the race, but *death*—blank nothingness; the conclusion reads: "If man cannot know truth, then he cannot exist?"

X.

Contents: A Second Part of Faust necessary because the First Part does not exhaust the theme; the collision reaches society and the State; hence society or the social organization as the system of productive industry is introduced in the second part of the tragedy under a typical description; definition of productive industry; how the division of labor operates to produce the largest product for the least exertion; all avocations necessary to supply the wants of each individual, and each avocation furnishes something desired by all; hence exchange or commerce is necessary; money the means of this exchange necessarily itself the product of labor, so that it can measure labor; the State, which is the rational will of the people, secures to each individual the results of his deed in the system of productive industry and protects him; he becomes a "universal individual" by becoming a part of the great system of industry which is consolidated by the laws of the State; this process of mediation presupposes that man can know truth or can come into relation with the universal by his will, and also by his intellect; the communication of one's convictions to others; how individual opinion becomes universal conviction; justice (or the securing to each the result of his deeds) essential to industrial society; results of its failure; effect of fictitious money.

The poet's theme is not exhausted, and, therefore, the poem is not completed. Such, my dear H., was the conclusion of our last letter. The reason assigned was that the proposition, man cannot know truth, places the individual who entertains it as his conviction in conflict with the entire content of self-conscious intelligence. This content includes, according to our analysis, not merely the objects of rational aspiration for the individual, but also, in the sphere of *realization*, the family, society, and the State. Leaving out of view for a moment that other world, the sphere of actuality—also mentioned in a former letter—that spans the

to accept as a fair specimen the result of the labors of the other if the subject treated bears traces of mutilation. But, above all, as any serious attempt to make you believe that the headless and wingless specimen was complete as Nature produced it, would only excite your derision, still more should the dogmatic assertions of the critic, though ever so persistent, fail to mar your appreciation of a great work of art, but simply serve as "ear-marks" by which you discern his own quality.

real world as its empyrean, it is obvious that the poem would be but a meagre fragment if it ended with the presentation of the collision, either between Faust and his conviction—that is, between his aspiration to know and his conviction that he cannot know—or between Faust and the family—that is, between the man who denies the existence of reason, of truth, and the family—an institution of reason—the embodiment of truth. To exhaust the theme, therefore, even as far as the world of reality is concerned, it is obvious that the poet has to present Faust in collision with society, and finally Faust in collision with the State—as both of these institutions are but embodiments or realizations of the same intelligence.

In a note to Letter IX you find a statement of the process of mediation involved in the family. This institution presupposes the existence of both Society and the State, but the former more immediately than the latter. The process itself we observe to consist in the continual becoming of individuality by the continual cancellation thereof. We traced the individual up to the point where the isolated singleness of his being broadens out into a husband, a father, and the head of a family. But the process of mediation does not stop here. As the head of a family, he stands charged by every instinct of his manhood with the protection of each and every one of its members—not merely against danger, but against want in any form. To accomplish this, he realizes, or, what is the same thing, he enters into what we have called the presupposition of the family—society. Of course, dear H., I do not mean society from its social or emotional side, but the social organization as the system of productive industry.

Productive Industry.—This system of the modern world, by which is meant free industry, is an organic totality. Its final end is the production of the means to supply the wants of that world, and thus to guarantee its existence against physical necessity. This reasonable end permeates the totality, and secures to each member a rational existence or sphere of action. As an organic totality it is automatic in its functions; every means is an end, and every end is a means, and thus it elaborates every means posited by the end of its existence.

Waste, either in the form of misapplication of its exertion, or in the form of misapplication of the means produced, negates the

rationality of that exertion. Hence economy is the first law of its activity.

But the earth presents different degrees of facility for different products in different localities, and different individuals possess different degrees of aptitude to avail themselves of these facilities. Hence economy, which demands the largest product for the least exertion, produces the various avocations, each devoted to the production of a special means, or a special class of means, to supply a special want, or a special class of wants. But each individual producer in any one of these avocations has all the wants in kind that are to be supplied. Hence all the avocations are necessary to supply the wants of each individual, and the one avocation in which the individual is productive supplies the particular want of all, or many, with the particular means produced by that avocation. Thus the system of wants—Nurture, Amusement, and Culture of the individual members—presupposes the system of avocations of productive industry as a whole. But as each produces for all, and all for each, exchange of products alone can bring together Means and Want. This, however, is possible only if any one of the means, as such, can be expressed in the terms of all the rest. But as *all* the means produced supply all the wants, and all the wants demand *all* the means, any one is capable of this. They are all means alike, and the common end furnishes the common measure to determine the relative value of each in terms of all the rest. What specific one of the means is to be employed in practice at any given time—this is determined by the law of economy of the time and the locality.

The further specialization of the function of exchange into the various avocations of commerce, such as banking, transportation, insurance, etc., follows from the law of existence (autonomy) or the law of activity (economy), and do not concern us here.

It is the means of exchange, as an integral part of the system of means produced by industry to supply the system of wants, that requires our attention. It is such a means produced and determined by and for such a rational system, supplied with a true certificate as to the quality and quantity of the given sample; that is, money—the money of fact, truth, and reason. In it, as the product of the system and its end, that system is self-determined and not determined from without.

This system, as stated, is rational. It derives this content from the end of its existence, and that is the maintenance of the rational beings of whom it is composed. These beings enter as potentially rational beings—that is, as potentially free. They choose each the avocation the most reasonable for him. They enter this system, not to lose this potentiality, but to develop it into a rational existence. This furnishes the essential determination of every relation involved within the totality.

To announce these determinations and to give them reality for the individual, to enforce them, is the function of the State. Its will, when announced, is the law, which, thus filled with this rational content, is the rational will of a people, and this will, thus imbued with this content, when enforced, is justice for the individual. Through it, or in it, the want and the means are united into the one end—the existence of a rational being. That is to say, by it the deed of the individual and its result are assured to him, and become the means for his existence.

It is into this system that the individual enters, and through it the process of mediation which transforms individuality into citizenship is completed; step by step his individuality is elaborated into universality until it is imbued with the rational, the universal will of the State. As individual he becomes the head of the family. As such, the well-being of that family is his rational aim. His individual well-being is bound up with the well-being of three, five, ten, or more. He next enters the industrial totality. The end of its existence is to supply the wants of him and his, no less than the wants of every member of the totality. The result of his exertion becomes a part of the general resources for all, and the exertions of all become the resources for the general wants of him and his. His individual contribution, the result of his act, is mediated through the contributions of all, and reciprocally the contributions of all are mediated through his. In accepting, and, what is the same thing, guaranteeing this mediation, he is a citizen of the State—the incorporated will of the totality imbued with its rational end, the existence of free beings. In this the general will, clothed with the power of the totality, exists for him, and reciprocally he for it. For him, in that it recognizes his act, the embodiment of his will as its (the State's) own, as the embodiment of its own will, as lawful, and guarantees its existence—protection.

He for it, in accepting the general will as the content of his individuality, his caprice (rendering obedience to the laws), and in pledging his existence (life, fortune, and sacred honor) for the maintenance of the State. Thus, and thus only, is the individual universal and the universal individual—the individual will has its power in the universal, and the universal its reality in the individual.

NORM I.—The process of mediation here sketched in its main logical elements rests upon and is the product of reason—the ability of man to know and produce truth—to come into ideal relation with the universal. I, the individual, hit upon a thought which sways my conviction, which looks absolutely true to me. I communicate it to you; it sways your conviction—it looks true to you. We then believe alike—have but one conviction, although we are two wholly distinct individuals. We communicate the same thought to a hundred—a thousand; it exercises the same effect upon them with the same result—reducing them to one mind. It is communicated to millions—to hundreds of millions (this is not overstating the fact in regard to the thoughts of Euclid, Homer, Shakespeare, and the like)—and the same result follows. This illustrates what I mean by the universality of truth or the universal—the basis of conviction, of subjecting the individual to truth, of making a many one, or a one many, without destroying the one. Of course, the possibility of the existence of a general will, of a general purpose, rests upon the possibility of the existence for man of this universal, that can sway and reduce to unity the different individual convictions and opinions. Without this, the individual will will be the bearer of its individual purpose determined by the individual opinion.

NORM II.—From what precedes, we have the following results:

1. A guarantee of justice is the necessary presupposition of the system of productive industry—of industrial society.

2. A failure of justice withdraws the motive for rational exertion from productive industry. Result—destruction of industry.

3. A failure of industry is: 1st. A failure of the material resources of the State. 2d. It is the failure of the process which contains the mediation through which the individual becomes a citizen—becomes imbued with the universal, with the truth of his existence expressed or embodied in the State. Result 1st. Failure of the vital essence of the State. Result 2d. A failure of the development of the potential rationality of the individual into a reality—of his caprice into freedom—of his physical life into a rational existence.

4. A failure of industry, as above, is a failure of the material resources of the State (see general head III), of its revenue payable with the means of exchange. You supply this from without. This withdraws a motive from production to supply a want (means of exchange) inherent in the system. Result 1st. Increase of the evils you seek to remedy—that is, decrease of production. Result 2d. Increase of the effective power of causes that produce results 1, 2, and 3.

5. The means of exchange is a want that springs from the system of productive industry. Outside of that system it has no existence. Result 1st. The means you supply from without are fictitious. Result 2d. As a want that springs from the system, it presupposes that system; but supplied from without, it destroys the vital powers of that system, and hence itself its own presupposition.

XI.

Contents: The family charged with the (a) production, (b) nurture, (c) amusement, (d) and culture of the individual; society charged with the production of the means to supply the wants of the family; the State charged with the guarantee of justice or the return of the result of the individual act upon the individual as his own; the criminal and the beggar are in conflict with this or that law of the State, but not with the State as a whole; but Faust denies the reality of all rational institutions; for him the State is destitute of authority; a State in which the citizens do not recognize the necessity of its determinations is ripe for revolution; it is an embodiment of unreason; Faust must enter such a State in order to manifest his conviction; *first*, we must have Faust in conflict with industrial society (paper-money scheme); and *second*, in conflict with the State as a sovereignty.

In my last, dear H., I stated something in relation to society as an industrial whole, and followed it up to the point where it unites with its presupposition, the State. This we found to be the realized rational will or the general will of the social totality. Into this we traced the individual from the *family*—charged with his production, nurture, amusement, and culture up to the time when he himself becomes productive—into *society*, charged with producing the means wherewith the wants of the family are supplied—and thus into the *State*, charged with the guarantee of justice, with the guarantee of his rational existence, by returning the result of his individual act, lost apparently in the general resources produced by the industrial totality—to him the individual, as his own. If the act is good, in harmony with the general will of the State, the law of the land, he is entitled to the result; whatever is created thereby is his. If the act is bad, in violation of the general will, he is still entitled to it—*i. e.*, to the result, and the State brings it home to him.

In either case he is a citizen, and not in conflict with society or the State as such. The criminal and the beggar are in conflict with this or that law of the State, but not with the State as a whole, or with society as a whole. They are still positive quantities in either, if only in the capacity of increasing the general want, which in the system before us is not negative, but the perennial fountain of rational exertion.

To be in collision with these institutions, as institutions, it would appear, therefore, that the individual must be a rebel.

But the rebel, while he denies this or that State, labors to establish *a* State, and thus attributes validity to the State as such

This, however, is quite a different position from what is occupied by the man who denies the possibility of reason, the possibility of truth to man. He denies the validity, not of this or that State, but of the *State as such*—of the entire mediation involved in the family, in society, and the State, through which the individual becomes a citizen, a free rational existence, and the State a reality. In his view the State, in itself, as we have seen, the embodiment of the rational will of a people, becomes the embodiment of the mere arbitrary will of a people—wholly destitute of authority as against the will of the individual, and therefore non-existent.

But the State as such is the embodiment of the rational will of a people, the general will filled or imbued with and controlled by reason. All its functions are derived from this, and have for their final end the realization of the determinations of this rational will, from day to day, in the laws and regulations of the realm, in order that justice may be a reality for the citizen.

The general will, however, can only be imbued with rational determinations in so far as these have become developed, in the consciousness of the social totality—only in so far as that totality has become self-conscious. But in the world of reality, in time, this can only be imperfect at any given period. Hence there is a possibility that a given State may be largely the embodiment of unreason, and such a State, while it would produce the conviction of Faust on the one hand, would furnish an appropriate arena for the activity dominated by that conviction on the other.

It is in such a State, and such a State alone, dear H., that we can look for the elements that will give power to Faust to sustain his side of the collision; for you will observe the conviction announced is the pure abstract negative. The rebel negates the State against which he rebels, but his power is derived from affirming the State as such. This affirmation is the basis of association, of combining with others for the overthrow of the State rebelled against.

But if there is no truth for man, pray what becomes of conviction? If no conviction, what of free association, of free co-operation for the attainment of an end requiring co-operation?

It is obvious, therefore, that the theme demands that Faust should find within the State an environment, so to speak, in harmony with his conviction. But that would place the collision

not between Faust and the State, as it exists in the world of reality, but between Faust plus whatever unreason might be found embodied in the State, on the one side, and the rational elements of that State (for without some rational elements it could not exist), plus the State as such, the actual, the ideal State, on the other. While this collision, therefore, still belongs to the sphere of reality, it at the same time presents the bridge, the transition by which we pass over into the sphere of actuality indicated in our analysis.

Again, the question arises, How is a collision between Faust and society, as a whole, possible? for that is the very essence of the conviction of Faust: it negates the organic totality as such. Society, it is true, is an organic totality, but the principle of its organism is implicit, incorporated, appears nowhere in that totality as a distinct, explicit, independent reality. This principle is justice, as we have seen, but justice is the function of the State. Hence, in order that the collision may be real, it must assume the form:

First, Faust in collision with the State as the guarantee of the organic principle of the industrial totality—industrial society.

Second, Faust in collision with the State as such, with the State as a sovereignty.

With these reflections fairly before our minds, dear H., let us proceed to examine what the poet presents us.

Before doing so, however, permit me to call your attention to a remark made in a former letter. By reference to the one containing the analysis of the sphere of manifestation, you will find it stated that the conviction of Faust does not affect immediately the third relation which the individual sustains to the content of self-conscious intelligence—namely, aspiration toward the true, the good, and the beautiful. I deem it advisable to refresh your memory in regard to this remark, for the reason that the absorbing effect which the relation which Faust sustained to the family during the first part of the poem was well calculated to dim, if not to obscure, this very important element, not merely in his character, but also in our appreciation thereof.

It is highly important, however, that we should remember that it is there, dimmed, obscured for a time, if you will, but not eradi-

cated nor eradicable. It is inherent, constitutive alike of the character of Faust, human nature, and the poem.

XII.

Contents: The Holy German Empire; Mephisto as court fool, the representative of the "third estate"; the two classes that support the throne and take for recompense the church and State; justice has vanished from the realm; the results told by the chancellor, commander-in-chief, treasurer, and steward; the fool thinks that it is not justice that is wanting, but money, or, at least, cunningly diverts the attention from the true want, that of justice; treat the symptom rather than the disease; "The want is money: get it."

At the conclusion of our last I was about to proceed with the examination of the poem when it occurred to me that we were in danger of overlooking a matter of some importance, and now I find another fact that we ought to remember, and that is, that the poet spoke and wrote in German—was, in fact, a German by birth and nativity. This, however, is not so important, as the circumstance that the German people, even in the poet's day, had a political organization somewhat unique among the political organizations of the earth.

Indeed, so early in the poem as in the scene in Auerbach's Cellar we are informed by one Brander that it ought to be a cause for self-congratulation, nay, of thanksgiving to Almighty God every morning before breakfast, so to speak, that no one needs to pay the least attention to the Empire.

But let us step over and see. See Faust introduce himself under his *alias* Mephisto—and it may be as well for our own behoof to observe that he does not deem it advisable to lay this *alias* aside throughout the first two scenes. Obviously on the alert to understand the lay of the land before he ventures abroad, see him introduce himself and be welcome to the highly important function of court-fool! Do not smile, my friend; it was the only function assignable to a representative of the third estate in the vicinity of the throne, or even in hearing distance thereof, for long centuries of human history. Yes, even such has been the lot of man! Court-fool! Well, it was not a very exalted position, nor yet a very authoritative rostrum from which the consciousness of the people had to voice its mandates to itself; still, something better than dumb silence. Indeed, important enough it would

seem to deserve notice and even answer from the very chancellor of the realm himself. Hear him: "Two classes only have arisen in the Emperor's ancient dominion, and they support worthily the throne—the priests and the knights. Every calamity they forefend and take as humble recompense the Church and the State."

Talk to us of public opinion, a third estate, or even hint at such!

"Atheist, heterodoxy, witchcraft, the very ruin of land and people. *Nature, Spirit!* Is that language for Christian ears? Why do we burn atheists at the stake but because such language is highly dangerous? Nature is sin, spirit is devil, and between them they hatch naught but doubt and evil," says he.

This State, so marvellously defended against every calamity, as we are thus assured by his Excellency the Chancellor, is, nevertheless, strangely out of joint. Nay, he himself, this very Excellency or Accidency, has but now informed his Majesty the Emperor, after the most elaborate compliment, "that Justice, the thing loved, wished for, sought after, nay, demanded by all men, has vanished from the realm. The State is one vast hurly-burly of lawlessness."

One steals a herd of cattle, another a wife, another the sacred vessels, the chandelier, the very cross from the altar, and publicly boasts his deed unpunished. Nay, the judge upon the bench divides the spoil with the thief. "We must find some remedy. Where all are bent on mischief, and all suffer, the Majesty of the throne itself will be in danger," thinks this wise man.

The commander-in-chief reports the army but one step removed from open mutiny, and is of the opinion that if the State were not owing the hired soldiers some back pay, they would take to their heels. But as it is they are content to plunder the people whom they are hired to protect. The treasurer reports that so many rights and privileges have been given—frittered away—that there is nothing left to which the State has any right. Every one grasps and gathers for his private coffer, and our strong-box is and remains empty.

Indeed, this has arrived at such a pass that the very cellar and kitchen threaten to suspend performing their functions for the royal table itself. Obviously, my friend, not a very high specimen of rational reality, this State of ours.

What wonder that his Majesty, after listening to these highly

edifying reports as to the condition of affairs, turns to the fool with:

"Say, fool, can't you help out these gentlemen with some additional case of misery?"

Fool. "I? No indeed, to see the splendor surrounding thee and thine! What could be wanting? Confidence? Where Majesty resistlessly commands, where power at hand destroys the inimicable, where good-will, strengthened by understanding and industry manifold, is at hand,

What could for evil be combining.

Spread darkness where such stars are shining.

Alas, your Majesty! where, into what corner, can you look in this world but that you see some want? One lacks this, the other that, but here it seems the thing wanted is money."

"Of course you cannot rake it together in the street. Still wisdom knows how to obtain what is deepest buried. In mountain veins, beneath the foundation of ancient walls, both minted and unminted gold is found. And do you ask who brings it into the light of day? I answer, The spiritual power of your man of talent."

You will observe, my friend, that the want of justice, the thing loved, wished for, sought after, nay, demanded by all men, the want which one would presume the most imperative for the existence of society, and which, once supplied in some reasonable degree, might, peradventure, supply all the rest, this want of wants, the very root, the seed-grain of all the rest—this want is not mentioned by Mephisto. Nay, looked at with our eyes open, it would appear that financial and industrial anarchy is but the result of a failure of justice (see Letter X). Not only this, but it is the method which the industrial totality as an organism has of expressing that failure. And beyond that it is the method employed by that totality to serve notice upon those whom it may concern, that such failure shall not be always. Was it for Mephisto, think you, to call attention to this?

So having finished the hysterical unreason of his Excellency the Chancellor, who had exploded, at hearing the expression "spiritual power of your man of talent," with a piece of two-edged sarcasm, and having been checked by his Majesty with "What do you

mean with such a lent sermon? Will it supply our wants? I am tired of hearing the everlasting how and when. The want is money—all right, get it!"—meant apparently as much or more for the Chancellor as for Mephisto—the latter continues: "I'll get all you want; nay, more. Although the thing is easy enough, still it has its difficulties. It lies about in heaps, but to get hold of it, that is the trick. Where is the man that knows it? Just think for a moment—think how, during the fearful days when human inundations swept over land and people, one and the other, in the terror of the moment, hid, buried his precious wealth. So it was in the days of the mighty Romans, and from that time down to this very day. All this lies still buried in the ground; but the ground belongs to the Emperor, by right of eminent domain, and he shall have the treasure."

In all this, my friend, you will observe how skilfully Mephisto succeeds in forging the issue—in substituting the symptom for the disease, as the doctors would say. Yes, more, is already busily preparing the poisonous anodyne, to cheat the patient, to lull him to rest, to allay the paroxysm, the only sign of health left in the system upon which alone any hope of recovery could be based. In the report of the Chancellor to the Emperor the poet presents the origin and source of the evil—a failure of justice. The commander-in-chief elaborates its effects upon the army; the treasurer upon the treasury; and the general steward brings them home, so to speak, to the bed and board of his Majesty. But what wonder that a sovereign opens the very session of his cabinet at which this state of affairs is presented, after the courtesy of a welcome is despatched, with the half reproachful question:

"But tell, me gentlemen, what is the reason that in these bright days, days which we had intended to have free from care, which we had dedicated to pleasant recreation and enjoyment—why is it, I ask, that we should sit here and worry ourselves with business, with consultations—why is it? Still, as you think it cannot be avoided, I have consented, and a session may proceed."

I say what wonder that such a sovereign should appreciate the want that threatens his cellar, his kitchen, and his table, much more readily than the want that merely converts his empire into an anarchy? Besides, the want of society, justice, as we are informed, and truthfully informed, by the Chancellor, can only

emanate from the sovereign himself, while the remedy suggested is so easy, can in point of fact be abundantly supplied by the—Fool.

Don't it strike you as very natural that such a sovereign should find that (as suggested by the fool) "The want is money—get it"? And herewith the council stands adjourned.

XIII.

Contents: If they had the philosopher's stone, the stone would lack the philosopher; the fool's gospel: get money as preferable to justice; the Empire a State on the verge of revolution, a tinder-box only needing a single spark to fire its contents; the fool moistens the tinder with money and wards off revolution by this means; the fool's gospel begets fool money; the State fails to perform its essential function and provide justice; the consequence is violence and robbery everywhere prevalent; productive industry ceases and the finances become deranged as a further symptom; Faust's agnostic conviction, practically realized in Mephistopheles, the denier of all rationally ordered existence in the form of family, society, State, and church, substitutes one of the consequences of this failure of justice for the true cause and suggests that the want of money is the only evil, and that its remedy is an issue of paper money based on the possibilities of future production; but the State's business is not to supply the products of industry; society, as the aggregate of free industrial units, should do this; if the State does this, it destroys the industrial freedom of the individual and deprives him of the culture essential to the development of his manhood; if the value of the products of industry is to be measured by a standard not furnished by industry itself (i. e., by "flat money"), all accurate ascertainment of true values becomes impossible; no one can tell what the products of his industry will bring him in exchange for the products of others; the arbitrary will of the State makes or unmakes the standard, and labor finds itself furnishing real values for fictitious values and is demoralized; industry relaxes and a spirit of speculation becomes rife; hence in Act IV, Goethe shows us the effect of the fool's remedy to be ultimate anarchy and revolution; but the present effect is apparently to make all happy; "one half the world carouses and the other half struts about in fine clothing; while cooking and roasting go on in the kitchens and the crowd rushes to the bakers, the butchers, and the saloons."

In our last, dear H., we observed the surroundings into which Faust has entered. Keeping our eyes upon this, we paid no attention to the soundings which out of abundant precaution that gentleman takes in that scene to right and left in order to ascertain the course of the channel. But when we hear him at the close musing to himself with peculiar chuckle, "A precious lot! how desert and well-being depend the one upon the other, that never enters their noddles; had they the Philosopher's stone in the hollow of their hand, the stone would lack the Philosopher"—we may rest assured that every point of the compass is fairly

teeing to it its organic principle, justice, supplies it in lieu thereof with paper money. Paper money to supply the place of justice! Well, what is the event? How did society thrive under this new gospel? Let us go and see (Act IV, scene 1.):

Meph. "On my journeyings it did not escape my attention that our worthy Emperor is in an awkward situation. You remember him? At a time when you and I amused him and filled both his hands with false wealth, why the whole world was at his feet. You know he came to the throne when quite young, and was pleased to commit the egregious blunder to believe that a person can govern an empire and enjoy life at one and the same time."

F. "Egregious error."

M. "Well, he enjoyed life—and how? In the mean time the State fell into anarchy, where great and small, right and left, were at feud; brother slew or banished brother; castle was arrayed against castle; city against city; trade against nobility; the bishop against chapter and congregation. Wherever two met, they were enemies. In the churches, death and murder; beyond the city's gates, merchant and traveller as good as lost; for to live meant—defend thyself. Well, that went at a high rate."

F. "Went? It hobbled, fell down, jumped up again, threw a somersault, then tumbled along in an inextricable, hideous coil."

M. "And no one dared to say one word against such a state of affairs, for every one wanted to be, and could be, boss. The most insignificant idiot was accounted a full stature of a man."

"The want is money; get it." That's the remedy.

And pray, what is the reason that every one should not be boss? Don't he have a will? Is not his will as good as that of any mortal man born of woman? Are we not all free and equal? With no truth attainable to man, to convince, to convict the individual of the idiocy of his caprice—but what is the use of endless repetition?

This, then, is the event for society in its conflict with the conviction of Faust—but not just yet. This is the ultimate event, but its immediate form, the cloak that hides that ultimate, bears quite a different aspect. Let us see that too (Act I, scene 4. *Second Part of Faust*):

Steward (speaking). "Most serene, I never in my wildest dreams expected that it would be my happy lot to make report of fortune

such as elates me now! The last account is settled and receipted. The usurer's claws are pared. I feel as one relieved from the pains of hell. Heaven has no brighter days than this."

General. "Arrears are paid, the whole army is re-enlisted, the soldiers feel fresh blood in their veins, and landlords and wenches have a thriving time."

Emperor. "What now, my man? Your breast heaves, your brow is smooth of wrinkles; you approach as if borne on the wings of joy."

Treasurer. "Inquire of them; they did it all."

Faust. "The Chancellor it behooves to explain the transaction."

Chancellor. "Ah, happy me, in my old age; look and listen. See here, the faithful leaf that has transformed all our woe into weal,"

He says, exhibiting the "note" that we have seen. For it appears that the whole transaction was palmed off upon the sovereign during a carouse—the carnival—to be noticed hereafter. For, in the judgment of the poet, the character of the deed was not to be believed as emanating from the cool, sober judgment of any mortal that was ever called to govern. But the thing having been done, and the effect being apparently so happy—

Treasurer. "Your Majesty can form no conception what good it has done your people—how happy it has made society. Look at your city, but yesterday decaying, slumberous as a graveyard; see the life in its streets, how everything rushes, everybody enjoying themselves. Your name, although long since a talisman of good fortune, was never received with such happy greeting before."

Steward. "Besides, you could not recall them if you wanted to; they spread abroad with the rapidity of lightning. The money-changers keep open house, and every note is honored with gold or silver—of course at a discount. Then the crowd rushes to the bakers, the butchers, the saloons. One half the world seems to think of nothing but carousing, while the other half struts the streets in brand new toggery; the haberdasher measures and cuts cloth; the tailors sew. 'Long live the Emperor!' comes echoing from the cellars with the fumes of cooking, roasting, and the clatter of kitchen gear."

This is the result *now* as presented to his Majesty, who therefore

remarks, quite innocently: "As much as I am surprised at it, I have to let the matter take its course." What else can a fool-led sovereign do?

(*To be continued.*)

SYMPNEUMATA;¹

A Report of the Contents of a Work by Lawrence Oliphant.

BY SARA CARR UPTON.

In a few words of preface the author introduces his book as suggesting a basis of relative truth for the understanding of human life.

He disclaims apology for the necessary assumptions in his statements to follow, but regrets the difficulty which he finds in explaining to others that such assumptions are due to the imperative force with which the conceptions stood forth to his mind; and he goes on to say that the immense conviction which here finds voice does so crudely, because the faculties through which it approaches the reader are incomplete.

The reader may humbly grant that his faculties for receiving are incomplete, but this does not make it quite clear why the writer's faculties could not have rendered many troublesome sentences less involved.

The plea for indulgence for the statements with authority has a certain reason, and courtesy will grant it, with the mental reservation that later on the intellect will claim its right to perceive clearly their logic.

We must also ask the reader to remember that the present abstract of Mr. Oliphant's book suffers from the same complication of sentences. This is necessarily so, since we have chosen to use his own words to express his own ideas wherever possible. In this way something is lost, indeed, but much is gained.

¹ *Sympneumata, or Evolutionary Forces now active in Man.* Edited by Lawrence Oliphant. William Blackwood & Sons, Edinburgh and London, 1885.

CHAPTER I.

THE EARTHLY MALADY.

He first considers the Creation and the Fall of man.

The literal belief in the first of Genesis that the whole creation was finished and rounded off in six of our days, and that our first mother brought simple ruin to the human race from the act of eating an apple that was not ripe for her, is the direct consequence of the gross materiality that arose from man's fall, as Mr. Oliphant interprets it. He does not take the first chapter of Genesis as his text. He is far too well versed in the bibles of the world to choose any special one, but he uses it as he does other scripture, and wherever it supports his argument. His theory is that the infant human race was created with the divine vitality playing upon it, and working in its interior organism outward to its surfaces.

The "fall" came from the chosen and conscious opening of the human organization, by its own will, to influences from the lower animal creation, and thus proceeded from outward surfaces to the inward organism. This caused an opposition and conflict of current in which the human body would have perished, had not its outer casing become solid, in order by this change to preserve the inner organism of man still permeable by the divine vitality. And Genesis, iii, 21, is interpreted to mean that God made them coats of skins of animals, or substituted the animal accretion of skin for their fluid and luminous condition in the Garden of Eden. A passage from the Kabbala is quoted in Chapter IV, which says: "When Adam dwelt in the Garden of Eden he was dressed in a celestial garment, which is a garment of heavenly light." Thus an arrest in true human evolution occurred, the fluidity of the human body was lost, and man's consciousness of his inner processes became closed, while his dominant consciousness began to reside in the outer activities of the overlying system by which the lower creation proclaimed affinity with him. Thus the conflict of currents in man, the divine and the animal, always remains. His covering of matter is swung to the vibration of the animal world, and is reacted on by the divine-human frame within, though the door has never been wholly closed against a reassertion of true vitality. The formation donned by the human

frame, as a bulwark for its inner life, was such a body as might have been the crown of a complete evolution of the lower animal creation.

Thus the evolutionary or Darwinian doctrine is the surface truth. The modern scientific world finds, as it penetrates deeper into organic mysteries, that relation between humanity and the lower creation which represents to its imagination the totality of truth with regard to the human organism. The apprehension that this husk is merely an outer shell of every component atom of the visible body, and composed of the gross elements of an external and solidified brute accretion, is necessary for the true understanding of life, and this truth contains the simple philosophy of the phenomena called death. For a time the outer and inner man grow together, but as the growth of the real man and of the essence-forms of his organism can never pause, a moment inevitably comes when the compression of the organ coverings, which are composed of low matter, will cramp the fine expanding matter of the man himself, and must be gotten rid of. Gradual death, which men call old age, is the gradual growth of the finer matter of the man, which, during vast ages of past history, has been always obliged to withdraw itself from its coverings away from the earth. Full human evolution not having been a terrestrial possibility, death has prevailed.

But Mr. Oliphant foresees in the ages whose coming now begins, a new phase of terrestrial existence. That part of man which now withdraws from the body at death is fast growing in its race history toward maturity, and will soon begin to put forth force that will subdue the animal side. The future service of man to the globe will not cease with a visible discarding of the corrupting flesh, but on dissolving his covering of earth. He will in his new phase be visible to all of his kind. And this will occur with the natural processes of evolutionary laws which eternally operate in his organism.

CHAPTER II.

THE DIVINE DESCENT.

Mr. Oliphant says that the century in which we live witnesses the development in man of an acute sensitiveness for perceiving

the quality of the finer sensations of his own physical organism. This fact is the result of a silent evolution ; and the present is the end of the period, whose beginning disappears in the infinite remoteness of the past eras.

A return to the conditions under which the divine vitality plays through the human organism is now first possible. Thus the return of the faculty, and the power to test and perceive it, are coincident. The immanence of God in man, so much asserted and so little felt, becomes a physical fact ; as truly physical as any emotion which we know—love, heroism, fear, jealousy—but acting upon the surface with an intensity superior to that of any known sensation. Its quality is that of sex-duality, and it touches man with a sense of infinite purity which makes him aware that he is in organic rapport with a copartner of these divine influxes, whose being melts into the inner spaces of his own and completes those forms of his which receive this life from God. It is impossible for any human being to confound this emotional sensation with any other. Man is now ready, without and within, for the presence of that God who comes announcing himself as Father-Mother, Two-in-One, showing each human creature to himself as a divine being before a divine God, in service of the world. The moral and physical experience that generates and confirms the conviction that such are the central pivots of life's true philosophy, may be gained either as a gift or by a struggle.

CHAPTER III.

THE INVISIBLE BATTLE.

The earth-man (the human race as it is) has evolved unevenly as to the different parts of his nature. In the last few generations the intensification we have spoken of in his inner growth has specially vitalized his intellect. The secret fountain of his spirit, the sympneumatic influx, has fertilized the soil of his mentality. Hence we see a growth which is one-sided, although it gives promise of a higher moral condition than has yet been known, by bringing an increased sense of individual duty to mankind, and has yielded greater intellectual, rational, and inventive development than ever before realized. But because as yet many of the keenest thinkers close themselves against the investigation of their

moral impulses, and fail, therefore, to learn the dependence of their mental and physical faculties upon them, the general growth still remains stunted, and the food of all true thought and reason is lost by the suppression of the faculties for its use. Those who aspire to gain the fulfilment of the human evolutionary movement of their time find that they must master, as a first study, the mode of motion of the affectional forces. And, as the preliminary to this study, all conflicting conditions—*viz.*: all previous opinions, conclusions, social prejudices, religious, philosophic, and sceptical convictions and individual conceits, all ties of race, friendship, family, where these are not wholly subservient to the life effort for truth—must be put aside.

In the calm pause of mental expectation which follows, the man, listening at the door of his own nature for an answer, perceives a cry vibrating through his love-forms, claiming the succor of his fellow-men. And mind must now take its place as the machinery between the highest moral forces and the lowest physical needs of humanity. When a man has reached this point, that he is mightily pushed from within to know what ails human nature, and when his will is set to annihilate evil in himself, and let the good live and grow, he becomes aware of a subtle will-force of a distinctly personal character opposing itself to the development of the true emotions, and seeking to impair their purity. To combat this external will-effort to paralyze the will, we must accept hypothetically that there are invasive activities which meet the individual in the shape of exterior resistance to every really lofty and impersonal aim in life. The opposition of these intelligences of baser qualities can be overcome only by meeting them and resisting them, for, by ignoring them, the individual remains under their control. The verification of this hypothesis may be taken or left, but it constantly proves itself. To successfully oppose these currents of vice, the investigator must have less selfish aims than those generally used to give strength of will and to supply the stimulus for high endeavor, such as the personal hopes or fears of his religion, or the self-righteousness which urges an individual to obtain a character for pre-eminent virtue among his fellows. He must be shorn of the selfish stimulants to virtue.

The daily strife in which a man now finds himself embarked finds confirmation in the primitive teachings or early traditions,

which record that the first influences of evil before which the race fell and which preyed on its infancy did not form a part of its original individuality—consciousness—but approached it from without, as from regions beyond its own sphere of activity. No sense becomes more clearly developed during the strife than that the evil in himself, which a new and high power of evolutionary growth is enabling him to reject, is not a part of himself either as a man or as a race, and that the death principle so deeply involved throughout man's physical and spiritual frame is a foreign intrusion.

CHAPTER IV.

THE TESTIMONY OF THE AGES.

Mr. Oliphant states that while reference to records of antiquity may be interesting as confirming the revelations to be obtained as intuitions of the spirit by the now illuminated man, they are not necessary; nor does he think it appears that any better understanding of the spirit of the records would enable us to read there the process of this evolution.

He makes an elaborate appeal to the false gods of heathendom and to the phallic worship to prove the dual nature of God, and then refers to Judaic literature, quoting the received version of the Bible from *Genesis*, *Isaiah*, *Ezekiel*, and *Hosea*, referring to the much-disputed word *Elohim*, and the hidden name called by the Jews, when spoken, *Adonai*. The commentaries on the *Talmud* confirm the dual nature, and the *Targum* repeatedly uses the word *Shechinta*, the feminine God. The Kabbalists use a prayer for the reunion of the Holy One and his Shechinah. In the midst of these quotations a few words are inserted carelessly, pointing to "possibly unconscious" references to the divine dual personality in the New Testament. Such references abound in *Revelations*. This is one of the first signs of the apparent ignoring by Mr. Oliphant of the life of Christ as throwing light on the spiritual path. This looks a little like an obliquity, for, even taken at its lowest value, this record has equal claim to consideration with the ones he quotes from, for the two plain reasons of its more recent date, and as the last written revelation from any Christ which is known and received. It is very important, if we are examining evidence at all, to know what can be found in the

New Testament on this point, and also whether there is reason to suppose that the prophecy of John is more "possibly unconscious" in its references to the dual nature of God-man than the prophecy of Isaiah or Hosea.

CHAPTER V.

THE MESSIANIC PRESENCE.

In this chapter we receive the categorical revelation of what the previous chapters have led us to, and we learn what is the keystone of the arch of the new building.

To Mr. Oliphant the present world-period holds in its bosom the regeneration of the world, waiting to reveal itself to each individual. It is not to be imposed by the genius of prophet or leader, but it is a gift of God to the race. This sounds like the fulfilment of the prophecy in Jeremiah, that after certain days there is promise of a new covenant. "I will put my law in their inward parts, and write it in their hearts, and will be their God and they shall be my people; and they shall teach no more every man his neighbor and every man his brother, saying, 'Know the Lord,' for they all shall know me, from the least unto the greatest, saith the Lord." The age is now ripe, says Mr. Oliphant, to reunite man in physical and mental companionship, each with his complementary being, from whom separation began at the fall. This being he names "*Sympneuma*," a Greek word signifying "breathing with" or "in conjunction with." With this being, communication establishes itself by new developments of the senses of sight, touch, and hearing. And through the establishment of this communication man co-operates with those beings whose mission it is to raise the human race out of its miseries by projecting into it their essence, which is an intenser quality of the divine force than that of the human race.

The sole condition for this inheritance is mental acceptance of the biunity of the Divine nature and the biunity of the human nature created in His image, first as a possibility, and afterward continuing one's education into the perception of this. The intense vitality which God is now pressing down upon us burns with a fuller fire of His sex-completeness than the world could have received before; and unless the men and women of the day

can acquire physical and mental perception of and participation in the active and emotional existence of the being who is their sex-complement—their love—the avenues are closed by which this fact of God can alone impart itself to our consciousness.

Ruskin, another seer, is constantly referring to the possibility of some new vital energy developing itself under the conditions of modern human life.

CHAPTER VI.

LOVE.

The acquirement of this new order of faculty—moral, rational, and physical—requires an apprenticeship of years before the keen perceptive consciousness of what passes in soul and body is attained. That man is ready for the struggle who feels that no other life is worth pursuing than one that holds out hope of a conscious union with the life-currents of the Deity; the power of a marriage in soul, mind, touch, sight with the true being and companion toward whom every instinct of man tends; and proceeding from this marriage the power of so intense an identification with the whole body of humanity that he feels no other use for life can be found than to cast it before the feet of the brother for ceaseless and organic service. As hope and encouragement to enter this path, Mr. Oliphant tells us that living for these things has brought "many"—and presumably the band now surrounding him—into a new world, where new faculties respond to new forces, where experience supersedes hope, and where the work of God goes forward working hourly to the redemption of the planet.

He speaks of the life and death of Christ as "a bomb-shell of penetrating particles which burst upon the world, scattering its myriad germs of slow-ripening moralities upon no region of the human sort so freely as upon those sensitive structures in spirit and body by which the creature responds by sentiment or sensation to currents of sex-life from God above and from the animal life below."

From the time of the insemination into the race of these more potent altruistic germs contained in the teaching of Christ "there have never been wanting choicer natures in each succeeding generation to hold before it increasing purity and self-abnegation in the

sex-affection, in spite of the vice and grossness in which the whole question of passional love has wallowed." He promises that the evolving knowledge of our time will make the mystery clear, and that those of his band have already a keener acquaintance than was ever afforded in any previous period of human history with the divineness into which passion soars, and with the hell on earth which is the consequence of its poisoning or destruction.

CHAPTER VII.

THE SUBSURFACE WORLD.

I see no way to approach the chapter called the subsurface world by any usual or known methods. It may be wild nonsense, but when a thing is asserted that we have no means of proving or judging, except as it is probable or improbable according to everyday opinion, I must make my judgment according as my mind sees immense possibilities for the solution of the problems of life, or sees only material and actual facts of former experience. To my mind, which calls for a meaning between the lines, and under the words, and below the form, I can only say that it may be. It is not impossible, and with finer senses it might be that we could know that there is a subsurface world, a plane of life upon which all beings once met and held intercourse from whatever world or condition they approached. We can conceive that in the earlier period the earth-humanity lived in open consciousness of this plane, which had been originally *the surface plane*, and that it has receded as man has grown more on the surface plane, and has become more dimly conscious of this world, so as to finally deny it. In this subsurface world it seems that, owing to the fluent nature of forms, man could influence, and be influenced by, organisms of others, or by the forms of external nature. The subsurface world was the region in which his evolution was arrested, the plane from which he was to act upon the world around him. From the time of the severance of the divine man into two, where the interior, the woman-form, which was the well-spring and repository of the divine currents in their transmission to man, ceased her work, man—who was to have transmitted these divine currents throughout the inferior creatures, the kingdoms of the beasts, the planet, the elements—lost his dominion and power over them, and the animal

nature which stands the nearest to man in the wonders of the organization, instead of receiving from him of the fountains of life, became to some extent hostile, and began to impel back upon man particles from its vitality. Man, instead of evolving in a manner exclusively human, became human animal. The present terrestrial man is only just becoming capable of understanding how foreign and abnormal to the God-made man is this body of his, which he has taken on from the animal world, and which is the coarse and heavy husking of each organic particle of the man's true frame. This most external framework should be properly a spirit still, and should not be deprived of those attributes which overcome time and space; which attributes men, even in their present grossness, possess as regards the emotions and intellect. It seems that in the process of evolution there must be a return to the true order, and that terrestrial man must lay off this excrescence layer, again become a pure divine spirit, receiving and giving forth divine currents, and having only so much of a body as is necessary in order to establish an organic connection between him and the particular world in the service of which the divine behest retains him. Such a body is assimilated from the finer particles in the atmosphere of that earth, and is the ultimate efflorescence of his God-human form. It is asserted that the subsurface world was already the seat of disorders from other planets, but that it is useless and dangerous for man now to turn his attention to questioning the why and the wherefore of this, which will in time be clear to him.

It suffices to say that though he partly exists semi-consciously in this subsurface world, and though he is open to attack from it, an angel with a flaming sword ever guards the treasure of his divine identity, and the attacks are directed against the inherited body of the animal accretions.

CHAPTER VIII.

THE REVELATION OF SECRETS.

This is the pæan of the Sympneuma, the revelation of the secret of secrets, the key to the termination of the world's distress by revealing its joy. The sore of the world has been its love-centres, which have sought love and have found lust and unlove, and have

sought rest to find strife and hate. Although only one out of ten can accept this secret and test it experimentally, the vitality is pressing upon all, and all are undergoing the same process of change into higher organization of spirit and mind, though they may not understand it. This secret, which is asserted as practically attainable, though perhaps practically indescribable, is that the clear presence and companionship of the other self presses upon the increasing consciousness of all willing individuals. The method of its impress is asserted to vary according to constitutional variations of persons. It selects in each the faculty readiest for acute development, training in one at first the aptitude to see by growth of finer tissue in the nerves of vision; in another playing upon the hidden organs of sound until the ether motions from its finer speech are accurately distinct; using in others the power of touch, to let its substance be felt; in some approaching the surface consciousness of heart, brain, and body, by issuing forth upon it from unimagined organs which fill the regions of the inner man and which wake to unexpected life as they become the highways of holy energies and joys. But in whatever way it comes, it comes to each man as the sweet and perfect possession of the one perfectly beloved being, the whole friend that fills the whole of his nature, the sure joy that makes sure the right to open to joy. Man is conscious that he meets normally and naturally "a race of human persons who dwell like him in the spaces around his planet, who are tied like him to the duties of its progression, who have an organic relation to human life on the planet, and by virtue of this are purely devoted to its every need; and they are and always have been the immediate fountains through which men have sipped their scattered drops of high beliefs and trusts and insights." Man's attitude to the world is altered. He needs nothing for himself, desires no power but to participate in the divine intention of the hour, needs knowledge only for the power to serve, succor, and release, and seeks this end, which for his own service and pleasure has become valueless, as one of a vast fraternity.

He has now a double point of view—he is woman-man, and the processes which were only mental have become emotionally mental. The woman has become man-woman, and around her sea of feeling is built a compassing of strength.

CHAPTER IX.

THE CALL TO WOMAN.

The world's history heretofore has been mostly a history of a male world, and when woman has taken part as actor or prompter, it has mostly been by accident. This arises partly from her incapacity and partly from an instinct in man to restrict her capabilities. Man had retained *his* form, and the animal accretion was on *his* original surface, and *he* suffered the void within. But the woman had no form save the envelope of the Sympleuma's outer form, and had to be torn out of the coverings of herself to be unnaturally recovered. Both suffer in the external world, but the woman is most out of her place. The change that is contemplated in the planets' future life is a radical one, and must involve a complete and organic change of the race. This change comes in man by the reawakening of his slumbering, closed form-system, by the inflow of the feminine vitality in the accession of the Sympleuma's personality. It comes to woman in the awakening of her active powers at the embrace that steals upon her as her Sympleuma's form constructs itself around and in her. Through her he is reopened to the world of fecund womanhood throughout the universes, and through him she is opened to the potent manhood of the whole connected world. The woman is reborn to herself—that self which can only know itself as being when it is open to absorb the potencies of divine biunity and to pass them forth to men. There is a new world being born of intense experiences, fresh physical insight, of vivid sensations, of knowledge sure, because *sensational—experimental*—just at the time when the masses of the human family, and even its finer minds, are accepting the present resources as the final ones. But this change in man is effected solely by virtue of his organic reception of the Sympleuma's organism within his own, and in the woman-halves of men by the pervasion of her system by the male Sympleuma. Through these inmost forms in womankind the divine fertilizations of renewed humanity can alone approach. Man will no longer crave the commerce of the dis severed sexes, nor will he desire children in the present form of the race.

The Sympleuma's presence pervades and satisfies and bids the

2. The free constructing, sustaining, and satisfying play through out such beings of full God-forces.

3. The loss in ancient time upon the earth of the full human capacity for receiving the perfect force.

4. The long subsequent inactivity of the earth-race in regaining its nature.

5. Its incidental helplessness amidst lower forces acting in and around it.

6. Its destiny to complete the race re-education by reattainment in each individual in some great future of its full androgynous constitution.

7. The salient importance of the present years, because they mark the full assimilation of the forms and forces discharged upon the almost unconscious structures (of the race) nearly two thousand years ago (by Christ).

8. The responsibility of each human being to receive by virtue of the power within him a new quality of consciousness which will dwarf old senses till they disappear.

9. The claim that each nature makes to hold itself free to receive in soul, spirit, heart, mind, reason, will, nerves, fluids, and flesh all impulses that meet the consciousness in answer to pure requests for purest life.

10. The capability now developing in men and women for perceiving the companionship of the Sympneuma hourly and daily, which initiates the conscious new departure of each human being.

11. The restriction of womanly activities on earth, which begins to vanish.

12. The past and present intellectualization which has impeded that human growth, which should now supervene.

All these considerations are the preface to all life. He who has made all that precedes his own by sure experience rises for the work of life equipped with fresh vigors. Being thus ready for service, he finds that the nature he now owns dictates a relationship to all human beings which he cannot evade; and he finds that his vigors for service cannot be imprisoned in creeds, modes of thought and reasoning, or personal demands. Such a person solves—by pressure of the love that grows within, which love he is powerless to repress—the question called “social.”

He finds now "I am my brother's keeper" to be the sum of his consciousness, the standard and warrant under which he puts forth every energy and lives his earth career.

It is further prophesied that the duration of man's life will be greatly extended, and that in men and women who begin to know themselves as biune, the sense of the desire for the retirement of the present millions from sin and misery will prevail over the desire to continue peopling the earth after its present fashion.

Such persons will find the instinct for reproduction to pass away. Faithful and inseverable companionships will still exist with increase of worth to man and woman, but often with entire innocence of the relationship of person which would maintain in a painful activity the currents of the decaying unisexual layers. And a partial suspension of race reproduction may be regarded as a possibility. This is consistent with the theory that man's semi-animal layer is being slowly extinguished, and that he now can forbid the entrance of influences from the outer world, because his inner growth can transmit to his external vigors sufficient to regulate accretions of terrestrial particles for his terrestrial life, instead of, as now, having these forced upon him. Each man and woman now married to the spirit which completes them as units of humanity knows no longer the unrest and want that arise from uncompleted humanity; and the sensations of dual growth may engender the waning of all old sense.

The outgrowth of the Sympneumatic frame brings man where he may grow as pure and simple man. Human activities, having been almost exclusively male, have been in fact *half*-human, besides being mixed with brute vitality.

Woman has been purposely bound by swathing clothes to prevent her growing until the resumption of her male envelopes could prepare about her a form to hold divine growths developing from within.

CHAPTER XIII.

THE NEW FACULTY.

This is a long and prosy chapter, with no new setting forth of matter, whose chief point is that the person joined to his Sympneuma is, as it were, "behind the scenes," and has new eyes to judge and appreciate present events and phenomena.

CHAPTER XIV.

SPIRITUAL PHENOMENA.

The summing up of this chapter is that the historic life of our planet resolves itself into inspiration by good spirits and obsession by bad ones, which Mr. Oliphant calls a simpler definition than the conflict of good and evil, light and darkness, virtue and sin, and considers as completely accounting for all the phenomena of life.

The test by which "to try the spirits" is the determination to belong to universal and not to private service.

When the idea that a man's love for his neighbor was the one object to be lived for to the exclusion of all others—worth the sacrifice of life—was first presented to the world—society, priestcraft, government, and learning put the rebel to death. But the thought has grown through the centuries, and the creed, too subtle for the mental grasp of a world under a Roman empire, comes to the mentality of modern men again in a higher form.

Now, there is no question whether to love his kind is good for man, nor whether or not to live and die for truth is good. The proposition now is—clothed also in most confused language in this chapter—that no man is truly living in love, or at the height of his humanity, who is actuated by any other motive than a universal humanitarian one for the good of the race. That human nature throughout the world is one—not many. That, just so far as a man or group of men acts from other motives than humanitarian ones, his nature or theirs is impaired.

Man can now gain the mastership of the occult, sentimental, and transcendental through knowledge of the subsurface world by means of his opened senses renewed through self-ordeal, self-knowledge, and self-judgment.

He reads the whole human story as a current of increasing development.

CHAPTER XV.

THE LATENT MANHOOD.

Mr. Oliphant recognizes the principle that Browning is ever recurring to as the root of the philosophy of life. Through evil to good—all good gained is learned through learning to know

the bad. Mr. Oliphant asserts that a profound inspection of the human problem shows the result of any crime to be a deeper injury to the criminal than to society. His reasoning is that the seed of evil sown through the criminal bears fruit in increase of knowledge to prevent, cure, understand, guide, judge, and thus to love; while to the criminal it brings an accretion of brute formation that hinders and obstructs.

But he holds that we are entering another phase of phenomenal life than that which has heretofore been considered by science and philosophy. Sympneumatic inspiration, through its conscious experiences, is to be the standard by which to measure the results of science, since these instincts are in their quality, intensity, and vigor prophetic, and the revelation of all the mystery that has lain since prehistoric time behind the partial phenomena of human life. The man who accepts them projects the illumination of his whole personal experience of emotion and reason upon the loftiest operations in the world of thought, as well as upon all faiths, reasonings, and seekings after truth in physics and metaphysics. And in respect of each oldest and newest action he ascertains the degree of its help in preparing for the rebirth of the more real human condition that now tinges the horizon of possibility.

CHAPTER XVI.

CHRIST.

The chapter called Christ treats of the advent of woman through Christ, who was the crowning individual instance of human qualities which were absolutely universal, and who was constituted with that purity which precluded him from recognizing tribe, sex, or person as severable from the whole.

The Hebrew law began to recognize the duties and necessities of woman as something different from a mere adjunct to male existence, which, in the unmixed Semitic estimate, she remains to this day.

“That reading and rendering of the human spirit, its powers, its developments, its demands, which were projected upon the mind of this world by radiations from the illimitable wealth and unfathomable intensity in the nature of Christ, was the blossom that grew forth from many generations of Hebrew suffering and

endeavor. The *full genius of moral intuition*, concentrated within a human form, had become a phenomenon possible in a race thus consciously prepared to consummate a mighty sign of terrestrial evolution, but, despite all the circumstances which tended to mitigate for the immediate surrounding world, the shock of the first open discharge throughout it, of fully externalized elements of essential potency, it shivered the national form that had produced it, this being too tenaciously interwoven with a tribalism that rejected modification."

These human qualities, as presented in Christ, were the first absolutely universal ones. They held in solution not only the emancipation of the oppressed, but the "attainment by woman of faculties for the projection of long-dormant femininity into the affairs of terrestrial life."

"The Hebrew nation, which, like the aloe plant, died in its effort of fruition, and the iron empire which advanced to strangle the birth it was destined to cradle and transmit, were alike unconscious of the parts they played. Yet the germ of all that is persistent in to-day's civilization, and what strains most vigorously toward completer evolution, was discharged at that epoch throughout the layer of the humanitarian body which appears to superficial sight as terrestrial man. A simultaneous organic change occurred whereby the mysteries of man's interior being instituted a quiet process of attack upon his gross external constitution, to pierce and penetrate it. This action of the inner upon the outer human formation is the greatest verity concerning human phenomena that man of to-day can grasp."

"The little world that took upon its limited mentality the impulse from the new master's mind evinced a clear perception of what his thought implied in the external social form, and essayed at once reorganization on the basis of interministration by men and women, and apprehended completely the identity of woman's spiritual aspiration and destiny with those of man. From that time woman counted for half humanitarian life throughout the region which was for several centuries charged with its development."

"Throughout long centuries of the more ancient progress, the idea of virtue was a negative one, that of abstention from injustice and abstention from excess of inclination and disturbing activity. The positive quality of operative human emotion did

not and does not act through the loftiest orientalism of precept or example."

From the time of Christ the accession of vitality has included the elements which still fever the social mass with their efforts for freedom and service; the elements of the equal right of woman with man to growth and power; of the indissoluble interdependence of man and woman; of distinction of race characteristics, and the annihilation of separate race interests; and all the elements of that complex type of morality, mentality, and physique which is now rapidly establishing itself as the phenomenon of our era.

CHAPTER XVII.

GOD WITH US.

"To find the deepest and truest of their instincts, and to be true to them, is the simple duty which men and women prove themselves for the most part incapable of performing." "Freedom for development and application of pure moral impulse is now the hunger of humanity; mutual coercion and suppression of this impulse is its crime." "Whoever begins to measure acts and facts of life around him by the deepest movements that transpire within him, and will not allow the movements around to impress him except as the fullest movement within gives sanction, knows what ceaseless effort and frequent pain the course entails, and yet that it is the only course of individual progress."

CHAPTER XVIII.

FREEDOM OF THE ENSLAVED.

"The legitimate claim of each person—the claim most difficult to exact of modern societary development—is to be himself. This is the only basis of that perfect altruism which would retrieve society." There are two tendencies among those who lead progress: one to develop higher and subtler qualities painfully because of impressions stamped on mentality from without, social prejudice, religious formulæ, rationalistic dogmatism, and all the rest of the material which man might dominate, but which controls him; and the other tendency to grasp pleasure in recklessness of pure and

noble sentiment, which corrupts and degrades, urging a limited set of faculties to hyper-development and leaving in absolute atrophy the larger wealth of others with which they are endowed. Yet highest growth would transcend pain, and keenest pleasure must be free of debasement. Men must grow toward high perfection, and must live with joy inflowing and outflowing. Whatever in man is pure, true, human, divine, is essentially both progressive and delightful. Both forms of suffering are signs that man is ignorant of the great powers to which he inly grows.

That man will escape from each who will turn faithfully to the gathering ground of all essential forces within his quivering soul. He will find that he belongs to a new race, and that his pain and weakness and folly come from his not knowing this.

"One claim uprears itself in holiest lawfulness, the world's cry for redemption, and lo! the God that meets you in the eternal sanctuary of yourself comes but for that."

CHAPTER XIX.

THE WORK OF THE FREE.

Mr. Oliphant looks for the human race to be actuated and directed by intense passions within them, such as have heretofore been represented only in genius, "This age begins to produce men who can save Man by simply being in the outward life that divine thing which they are at the core." "These, if they leave all else to seek initiation into the ways of their real nature, will become subjects of certain leading experiences that will indissolubly unite them by their sameness, and rejoice them by their infinite variety."

"The incredible phenomena of sympneumatic consciousness constituting the completed capacity of human creatures for sustaining the full impregnation of biune divineness, will change the whole aspect of the world, and change and raise in each the diapason to which he tunes his duties and his pleasures."

"The question of how personal satisfaction shall be possessed is closed, and changes to the demand that his larger self, his entire race, shall possess the capacities with him for perfectness of joy."

"It is not the business of the subjects of these potent phenomena to urge to unreal, because premature, exercise the con-

sciousness of inner vitalization among people in whom it is delayed. It would be both dangerous and futile, and such revelations make true development throughout the societary body by very gentle pressure and percolate very slowly throughout its connected organism. Man is not judge for man; but to questioners, men who yearn, suffer, grow faint, the sufferers that have been, may speak heart-open, offering their release. . . . When once these souls escaped hold full possession of passion more ardent than is told in all romance, and begin to understand the laws of living which it imprints upon the brain, the agreements which appear among the identical institutions begin to create among them, however widely scattered through the earth their duties may be, a new societary form, strictly cohesive, however wide its first attenuation. . . . It is the beginning of a vast people who shall come to save."

"The incapacity for being a stopping-place of pure life-forces marks more than anything the resumption by man of his true qualities of spirit and body. His resumption of the pure sense that he is, in respect of all the powers that constitute him man, recipient and agent, generates a spontaneous estimate of societary phenomena, and in the complete identification of general and personal interests the world reads as a plain book."

"The sense of rivalry in things moral and material having vanished, and the knowledge gained that man's errors arise from the organized mismanagement by the whole society of the world, of the individual life-forces which are its joint capital for action, the mutual judgments of men must cease. . . . Each one will know that, however elevated his little excellence may appear by comparison, he cannot be truly perfect while there is moral malady in any other man; because the currents of moral life, as in true fact of physical, course through the whole humanitarian structure, and convey to each part something of the disturbance that may be localized in any part."

"Men will cease to affirm of themselves and others that they are vicious or virtuous, for they will know, as they experience and perceive tendency to error, that it is the sign of faculty fevered or congested, starved or paralyzed, and the use of such perception and experience is to induce search for the impediments to universal growth which is thus indicated."

"A new era in the history of ministrations now opens for those who offer and for those who take. In this era those who hold that the inheritance of tendency, faculty, and circumstance belongs, like all that comes from God, equally to all mankind, will approach others with apology of desire to impart the force they have reserved, and a prayer to be relieved of that which they have no right to retain."

"The littleness of the intellect of men is inadequate to definitely solve the many-sided problem presented at this time throughout the earth, calling for theory and action, political and social, and the sincere on all sides miscalculate at every step the effects throughout humanitarian men of the measures they advocate." "Therefore, throughout the network of those who claim companionship with higher beings, and who acquire through them knowledge of the absolute incapacity of man's mind to devise fixed plans for humanitarian progress, there will exist no restlessness born of the expectation of definite issue."

"They know that the full solution of the earth problem far transcends present power to grapple with it, and, though they can live for no other purpose than to forward possession by all men of ideas of perfectness, they silence in themselves all clamor for anticipation of the ways of working."

"There exists in the social world no general recognition that men should live simply for God and men. These people, under the inspiration of the ministering influences which surround them, will perceive that they withdraw more and more of necessity from every sympathy with the present methods of social life."

"Yet these children of fire, sons of the ardent genius for an immense morality which the earth has long travailed for and at length brought forth, stand and labor in isolation while there is sign in any place that they are wanted there; and while their work and duty hold them at such post, their gentle sympathies for all that touches men and that men love, and even with men's mistakes and follies, will hold them silent regarding the gulf that opens between their purely universal motives and the narrower personal ones on which perforce at present the greater number base their actions."

In these last pages Mr. Oliphant disclaims for his band—this first growth of the new humanity—all schemings, dreamings, theorizing, doctrinizing, and dogmatisms which he claims shrink away from

the vigorous and direct current of activity which they put forth in the practical performance of every nearest, most obvious, and simple duty.

This union of the theory and practice, the system and the life lived from it, will perhaps be the proof which men may not unjustly require from the assumptions and assertions in Mr. Oliphant's book, and they perhaps admit of no other proof to our present faculties. According to his last phrase, we may look for a new world given to man in the evolution of new faculties and powers whose long delay has made the misery of the planet.

NOTES AND DISCUSSIONS.

SENTENCES IN PROSE AND VERSE.

SELECTIONS BY W. E. CHANNING.

She was of a large enough nature to give gold for silver and never count the cost.—*Bethesda* (a novel by Miss Halsted).

A man loves a woman just in proportion to the amount she exacts from him. If you accept all, and do nothing, he will be absolutely devoted.—*Ibid.*

Through her he found the passion which warms; through him she found the reason that steadies. She no longer was tossed from this to that, but had some things in which she could trust, some ideas by which she could hold firm; and his life was no longer that of an observer from a lonely standpoint, but the intense existence of eager participation, striving for the best.—*Ibid.*

This unity of life means pain as well as joy; to disintegrate a double spiritual life is like disintegrating a physical life, which produces agony. She had suffered it all a thousand times in anticipation; he, man-like, did not know what it meant until it was upon him.—*Ibid.*

To fertilize an arid grief, one must strike deep, even to the waters of truth, which underlie all lives as streams underlie all lands.—*Ibid.*

Superficial treatment cures no disease; it but forces it onward to work destruction on the vital organs. Her desire to find pleasure in exterior things, so that she might forget the hollowness beneath, took from her interior strength.—*Ibid.*

Is there any art that expresses religion so well as music! The craving, the aspiration, the harmony, the insubstantiality, which comes so near being pure spirituality—what more like religion! Then, the innumerable chords, the notes so distant, yet the same.—*Ibid.*

A girl's face which seemed a human type akin to that of the landscape [on the Cornice road]. It was not lacking in strength, but showed a pre-eminent refinement, which was full of passionate sensitiveness.—*Ibid.*

The features were finely cut, and the complexion of a clear pallor, which made more forceful the long eyebrows slightly curving over large hazel eyes, and the golden-brown hair which was drawn simply away from a forehead capable of much serenity. In animation the changes of warm sunshine and soft shadow which characterized the view were here also. But in repose a sadness of expression settled upon the face, often seen in countenances expressing at once youth and earnestness.—*Ibid.*

Her mental horizon reminded her of the desert she had so lately traversed; long sable dunes sweeping away, with no boundary but the sky; waves of sand, changing under the wind, to break only into other tawny waves, and, while changing, ever the same.—*Ibid.*

Her heart slept, as did nature around her, under the starry, purple sky. Presently the dawn would come; and what would the light awaken that was now wrapped in dewy silence! It was winter now; the plant was there, but no bud; what fruit, then, would ripen in the summer sunlight?—*Ibid.*

Within the convex mirror, which was turned to the world on every side, there grew a personality as surely, as silently, as crystals form in the still sea-caves. And this personality had a magnetism which no one understood, least of all, perhaps, herself.—*Ibid.*

It is only the affluence of love, falling like rain upon the just and the unjust, which makes any one the recipient of devotion from another. Love comes to us rather for what we should be than what we are.—*Ibid.*

She was finding out that it is not an infallible rule to do as one would be done by. Some natures are diametrically opposed.—*Ibid.*

On either side ancient and modern villas rose, among shimmering olive-groves, whose leaves stirred in the sunny air, and caught lights never twice the same.—*Ibid.*

Hyacinths and harebells, violets and anemones, and the voluptuous narcissi, passionate as a southern beauty, Nature's unseen incense, rising around them, seemed to have permeated Beth; her liquid eyes were eloquent of mysteries half revealed, of truths whose fragrance came to her as the flower-scents did.—*Ibid.*

Over her face, as she gazed, swept the expression of many unuttered, uncomprehended thoughts. The beauty oppressed while it exalted her. She would have liked to be the life of the earth, the warmth in the air, the light in the sun.—*Ibid.*

Such dainty fingers—feeling fingers—too! Persons have such different hands! Mine, now, they are large, and not a bit pretty; but I can feel, can see with them, as if each finger had an eye. If I were blind, I think I could almost tell the color of your little rose-leaf hands.—*Ibid.*

A slender figure, all in white, with a crimson rose against the throat; a head exultantly carried; a fair face, with dark eyes shining joyously, was what she saw. She could not help smiling as she tucked back a wilful lock of hair. It surely was more golden than usual to-day, because it knew he liked it so.—*Ibid.*

We are alone in the world together; we are outside the limits of society, and our only aim should be to keep our conscience free, our lives noble. Remember, I do not think it any gift of mine that you hold my faith. I do not give it; it is yours.—*Ibid.*

She leaned against the railing, and watched the seething waves, with thoughts which were incoherent and perturbed, and restless as they. The pristine clearness of her mind was beaten to an opaque mass by the repeated shocks of circumstance against emotion. It seemed to her that the whirling, eddying, foaming track would deafen her with its conflict; and yet she must be quick to hear both the voices within and without, and to distinguish which edicts were the right.—*Ibid.*

You talk of suffering being pure waste; I tell you it is pure gain. You talk of self being the motive to exertion; I tell you it is the abnegation of self which has wrought out all that is noble, all that is good and useful.—*Ibid.*

The outline of her face and figure was clearly cut against the dark-blue damask, while an eager ray of sunlight flowed and rested on the bronzed gold of her hair.—*Ibid.*

She let her eyes follow the forms of trees and slender campanili to the deep sky, and rest there with a yearning too impersonal for sorrow or for pleasure. The sea affected her in the same way; the ocean stretch-

ing out to the sky, the sky curving down to the sea, seemed to her like a great truth bending over an earnest mind, and she never wearied of such sublime monotony.—*Ibid.*

The roaring tenor notes, the throbbing pain of the baritone, the earthly despair of the bass, the organ sending its dirge-like tones through the solemn arches, which now echoed to the joyous peal of resurrection, and again to the subsiding hush of peace attained, to all this she responded with a spell-bound intensity; and as at last she bent her head on the cushion before her, who will say that the great yearning in her heart was not a prayer!—*Ibid.*

Her attention was aroused, and this was all he wanted. Indifference is the one thing to be dreaded when one wishes to make a friend. And, during the long hours of resurrecting spring sunshine, while he worked, as well as the starry nights, when he dreamed, he had allowed his fancies to caress the thought of securing a friendship which should indemnify him for the disappointments life had given him to bear.—*Ibid.*

She was in many ways as transparent as crystal to him. He saw her innocence, her purity, with as reverential recognition as Indians would see the limpid ball into which they believe pure hands can roll water.—*Ibid.*

She would as soon suspect an apple-tree of poisoning her as a friend of harming her. Some trees did, she knew, but hers were not of that kind.—*Ibid.*

He was verifying preconceived ideas with a sense of the fitness of things, which was indescribably keen; and Bethesda glided from surprise to surprise in finding that M. d'Isten had a multitude of opinions like hers, only more developed and posed; and that there were a number of points they had each reached with equal certitude by widely diverging paths. Each hour showed how much farther back than their acquaintance dated their mutual tendencies to each other.—*Ibid.*

Madame Mabelle was fairly entangled in the meshes of her silk embroidery. Bethesda sat leaning her head, with its low masses of bronzed gold, against the passionate color. She looked somewhat sad, as usual, in repose. Her hands were crossed listlessly; small, maidenly, firm hands, capable of all devotion, so delicate yet strong were they.—*Ibid.*

The glowing ruby clasping the words, "Let not grass grow on the path of friendship," seemed a direct answer to her doubts. "I wonder who it was made for," mused the girl. . . . "Perhaps for some Christian maiden, whose lover gave her this as a betrothal ring; that diamond might be the

virgin who was enwrapped in the folds of his heart. Or, perhaps, the gem might be a tear, too—it was the symbol of a love which should last through the circle of eternity, even though grief lay in its midst.”—*Ibid.*

Women take so much upon themselves; they feel the weight of the universe, of every man who likes them, upon their shoulders. They never seem to remember that men are also reasonable beings, quite able to take care of themselves . . . Leave each his independence of action, men as well as women . . . If we carry our own trials worthily, it is as much as we are able to do—often more!—*Ibid.*

“Thro’ love to light! Oh, wonderful the way
That leads from darkness to the perfect day!
From darkness and the dolor of the night,
To morning that comes ringing o’er the sea.
Thro’ love to light! thro’ light, O God! to Thee,
Who art the light of love, the eternal light of light.”
R. W. GILDER.—*Ibid.* [motto of last chapter].

DR. EVERARD, TRANSLATOR OF “HERMES TRISMEGISTUS.”

[We have received the following note from Prof. R. E. Thompson, of the University of Pennsylvania.—THE EDITOR.]

The translator of “Hermes Trismegistus,” Dr. John Everard, the translator of “The Divine Pymander”—strictly “Poemander”—was an English divine of the reign of Charles I. In his earlier life he was a Calvinist of the ordinary type, and distinguished chiefly for his zeal in preaching against the Spanish Marriage, for which he was sent to prison, as also “for holding conventicles.” But he afterward fell in with some of the mystical writers, was brought to change his theological perspective, and became as zealous a preacher of that as he had been of Calvinism. But he did not lose his interest in the struggle for liberty. While Laud was still at the height of his power, Dr. Everard foretold his overthrow. “My friends (said he), remember and mark my words; you now see the Bishops high, great, and swelling, grasping all the power of both Church and State into their hands; but if ever you live to see a settled Parliament in England—I mean a Parliament having power in themselves, so that the King may not (as he hitherto hath) at his pleasure break them off, which will be ere long—you shall see the utter downfall of Bishops.” His last summons before the Court of High Commission was just after

that rising of the Scotch which proved to be "the beginning of the end." He reported of his judges: "I do observe by their countenances, their hearts fail; for I see very bad in their eyes." His historian says: "He lived to see Strafford and Canterbury put under the Black Rod [*i. e.*, under arrest, in 1640], and then he was gathered to his fathers."

After his death (in 1641) appeared his "Gospel Treasures Opened, or the Holiest of all Unvailing," edited by Rapha Harford, with the "approbation" of Dr. Thomas Brooke as censor. There are three English editions—1653, 1659, and 1679. A Dutch translation appeared in 1688. The first edition was reprinted by Christopher Saur, of Germantown, in 1757. In 1773 Anthony Benezet extracted from it "A Supposition of Two Drops of Water Reasoning Together," and published it among other mystical tracts. In 1819 a little volume of extracts from his sermons was published in Philadelphia, along with Rapha Harford's account of their author.

To the second and third editions of his sermons are appended translations from Johann Derck, the Anabaptist mystic; from "Dionysius the Areopagite"; from Johann Tauler, and two anonymous authors of the same school. He also translated the "Deutsche Theologie" from the Latin version of Sebastian Castellio, but its appearance was anticipated by the publication of John Deacin's version in 16(1). It lies in MS. in the Library of Cambridge University, of which Dr. Everard was a graduate.

His translation of the "Poemander of Hermes Trismegistus" was published in 1650, and again in 1657. An American edition appeared in Boston in 1871, edited by Paschal Beverly Randolph, and published by the Rosicrucian Publishing Company. The most accessible edition of the Greek text is that published in Berlin by Fr. Nicolai, edited by Gustav Parthey, in 1854. It is based on a careful comparison of the MSS., and has a Latin version based on that of Marsilius Ficinus (1493). R. E. T.

THE CONCORD SCHOOL OF PHILOSOPHY.

The Concord Summer School will open its ninth term on Wednesday, July 13, 1887, at 9.30 A. M., and will continue above two weeks. The lectures in each week will be eleven; they will be given morning and evening, except Saturday evening, on the six secular days (in the morning at 9.30 o'clock, and in the evening at 7.30), at the Hillside Chapel, near the Orchard House.

The terms will be \$5 for each full week; for all the lectures, \$10. Single tickets, at 50 cents each, may be bought at the shop of H. L. Whitcomb, in Concord, after July 10th, in packages of *ten* for \$4.50, and of *three* for \$1.40. Any one to whom this circular is sent can now engage course tickets by making application, and sending \$5 as a guaranty. For those who make this deposit, tickets will be reserved till the tenth day of

July, and can then be obtained by payment of the balance due. They entitle the holder to reserved seats. Visitors coming and going daily during the term may reach Concord from Boston by the Fitchburg Railroad, or the Middlesex Central; from Lowell, Andover, etc., by the Lowell and Framingham Railroads; from Southern Middlesex and Worcester Counties by the same road. The Orchard House stands on the Lexington Road, east of Concord village, adjoining the Wayside estate, formerly the residence of Mr. Hawthorne.

Lodgings with board may be obtained at the following houses in Concord village:

Miss E. BARRETT, Monument Street.

Mrs. KENT, Main Street.

Mrs. O'BRIEN, Monument Square.

Mrs. GOODNOW, Main Street.

Mrs. B. F. WHEELER, Belknap Street.

Mrs. HOW, Hubbard Street.

Lodgings without board can be obtained in the neighborhood of each of the above-named houses. Visitors will make their own arrangements without consulting the undersigned.

A. BRONSON ALCOTT, *Dean*.

S. H. EMERY, Jr., *Director*.

F. B. SANBORN, *Secretary*.

CONCORD, June 10, 1887.

LECTURES AT THE NINTH SESSION OF THE CONCORD SCHOOL OF PHILOSOPHY.

JULY 13-30, 1887.

There will be two courses, morning and evening, beginning at 9.30 A. M., on Wednesday, July 13, 1887—the topics as follows, and the names of lecturers subject to change hereafter:

TWELVE MORNING LECTURES ON ARISTOTLE.

"Aristotle's Doctrine of Reason," by Prof. W. T. HARRIS, of Concord, Mass.

"Aristotle's Theory of Causation," by Dr. EDMUND MONTGOMERY, of Texas.

"Aristotle and the Scholastic Philosophy," by Prof. THOMAS DAVIDSON, of Orange, N. J.

"The Ethics of Aristotle," by Rev. Dr. A. P. PEABODY, of Harvard University.

"Theory of the Infinite—Aristotle and Kant," by Prof. H. N. GARDINER, of Smith College.

"Aristotle and the Christian Church," by BROTHER AZARIAS, of Rock Hill College, Md.

"Aristotle's Physiological Doctrines," by FILLMORE MOORE, M. D., of New York.

"Aristotle's Theory of the Syllogism Compared with that of Hegel," by Prof. W. T. HARRIS, of Concord, Mass.

"Aristotle's Politics and Montesquieu's *Esprit des Lois*," by Prof. LUIGI FERRI, University of Rome, Italy.

"Social Science in Plato and Aristotle," by Mr. F. B. SANBORN, of Concord, Mass.

"Aristotle on Education," By F. L. SOLDAN, LL. D., of St. Louis.

"Friendship in Aristotle's Ethics," by Mrs. ELLEN M. MITCHELL, of Denver, Col.

TEN EVENING LECTURES ON DRAMATIC POETRY.

"The Poetics of Aristotle in its Application to the Drama," by Prof. THOMAS DAVIDSON, of Orange, N. J.

- "The Dramatic Element in the Greek Drama and the Norse Edda," by Prof. W. T. HARRIS, of Concord, Mass.
 "Shakespeare's Poetics," by Rev. Dr. C. A. BARTOL, of Boston.
 "The Divine Nemesis in the Greek Drama and in Shakespeare," by Prof. C. C. SHACKFORD, of Brookline, Mass.
 "The Collision of Individuals with Institutions in the Greek and the English Drama," by Mr. EDWIN D. MEAD, of Boston.
 "Aristophanes and the Elizabethan Drama," by Mrs. JULIA WARD HOWE, of Boston.
 "Marlowe and his Successors," by Mr. F. B. SANBORN, of Concord, Mass.
 "Ford and Massinger," by Mrs. E. D. CHENEY, of Boston.
 "Schiller's Relation to Aristotle," by Dr. JULIUS GOEBEL, of Baltimore.
 "Browning's Dramatic Genius," by Rev. GEORGE WILLIS COOKE, of Dedham, Mass.

Four brief papers on "Ontology," in two or three sessions, will follow the above courses.

One of these will be given by Prof. DAVIDSON, another by Dr. MONTGOMERY, a third by Prof. HARRIS, and the fourth by some lecturer still to be announced.

THE DATES OF THE LECTURES WILL BE AS FOLLOWS:

JULY, 1887:

13th, 9.30 A. M., Prof. Harris.
 7.30 P. M., Prof. Davidson.
 14th, 9. 0 A. M., Dr. Montgomery.
 7.30 P. M., Prof. Shackford.
 15th, 9.30 A. M., Prof. Davidson.
 7.30 P. M., Mr. Sanborn.
 16th, 9.30 A. M., Rev. Dr. Peabody.
 18th, 9.30 A. M., Prof. Gardiner.
 7.30 P. M., Prof. Harris.
 19th, 9.30 A. M., Brother Azarias.
 7.30 P. M., Mrs. Howe.
 20th, 9.30 A. M., Prof. Harris.
 7.30 P. M., Mr. E. D. Mead.

JULY, 1887:

21st, 9.30 A. M., Dr. Moore.
 7.30 P. M., Mrs. Cheney.
 22d, 9.30 A. M., Prof. Ferri.
 7.30 P. M., Dr. Goebel.
 23d, 9.30 A. M., Dr. Bartol.
 25th, 9.30 A. M., Mr. Sanborn.
 7.30 P. M., Mr. G. W. Cooke.
 26th, 9.30 A. M., Mrs. E. M. Mitchell.
 7.30 P. M., Prof. Davidson.
 27th, 9.30 A. M., Dr. Soldan.
 7.30 P. M., Dr. Montgomery.
 28th, 9.30 A. M., Prof. Harris.
 7.30 P. M., Prof. Harris.

These dates are subject to change, but only in one or two instances. Additional lectures may be given on the 29th and 30th of July. With the exception of July 23d and 28th, the morning lectures will all relate to Aristotle. The morning hour in all cases is 9.30, and the evening hour 7.30.

JUNE 10, 1887.

THE JOURNAL OF SPECULATIVE PHILOSOPHY.

VOL. XXI.]

APRIL, 1887.

[No. 2.]

CRITIQUE OF KANTIAN PHILOSOPHY.

TRANSLATED FROM THE GERMAN OF PROF. DR. KUNO FISCHER, BY W. S. HOUGH.

CHAPTER IV.—(*Concluded.*)

II. Examination of the Doctrines of Freedom and Development.

1. Schopenhauer's "Critique of the Kantian Philosophy."

In his "Critique of the Kantian Philosophy"—which is based upon the second edition of the chief work—Schopenhauer has accounted the same the highest product which the history of philosophy has brought forth. It is related to the old metaphysics of the nature of things (God, the world, and the soul) as the true view of the world to the false, or as the new chemistry to alchemy. And even the profound idealistic systems of old time—which, as the religion of India and the Platonic philosophy, had attained the insight that our sense-world is only conceived and phenomenal—are related to the Kantian doctrine as the incorrectly established truth to that which is correctly established, or as the heliocentric view of the world of a Pythagorean to that of Copernicus. At the same time the Kantian philosophy wants both completeness and consistency. Its two chief merits are accompanied by two chief errors. Its greatest merit consists in the "distinction of phenomenon from thing-in-itself," from which "the complete

diversity of the Real and the Ideal" and the merely conceived or phenomenal (hence not real) being of our sense-world become apparent. Its second merit consists in the "knowledge of the undeniable moral meaning of human conduct, as entirely different from and not dependent upon the laws of phenomena, nor even explicable in accordance with them, but as something that is immediately connected with the thing-in-itself."¹

The first of the two main errors of Kant, Schopenhauer finds in the fact that he has not clearly distinguished between sensible and abstract or reflective knowledge. This has led to irremediable confusion, now by falsely confounding, now by falsely opposing the two sorts of knowledge. Thus Kant has denied sensible knowledge to the understanding—as if there could be a visible sense-world without understanding; and has treated reason, not as the faculty of abstract or reflective knowledge by means of judgments and conclusions, but as that of principles and moral conduct, while, in truth, it only determines the rules according to which prudent conduct is regulated. Moral or virtuous and reasonable or prudent are by no means synonymous. The Machiavellian policy is not virtuous, but it is, indeed, clever and reasonable, while sacrificing generosity is quite as virtuous as it is unwise. From the sensible knowledge of the understanding there arises the abstract, through the faculty of reflection or thought (reason). Hence sensible perceptions are related to notions, as sensible objects to thought-objects, or as "phenomena" to "noumena," but *not* as appearances to things-in-themselves; for abstract notions represent nothing but appearances. Kant's treatment of the difference between phenomena and noumena as equivalent to the difference between appearances and things-in-themselves, and his consequent designation of the latter as noumena, has proved a mischievous and fatal error, growing out of that first fundamental one.²

The second main error which conflicts with the idealistic ground-view of the "Critique of Reason" consists in the false introduction of the thing-in-itself as the external cause of our sensations. It is not the recognition of a thing-in-itself to a given phenomenon

¹ Schopenhauer, "Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung," vol. i, Appendix (5th ed., 1879), pp. 494-500.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 513 and 517, 563-566, 610-614.

that is erroneous, but this method of deducing it, which, as we see, proved so troublesome to the second edition of the "Critique" in its "Refutation of Idealism." "No one imagines that he knows the 'Critique of Reason,' and has a clear notion of Kant's doctrine, when he has read the 'Critique' only in the second or in one of the following editions; that is absolutely impossible, for he has read only a mutilated, corrupted, and in some measure spurious text."¹ It is equivalent to a contradiction of the idealistic ground-view of the Kantian doctrine to regard the thing-in-itself, according to the law of causality, as the *external* cause of our sensations. And it is equivalent to an utter misconstruction and denial of the entire Kantian doctrine to reject the thing-in-itself altogether, or to deny it reality—*i. e.*, the character of original being, as has recently been done in some of the latest periodicals. Schopenhauer unjustly attempted to ascribe this view of the Kantian system—which he was wont to call "nonsensical tittle-tattle"—to the philosopher Fichte, who, on the contrary, had maintained, like Schopenhauer, that the logically consistent critique of reason could never teach the *external* existence and causality of things-in-themselves,² and had, like him, denied the unknowableness of the same, and held that the thing-in-itself is to be *immediately* known in our self-consciousness, that it is so known, and, indeed, as *will*.

We have here no interest in further pursuing Schopenhauer's criticism of the Kantian doctrine of knowledge, since that would necessarily lead to an examination of his own doctrine, which saw itself obliged, following its distinction between understanding and reason, between the sensible knowledge of the one and the abstract knowledge of the other, to reject entirely Kant's doctrine of the categories of the understanding and the postulates of reason. In the two chief points which constitute the character of the system—namely, in the doctrine of the ideality of all phenomena (objects) and of the reality of the thing-in-itself, which is completely independent of and different from all phenomena—Schopenhauer is agreed with Kant, and has sought to develop his own system:—*The World as Will and Idea*—in accordance with these principles. In his view respecting the ground-work of the Kantian philosophy

¹ Schopenhauer, "Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung," vol. i, pp. 515–517.

² Cf. *supra*, pp. 160, 161.

we must concur; also in his view that the confusion of phenomena and things-in-themselves conflicts with this ground-work; also in his view that things-in-themselves are confounded with phenomena when they are recognized as things external to us, and as the external causes of our sensations; also in his view that in the "Refutation of Idealism," as developed in the second edition of the "Critique," things external to us do figure as something independent of all thought, and accordingly as things-in-themselves. When, however, Schopenhauer holds that not merely the *external* causality of things-in-themselves, but their causality in general, is irreconcilable with the Kantian doctrine—since, according to the latter, the notion of causality in general is inapplicable to things-in-themselves—we can not agree with him either in that such a view contains the contradiction claimed by him, or in that the first edition of the "Critique" is free from *this* contradiction, if it were one. That things-in-themselves are the supersensible substratum or hidden ground of the constitution of our reason, hence also that of our sensations and world of sense, Kant himself declared to be "the constant assertion of his criticism." It never occurred to him to apply temporal or sensible causality to things-in-themselves; their causality is the timeless or intelligible, just as their reality is not temporal but timeless being.¹ If Schopenhauer will recognize the validity of no other than time-causality, that is his affair, and belongs to the exposition and criticism of his system, with which we are not now concerned. He censures Kant because he ascribes causality to things-in-themselves. Why does he commend his affirmation of their *reality*? It has been difficult enough for Schopenhauer himself, and a wholly futile attempt withal, to ascribe to the thing-in-itself (will) original being, and at the same time to deny to it causality. After I have shown in what points I agree with Schopenhauer concerning the difference between the two editions of the "Critique of Reason" and the contradiction in the Kantian doctrine of knowledge, I must express the wish that, respecting this very question, those points shall not be overlooked in which I differ from him.

2. The Connection between the Doctrines of Knowledge and Freedom.

The Kantian doctrine of knowledge, subject to the contradiction pointed out, conflicts with the doctrine of freedom. Free

¹ Cf. *supra*, Chap. I, Part III, Sec. 2, and Chap. II, Part II, Sec. 1.

from this contradiction, it establishes the possibility of freedom, and, indeed, *it* alone among all systems. For there is no doubt that, according to this doctrine, the thing-in-itself, absolutely distinguished from all phenomena and absolutely independent of space and time, is and can be nothing other than freedom or *will*. We have already elucidated this point with such explicitness that there are neither new grounds to be given nor single Kantian sentences to be cited for its substantiation.¹ The three "Critiques" may be taken as the authentic documents for the doctrine: The "Critique of Pure Reason" in its doctrine of intelligible and empirical character, the "Critique of Practical Reason" in its doctrine of the reality of freedom and the primacy of will, and the "Critique of Judgment" in its doctrine of natural adaptation and immanent natural ends, as well as of final moral ends and the original ground of the world. After Kant has shown with such fulness and clearness the connection of his doctrines of knowledge and freedom, or, what is the same thing, the identity between thing-in-itself and will, we cannot possibly think, with Schopenhauer, that the matter only hovered dimly before him, like a presentiment; and that he recognized the thing-in-itself as will, not with the conviction of the philosopher, but as

"Ein guter Mensch in seinem dunkeln Drange
Ist sich des rechten Weges wohl bewusst."²

"I therefore venture to assume," said Schopenhauer, "although it is not to be proved, that Kant, as often as he spoke of the thing-in-itself, always thought in the obscurest depths of his mind indistinctly of will."³ But, after Schopenhauer himself has recognized the "distinction of phenomenon from thing-in-itself" and the "knowledge of the undeniable import of human conduct as something that is immediately connected with the thing-in-itself," as the two greatest services of our philosopher, and has extolled his doctrines of time and space and of intelligible and empirical character as "the two diamonds in the crown of Kantian fame," we are compelled to regard the sentence just cited not only as an

¹ *Ibid.* Chap. II, Part II.

² "A good man, through obscurest aspiration,
Has still an instinct of the one true way."

FAUST: *Prologue*. (Taylor's translation.)

³ Schopenhauer, "Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung," vol. i, p. 599.

imperfect and less commendatory estimate of the services of Kant, but as an obvious contradiction of this his own statement. Kant knew what he taught when he apprehended things-in-themselves as *Ideas*, these as *ends*, these as determinations of *will*, and the will itself as *freedom*, which, although revealed to us with immediate and absolute certainty only in our own moral being, is nevertheless necessarily identical with "that supersensible which we are obliged to posit as underlying nature as phenomenon"—*i. e.*, with the thing-in-itself.¹

3. The Contradiction in the Doctrine of Freedom.

Between the logically consistent doctrine of knowledge of Kant and the doctrine of freedom there is no contradiction, but the deepest and most perfect harmony. To have discovered and expounded this harmony is the immortal service and stroke of original thought which has made the Kantian philosophy what it is.

The doctrine of freedom demands a system of morals absolutely free from hedonism, elevated entirely above every eudemonistic view of life, and thus above all strife between optimism and pessimism. Kant himself, in separating virtue from happiness, developed such an ethics, but when in his doctrine of the *summum bonum* he united them, this high ethical ground was virtually abandoned. After all eudemonistic aims in life had been utterly shut out in a system of ethics based upon freedom and the purity of will, they should not have been introduced by the doctrines of the *summum bonum* and of the immortality of the soul. We were already obliged earlier in the discussion, in order to set forth clearly Kant's doctrine of immortality, and to distinguish the true conception of it from the false, to point out this contradiction in his doctrine of freedom, and may here avoid all repetition by referring to those remarks.²

4. The Contradiction between the Doctrines of Knowledge and Development.

That Kant had already furthered the historical-development view of things before the "Critique of Reason," and had made it his working problem; that he had established this view by means

¹ Cf. *supra*, Chap. III, Part III, Sec. 3.

² *Id. supra*, Chap. II, Part III, Sec. 2. Cf. Schopenhauer, "Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung," vol. i, pp. 620-622.

of the "Critique," and had developed its principles in his treatment of both nature and human civilization, or the whole organic, social, and moral world—all this has been pointed out in a previous section.¹ We have also shown that, according to his doctrine, the world-development is to be apprehended as *phenomenon*, and, in fact, as *teleological* phenomenon; that in its unity as well as in its ultimate ground it is nothing other than the *progressive revelation of freedom*.² We therefore regarded Kant's doctrine of development as a unification of his doctrines of knowledge and freedom, and the world-development itself as a unification of phenomenon and thing-in-itself, and as such a unification as neither confounds both nor negates itself by holding the unknowableness of the thing-in-itself, on the ground that, as the immanent end of a thing, it is not to be found in the phenomenon, as the object of our experience, by even the minutest analysis. There is, accordingly, a point of view from which the Kantian doctrine of development does *not*, in the first place, conflict with the doctrine of knowledge.

We must conceive the development of things teleologically, grasp it universally. We must extend its application to the entire universe, but its knowableness must be limited to the moral order of things, since all ends become known merely from the will, and the will only from one's own practical reason. Consequently, the development of things, like ends in general, remains theoretically unknowable. Since, now, all phenomena are objects of our experience or scientific (theoretical) knowledge, and development is phenomenon, and yet held not to be an object of knowledge, there confronts us here a contradiction between the Kantian doctrines of knowledge and development, which effects the validity of the latter. It consists in ascribing the character of phenomenon to development, and at the same time denying its scientific knowableness. The Kantian philosophy teaches the unknowableness of thing-in-itself and the knowableness of phenomenon: this, its foundation-doctrine, is shattered as soon as it sees itself obliged to recognize either the knowableness of the former or the unknowableness of the latter. To such a recognition it is brought

¹ *Vid. supra*, Chap. III, Parts I and II.

² *Vid. supra*, Chap. III, Part III.

by its doctrine of development. Without the knowledge of the end or of the thing-in-itself which underlies the development of things, this development is an incomprehensible, unknowable phenomenon, and therefore, in strictness, *no* phenomenon at all. If the immanent end of things is not apparent to us, then certainly there *appears* to us no development in the nature of things. Hence the Kantian doctrine of development finds itself in the following dilemma: either the intelligible, knowable—*i. e.*, *phenomenal*—character of development must be denied, or the knowableness of the thing-in-itself affirmed; and, indeed, not merely its practical and moral knowableness, but also its theoretical and scientific.

III. Examination of the Doctrine of Phenomena and Things-in-themselves.

1. The Knowableness of Human Reason.

The scientific validity of the doctrine of development demands this affirmation. Hence the Kantian doctrine of knowledge does not admit of permanent acceptance in the form it received in the "Critique of Reason," in accordance with which only sensuous phenomena are objects of knowledge, and all theoretical knowledge is confined to the realm of phenomena or objects of sense, while all practical knowledge remains restricted to the realm of freedom or of Ideas, and any further knowledge is impossible. But the "Critique of Reason" contradicts this result itself, inasmuch as it is obliged to admit the existence of a sort of knowledge which is neither practical (moral) nor has sensible things or phenomena for its objects. This knowledge is *the Critique itself*, so far as it discovers and establishes along the line of its investigation the conditions of experience. It professes to have determined in its *Transcendental æsthetic* and *analytic* the constitution or organization of human reason. This knowledge is *no practical* one, for its subject is not freedom; and the objects of this knowledge are *not phenomena*, since space and time are, as the "Critique" teaches, not phenomena any more than the productive imagination, the pure understanding, or the pure consciousness are phenomena. This knowledge is *not experience*, for its objects are precisely those conditions which precede all experience and make it possible. All knowledge which

aims in the first place only at insights, and not at conduct, must be termed *theoretical* and scientific. Such a knowledge is presented in the "Critique of Reason"; it is neither empirical nor practical, but indeed theoretical, and such as lays claim to the character of science: it is the *Doctrine of Knowledge*; and *that* it would not be if its doctrine of knowledge were not knowledge. It establishes the knowledge of experience by showing how experience originates; and it would fail of its end entirely if it itself were experience, for that would be tantamount to establishing experience by experience, hence not establishing it at all, but presupposing it, as the dogmatic philosophy had done. Nor may one here object that Kant, then, has used the inductive method of experimental science in establishing his doctrine of knowledge, so that the "Critique of Reason" itself rests on experience. Let us not deceive ourselves by an ambiguous play with the word *experience*! In strictness, our philosopher recognizes *only* that knowledge the objects of which are *phenomena*, while, on the contrary, the "Critique of Reason" virtually leads to a sort of knowledge the objects of which are *not* phenomena, but are the subjective conditions of phenomenon *per se*. The fact of experience is one thing, its establishment another. Whatever is established by experience is *empirically* known; that, on the contrary, by which experience itself is established is precisely, on that account, no object of empirical, but only of *transcendental* knowledge. These two sorts of knowledge Kant must have distinguished in the way that he did. Transcendental knowledge has the character of theoretical, as opposed to practical, but not that of empirical knowledge. We thus see how the "Critique of Reason" transcends in its own insights the bounds which it itself had set as the insurmountable limits of all theoretical knowledge.

The insight into the subjective conditions from which our phenomena (objects of experience) and the knowledge of them originate, constituted Transcendental Idealism; the insight thereby gained, that we can have no other objects of knowledge than sensuous phenomena, constituted Empirical Realism. We know what necessary connection subsists between them: they are related as premise and conclusion. Nothing is therefore more thoughtless, when judging of the critical philosophy, than to leave

the character of transcendental idealism, whether through ignorance or misconception, entirely out of sight, and to proclaim the Kantian doctrine empiricism, as often happens these days.

The "Critique of Reason" involves the problem of deducing from the nature of our reason—which is revealed to us only through the most penetrating self-knowledge—the conditions of experience ("faculties of knowledge," Kant termed them), and thus of developing the doctrine of knowledge to a veritable *doctrine of the process of knowledge*. This problem remains unsolved in the Kantian philosophy itself; but we have shown that the "Critique of Reason" contains the data for such a solution, and that its investigations are ordered in such a way that it shows us the elements of the course of development of human knowledge from perception to science and the system of the sciences.¹ Now, the doctrine of knowledge itself is scientific knowledge; and the doctrine of development founds itself upon the notion of *end*, without which no sort of development as such is intelligible. Hence this notion may not be regarded merely as a moral principle for the knowledge of the moral order of things, and a maxim of reflection for contemplating the organic world; it is a *principle of knowledge* which is valid for the entire knowable order of the world, the natural as well as the moral.

2. The Knowableness of Human Natural-ends and of Blind Intelligence.

Let us examine the reason why Kant limited the knowableness of ends to the moral, and excluded it from the natural world—why he saw himself obliged to deny knowableness to the immanent natural-end, which he had introduced into his "Critique of Reason" as a necessary Idea in our contemplation of the organic world, and as the principle of teleological judgment. He held that ends are only so far knowable as they are consciously possessed and willed; that only will and intelligence can posit ends and act in accordance with them; that consequently nature or the material world has no ends—no knowable ones; and that therefore the ends also, without which we are unable to comprehend the origination and constitution of *living* bodies, are not forces operative in nature, not knowable objects, but mere *Ideas*, which we

¹ *Vid. supra*, Chap. III, Part II, Sec. 2. Cf. Fischer, "Gesch. d. n. Philos.," vol. iii 3d ed.), p. 519, *et seq.*

must have, since, although in organized bodies the parts should be understood in the light of the whole, we, with our discursive understanding, can only put together and comprehend the whole from the parts. We are consequently incapable of perceiving a whole composed of parts and members; and since we cannot know it as the creative *ground* of life, we must conceive it as its *end*. The whole, which we are to conceive, but cannot perceive sensibly as object, we are obliged to think as *Idea*, and hence we are compelled to consider living bodies *teleologically*. Had we an intuitive understanding, we should not need a faculty of teleological judgment. In this faculty our reason takes refuge, as it were, in its weakness, developing it out of its own primitive powers, because it needs it to compensate, as well as may be, for its native incapacity. By the way in which Kant establishes the reflective judgment in general, and the teleological in particular, it presents itself as a necessary *form of development* of human reason, which seeks to solve a problem, to supply a needed knowledge, and can attain its goal with the peculiar constitution of its intellectual faculties in no other way.¹

Ends in nature, therefore, according to the Kantian teaching, are unknowable and in effect impossible, since they require to be posited by will and intelligence; and such an unconscious intelligence, such an end-active yet blind force, contradicts the notion of matter. Thus hylozoism, which teaches that matter is living and energized by inherent causes, was regarded by Kant as the death of all Philosophy of Nature. Since, now, living organized matter exists, and we cannot conceive of it except as adapted to ends, Kant was obliged to deduce the end-active underlying force from the moral ground of things—*i. e.*, from the *divine will*, and thus to give his teleological view of life and of the world a *theistic* basis. But the immanent natural ends, the Idea of which rules and guides our teleological judgment, are thereby transformed into divine purposes, and life itself, as well as all natural development, remains unexplained and inexplicable.

The unknowableness of natural ends is based by Kant upon the impossibility of an unconscious intelligence or of a blind will. But the reality of such a blind intelligence had already been shown

¹ *Id.*, vol. iv (3d ed.), pp. 492-498.

by Leibnitz in his doctrine of the unconscious or imperceptible ideas (*perceptions petites*), a doctrine which he raised to fundamental importance in his theory of knowledge. And, in fact, Kant also was obliged to recognize the knowableness of natural ends and the unconscious activity of our intellectual faculties. He recognized it in human nature, though he had denied it in the organic world. We further the moral ends of life by means of the "mechanism of instincts"—as Kant terms the impulses of our natural ends of life—without being conscious of them and willing them. Our natural interests create that struggle for existence, and that increasing complexity of industrial society, from which issue, unconsciously and without volition, the moral orders of life. Everywhere where Kant established the necessity of the latter he laid the greatest stress upon the reality and activity of our purely natural and at the same time intelligible ends of life.¹ That we conceive a common world of sense is a fact that our reflective consciousness finds at hand, but does not create, since it is, the rather, produced from the material of our impressions by the systematizing representative faculties of reason, and hence arises through the non-reflective and unconscious activity of intellect. Kant saw in the productive imagination this form-giving faculty, which acts unconsciously in accordance with the laws of pure consciousness, and constitutes the bond that unites sense and understanding. "*Synthesis in general is merely the work of the imagination, a blind though indispensable function of the soul, without which we should have no knowledge whatever, yet of which we are seldom even conscious.*" But to bring this synthesis to notions—that is a function which belongs to the understanding, and in the exercise of which the latter first procures for us knowledge in the real sense."²

When, accordingly, in our contemplation of nature, and especially organic nature, Kant ascribes only subjective validity and necessity to the *notion of end*, it conflicts with his *theistic* doctrine, according to which the final end of things, and particularly the origin of life, is deduced from the original ground of things, thus recognizing an end-active power, which is by no means a

¹ *Vid. supra*, Chap. III, Part II, Sec. 3.

² Kant, "Kritik der reinen Vernunft." "Transcend. Analytik.," § 10. Cf. Fischer, "Gesch. d. n. Philos.," vol. iii (3d ed.), p. 370.

mere idea. When Kant denies the *knowableness* of inherent natural ends in general, it conflicts with his doctrine of the *natural ends of human life*, which he regarded as a completely knowable and end-conformable mechanism of instincts, by means of which the natural historical progress of mankind is forced to a moral development, and its end unconsciously and without definite aim promoted, though not of course attained. When Kant denies the possibility of an unconscious intelligence and an unconscious activity toward an end—which is necessarily presupposed in the conception of inherent natural ends—it is contradicted not only by his doctrine of morals in the points just mentioned, but also by his doctrine of knowledge—that is, by the “Critique of Reason” itself in its deduction of the pure notions of the understanding, and especially in its doctrine of the *productive imagination*, as being “a blind but indispensable function of the soul, without which we should have no knowledge whatever.”

3. The Knowableness of Life and of Beauty.

When Kant teaches that all phenomena originate from the subjective conditions of our reason—*i. e.*, from the material of our own impressions and the form-giving faculties or the laws of our thought—it is contradicted by his view of *organic* phenomena. According to these conditions, there can be no objects in the sense-world which are not composed of such parts as precede the whole; hence Kant also teaches that all phenomena, especially bodies, are only mechanically knowable. But, now, there are certain objects with which this relation is reversed. In this case the whole does not result from the parts, but the parts from the whole. Every one of such objects is a whole which differentiates, articulates, and develops itself. Such phenomena are *living* bodies. Could we perceive a whole before its parts, and derive the latter from the former, then also an organism would be mechanically knowable, and hence an object of scientific knowledge in the exact sense of the word. But that we cannot do, because such a faculty of perception, such an intuitive understanding, is wanting in us. We are therefore obliged to derive the constitution and parts of an organism from the *Idea* of the whole, and consequently to consider it *teleologically*.

The character, then, of living bodies consists in their being

wholes which articulate, organize, and develop themselves. Now, let it be carefully noted that it is not this *character* of the organism, but only the teleological idea of the same, which comes to the account of our reason. What, accordingly, characterizes living phenomena, and makes them what they are, does not permit of being determined from the subjective conditions of our impressions and forms of thought, and is not founded in the general, but in the *specific* conformity to law or type of the phenomena themselves.¹ If there are living things, Kant explains to us in his "Critique of Judgment" why we must conceive of them *teleologically*. That there are living things, however, or, in other words, that life *appears* to us in the sense-world, the "Critique of Reason" and transcendental idealism do *not* give us to understand. On the contrary, when we compare the way in which Kant explains phenomena with the way in which he apprehends the character and fact of life, it remains unexplained and inexplicable that life, as such, appears to us in the natural world. We are therefore obliged to conclude either that life *per se* does not belong in the phenomenal world, or that something appears in it, which, the criticism of reason, cannot derive from our faculties of knowledge, neither from sense, nor from understanding, but which, independently of our ideas and phenomena, underlies life and constitutes its phenomenon. Now, the fact and phenomenon of life are undeniable. Its creative ground, since it subsists independently of our ideas and phenomena, belongs to things-in-themselves, which are to be thought as Ideas and ends, and are, in truth, *will*, the principle of the intelligible, or moral order of the world. We are obliged to conceive this creative ground of life as immanent natural-end—*i. e.*, as unconscious intelligence and blind will, and can now no longer hold this conception to be a mere Idea, which we superadd to the phenomenon of life, since, without the reality and activity of inherent natural ends—*i. e.*, without blind will—the fact and phenomenon of life would not exist at all, and every addition from the side of our reason would be purposeless. That whole, which differentiates, articulates, and organizes itself, is the definite end of life, or the will to live, which must

¹ Cf. Fischer, "Gesch. d. n. Philos.," vol. iii (3d ed.), pp. 514–518; vol. iv (3d ed.), pp. 403–406.

assert itself by activity, and develop the necessary organs for the fulfilment of its functions.

And what is true of living phenomena must also be true of the *æsthetic*. That there is a state of harmony and freedom for our faculties of mind in which, independent of all desire and all interests of knowledge, we give ourselves to pure contemplation and enjoyment—that follows from the constitution of our intellectual nature. *Æsthetic* pleasure is a pure subjective state, apart from which there could be no talk about *æsthetic* objects. That, however, in this state of free contemplation this object impresses us as beautiful, another as ugly, a third as sublime, must be conditioned by the *peculiar sort* of the phenomena, and permits as little as the character of life of being derived from the subjective factors which are the ground of the phenomena and their general conformity to law. There must, accordingly, be something independent of our faculties of reason, which underlies the phenomena themselves, makes them what they are, and is related to the given phenomenon, as the intelligible character in us is related to the empirical. We must add that this something becomes known to us from the phenomena themselves, although we do not find the same in the analysis of the given object.

4. The Knowableness of Things-in-themselves.

This something is the *thing-in-itself*, the absolute unknowableness of which Kant, it is true, asserted, but in the progress of his investigations by no means adhered to. On the contrary, in the Critiques of "Practical Reason" and "Judgment" light was thrown upon the subject in a way which he had not foreseen in the "Critique of Pure Reason." We know that he still denied in the second edition of the latter the possibility of principles, the necessity of which he thereupon disclosed and made the basis of his critique of the *æsthetic* judgment.¹ This very noteworthy fact must not be overlooked. And in criticising the Kantian philosophy we should always remember that it by no means issued from the "Critique of Pure Reason" as a finished system, but that, on the contrary, it unfolded and developed itself, and reached results which were not involved in that work, do not accord with its fun-

¹ Cf. *Id.*, vol. iv. (3d ed.), p. 408, *et seq.*

damental principles, and could not be adjusted to them by any attempt at artificial symmetries, such as the philosopher was so fond of applying. The phenomena to which we add the idea of beauty, of sublimity, or of inner adaptation, are not comprehended by the phenomena the origin of which the "Critique of Reason" teaches; they are *sui generis* and include more than these.

According to the "Critique of Reason," things-in-themselves are the substratum of the nature of our reason as well as of phenomena.. They are, therefore, to be absolutely distinguished from phenomena, never confounded with them, hence never with things external to us, but always to be thought as the unknowable original-ground of things; that is the doctrine that runs through the entire "Critique of Reason," and it is difficult to believe that any one having read this work would dispute its Kantian character. It could not have occurred to Kant to hold the thing-in-itself to be a mere idea, or a mere thought-thing—*i. e.*, a cause ascribed by us in thought to phenomena, and nothing further, as it is maintained that he did in numerous recent publications. Were the thing-in-itself a mere thought-thing and nothing more, it would as such be completely knowable, and not unknowable and inscrutable, as the "Critique of Reason," nevertheless, teaches with the utmost explicitness. If the character of true actuality or reality did *not* belong to things-in-themselves, as the original ground of thinking and phenomenal being, the doctrine of their *unknowableness* would be not only meaningless, but absurd. How can anything which in reality does not exist at all, but is merely thought, be seriously regarded as something unknowable? Whoever, then, thinks that according to the Kantian teaching there is no such thing as the reality of things-in-themselves, must also maintain that Kant has never spoken of their unknowableness. But if any one actually thinks that, then he belongs to the already numerous critics of Kant who write books on his philosophy, yet for whom the "Critique of Pure Reason" is to this day a thing-in-itself!

Every one who has followed the fundamental investigations in this work up to the close of the *Transcendental Analytic* will have the impression—after the section "On the Ground of the Distinction of all Objects whatsoever as Phenomena and Noumena"—that things-in-themselves are and remain unknowable, that they

represent the insolvable mystery of the world, and that our knowledge must confine itself to sensible objects and to sensible experience. This new establishment of empiricism, which carries with it the destruction of all metaphysics, now receives the distinction of being the chief service and real result of the Kantian criticism. Thus the Neo-Kantians of the day have stopped short under this impression, and likewise many of our natural scientists, who understand the Königsberg philosopher less than they praise him. They overlook the fact that the *establishment* of empiricism is *not* empiricism and cannot be empiricism; that, on the contrary, it consists in the investigation of the principles of all experience, and must therefore result in a Doctrine of Principles or a "*Metaphysics of Phenomena*," to have established which, Kant regarded as the problem and performance of his doctrine of knowledge. He otherwise would not have written his "Prolegomena to every Future Metaphysic which may appear as Science."

When, however, we have followed the course of the "Critique of Reason" further, and reached the close of the *Transcendental Dialectic*, the darkness which obscured the thing-in-itself begins to disappear, although its unknowableness is now confirmed by proofs. We are taught that, and why, we are obliged to conceive of things-in-themselves; that, moreover, while they are not objects of knowledge, they are nevertheless *necessary Ideas*, which have for their subject the original ground of both thinking and phenomenal being, as well as that of all possible and actual existence. We now know, furthermore, *what* is to be thought under these original grounds or unconditional principles—viz., the soul, the world as totality, and God. Among the world-Ideas, *transcendental* freedom is represented to us as the sole one which, while it can never be phenomenon or object of knowledge, can yet be the conceivable original ground of all phenomena and of their order as natural laws. In the last place, these ideas serve as a criterion of knowledge; they present themselves as regulative principles of knowledge—*i. e.*, as *goals* of experience, which, it is true, can never be attained, but yet are to be continually striven for, in order that our knowledge may become systematized and may so combine in itself the highest diversity with the highest unity, that the specific results of the several experimental sciences shall become more and more unified and approximate a system of

knowledge which forms a simple whole. Were such a system attainable, all the sciences would ultimately be members of *one* whole, and the order of the world would become known to us as a genealogical system, in which all phenomena in their various species descend from one single primitive ground. This primitive ground is unknowable. Hence the Ideas, since they prescribe "the principles of homogeneity, specification, and continuity (affinity)" for the experimental sciences, should likewise be recognized only as maxims of our knowledge, and not as principles of things.¹ Notwithstanding, in the Doctrine of Ideas things-in-themselves have so far emerged from the obscurity which enveloped them that they present themselves, not, it is true, as objects of knowledge, but as principles regulative of knowledge.

The Doctrine of Method of pure reason takes a step farther. It reveals to us in its "Canon" the *possibility* of a knowledge of things-in-themselves, not along the path of experience and science, but on the ground of moral laws given by immediate self-knowledge or moral certitude. *If* there are such laws, they have an unconditional validity—a validity independent of all experience, exalted above all knowledge, opinion, and doubt, and of immediate axiomatic certainty. And as certain as they themselves are, so certain do they make to us the reality of the moral order of the world and of those Ideas which represent its power, final end, and original ground: these are the Ideas of Freedom, Immortality, and Deity. Thus the "Critique of Pure Reason" leaves us with the view of the possibility of a knowledge of things-in-themselves, only that we are forced to take this knowledge, not as theoretical, but as practical to regard its certainty, not as objective, but as subjective or personal, and to designate it, not as science, but as belief.

The "Critique of Practical Reason" *realizes* the possibility which the Doctrine of Method of pure reason had held in prospect. It establishes the fact of the moral law and discerns the reality of freedom and the moral order of the world. That the thing-in-itself underlies our theoretical reason the "Critique of Pure Reason" teaches; that this thing-in-itself is the *will* the "Critique of Practical Reason" teaches. Under whichever title the knowledge of the thing-in-itself is recognized, the important

¹ *Id.*, vol. iii (8d ed.), pp. 514–518.

thing is that it enters into the illuminated circle of our reason, not only as Idea, but as reality and power; we know *what* it is, and that the history of human civilization consists in the fulfilment of the laws of freedom and the moral ends of reason, to which our natural ends of life are subordinate and subservient. The Kantian Philosophy of the State and of Religion, together with the historico-philosophical treatises which belong thereto, reveals the world-history to us as the necessary development and manifestation of freedom.

And that not only the moral, but also the sensible or natural order of the world, that the world-development, not only as history of culture, but also as *history of nature*, is the manifestation of will and of freedom, our philosopher taught in his "Critique of Judgment." The will is that thing-in-itself which underlies the constitution of our faculties of knowledge, is the cause of our intellectual development, and makes it subserve the moral. The will is, that thing-in-itself which underlies phenomena and determines their empirical character in such a way that we are obliged to judge their forms (in the state of our free contemplation) *æsthetically* and their life *teleologically*. It thus appears that there is something in the empirical character of things which does not admit of being explained from our theoretical reason, nor of being discerned in our experience or in the analysis of phenomena, and yet which is involuntarily present, and necessary to our thought. This something is the phenomenon of freedom and the freedom of phenomenon, or, in one word, *natural freedom*, without which there would be no development, no life, no beauty; without which, therefore, our æsthetic as well as teleological judgment would be without an object.

That there must be a correspondence between the thing-in-itself which underlies our faculties of knowledge and that which underlies phenomena or the sense-world, Kant had already intimated in (both editions of) his "Critique of Pure Reason." In the "Critique of Judgment" he now asserts it, explaining at the same time in what this correspondence consists. Then for the first time certain very noteworthy sentences become intelligible, which, on a thorough study of the "Critique of Reason," will have left upon every penetrating reader the impression that the philosopher says more than his doctrine of knowledge justifies. It declares it to

be possible that *one and the same* thing-in-itself may underlie both objective and subjective phenomena, or, what is the same thing, both matter and thought. Let us take his own words: "That something which so affects our sense that it receives the ideas of space, matter, form, etc.—that something, regarded as noumenon (or, better, as transcendental object)—*might well be at the same time the subject of thought*, although, through the way in which our external sense is thereby affected, we receive no perception of ideas, will, etc., but only of space and its determinations."¹ As long as soul and body were regarded as things-in-themselves it was impossible to explain their union. "The difficulty which has suggested this problem consists, as is well known, in the presupposed dissimilarity of an object of the inner sense (soul) and the objects of outer sense, since that depends only upon time, these upon time and space, as the formal conditions of their perception. If one thinks, however, that both sorts of objects do not thereby distinguish themselves from one another inwardly, but only in so far as one *seems* external to the other—*hence that which underlies the phenomenon of matter as thing-in-itself; perhaps, ought not to be so dissimilar*—the difficulty vanishes," etc.²

If we designate the thing-in-itself which underlies our modes of thought, or the constitution of our faculties of knowledge (theoretical reason), as the unknown quantity X , and the thing-in-itself which underlies external phenomena or the material world as the unknown quantity Y , then the "Critique of Reason" has already pointed out to us in both its editions the *possibility* that $Y = X$. This it was obliged to do, since the phenomena of matter are indeed nothing other than our necessary modes of thought. And yet, again, it might not speak of the possibility that $Y = X$ if things-in-themselves really are as unknowable as it teaches.

Now, the "Critique of Practical Reason" teaches, by establishing the *primacy* of the practical reason, that this is the thing-in-itself which underlies and determines our theoretical reason; it teaches that $X = \text{will or freedom}$; nor does it state this proposition with a "perhaps" or "it might be," but with complete certitude.

If, now, $Y = X$, and $X = \text{will or freedom}$, then also Y , the

¹ Kant, "Kritik d. r. Vernunft" (1st ed.). "Transc. Dialectik. Kritik der Zweiten Paralogismus." Cf. Fischer, "Gesch. d. n. Philos.," vol. iii, p. 447, 570.

² Kant, "Kritik d. r. Vernunft" (2d ed.), pp. 326, 327.

supersensible substratum of the material world, must cease to be a perfectly unknown and unknowable quantity; for $Y =$ will or freedom. The philosopher must advance to this equation. He does so in the Introduction to the "Critique of Judgment," the entire theme of which rests upon the fact that the hidden ground of nature or the material world is one with freedom, that will and freedom underlie the sense-world also, that this, too, is the phenomenon of will or the manifestation of freedom. If it were not such, there would be no self-developing bodies, no phenomenon of life, no objects of our æsthetic and teleological judgment, no theme of the faculty of judgment, thus also no problem as the subject of its critique. Hence the philosopher says in the Introduction to his "Critique": "*There must, then, be a ground of the unity of the supersensible which underlies nature, with the supersensible which the notion of freedom practically contains.* The notion of this ground, although it does not afford us either a theoretical or a practical knowledge of the same, and hence has no particular sphere, nevertheless makes possible the transition from the mode of thought according to the principles of the one to that according to the principles of the other."¹

If we now compare the foundation of the Kantian criticism with its completion, the "Critique of Pure Reason" with the "Critique of Judgment, it clearly appears how the work has progressed and been transformed under the hands of the philosopher. Neither the doctrine of phenomena nor that of things-in-themselves has remained the same. Phenomena now confront us with the character of individuality and freedom, things-in-themselves with that of unity of essence and knowableness, for the correspondence between the supersensible substratum of our sensuous reason and that of the sensible or material world bases itself in the end upon their identity of nature; they are *will* and *freedom*. And herewith the veil falls, which, as it seemed, enveloped things-in-themselves in impenetrable obscurity. After the "Critique of Practical Reason" had established the reality of freedom and the moral order of the world, and subordinated our sensuous and theoretical reason to the practical, and the sensible and material world

¹ Kant, "Kritik der Urtheilskraft," Introduction. *Vid.* "Werke," vol. vii, p. 14. Cf. Fischer, "Gesch. d. n. Philos.," vol. iv (3d ed.), pp. 397, 497. For elucidation of the sentence quoted, cf. *supra*, Chap. III, Part III, Sec. 3.

to our theoretical reason, the entire order of the world was recognized as the manifestation of thing-in-itself, as the phenomenon of will—i. e., as the development and manifestation of freedom.

The farther the Kantian investigations advance from the doctrine of knowledge to the doctrine of Ideas, from this to the doctrines of moral freedom and the moral order of the world, from these to the philosophic doctrine of history, and to the doctrine of the natural freedom of phenomena (bodies)—which coincides with the critique of æsthetic and teleological judgment—the more distinctly things-in-themselves come into view. And the more the Kantian doctrine reveals things-in-themselves in phenomena, and the latter win the character of phenomena of will, so much the more unmistakably does the character of the doctrine of development imprint itself upon the Kantian philosophy; with so much the more distinctness does it prove itself to be, as the problem of critical thought demands, the philosophical establishment and development of the *history of the development* of universal knowledge. This is the way which the Kantian Doctrine of Ideas points out and follows. It is therefore a very superficial and radically false conception of the Kantian philosophy to understand its doctrine of phenomena and things-in-themselves as dividing the world for the weal of mankind into science and poetry, in the former of which empiricism and materialism are sanctioned as the only valid knowledge, while in the latter metaphysics is saddled upon Pegasus, and the Doctrine of Ideas permitted or compelled to seek its kingdom in the land of dreams. In this way one runs in danger, with the author of the "History of Materialism," of confusing Kant's "Critique of Pure Reason" with Schiller's "Partition of the Earth."

Our examination of Kant's fundamental doctrines has reached the result that his system received a development in the course of the three chief critical works which the first ground-work neither counted upon nor was adequate for. After the "second Critique" had made knowing reason dependent upon the law of *moral freedom*, and the third "Critique" had discovered in the beauty as well as the life of phenomena the character of *natural freedom*, new problems arose, which could no longer pass for insolvable on the ground of the unknowableness of things-in-themselves. These problems became the themes of post-Kantian philosophy.

CHAPTER V.

THE PROBLEMS AND LINES OF DEVELOPMENT OF POST-KANTIAN PHILOSOPHY.

1. The Ground-Problems of Post-Kantian Philosophy.

1. The Metaphysical Problem.

A series of heterogeneous yet historically significant systems have sprung in the course of a few decades from the roots of the Kantian philosophy. This fact alone shows how manifold and fruitful have been the influences, how deep and far-reaching the stimulus, which the philosophic spirit received through the "Critique of Reason." Perhaps no philosophical epoch since the days of Socrates and the Attic philosophy has been so ripe for great and rapid advances as the epoch illuminated by Kant. New problems spring from his criticism—questions which affect the groundwork of philosophy, and which are seized from so many and different sides, that their investigation calls forth variously opposed points of view. And the complicated course of development which the Kantian philosophy took, branching again and again, as it did, finds here its explanation. We see it separate into a number of conflicting lines of development, these divide up into all sorts of antitheses, and these again into lesser contrasts. Thus there arises a great, and with the onward movement ever-increasing, variety of views, systems, and schools, which on the first outward appearance looks almost like a state of confusion and decline. Yet there rules in these phenomena a necessary law of development. In order to find one's way in the general course and lines of development of post-Kantian philosophy, extending down to the present, one must know the state of the problems which resulted from the character and final form of the Kantian work itself.

The entire theme of the latter consisted, on the one hand, in the doctrine of the *origination* of phenomena from the constitution and faculties of sensuous (=human) reason, and on the other in the doctrine of the *original ground* of phenomena, or the thing-in-itself, which underlies the knowing reason and its sense-world. For since the knowing reason, according to Kant's fundamental doctrine, is of a *sensuous* or receptive and impression-

able nature, it itself cannot possibly be the original ground. Since phenomena arise from the impressions or sensations of sensuous reason as their material, sensations cannot possibly be explained from phenomena; for our philosopher was not of the opinion that the earth rested upon the great elephant, and the great elephant upon the earth. The doctrine of the origination of phenomena from (the material and thought-forms of) our reason is *Transcendental* or *Kantian Idealism*. The doctrine of the original ground of our knowing reason and of phenomena we have designated as the *Kantian Realism*, because the philosopher wishes to have understood under *Transcendental* realism that way of thinking which regards the things external to us (*i. e.*, external phenomena) as things-in-themselves.¹

Kant carried out the idealistic establishment of his doctrine of knowledge, but the realistic, with all the questions involved in it, he declared to be impossible, owing to the unknowableness of the thing-in-itself. The realistic establishment would have had to answer the question why our knowing reason has these and not other thought-forms, why it is thus and not otherwise constituted. But an answer to this question Kant held it would be impossible for any one to give. Nevertheless, he himself in so far answered it that he made the thing-in-itself intelligible in the "Reality of Freedom" and of pure will, and subordinated the theoretical to the practical reason. Distinguishing, now, in the doctrine of knowledge, the question concerning the *subjective origin* of phenomena from that concerning their *real ground*, the latter may be taken as constituting the *metaphysical problem*, which Kant declared to be completely insoluble, but which he by no means left completely unsolved. He lets so much light fall upon it that more light must necessarily be sought, and the complete illumination of the thing-in-itself striven for, in distinction from all phenomena and without confounding it with them.

To obviate all misconceptions, the reader will carefully distinguish, in connection with the Kantian doctrine, between empirical realism and metaphysical realism; that concerns phenomena, this things-in-themselves. Transcendental idealism establishes empirical realism, and is itself established by metaphysical realism.

¹ *Vid. supra*, Chap. II, Part I.

2. The Problem of Knowledge.

The Kantian doctrine of knowledge consisted, in the broadest sense, in isolating, fixing, and explaining the fundamental facts of our rational knowledge. These facts were of both theoretical and practical (moral) sort. The theoretical facts separated themselves into those of science or knowledge in the narrower sense, and those of our necessary contemplation or judgment of things guided by the Idea of end. The two ground-facts of scientific and, in the exact sense, theoretical knowledge were those of mathematical and natural science. The two necessary ways of contemplating the adaptation of phenomena to ends were our æsthetic and teleological points of view, while practical knowledge had the character—*i. e.*, the disposition and moral worth of our conduct for its object.

These facts of reason, unlike as they are, agree in that they all lay claim to a necessary and universal validity, which presents itself in the form of synthetic judgments *a priori*. The problem of the philosopher was: How are these facts possible? It was, then, a question of the establishment of their conditions or factors. They were sought and found along the path of *inductive* inquiry. As certain as these facts are, so certain are the conditions from which they follow. And since they are facts of reason, their conditions must be *faculties of reason*. Just as conditions precede that which is conditioned, so these faculties must precede their products—the facts of our knowledge and objects of knowledge, hence also of our experience and objects of experience. They are, therefore, *before* all experience, or, as Kant expresses it, “*a priori* (transcendental)”; that is, they are *pure* faculties of reason, or such as belong to reason, not as resulting from its experiences, but as preceding all experience, which it has yet first of all to have.

We see *how* the critical philosophy proceeds. It determines and constitutes the facts of reason; this is its *starting point*, and contains the putting of the question. It analyzes these facts, and finds by this inductive method the necessary and original faculties of reason which produce these facts; this is its *method*. It discerns wherein pure reason consists, or the content of what faculties constitute it; this forms its *result*. Do away with any one of the faculties discovered—as, *e. g.*, sensibility or understanding—and you have done away with the *possibility* of experience! Hence

these facts are necessary. Add to the facts discovered another that conflicts with them—as, *e. g.*, an intuitive understanding, or a supersensible perception—and you have done away with the fact of *human* knowledge and experience! Hence such a faculty is impossible. This is the *method of proof* which Kant called the Critical or Transcendental. By his process of induction Kant claims to have discovered the constitution of our reason, the laws of our thought and knowledge, with just as much logical consistency and certainty as Kepler did the harmony of the cosmos and the laws of planetary motion. Suspend Kepler's laws, and the phenomena of planetary motion become impossible.

Human reason must combine in itself as many fundamental faculties as there are conditions required for the fact of human knowledge. Thus the fact of pure mathematics was established by the fact that space and time are the two ground-forms of our sensibility, and hence pure perceptions; the fact of experimental knowledge or natural science by the fact that the understanding, a faculty essentially unlike the sensibility, forms and combines phenomena by means of its pure irreducible notions. These notions are not representative, but synthetic, and of the nature of judgments. What they combine must be given, hence received and of a sensuous nature. On this account, our reason is only capable of knowing sensible objects, and not supersensible, as things-in-themselves. There is accordingly in the arrangement of our faculties of knowledge no intellectual perception or intuitive understanding, to which alone things-in-themselves could be given, and could be intelligible. There is no object without subject, no thought without thinking, no appearance without a being to whom it appears. We should have no common world of sense, no objective experience, if we were not able to connect, arrange, and synthesize the given material of our impressions according to the same universal laws of thought. To produce phenomena common to all, there is required "the pure consciousness" and "the productive imagination" which operates unconsciously according to the laws of the former. To conceive the given phenomena, there is required "the faculties of apprehension, of reproductive imagination, and of recognition in the notion," as Kant designates them. Thus we see before us a series of different fundamental faculties, which, according to the computation of the "Critique,"

are necessary in order to create the facts of our knowledge, and the sum-total of which constitutes the productive capital of the *theoretical reason*. But this sum has only the character of a collective unity.

There is still to be added the fact of *practical* knowledge, which consists in the moral estimate of our dispositions and conduct. This estimate necessarily involves the idea of an absolute command, or of an unconditionally obligatory moral law. But a law that prescribes the course of conduct for our *disposition*, and thus concerns our truest and innermost being, can only be given by ourselves, and consequently demands the faculty of autonomy or freedom, which consists in a completely unconditioned or pure will. The moral law becomes apparent from the fact of our moral judgment, and freedom from the fact of the moral law. The moral law commands: "Thou shalt unconditionally will and act so and not otherwise!" In this we recognize the autonomy of our pure will, or the reality of our freedom, which expresses itself in the declaration: "Thou canst, *because* though oughtest!" Thus Kant brings us to the knowledge of our freedom also by the analysis of a fact—*i. e.*, by *induction*—while at the same time he expressly declares that this insight is not of an empirical character.

According to the results of the "Critique," the *theoretical* reason falls into the antithesis of sense and understanding—the two poles of knowledge—and the *entire* reason into the antithesis of theoretical and practical reason, or into that of the faculties of knowledge and the pure will. To these faculties of reason there correspond the two realms of reason—the sensible and the moral orders of the world, or nature and freedom. There mechanical causality rules, here teleological. Now, it is a fact that there are phenomena which appeal to us involuntarily as adapted or as not adapted to some end, and which we, therefore, judge as *æsthetic* or *teleological*, according as the character of their adaptation is referred merely to our contemplation of them, or to their own existence. There thus adds itself to the theoretical and practical ground-faculties the reflective judgment, which takes its place between the other two, and itself falls into the two sorts of *æsthetic* and teleological judgment.

Thus there results, by the inductive method of the Kantian criti-

cism, by its analysis of the facts of our theoretical and practical knowledge, and of our æsthetic and teleological contemplation of things, a series of different original faculties, the collective content of which constitutes our pure reason. These faculties are related to those facts as their ground. The question now arises: *By what are the faculties themselves established?* For we cannot possibly satisfy ourselves with the idea that reason is only their sum or collective notion. Just as the connection between phenomena is the work of reason, so the connection between its own faculties must be of the nature of reason. The sum-total of these faculties, therefore, is not merely collective, but *systematic*; and the system of our faculties of reason must have a determinable common root, from which it is derived. The investigation of this common origin, and the deduction of all the faculties which Kant represented as primitive powers and made the substratum of the phenomenal world, from the nature of reason itself, is the *ground-problem* which presented itself after the close of the Critical philosophy, as proceeding from its results, and as determining the direction of the investigations that followed.

II. The Lines of Development of Post-Kantian Philosophy.

1. The New Establishment of the Doctrine of Knowledge.

The question, therefore, in the development of the doctrine of knowledge and in the solution of its problem is one of a new establishment of the faculties of knowledge. What Kant found by the inductive method is now to be developed by the deductive. The possibility of such a *deduction* depends upon the knowledge of a principle underlying our faculties of knowledge, and hence the constitution of reason in general. Kant had discovered the laws of our thought and of the process of our knowledge by the observation and analysis of the facts of knowledge just as Kepler did the laws of planetary motion by the observation and computation of its phenomena. After Kepler had discovered these laws inductively, Newton appeared and deduced them from *one* fundamental force and *one* fundamental law. And similarly as Newton is related to Kepler in the establishment of the laws of motion of the celestial bodies, the post-Kantian philosophy is related to Kant in the establishment of the laws of thought of our reason. But

this comparison is intended to have no further application than subserves the apprehension of the *problem*, and is used simply to emphasize the deductive character of the latter.

Kant himself had hinted at this deductive development, not only by the deductive or synthetic *mode of exposition* which he followed in his chief work, but also by the arrangement of the faculties of reason themselves. These he not merely co-ordinated, but sought persistently to systematize. The productive imagination was to him the uniting bond between sense and understanding. That these faculties had a common origin was possible, but this origin was unknowable. The practical reason he regarded as the superior faculty, the theoretical as subordinated to it and dependent upon it, the reflective judgment as the uniting bond of both. Thus he had himself already given a *system* of the faculties of reason, which wanted, to be really such, only the character of unity and a foundation-principle.

This unity the philosopher declared to be unknowable, and hence a thing-in-itself. Should it become known, then the solution of the problem of knowledge would also be the solution of the metaphysical problem. It thus appears why the post-Kantian philosophy takes the metaphysical direction—in that it seeks to establish the doctrine of knowledge deductively—and, indeed, by attaching itself immediately to the Kantian doctrine. It shapes itself in its progressive forms of development into a knowledge of the thing-in-itself; and it is easy to foresee that in this progress the question concerning things-in-themselves and their knowableness will be the theme of pre-eminent and decisive importance. We will add still a second prefatory remark on this point. If the thing-in-itself passes for *unknowable* in the current academic sense of the Kantian doctrine, following the statements of the “Critique of Reason,” then the doctrine of its knowableness becomes at once the doctrine of its *nothingness*, and the post-Kantian philosophy soon enters a stadium where it becomes necessary to dispense with things-in-themselves altogether. There thus arises with the advance of post-Kantian philosophy the important and penetrating question whether the denial or affirmation of the reality of things-in-themselves must go hand in hand with the knowledge of them. An affirmative answer virtually declares for the true *realism* presented by a right understanding of the Kantian doctrine, in oppo-

sition to transcendentalism, which has no basis. Thus originates the conflict between materialism and Idealism in the post-Kantian metaphysics—a conflict which extends down to our own day.

2. The Threefold Antithesis: Fries, Herbart, Schopenhauer.

The immediate problem, then, which the post-Kantian philosophy seizes upon is the establishment of a new doctrine of knowledge from one single principle of reason. This movement has three characteristic features: as doctrine of principles, it is *metaphysical*; as doctrine of unity, it is *monistic*, or, in current historical terms, *System of Identity*; and, since its principle is the thinking knowing reason itself, it is *idealistic*. Every one of these characteristic developments called forth an opposing development, which likewise appealed to the Kantian doctrine, and sought to justify itself by claiming the right interpretation and criticism of Kant. There thus arises in the principal directions taken by post-Kantian philosophy a threefold antithesis, each standpoint being a special interpretation and criticism of the Kantian doctrine. The question with each is: What is the truth, what the deficiencies and errors of the Critical philosophy; what the permanent, what the perishable in the work of Kant?

The first antithesis is the most far-reaching. It affirms the necessity of a new establishment of the doctrine of knowledge, but rejects the metaphysical, monistic, and idealistic (*a priori*) line of development, as leading to a solution of the problem, and demands the observation of our inner life—*i. e.*, empirical and psychological investigation as the only means of determining the system of our faculties of reason. The true critique of reason could be nothing other than "subjective anthropology"; "theory of the inner life"; "natural doctrine of the human mind." Accordingly, not metaphysics, but "*Philosophical Anthropology*" appears as the fundamental discipline; it is along this line that the criticism of reason and the doctrine of knowledge is to be newly established. The representative of this standpoint is Fries (1773-1843), who founded a school, and has had a lasting influence. His principal works are: "System of Philosophy as Exact Science" (1804); "Knowledge, Belief, and Presentiment" (1805); and "New Critique of Reason" (1807). The latter is the chief work. Post-Kantian philosophy separates itself into the metaphysical and the anthro-

pological movements. What else can the knowledge of *human* reason, hence the critique of reason, seek to be than subjective or philosophical anthropology? So say Fries and his followers. How can anthropology seek to be the fundamental philosophical discipline when it itself, like all experimental sciences whatsoever, must needs be established? So answer their opponents.

The *second* antithesis has its origin and application within post-Kantian metaphysics. It accepts the metaphysical establishment of the doctrine of knowledge, but utterly rejects the monistic and idealistic features of the movement. It opposes to monism (System of Identity) the plurality of principles, and to idealism, a realism which fathoms and discerns that which truly is (= thing-in-itself), as something absolutely independent of all thought. Kant had rightly grasped things-in-themselves as the supersensible substrate of all phenomena and ideas, and as completely independent of them; and this their character must be scrupulously retained, and the knowledge of them made a matter of earnest pursuit. Every monistic and idealistic metaphysic rests upon the uncritical and radically false presupposition that one and the same subject has different faculties or powers—*i. e.*, upon the contradictory notion that one is many. Kant himself was under this constant presupposition, since he regarded human reason as of such a nature that it had and united in itself many and essentially different powers. His criticism of reason was in this respect—and not alone in this—not critical enough. And this constitutes its fundamental error. It needs, therefore, not only to be completed, but to be reconstructed and built anew from the foundation up; for it worked with notions that are full of contradictions, and hence neither qualified for knowledge nor for testing and establishing knowledge. Such contradictory notions are: thing with its attributes and changes, causality, matter, ego. Accordingly, it must be the first and fundamental problem of philosophy to investigate and rectify our categories of knowledge. This reconstruction and rectification is the theme of a new metaphysic, which opposes itself to all monism and idealism, and, by the removal of the contradictions that fill our natural thinking and constitute its evil, prepares the way for a knowledge of true being, in order, from the point of view of such knowledge, to explain the origin of phenomena and ideas.

The founder of this standpoint is *Herbart* (1776–1841). The first foundation-stone was laid by the work "Chief Points of Metaphysics" (1808). A synopsis of the whole system was given in the "Introduction to Philosophy" (1813). The principal work containing the completed system is the "General Metaphysics" (1829). In the preface to this work Herbart says, in concluding: "Kant maintained that 'our notion of an object may contain what and however much you will, we must nevertheless go outside of it in order to predicate existence of it.' This fact, now, is that to which the present work everywhere points; and *on this account the author is a Kantian*, if only from the year 1828, and not from the days of categories and the 'Critique of Judgment,' as the attentive reader will soon discover. It is not necessary to say more in advance. But let one arm himself with patience, for the chaotic state of previous metaphysics must first be shown; and it can only be gradually brought to order."¹

The *third* antithesis has its origin and application within the monistic metaphysics. It affirms the metaphysical and monistic knowledge of thing-in-itself as *one* original being underlying all phenomena, and hence all knowledge; but it rejects every idealistic conception of this original being. In consequence, it identifies original being (thing-in-itself) with thinking knowing reason, transforms it into an abstraction, and hence confounds it with ideas and phenomena. It thus demands its realistic and individualistic apprehension in opposition to the idealistic and abstract. The more abstract original being is thought, or the more it is universalized and designated with such names as "Absolute Identity," "Absolute Reason," "the Absolute," etc., the more exasperated the representative of this opposition to idealism becomes, who, nevertheless, is himself an offspring of the family of Identity-philosophers. The All-One cannot possibly be the universal; that is original, this derived, always derived, and so much the more, the more universal it is. Reason forms its notions by abstracting them from ideas, which themselves are abstracted from sensible perceptions, which latter are produced from the material of our sense-impressions and the perception-forms of our intellect—space, time, and causality. But these are functions of the

¹ Joh. Fr. Herbart, "Allgemeine Metaphysik," Preface, p. xxviii.

brain which as such presuppose the bodily organism and its stages of development. Nothing, therefore, is more absurd than that conception of the All-One which turns the matter upside down, and seeks to have recognized as the Original the absolute First—what, in truth, constitutes one of the last links in the chain of derived and dependent phenomena. Since now original being cannot be anything universal, it must be sought in the essence of individuality. Since it does not admit of being derived or of being known mediately, it is only to be discerned immediately—*i. e.*, in ourselves, in our innermost being. Now, the essence of our self-consciousness is effort or volition—the *will* for this definite life-manifestation, this particular existence, this individuality, this character. It is the will, not as consisting, so to say, in consciousness, but as impelling the consciousness on to a certain stage of its bodily manifestation and organization, and hence is the unconscious or *blind* will. But the very same principle which constitutes the essence or innermost being of *our* manifestation is the essence or being of *all* phenomena. Hence the All-One, the original being, or thing-in-itself, is will. The world and the realm of things in all their gradations is its phenomenon. *That* it is so, is perfectly evident. *Why* and *how* the will appears and objectifies itself in the phenomenal world, remains inscrutable.

The founder of this standpoint is *Schopenhauer* (1788–1860). He derives his doctrine immediately from the Kantian doctrine, and claims to be the only philosopher who has thought out the latter with logical consistency, and completed it. As metaphysician, he is opposed to Fries; as transcendental idealist, to Herbart; as realist and individualist, to the *idealists of the System of Identity*. He was fond of calling Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel “the three great sophists,” in comparison with whom he himself appeared as the philosopher in the pre-eminent sense. In his first work—“On the Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason” (1813)—he established his point of view; and in his chief work—“The World as Will and Idea” (1819)—he carried it out to its logical results. Schopenhauer lived to see late in life his growing fame—a fame which has survived him, and still survives to-day.

III. The Course of Development of Post-Kantian Philosophy.

1. Metaphysical Idealism.

The threefold antithesis which we have delineated necessarily presupposes that the thesis to which it is opposed is not only firmly adhered to, but wrought out into such comprehensive and powerful forms that they represent the actual dominating course of development of post-Kantian philosophy. However different the opponents of the thesis and their lines of work may be, they all have one common object of attack; they reject in a body metaphysical idealism—*i. e.*, that movement which makes Critical or Transcendental idealism into metaphysics, or, what is the same thing, which seeks for the *original ground* of phenomena within knowing reason. This is utterly false, says Fries, since critical idealism is not metaphysical, but anthropological, and the knowledge of our transcendental faculties not transcendental (*a priori*), but empirical. From this erroneous conception, which confounds psychology and metaphysics, object of knowledge and mode of knowledge, by regarding knowledge of the transcendental as transcendental knowledge, there results "the unfounded assumption of the transcendental," "the Kantian prejudice," which dominates the entire metaphysical idealism. This development is utterly false, says also Herbart, since the object of metaphysics is not the knowing reason, but real being *per se*, independent of all thinking and knowing. This development is utterly false, says also Schopenhauer, since the knowing reason is the subjective origin of phenomena, but by no means their original ground.

Nevertheless, metaphysical idealism or the idealistic System of Identity was the first and most direct development that resulted from the Kantian criticism. Kant himself had not only indicated this development, but fixed its course. He had given that significant hint, that sensibility and understanding, these two essentially different theoretical faculties, may, perhaps, have a common, but to us unknown, root; he had made theoretical reason dependent upon the practical, and mediated both by the reflective judgment;¹ he had designated the *unification* of intelligible and empirical character as the theme of the cosmological ground-problem, and the *unification* of thought and external perception in the

¹ Cf. *supra*, Chap. V, Part II, Sec. 1.

same subject, as that of the psychological ground-problem. Everywhere in the Kantian criticism the inquiry is raised concerning the principle and unity of our faculties of reason. And since this unity passes for unknowable, it is identified with the thing-in-itself, and hence with the subject of a metaphysical problem which the philosopher declared to be insolvable. The attempt to solve this problem from the nature of reason is of necessity the next step in advance.

2. The Threefold Advance: Reinhold, Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel.

The problem is, to solve a series of antitheses contained in our reason. The deeper and more comprehensive these opposing faculties are, the deeper and more comprehensive is the unity or common root from which they spring. Consequently metaphysical idealism passes through a series of stadia of development, and increases or deepens and broadens with every step its grasp of the unity of reason. And since what we have here to discover is the origination of our faculties of reason from *one* primitive ground, the constant theme (which was already formulated in the "Critique of Reason") of metaphysical idealism is *the doctrine of the development of reason*.

Within the sphere of the knowing or theoretical faculties of reason there lies the antithesis between sensibility and understanding; within the sphere of all the faculties of reason, the antithesis between theoretical and practical reason, or between knowledge and will; within the sphere of the whole world of reason, the antithesis between nature and freedom, or between the sensible and moral orders of the world.

The first question, which comprehends least, is concerned with the unity or common root of our theoretical faculties. It is shown, as a solution, how sense and understanding spring from one and the same faculty—that of representation. This attempt was made by *Reinhold* (1758–1823) in his "Elementarphilosophie" (1789).

The second question, more penetrating and far-reaching, has to do with all the faculties of reason, the theoretical and the practical. In answer, it is shown how the collective faculties of reason spring from the pure self-consciousness (ego)—the essence of which is the *will*—in accordance with the necessary law of development of the mind, which, whatever it is and does, it must also

which lay the foundation of his system, and had begun his influential activity as professor in Berlin. Toward no one of his opponents did Schopenhauer show more hostility, since (apart from other grounds of enmity) he saw in Hegel the culmination of that perverted development—the philosophy of identity—“non-sense,” he called it.

In the short period of a generation (1790–1820) post-Kantian philosophy fixed and wrought out its leading principles, lines of development, and antitheses. One fact in this connection is very noteworthy and significant. The new philosophy rests in the first place entirely upon the authority of Kant, and seeks still in the stadium of the “*Wissenschaftslehre*” to be nothing other than the *well-understood* Kantian doctrine. With Schelling, however, it begins to affect superiority, and it soon becomes fashionable to talk of “old Kant” as of past greatness. Then, on the other hand, as opposed to the threefold idealistic movement, there arises the threefold antithesis, the representatives of which, each in his own way, point back to Kant. Fries wants to be a Kantian without sharing the errors which resulted in “the Kantian assumption” of the idealists who preceded him. Herbart wants to fulfil the demands of the Kantian criticism by applying them to the Kantian doctrine itself, and calls himself a Kantian from the year 1828. Schopenhauer honors the founder of the Kantian philosophy as his teacher and master, as the greatest of all thinkers, and himself claims to be the one genuine Kantian among all the rest who has thought out the work of the master to its end, and solved the problem. Thus the Kantian doctrine exercises a controlling power over the subsequent systems which describe, as it were, their orbits about it, the centre of motion, and gravitate again from aphelion back to perihelion. The present bears witness that in our age the writings of no philosopher are so zealously studied as fountains of *living* truth as the works of Kant.

LETTERS ON FAUST.

BY H. C. BROCKMEYER.

XIV.

Contents: Those made suddenly rich demand amusements prepared for them; Goethe's view of art; art is the product of the "sense of truth," the self-envelopment of eternal reason; how can there be art for the man who denies both truth and reason? In this new sphere, Faust comes into conflict, not with aspiration (as in the First Part), nor with civil society (as in the paper-money scenes), but with the actualization of reason in the form of art; the understanding (Mephistopheles) cannot produce the beautiful, but can suggest the key which will lead to its discovery; the three unities of space, time, and action which should govern the drama; Don Quixote, as the typical example of aspiration, seeking for the beautiful in the realm of the prosaic understanding.

In our last, dear H., we traced the collision between Faust and Industrial Society to its conclusion, leaving the latter, before that conclusion was quite apparent to it, in a very blissful state—"one half carousing and the other half strutting the streets in brand new toggery."

Now, the last time when you and I witnessed this play upon, the boards, some twenty years ago—I mean the time when we saw it brought out, and don't wish to be understood to intimate that it has been withdrawn already—you remember that we observed some other accompaniments, contemporaneous as it were, such as grand spectacular plays of the "Black Crook" species, "Aladdin's Lamp," and the like. These of course were not accidental, but were intended by the poet; and while he trusts the managers to select each according to the audience which he serves, still he (the poet) is bound in the discharge of his duty to indicate the class of themes appropriate to the main action, hence Faust remarks:

"You did not think, old fellow, to what lengths your arts would carry us. First we made him rich, now we have to amuse him." Of course: well, that is the task before us.

But before we go and see—I mean you and I, dear H.—to see how that is done, permit me to transcribe a verse from the poet, a verse not contained in this poem, as possibly bearing on the subject in hand:

"As all the multiplicity of forms in nature reveal but one

God, so in the wide realm of art there is but one eternal artificer. This is the Sense of Truth, which decks itself with what is beautiful only, and in serene confidence awaits the cloudless clearness of the brightest day."

Art, then, in the poet's view of the question, is the product of the Sense of Truth, the ability of truth in man; without this there would be no art worthy of the name. It is this ability for truth, this reason which is the artificer, who decks himself—he or it decks him or itself; he or it is the content, and he or it is the chooser; for he or it decks itself with what is beautiful only.

With this fairly before our minds, we have to see what a man, Faust, will make of this province of human endeavor; he who does not believe that man possesses the capacity to know truth is destitute of this artificer of art.

Here, at the threshold, where we enter into a new sphere of the theme, according to our analysis, and which is introduced by the poet in this remarkably unostentatious manner, it may not be amiss to call your attention to one of the peculiarities of that sphere—and that is, that it constitutes the immediate rational content of the man, Faust, himself. In placing himself in collision with that content, his every step will be instantly revealed in its true character—an object of pity or derision; and this gives an entirely new aspect to the poem, so far as it develops this part of the theme. In the former spheres the collisions move either in the individual, where the honest, heart-rending aspirations of the man for what is true, good, and beautiful, redeem the desperation of his conclusion, or in the world of reality, where the lights are at best reflected from imperfect mediums; but here the focal radiance cannot be avoided.

Well, we have to see what a man who does not believe mankind capable of truth will make of art—for that is the more specific task imposed—as we are informed by the steward who addresses Mephisto with "You still owe us that ghost scene; better get at it at once; his Majesty is getting impatient."

Chamb. "Yes, but now, even now, he asked for it; your delay, I hope, is not intended to annoy the all-gracious man?"

Meph. "Why, gentlemen, my companion is absent on that very business, and he knows how to go about it. Locked up in the strictest privacy, he labors with great diligence; for you see the

task requires extraordinary industry. I assure you, whoever undertakes to dig for that treasure" (treasure being the theme of the day, running in everybody's head), "the beautiful, requires the very highest art—the art-magic of the sages—my clever gentlemen; the thing is not so easy."

The demand, however, is not very extraordinary or exorbitant. It is merely the ghost of Helen and Paris—the ghost of the beautiful, not the beautiful itself. But even the ghost of that is dangerous to meddle with for some people—but we must not anticipate.

The demand of the occasion, the demand of the audience, made rich in the way we have seen, is to see Helen and Paris, the pattern samples or saints of man and woman of such an audience, in clear and definite forms; for no one has the slightest misgivings but that, his demand being complied with, he will see *it*, the beautiful, in very deed. No one has the slightest misgivings as to that, least of all Faust himself. Certain as he is of this, just so certain is he that the human understanding is perfectly able to supply this demand; and hence, when he comes to interrogate it, he is annoyed to a degree, when he is met with all sorts of quirks, turns, and evasions, nay, is told that the heathens dwell in their own hell, over which the modern understanding has no authority, has not as yet surveyed entirely, much less reduced to possession, as if that was an answer!

He knows, is perfectly certain, that with the mutterings of a few magic formulas the whole thing is done. "Well, yes, there is a means." "What is it? Spit it out, man." "But I don't like to reveal the sublime arcana." "Out with it, I tell you." "The first thing you have to do is to abstract from all content presented to you by your own world. Take this key." "What, that insignificant—" "First lay hold of it; first understand it before you treat it with derision." "Why, sure enough! it does grow in my hand—becomes luminous." "Does it? You begin to see what you have when you have your hand on a thing like that! Well, this key will guide you to the luminous tripod, the luminous triad, the three unities of time, space, and action. That tripod which you touch with the key, it follows you as an humble servant. You arise (in the world) without effort of your own, good luck elevates you, and before any one so much as notices your absence you are back. Once in possession of this tripod,

you call up hero or heroine from the ancient night at pleasure. Thenceforth, with magical manipulation, gods are made to order from any fog or mist that has the least smell of perfume about it," say of meadow-hay or the like.

"What next?"

"Let the endeavor of your whole being be downward; sink." Degrade yourself into an ape of former ages. That is all.

"I wonder whether that key will prove a blessing to him. Indeed, I feel some curiosity whether he will get back at all or not."

POSTSCRIPT.—But there is no telling; you see, dear H., in a question of this kind there is no telling how far the intense desire, the aspiration of a man, will carry him; what cuffs, sarcasms, and sneers he will be able to endure from his own understanding even. If we examine the over-memorable example left of record for us by history, the only one that deserves to be mentioned in this connection, we see how the ardent desire, the all-absorbing passions or passion of the man, was to do, what? Nothing but to rid the world of those monsters of iniquity, injustice, and cruel wrong which, according to common report, were prowling about oppressing innocence and virtue. It was, therefore, the beautiful in deed, the admirable in act, which he, Don Quixote, sought to achieve. Now, the desire of Faust to produce the beautiful is not a whit less pure and ardent than ever was the inclination of the knight of La Mancha to do a beautiful deed, and may therefore lead to adventures not less deserving our admiration. This, however, is only possible on condition that, as in the one case, our admiration is largely of ourselves, of our immense superiority in being able to distinguish between a common windmill of our neighborhood and a terrible giant from abroad, so in the other case we exercise a discrimination, if not equal, at least approximating that degree of excellence. Be that as it may, however, there is obviously no telling what this man's passion may lead to.

XV.

Contents: Mephistopheles vents his sarcasm; gives Faust advice to ape the classic forms in order to produce the beautiful—in short, to produce the ghost of the beautiful by abstract methods; Faust is not disgusted, but rather enamored with the forms of art; his love becomes jealousy; he sinks into a dream of the beautiful, and becomes oblivious of the present in which he lives; he must leave the court and return to the university, the proper place for such theoretical activities; the difficulty of solving his

problem lies in the fact that his love is not for the universal (for there is no universal for him, according to his conviction), but for the sole possession of Helen; Wagner's Homunculus can see Faust's dream, although Mephistopheles cannot; the reproductive imagination will help on the way to the productive imagination, which is what Faust needs for the attainment of the beautiful; Homunculus, a kinsman of the Will-o'-the-wisp, on the Brocken; he is the aspiration to come into being.

Our last, dear H., exhibits the quirks and turns, the evasions and sophisms, the arts, in a word, employed by the understanding, when interrogated in regard to the production of the beautiful. They ended with sarcasm, and a final brutal home-thrust of down-right impudence. Of course, to a man of sense, of right good horse-or-mule-sense—for a mule is far the superior to the horse when it comes to a question of sense of that kind—there is nothing more absurd in nature than this childish hankering after such unreal things as the beautiful of any kind or shape whatsoever. In the eye of such sense the entire proclivity of human nature in this direction is highly ludicrous under any circumstances, but when it detects that proclivity, fondling an object unworthy of the name, its indignation can hardly observe the bounds of common civility, and runs the risk of making itself ridiculous.

"I wonder whether that key will prove a blessing to him." It ought to cure his foolishness, no doubt—he really ought to have no more attacks of that kind. "I really feel some curiosity whether he will come back." Well, if this hankering after the beautiful were a mere matter of conviction, you see, Mr. Mephisto, there is no doubt but that you would have cured it long ago, and there would be no question of a relapse. But as it happens not to be, your curiosity in that respect is, to say the least, not very creditable to your own good sense; for you see he does come back, and that, too, with desire sharpened to hot hunger, notwithstanding your key—hot hunger sharpened to such an edge that we shall see wonders. Just listen, and look.

Faust. "Have I still eyes" (perhaps!)? "Is not this Beauty's fountain that pours a stream, bank-full, into my inmost sense? My fearful journey brings most blessed gain. How idle was all the world, how blank! And now, what is it now, since my sacred priesthood? Now it is as if placed on a new foundation, permanent, worthy of my heart's desire. Let the breath of life vanish the instant I forsake thee. The beautiful form which at one time ravished me with bliss when I beheld its magic scintillation was

but a picture of foam compared to this beauty! Thou art she at whose feet I bring as tribute the inspiration of every power, the essence of every passion to thee, affection, love, worship, madness."

Hot hunger sharpened, or, perhaps, dulled to such an edge that it turns to jealousy.

Faust. "Beware you! You impudent fool! You dare! Hold on! Stop that!" He vociferates at Paris, when the latter, innocently enough one would suppose, plays his ancient rôle, now some thousands of years old.

Faust. "What, am I here for nothing; have I not this key here in my hand; can I not hurl you, impudent rascal, back into nothingness by simple abstraction?" Perhaps you had better try the experiment, and see what becomes of the object of your aspiration, your Helen. Perhaps you had better submit (we meant to say) those objects, supplied by this method, to the glittering eyes of the understanding, and see whether the result will not be exceedingly disastrous. What is Hecuba to you?

Well, dear H., here we are; Faust, with his aspirations set ablaze by the means we have seen, the ghost of the beautiful conjured up from the past in accordance with the magic formulas contained in those strange cook-books ("*Ars Poetica*" and the like) is knocked senseless as regards mundane affairs, aspirations and all—at least so far as any present outlook is concerned, as to an object for that aspiration—his exalted vocation as high-priest at the altar of the beautiful, having resulted in that way, in consequence apparently of that little experiment which we suggested, but which was so bitterly deprecated by Mephisto—we have nothing left but the latter gentleman. For it is always well to remember that while Faust is himself and Mephisto, Mephisto is only himself, and not himself and Faust. Under this view of the situation we have nothing left at present but Mephisto, without mundane affairs, and Faust unconscious, dreaming as it would appear subsequently—but practically dead to all but his dream—so completely has the infatuation to produce the beautiful taken hold of the man.

Saddled with this dream, therefore, we have to sacrifice our position at Court—a loss we well understand ("That is the profit! loading one's self with fools"), but, burdened as we are, we must

back to our old home, the university, the place of investigation, the place for dreams—the Court is not for that.

Meph. “Rest there, of all the unfortunates the most. Seduced into inextricable intricacies of love—paralyzed by Helen, how is he to recover his senses?” That is the question—very intricate indeed!

For you see this is not a case of simple love, although such have been known, or related, as presenting a good many difficulties. But a case of love for the beautiful, of a very peculiar kind, not of that species which rushes out with hat off to the street-corners and market-places, to the crowd, whooping and calling aloud, “Come, come, one and all; come, enjoy, love, worship with me; bathe with me in this radiance divine; make my joy complete by sharing it; make it universal, eternal!”—not that kind of love, dear H., but that other kind, “the man must have the woman, or what in thunder is the book about?” That is the intricacy of the case, love of the beautiful that we can appropriate to our individual purpose—individual, understand, our exclusive and undivided purpose, to the purpose of our individuality. Intricate enough, but soluble here if anywhere. Here where our vocation, the worthy Doctor Wagner, has not been idle during our absence, is even now so absorbed in the solution of the most sublime problem, that the poor man naturally of the most delicate complexion in the world, looks like a very charcoal-burner, has not had, or taken time, so to speak, to even wash his face for months past. Sure enough, the worthy man, the very key-stone of the arch that sustains the learned world, has hit upon, has produced, or is in the act of producing, something worthy of that world, and not entirely foreign to the purpose in hand. Of course, it is a mere speck, a mere homunculus, but it is, or at least it strives to be, something human—would become so, in fact, and will spare no endeavor in that direction. It seeks to be the beginning of something human, and can actually see the dream of Faust, a thing wholly oblivious to your man of sense—to Mephisto.

Meph. “What wonders you relate, the more insignificant, the greater visionary. I see nothing.” Homunculus can in point of fact sneer back at the old man himself:

Hom. “Oh, you with the double hood of priest and knight over your eyes from infancy, what can you see, you of the north?”

"The question here is, as you yourself have stated it, How is Faust to recover his senses? If you have means for this end, use them; if not, leave the matter to me. The aspiration toward the beautiful is a matter of fact, an element of human nature, for I, even I, who, as you observe, am still in my bottle, still corked up, I can and do already, in this my rudimentary state, as you may say, feel, appreciate, that aspiration. If you have not learned that fact, you had better wrap that rag of reproductive imagination about the Knight (angels of mercy defend us!) and follow me"—"Here set him down. As his foot touches this ground, consciousness returns." For he seeks it in the realm of fiction. Poor man!

Faust. "Where is Helen?"

Hom. "Couldn't say; but like enough to be found here or hereabouts with proper inquiry." And is that all? As remarked, it is not much, but still it is, as far as it goes or desperately strives to be, human. This little light as is usual in such cases, a light that is before it ought to be—rather premature—sadly over-estimated as to the extent of horizon it illumines, can be of no real service to reveal the one thing looked for, the one thing needful. "Couldn't say," but perhaps "here or hereabouts"—and the like. Examined at close range, we see that we have met the bright little man or his relative in reduced circumstances—his first cousin, but we are not up in genealogy—before in no less elevated a region than the Brocken itself, where he performed duty as torch-bearer and general escort, as we remember, through the desolate empty places of those regions. There as species of pimp, in literary guise—manufacturer of the beautiful (of the kind where the man gets the woman) for the honored public of that empty locality of barren lust—in reduced circumstances, and therefore cuffed about by the boss of the household!

Meph. "Keep the road, in the devil's name; I say keep the road, don't be zigzagging about in that contradictory hobgobbling gate of yours—do you hear? or I blow that flicker—that will-o'-the-wisp light of yours out—out into utter darkness."

But here, as Homunculus, not in reduced circumstances, although plainly enough seen by the understanding armed with proper instruments of observation, for you see this peculiar phial is quite transparent, by virtue of these instruments—still, while the

phial is transparent to Mephisto, its contents are not. The Homunculus, as aspiration to become, with his marvellous propensity in that way, viewed as aspiration in general, is by no means unfamiliar with the aspiration *toward* (which in this case might be rendered *for*) the beautiful, especially when manifested in the female form, hence he is perfectly familiar with the dream of Faust—a thing not seen by Mephisto, and hardly credible to him who surmises, on being informed of the diagnosis of the case, that a remedy might perhaps be found on the Brocken itself (not a wild guess either), but he is willing to treat the matter with a suspension of judgment, for the thing has its peculiarities—the becoming.

Homunculus, however, is not merely familiar with the dream, but with the wondrous faith that he entertains in regard to the value of congenial surroundings; he hits upon a remedy by which to restore Faust to his senses. But beyond this their paths separate, and they meet no more (and there is no conceivable reason that they should)—the one to discover if he can how wisely to become (not to be confounded with how to become wise), the other to discover if he can the beautiful in the realm of fiction—to look for the self-embodied True in the realm of the untrue. And what of Mephisto? Well, he has his own thoughts. To him this much is certain: that in order to produce the beautiful we must know all the conditions under which it is produced, and he will see to it that no more failures shall occur on that score.

XVI.

Contents: The last words of Homunculus; his destination; Wagner's problem not yet solved; how to breed a poet; can the understanding produce a poem? Faust in Greece; he finds no one who has seen the beautiful except Chiron; in the classical Walpurgis Night he is to find, not the beautiful, but all of its conditions, commencing with Chaos and his daughters, or the formless opposite of the beautiful; any form is superior to no form; Greek art the standard of the beautiful; all modern art an imitation of it; hence the importance of discovering all the conditions of its production; the Trojan War the beginning of the consciousness of the manifestation of the beautiful, because the Greek then sacrifices himself for its recovery; deduction of the elements of the problem: jealousy of Faust, explosion, unconsciousness, necessity of resort to the Brocken of the classic world, return to consciousness, nature struggling to become beautiful in the shape of sphinx, griffin, etc., the family relation with Helen as the germ of institutional life; the Greek myths of Helen involve three things: Helen must be an individual, and yet must become universal and still retain her individuality; her wooers

must surrender life, fortune, and honor in the defence of the successful wooer; thus the family is made sacred, renunciation of individual passion secured; the aspiration is no longer commensurate with the object, for aspiration is national and should have a national object; this it finds in the Trojan nation; Greece proves its universality by destroying its opponent; the act of Helen, as proceeding from brute lust, appertains to the realm of Chaos, of ancient night, devoid of rational institutions, and symbolized by Phorkyas; the content of the act of Helen is individual aspiration for the beautiful, and this is a simple duplicate of the aspiration of Faust.

Whatever the success of Faust, there is no doubt but that his escort, whose services became of value only as we have observed, dear H., in our last letter, by reason of the peculiar intricacy of this love affair that we are investigating—there is no doubt, I say, that he, the escorter to this delightful region, will fall in with something in his line.

Hom. "The air is wondrous soft here, and the perfume most delicious."

Proteus. "I should say so, you lovely little rogue!" "On farther toward the point of this little tongue of land it becomes still more delightful, and the redolent air more inexpressible . . . Come! See!" . . .

. . . *Hom.* "Threefold remarkable spirit, stop." . . . "What I reveal to you in this soft emulgence is all-inspiringly beautiful." That is the last word of Homunculus.

Proteus. "It is in this vital emulgence where your light becomes musical"—becomes rhythmic, so to speak.

Nereus. "What mystery is about to reveal itself? Around the shell, around the feet of Galatea, it flames, now strong, now lovely, now sweetly, as if touched by the heart-throbs of love."

Thales. "It is Homunculus enticed by Proteus. You see the symptoms of imperious longing, hear the heaving." (Here there is a misprint in my book, dear H.—a *Dr* for *St*—so that *Stoeh-nens* has been printed *Droehnens*. Of course I cannot proceed in so delicate a matter until I have an opportunity to examine the original manuscript, and know that I am right. If the passage referred to anything in the world of reality, it might not be of any great moment, but here one cannot be too careful.)

This, then, is the last of Homunculus. He most assuredly is in a fair way to become, whether wisely or not. If the chorus in the next act of the poem may be believed, it would appear that this sublime problem, on which we saw the learned Dr. Wagner

sit hatching—the problem of how to produce genius to order in the human species by careful breeding, by wisely guiding the becoming—was not solved at that time.

It sings: “Alas! born to all that is desirable in life, parents of exalted rank, far-reaching power, a piercing eye to see the world, a heart attuned to sympathy with every human emotion, the adoration of the best of women, and an utterance most melodious; with all this, lost, lost to himself in the very bloom of youth!”

Not solved at that time, even under these circumstances, and so we may fairly dismiss that subject.

But how, my friend, how about the other, that cognate problem—at bottom one with this? Suppose we agree with the book that, at that time, man, or the understanding of man, was not as yet able to produce the Poet to order. There was no reason in this, was there? that it might not produce the work of the poet, the beautiful. Suppose it should succeed in this; why then Nature, as we say, may keep her Poet in her pocket. The problem is solved from the other end—the demand supplied.

But where is Faust?

Faust. “Here I am, as it were by a miracle, here in Greece!”—the wind knocked out of him again almost by the mere thought of this fact—“I felt instantly the ground on which I stood”—likely. “How I, the sleeper, was permeated by a spirit.” No doubt of that. “I stand a very Antæus.” “See what a remarkable collection! Now let me investigate this labyrinth of divers colored flames earnestly.”

That is the thing to do, no doubt of that.

But beyond the detection of here and there a good outline in the colossal abortions of Sphinxes, Griffins, and the like—the memories associated with them in his reading, and the exclamation, “How colossal the forms, how grand the memories!”—all of which Mephisto attributes to the very natural cause that when one is on the track of his sweetheart he is usually in an appreciative mood, we hear nothing from him outside of his dream which he brought along with him, until he is thrown into ecstatic hysterics by the circumstance that he finds himself seated upon the identical spot once occupied by Helen—upon old Chiron’s back. This hysteric ecstasy itself, however, is of short duration, as the whole thing runs itself into the ground—that is, into the foot

of Olympus; for the object which Faust had in view, therefore, beyond that "seat," this seems a very unpromising locality. Not one of the assembled, Chiron excepted, even as much as claims a passing acquaintance with the beautiful. Some of them have heard of somebody, who was neighbor to somebody, who, etc., but, as far as a sight of the object itself, not even through a telescope.

But what of that? We did not come here, says Mephisto, to find the beautiful. We came to hunt up the conditions under which it is produced and producible. Not merely the conditions in a loose, general way, but, distinctly, all the conditions—that is the reading of the text.

Commencing with Chaos, then? As immediate background, undoubtedly. But his daughters—they have some form, they are already beauties as compared to Chaos, and therefore not to be neglected. They are indeed the starting-point, if we do not want to fool ourselves again in this matter, and they are, or ought to be, here.

Observe, dear H., with what diligence he investigates, under such inauspicious circumstances, too, until he finds his object. See how he analyzes it, and, finally, with what diplomatic skill and perfect disregard of personal appearance he possesses himself of a veritable sample of these fundamental beginnings of all forms, the very first-born of Chaos. With these, the beginnings, the very principles of all forms in his possession, let your beauty present itself. That is—

But here a question puts itself of the very highest importance to our undertaking, and which, furnished as we are, can be postponed no longer. It is this, dear H.: If the unreality of the products of art of a given period is attributable to a superficial imitation, and this to a superficial knowledge of the imitated, and the latter is the Greek Ideal, as embodied in Helen, then you observe that it becomes of the highest importance to determine, if we desire to know *all* the conditions that we are in quest of, at what period in the development of this idea it is to be regarded by us as perfect—as standing revealed to the consciousness of Greece in all its divine splendor. Public rumor, you observe, merely reports that Helen stands for the beautiful, but does not determine this question for us with any degree of accuracy, and

unless it is so determined, why, we might make a serious mistake. Was it before or after the Trojan War? If manifestation is an essential element, then it could only be after that event. For then, and then only, was it manifested, lit up, as it were, by the world-torch of burning Ilion—proclaimed through all time in the wailing accents of helpless infancy, and the groans of more helpless old age—this is the sacrifice that man lays upon the altar of the Eternal.

This, dear H., is not the solution of that little problem; it is only the statement. Let us now look at it at a little closer range, in order to see how we get to the next act.

The intricacy of the problem is as follows:

1. We have the natural aspiration toward the beautiful, which is not confined to Faust, not even to man, but which is general, or nearly so, throughout animated nature.

But this aspiration manifests itself in conjunction with the sexual phenomena of procreation only, and in these phenomena we attribute to it the function of selection, of individualization, of exclusiveness, and hence jealousy.

2. It is this jealousy that produces the catastrophe in the scene between Faust and the Ghost of Paris and Helen, where the aspiration of the former demands an object exclusive for itself.

Then the explosion is caused which reduces him to unconsciousness—that is, degrades him to a level with every living thing in nature that mates, be it bird of the air or animal of the field.

3. In this condition the understanding is powerless to reach him, and the circumstance that the objects are mere spectres renders the case so much more desperate.

4. The only remedy in this case, therefore, lies in the cause of the phenomenon, and must be developed thence.

5. But the cause of the phenomenon is the potentiality in animated nature, which in its first distinct organized existence is the spermatozoa—in man the Homunculus.

6. It is under the guidance, therefore, of Homunculus that Faust is borne, in a condition wholly unconscious, wholly inhuman as man is under such guidance, to the classical Brocken, to the equivocal elements of ancient culture. To the world created by the aspiration toward the beautiful, as it expresses itself in nature.

7. The moment he touches this ground, consciousness returns, for he is at home amidst a world created by his own aspiration, or a world expressive of that aspiration in the forms of Griffins, Sphinxes, Sirens, Fauna—in a word, of nature struggling to become beautiful—to become human.

8. But, while that may be the meaning of this equivocal world, that world may also mean all human nature struggling to become bestial, as such phenomena too frequently do in the modern world. Hence, instead of seeing the purification of the object of aspiration, and through it of the aspiration itself, he declares especially and with vehemence that he does not want to be cured, would regard himself infamous if he did ("as infamous as all the rest"), and sees in these forms the possibility of obtaining an object for his aspiration as it is, as nature made it.

9. In this he succeeds when he discovers that point where self-conscious intelligence begins its process of mediation through which the object of the aspiration is purified, not merely from all animal elements, but, from its individual elements, into universality—through the institutional life created by that intelligence. This process is represented in the Greek Mythos of Helen, and involves the following elements:

1. The object is individual.
2. It is to become universal.
3. And retain its individuality.

1. Helen must be an individual woman, for thus alone is she an object for the natural aspiration for the beautiful.

2. This individuality can show its universality only by the power which it exercises over *all* men. To be the object for one, a few or many, is not sufficient. Universality means *all*.

All the young men of Greece are wooers.

3. Wooing, however good, as far as it goes, furnishes no demonstration of the universality in question. This can be supplied only by an absolute surrender of the individuality of each wooer—of his life, fortune, and sacred honor—to the object. All agree that whoever wins the object of their common aspiration shall command the life and fortune of each individual for the defence of his hearth.

4. The purification of the aspiration is thus complete; that is, in a formal way. The sacredness of the family is established by

formal compact signed, sealed, and delivered by *all* in the presence of all Greece.

5. To achieve this, however, each individual wooer had to renounce the individual woman; the universality of the object could only be established by this solemn renunciation. So long as the individual wooer demanded *this* individual beauty, come what may, he could not sign that compact. In lieu of it, of the individuality of the object, they have established for each the sacredness of the family as the home, the embodiment of the beautiful. A creation of intelligence in lieu of a product of nature.

6. But the immediate object, Helen, remains as nature made it. It is no party to the compact; and the family, even in its formal state, consists of two individuals, both of whom must be purified—must surrender their caprice in order to be united into one (see Letters III and IX, notes).

7. The object, therefore, is no longer commensurate with the aspiration, nor the aspiration with the object (for we must remember that both are either). The latter is individual; it as aspiration seeks an object commensurate with its individuality. This it finds, not in Greece, for Greece has signed that compact, but beyond where there are still men—men that are willing to kill and be killed for the individual object, the woman they want.

8. But this act on the part of the object arouses the formal compact, the formal family into an armed reality, that, in the event, demonstrates its own universality, by the destruction of the individual object of the aspiration of Helen—Paris and all his adherents.

9. The content of this victory, the family, of course, terminates the equivocal realm into which Faust was guided by his aspiration, and places the act of Helen in the form of Phorkyas, as the land-mark, as the everlasting monument of demarkation between its own world and that realm of Chaos, of brute lust, of ancient night, utterly devoid of any institution of rational intelligence—Phorkyas, “in whose creation no God was concerned.”

10. The content of this act is, as we have seen, the individual aspiration toward the beautiful, the same as manifested throughout animated nature—a simple duplicate of the aspiration of Faust, the man who denies the existence of truth to men.

11. It is this act which in the shape of Phorkyas throws Helen into the arms of . . . ; but let us go and see.

XVII.

Contents: The reception of Helen by Lynceus and Faust; the nature of their relation; not universal, but particular; the spectre of the hearth; Euphorion's fate predestined; the understanding, with all the conditions in its hand, produces only the external garments of beauty, and has even to dispute its title "with demons tugging at the corners."

Lynceus. "Let me kneel, let me look, let me die, let me live! Lost! lost! Dedicated body and soul to this God-given woman! Intently awaiting the glories of morn, with eyes on the East, the Sun arises miraculously in the South; attracts the eye to that side; instead of hills and dells, the wide expanse of earth and sky. Her to see! Her, the only one! Gifted with eyesight like the lynx, lo! I strain every nerve, bewildered as in a dream. How could I locate myself? The pinnacle! the tower! the gate! Fogs away and vanish before my eyes—such a goddess stands revealed! Absorbed are heart and eyes, and this beauty as it dazzles dazes me entirely; I forget my duties as warder—clean forget the wonder-horn. You may threaten, may destroy me; beauty assuages every passion."

This, mark you, from the man with extraordinary eyesight. Nay, in a few moments he comes rushing back with—

"You see me back, O Queen! Me, the man of unbounded wealth, begs, oh, begs one look from thee! He gazes on thee, and feels poor as a beggar, and rich as a prince."

After describing his store of wealth, whence, and how acquired—

"All this I held fast my own, but now, rather loosely, it becomes thine. I believed it of highest value, but now see that it is naught. All my wealth is vanished, cut down, and withered like grass. Oh, give it back its value with one cheerful look." Do!

Pray imagine the feelings of the poor man when he is told by Faust—

"Take away your burden edaciously acquired. Quick! Not exactly censured, but neither worthy of reward. Whatever the castle contains belongs to her, of course. To bring piecemeal offerings of special objects is superfluous. Go! Heap treasure upon the top of treasure; erect the sublime picture of unheard-of splendor. Let the arched dome shine like a new heaven. Ar-

range a paradise of lifeless life. In advance of her step, let the embroidered carpet unroll on carpet; her feet be met by velvet floor, her eye by splendors endured only by the gods."

How is that, dear H.?

Lynceus. "What the master orders is easily done. Mere play, in fact, for the servant to perform."

After such a reception we are prepared to look around and ask with the leader of the chorus:

"Who could blame our Queen if she should grant the Lord of the Castle some friendly attention? Remember, too, that we are prisoners, all of us, as we have been more than once since the awe-inspiring downfall of Ilion, and the labyrinthine journey thence."

No, indeed, no one ought to blame the queen—no one but a brute would. But you really were prisoners then—you were treated as such by the persons in charge? You, the handmaids, the immediate handmaids of beauty? And you really think that the circumstance that you all, Queen and handmaids, are prisoners now, ought to be considered in judging the conduct of your Queen in the case supposed?

Well, your experience in such matters entitles your opinion to a good deal of weight, no doubt, and when you tell us further:

"Women accustomed to the love of men (man in the plural) are no choosers, but judges they are; and, as occasion serves, grant their favors impartially to golden-locked shepherd or to black-bristled Faun alike." It only shows the extent of your experience. Nay, if we recall the greeting which your Queen received, but now, as it were, at the hearth and home of her husband Menelaus, we should be less than human if we did not agree with you. We remember your own surprise, even as you called out to your friends:

"Come, leave now the pleasure-strewn path of song, and direct your eyes to the palace portal. What do I see, sisters? is it not the Queen who returns to us with strangely agitated step?" (on a run, so to speak). "What is it, exalted Queen? what could happen to thee of exciting nature in the halls of thine own house? You cannot hide it, for in spite of you I read upon your brow a noble anger debating with surprise." (Not to say terror.)

Helena. "Common dread does not become the daughter of Zeus.

to be the beautiful—"Oh, give it, the trumpery, back its value with one cheerful look"—which evinces some sincerity, and also some appreciation of the outer relation of things, he would inevitably sink beneath the contempt of all mankind—his jewels being such a load.

And, now, what about the Lord of the Castle, the Knight so deeply interested in these questions, or their purport? Well, my dear H., you must look for yourself; how am I even to hint at any one feature of the ecstasy that now thrills his whole being—quivers, so to speak, the very spurs at his heels into music, when I could not even do justice to the effect of that ever-memorable "seat" in the last scene? Be pleased to recall the air, the genuflexions, the grimaces, etc., with which he officiated before us at the altar of Beauty—a beauty of the kind made of any mist or fog with the least scent of perfume about it; the kind that is wholly dumb—inside blank and outside fog. Then recall the effect of that "seat," and then endeavor to picture to yourself the looks, the attitudes, the feelings, the shiverings of the man when he comes into the actual presence of the beauty—the beauty of the kind where the man gets the woman.

Do this if you can; but I repeat my advice, go and see for yourself—not just now, however, for you see he is busy teaching this unclean—(I may say that, for she herself stated that she would think out some way of purifying herself, in order that she might approach the family hearth, when she adopted the other alternative of remaining as she was and letting the hearth go)—I mean to say that the Knight is teaching this unclean beauty how to rhyme. You might disturb him; take this glimpee into the inside there.

Faust. "I scarcely breathe; I quiver; Speech is dumb; it is a dream; time and place have vanished."

You observe. And so we have arrived whence we started for insight, for content—wholly dumb, mere pantomime; the very same pantomime we had before, with this difference, that for Faust it is not the other fellow that has the woman. But for us it is; and so we are whence we started, with hands, hearts, and souls empty.

Of course, that sublime picture of unheard-of splendor—that paradise of lifeless life, made up of the Learnings and Earnings

of the Ages—that is something. But you will observe that without a cheerful smile of beauty—a beauty that is itself content, and can employ such things—they are mere trumpery, the very extreme outer of form; and for this content we have the object as presented by nature. (See Letter XVI.)

The offspring of the *liaison* between the natural aspiration toward the beautiful and its object, as presented by rumor, with the understanding as go-between is extremely precocious, as is not unusual with offspring born out of wedlock, but, as is also not unusual, entirely too smart to live long. So after romping his little hour with the handmaids of beauty, who, as handmaids of beauty of that kind, are not averse to such and kindred recreation, he incontinently breaks his neck at the feet of his parents, to the relief almost of the latter; for no appeal of theirs, however touching or tender, has the slightest effect upon the youngster, bent on courting his fate with reckless daring.

Helen. “Scarcely called into life, scarcely given to the bright sun of day, thou yearnest from the dizzy heights beyond—beyond into space filled with agony and woe. Are, then, we naught to thee; is the golden bond a dream?” Nothing more; not even that under the circumstances. That is all one to him; and so—

Helen. “The tie of love is severed, and with it the tie of life. Deploring both, I bid thee a painful fare-the-well!” Of course, the tie of love and life is one and the same thing with beauty of this species.

Meph. “Hold fast the only thing that remains to thee—the garment! Don’t let go of it; there are demons tugging at the corners to drag it down below. Hold to it! It is not the Goddess herself—still it is divine. Avail yourself of the high, the estimable favor, and ascend. It bears you swiftly, high above the commonplaces through the ether as long as you can sustain yourself.” And no longer.

“We meet again far—far from here.”

The curtain drops, says the Poet; “Phorkyas in the side-scene straightens up, until she assumes giant proportion; pushes veil and mask aside, and exhibits herself as Mephisto, in order, by way of epilogue, to comment upon the piece, if deemed necessary.”

Not necessary, thank you! the face is all-sufficient.

You will observe, dear H., that the understanding with all the

conditions at command, from Phorkyas up to Helen, from the first-born of Chaos, the first rudiments of form, up to the highest example of beauty known to rumor—lacking the artificer, the Sense of Truth, achieves with all its marvellous skill nothing but the outer drapery, the external garments of beauty, and even this only with a disputed title, “with demons tugging at the corners.”

XVIII.

Contents: We have now seen what is the quality of art that the understanding can produce to satisfy the shoddy public thirsting for amusement during its leisure; the fourth act now opens; Faust bids adieu to clouds, and arrives at facts; there is an ocean of the unknown surrounding this realm of fact; a noble army of scientific toilers make inroads on it; want of organization in the toilers renders nugatory their work; to organize them shall be Faust's life-endavor; meanwhile the Emperor, with his fool-gospel, has so managed as to let his State fall into anarchy, and revolution is in progress; Faust and the Understanding prop the throne, and a victory is gained for the Emperor, Faust, and Anarchy; with justice present, every want is protected in its rational exertion; with justice absent, every want is a yawning chasm that seeks to engulf the State; Faust's labors, guided by Mephistopheles, tend to make anarchy perpetual; “court festivals” the only business left for the State; the Archbishop asks for a large endowment for church purposes, and gets it; “the want is money—get it”; but the Archbishop is not satisfied; he demands the share of the realm which has been assigned to Faust; it is the land still covered by the waves—the land of unknown truth covered by the ocean of ignorance, which science is to lay bare, and add to the *terra firma*; the Church wishes to control the conclusions of science, and have power of revision; the Emperor, however, does not grant this last request.

These, then, dear II., are the outlines of the themes we referred to in Letter XIV as appropriate to the main action, and from which managers may select without risk of serious mistake or incongruity so long as the main play is upon the board. The latter will now claim our attention. For society which we left so happy, “one half carousing, and the other half strutting the streets in brand new toggery”—in order to look after its amusements, to see that nothing might be wanting for its proper relaxation during the leisure moments of such exhausting occupation—is about to be informed of the full blessing which it is to enjoy from that new gospel mentioned in Letter XIII, “The want is money—get it.” Let us observe the progress of the play.

“The scene is the very pinnacle of a jagged mountain range of naked rock. A cloud approaches, leans upon the edge where there is a small level spot, opens, and Faust emerges,”

And bids good-by to clouds forever, having arrived on solid naked fact at last. Nay, the very ideal of naked fact, as we see.

For a moment he contemplates the illusions of the past, as they glide by in the shape of a cloud, that but now supported him, off toward the East. He still sees some outlines of beauty which, however, soon vanish, and the whole is piled up in a broad stratum along the horizon, resembling a glacier—mirroring with a sterile glitter the aims once so high to him in the days that are no more.

Another illusion, a slight mist takes the form of his first love—does not dissolve, but, gently gliding, ascends upward into the blue ether, and draws after it the better part of his inner self.

While thus occupied a “seven-league boot” heaves in sight. Another of the same kind follows, Mephisto alights. The boots march on in a great hurry.

Mephisto. “That’s what I call making progress to some purpose! But, say, what in the world has got into you, to halt in the midst of these monstrosities, among these cliffs and yawning chasms? Of course to me the scene is quite familiar, although not exactly in this locality; for, in point of fact, this used to be the floor of hell.”

Faust. “You’re never wanting in foolish yarns. It is high time you were spinning one of that kind.”

At which Mephisto proceeds in bitter earnest to rehearse the volcanic theory of geology. Assigns, however, as ultimate cause the banishment of the devils into the deepest depths, “where, being crowded together in a limited space without proper ventilation, the foul air generated produces coughing and sneezing; a blowing off at both ends, in fact, by all the devils at once.” This results in a volume of gas of such magnitude and power as to burst the crust of the earth wide open, and produce the phenomena we see.

In fact, we are in the midst of a discussion of problems in physical science, so called, and modern progress. Of course the illusions of the past we have found to be illusions in very deed, but here in this sphere of naked fact, here the understanding is master, and here something may be achieved of memorable import.

Observe that ocean of ignorance and doubt, on the one hand, and this noble army of toilers making inroads upon that ocean,

upon the unknown, on the other. Observe, also, how this mass of toilers is without organization, each working after his own plan, and the result as a whole is but too often a fluctuating, aimless strife; now victory, now defeat, leaving a large margin of debatable ground, which in my judgment might be reclaimed if a central institution were established that could pronounce authoritatively this is truth and this is error.

This is possible, and to accomplish this shall be the sole aim of what remains of life. If there is aught of ability in you, apply it in this direction.

Meph. "Nothing so easy as that. Hear you those drums in the distance?"

Faust. "What, war again? the prudent man dislikes to hear it."

Meph. "War or peace is all one to him who knows how to draw profit from either. You are on the alert for the opportunity; it comes, and there you have it."

Faust. "Please keep such wise saws to yourself. Explain what you mean in plain terms."

Meph. "On my journeying about it did not escape my attention that our worthy Emperor is in an awkward situation. You remember him. At the time when you and I amused him, and filled both his hands full with false wealth, why the whole world was at his feet. . . . In the mean time the State fell into anarchy, where great and small, right and left, were at feud; brothers slew or banished brother, castle was arrayed against castle, city against city, trade against nobility; the bishop against chapter and congregation. Wherever two met, they were enemies; in the churches, death and murder; beyond the city's gate, merchant and traveller as good as lost. For to live meant 'defend thyself!' well; that went at a high rate."

Faust. "Went? It hobbled, fell down, jumped up again, threw a somersault, then tumbled along in a hideous, inextricable coil."

Meph. "And no one dared to say one word against such a state of affairs; for every one wanted to be, and could be, boss. The most insignificant idiot was accounted the full stature of a man. Thus things went on, from bad to worse, until utterly unendurable; the better classes arose in arms and said, 'He is master who can give us peace. The Emperor can not, will not do it; let us

elect a new one who can revive the State, protect the citizen, and secure justice and peace to all.' ”

Faust. “That sounds very priest-like.”

Meph. “So it was the priests; they stirred up the rumpus; as it increased to a rebellion they sanctified the cause; and our Emperor, whom we made so happy, marches hither to fight perhaps his last battle.”

Faust. “I’m sorry for him; he was such a good, open-hearted fellow.”

Meph. “Come, let us take a look at the situation; as long as there is life there is hope. If we can rescue him out of this predicament, only this once, it will be as good as a thousand times. Who knows how the dice may fall; and if he has luck, why he will not lack dominion.”

(“They climb over an intervening mountain, and examine the position of the army in the valley beyond.”)

Meph. “The position I see is well selected. We join, and victory is assured.”

Faust. “What can we add—deception, blind delusion, empty show?”

Meph. “Stratagem! to win battles! Keep your eye upon the high purpose you have in view. If we succeed in preserving the realm and throne for the Emperor, you kneel down and receive that unlimited domain you mention.”

Don’t you see, if there is virtue in our scientific attainments here is the place to show it, and show it to some purpose. If they can prop the throne against the just demands of the best in the land—against the Church itself, its ancient pillar—pray who controls in the future? Best in the land? let them go hang themselves!

To trace the course of the battle we have no call; suffice it to say, that the event is victory for throne, Faust, and anarchy.

From this, then, dear H., we may form some estimate of the significance of justice to man, of its presence or its absence, and of the fool-gospel that replaces it, or seeks to replace it upon the boards of the State, where this play is being performed. With justice present every want is sacred, a fountain of rational exertion, a blessing to the State. With justice absent every want is a yawning chasm that seeks to engulf that State, as a body defunct, deserted by the rational end, the vital spirit of its existence.

To thwart this beneficent result, to make anarchy perpetual, this, then, according to the poet, is the deep damnation which the conviction of Faust brings upon the State, where it is adopted as the guiding truth. What boots it, that society as the industrial totality of the State is "in financial stress," as the phrase goes—the "rag-spectre" of fool-money, as Mephisto calls it, will stop its inarticulate muttering, its clamor for justice, for a season.

What boots it, that the season past, the best in the land arise in arms to achieve sovereignty for justice and peace? Faust is there armed with his conviction and modern arts to do battle for anarchy.

The course of the battle we had no call to follow, nor is it necessary to our purpose to examine the marvellous organization which the State receives in consequence. An organization in which, as the Emperor expresses it, "the only thing to be considered—unavoidably the only thing to treat of—are court festivals." But these important matters adjusted, and the gentlemen concerned having withdrawn, the Archbishop remains and addresses his Majesty in a very pathetic strain.

Let us listen :

"The Chancellor has withdrawn, the Bishop still remains, chained to thy presence by a sincere desire to utter a word of earnest warning. His fatherly heart throbs with anxious care for thee."

"What is it that can cloud this happy hour? Say on."

"Alas! with what bitter pain do I find thy exalted, thy sacred person at this moment in league with Satan! 'Tis true, apparently secure upon the throne; but, alas! in defiance of Almighty God and his vicar, his Holiness the Pope! When the latter learns the event he is sure to judge, to demolish thy sinful power with his holy thunderbolt. For all too well he still remembers how you on the very day of your coronation freed that magician. How the first ray of mercy from your diadem saved that execrable head to the everlasting scandal of Christendom! Consider, oh, consider! Strike your breast in contrition. Dedicate a modest mite of thy undeserved good fortune to holy Mother Church. That broad plateau where your tent was pitched when you entered into that unholy alliance with the evil spirits, where you lent a willing ear to the prince of liars—that I advise you to dedicate to

sacred uses. With hill and dense forest as far as they extend; next the undulating plain beyond, green with perpetual pasturage; with the clear lake abounding in fish; then the innumerable streamlets that brawl down into the vale; then the broad valley itself, with its meadows, fields, and downs. Thus you express contrition, and thus may hope for pardon."

Emperor. "I feel so much alarmed at the fearful deed. Go, fix the limit of the grant yourself."

It is not necessary, dear H., to see them. Sufficient that the good man has to return to the presence once or twice in order that he may be certain that he has secured enough. "The want is money, or money's worth—get it." For this is the Bishop, not the Church—only its servant. And yet such is the nature of things that even the Holy of Holies can be polluted by such servants—not merely polluted, but even worse—perverted.

The last time—the second or third—the good man returns, he remarks, as something that had well nigh escaped his memory:

"Pardon, your Majesty, I understand the shore of the realm has been assigned to that bad man. Of course he will be excommunicated unless it, too, is made tributary to the Church."

Emperor. "Why, there is nothing there as yet; everything is still covered by the broad ocean."

Bishop. "A vested right, and patient waiting will bring fruition."

It is not what is achieved, that which you can see, that you have secured to us. That bit of high ground, your royal self, is happily already tributary. But it is the endeavor for the future which we demand. Shall the readings of the understanding of man in the book of Nature, as he calls it, be corrected by the readings found by the Church in Holy Writ, or the latter by the former? Shall the readings of modern science be corrected by the readings of the Bible, or the readings of the Bible by modern science?—that is the question, your Majesty. You, as recompense for services rendered, during the recent unpleasantness, have privately—although publicly you attributed your success to quite different agencies—you have privately granted facilities for an organized effort to make inroads upon what your Majesty is pleased to regard as covered by ignorance and doubt—in a word, upon the unknown. Such an institution is likely to give more

authority, more permanence to the achievements in this direction than the fluctuating, confused, and not unfrequently conflicting efforts of isolated private endeavor. Recent events are well calculated to call our attention to the danger that may emanate from such a quarter unless it is made tributary to the Church—unless the Church, in fact, correct its results. Free, secular inquiry, or inquiry under the patronage of the State, is a very dangerous thing to our supremacy.

But his Majesty, fool-led as he is, refuses to interfere—recent events, the Church sanctioning the rebellion, not calculated to present very urgent motives in that direction; and so the next act.

XIX.

Contents: The collision of Faust with the Church; the "open country," where everything is on a small scale; the symbolism; church edifice on a height; shores of time; ocean of the infinite; sea-marsh of superstition made habitable land by science; Faust in his garden vexed at the ringing of the chapel bell; he desires the shade of the lindens and the outlook from their heights; Mephistopheles with his fleet not well received; the chapel is burned, and with it the lindens which Faust had intended to use as a look-out place from whence to survey his labors as a whole; the four gray women who had been banished from the soil by the Church, now set free, try to find lodgment in the breast of Faust, who sought a look-out on the linden heights, and burned the chapel; now his deed comes back on him, and destroys his sight; he seeks a logical survey of his labors as a consistent whole: this is an internal and not an external point of view; a poisonous marsh of metaphysics lies over there nigh the mountain of Truth, and must be drained; this marsh of metaphysics appears to his inner eye only, for the outer eye is blind; it is the same marsh that was described in the first scene of the First Part of this drama; Faust was mired in it when he pledged his soul to Mephistopheles; the poem has returned to the beginning; the demons are summoned to secure the soul of Faust, who died on reaching his happiest moment; a note on the significance of the Church (the linden heights); the word "congregation" (as translation of German *Gemeinde*); a common heart, common means, and common will united in one; it mediates or establishes, and preserves the family, society, and the State; it is the pure, cloudless vision of the rational universal, of the birth of the Eternal into time, that the Church reveals; it receives the soul on its entrance to this life, and at the end does reverence to the body for its services; this mediation spans life from eternity to eternity; the wanderer attributes this to Baucis: "Jenes grausam Abenteuers, Lösung war auch anvertraut."

At the conclusion of our last, dear H., we observed that there was a little business left in an unfinished state between the most reverend Archbishop and his Majesty. Not that it could be called unfinished either, but rather left in that condition in which busi-

ness of that nature is wont to be left by parties of that character—to finish itself as best it may. But, as we mentioned, the most Reverend Gentleman is not the Church. He, you will observe, is but an humble disciple of the Court-foul—of the prophet who first proclaimed to the world the gospel which the most or least Reverend is now proclaiming to a questionable Majesty of that world. The collision, therefore, which he mentions as possible between Faust and the Church is not one that is probable, for the reason that it is not true. There is no real collision between the Eagle and the Osprey. The mere scream of the prince of the air announcing his royal pleasure to be that he will have the prey of his timorous slave, is all-sufficient to settle the question as to who shall feast and who shall fast. That, my dear H., you observe is a mere question of prey. But the collision between the conviction of Faust and the good—the Church, as the sacred asylum of the good—is one that means “*to be or not to be,*” for one or the other. Not therefore between the prophet and his disciple; not between the Prophet and his Church that treats for dominions and principalities, but between Faust and that Church whose dominion is not of this world—between Faust and the Good—not measured nor measurable either in square or cubic inches, either by curved or straight lines, either by curvilinear or rectilinear figures, or what is outlined or enclosed by them.

I mention these matters here lest the unobtrusiveness of the subject should lead to oversights; here, where we come to—

ACT V.—An open country, where everything is on a very small scale—every object designated by diminutives; the old mother is Muetterchen; the garden is a—Gaertchen; the house is a hut; the Church is a chapel—Kirchlein; the bell a—Glöckchen;—everything except the grove of lindens, which stands in the very pride of age, apparently. This is quite fortunate; for it is by them that a stranger, a wanderer, otherwise nameless—a nameless wanderer in those parts—recognizes this as the very spot where years ago he was cast ashore by the contending elements—the storm-swept waves—then a mere youth. Yes, there stands the hut that gave him shelter in his then desperate condition. The hut of a couple of devout old people, whose kindly attention proved so helpful to the castaway upon those otherwise desolate shores. He dare hardly believe that they are yet alive, still en-

joying the supreme blessing of doing good ; for they were old even then. Still, he cannot resist to knock, to ascertain. And—

Baucis (very old). "Hist, dear stranger"—(original diminutive—"softly, softly ! Rest, please let the husband rest. 'Tis long sleep undisturbed that alone gives old age strength for its remaining task."

Wand. "Tell me, mother, is it you, you in very deed, and can I pour my gratitude in your bosom—my heart's blessing—for the help that you and your husband brought me ? Are you *Baucis*, who with such assiduous care revived life's flickering breath ?" [*Philemon enters.*] "And you, *Philemon*, who with brawny arm rescued all my havings from the deep ? To you, to the quick flame of your fire, to the silver voice of your bell, the solution of that fearful adventure was intrusted. And now let me step forward ; let me look into that infinite whence you received me ! Let me kneel ; let me pray, for my heart it is so full."

You observe, dear H., everything is on the very smallest scale—on the humblest terms. Church edifice, a hut ; congregation, three ; priests, none ; worshippers, one. For the good old people cannot be called worshippers in the ordinary sense, as their life has long since lost all duality—is but a living worship—oneness with the infinite. What else occupies their attention—these marvellous changes, improvements, etc., that have taken place of late in their vicinity, when viewed from that bit of high ground of theirs—are but part and portion of the same. And they are so wonderful to the good old people. For, you observe, these improvements have been made under their immediate observation, and that quite recently ; that is, during the time when the arm of *Philemon* began to fail by reason of old age—no longer helpful as formerly to the unfortunate castaways upon these shores of time. See how happily these have now been wedded to the sea. See that broad expanse of sea-marsh, formerly so unblessed, how it smiles beneath the evening sun, a very paradise of habitable land. The ocean—sense-picture of the infinite, of the unknown, and the like—the ocean is still visible, of course, but away, away over yonder, on the very verge of the horizon. So much have these cunning masters gained upon it. To all of which the worshipper says not one word.

In fact, it would appear that the wrapt expression on his face

is attributable to some other emotion than mere curiosity in regard to the question how much that *infinite of extent* has become less by the conquests achieved upon its borders ; and so good Philemon suggests :

“ Let us step in and watch the rays of the departing day. Let us ring the bell, kneel, and pray with serene trust in the God of our Fathers.”

And as that evening air, so balmy, begins to throb and pulsate with the aspirations of the worshippers toward the empyrean, suppose you and I follow its undulations to where they produce the next scene.

Faust. “ That infernal ringing of the bells ! It goes through me like a malicious shot. Before me my empire is unlimited ; behind me, I am annoyed by the remembrance that my grand possession is defective. The space where those lindens stand, the rusty structure—the rotten little chapel—are not mine. And if I desire to take a little rest there, the thought that the shade is not mine annoys me—is a thorn to the eye, a thorn to the foot. Oh, that I were a thousand miles from here ! ”

While reflecting thus upon the grandeur of his empire in the future before him, and that little insignificant obstruction—shall we call it—when he looks back, where he would like to rest a little now and then—what strange fancies man is subject to ! just as if the unlimited possessions already his did not furnish room enough to sit down, as if an awning, a ten-by-ten fly-tent, would not furnish shade, if that were an object !—Mephisto returns from a voyage with a fleet of not less than twenty sail, all heavily laden with wealth gathered from far and near. With twenty sail he returns, although he started with but two, and is surprised to be received in a manner unappreciative to a degree. He remarks :

“ You receive the intelligence of your exalted good fortune with a gloomy eye and a wrinkled brow ! Your wisdom is crowned with success. The land is wedded to the sea. The ocean receives the ship for its distant voyage cheerfully from the shore. You may say, and say truthfully, that from here—here from your palace—your hand grasps the whole world. From this very spot the enterprise commenced. Here stood the first shanty. A small ditch we scratched along where now the rudder paints its track with foam. Your high conception, the industry of those about

you, and directed by you, wrought the sea a conquest to the land. Here—”

Faust. “That infernal ‘*here!*’—that is precisely what annoys me. To thee, a man of sense, I may say it. If I could get rid of the ‘there,’ that limits the ‘here,’ the ‘there,’ that little chapel up yonder, with its fragrant linden shade! Every sound of its bell reminds me of the ‘there’—the over yonder!”

Meph. “Well, of course, it is a supreme nuisance; who denies that? Where is the ear of modern culture but is annoyed with the tingle-tangle noise. The everlasting bim-bom-bim clouds every happy hour of life; intrudes itself into every vocation, between the cradle and the grave, as if between bim and bom life were an empty hem-hem-hum.”

Faust. “Go, then, and rid me of the affair. You know the pleasant homestead that I have had my eye upon for the super-annuated couple?”

Meph. “Of course; and I really see no trouble in the matter. We simply pick them up with their traps, carry them a piece, and set them down; and, before you can say ‘Jack Robinson,’ they are on their feet again. The new home, with its modern conveniences, soon reconciles them, and amply compensates for the little inconvenience—the little compulsion undergone.”

It is as simple as snapping one’s finger. Well, the ‘there’ is removed. The noise of its *bim-bom-bim* no longer disturbs our deduction-induction, induction-deduction. It is true the riddance was not effected in so simple, almost innocent, a way as was anticipated. Turned out to be a little tragical, if we can believe *Mr. Lynceus*—the fellow whom we met at the castle, where he made that stupendous offering at the shrine of beauty. “Alas!” he says, “the good old people, always so careful about their fire, are they to be choked to death in the smoke of their own house?”

No, not in the half-innocent way has the riddance been effected; and we have lost the fragrant shade of those ancient lindens, too, where we had intended to do some scaffolding—up among those strong limbs, shaken of many a storm—throw across some scantling of timber from branch to branch, for our feet to rest on, for standing room, whence to gain a view of our labors as a whole. Faust, observing the phenomenon from his balcony, remarks: “I sympathize with the feeling of my warder, and in my heart regret

the impatient act myself; still, the lindens are gone up in smoke, or are charred into unsightly, half-burned stumps; what is the use of sighing? And, in point of fact, a scaffold—a look-out—is soon erected from which to gratify the eye with a view into the unlimited—with a glance into the infinite.”

The easiest thing in the world!

On nearer view, after being informed of the occurrence in full:

“The stars hide their gaze and sheen; the fire sinks, burns low; a breath of uncanny air fans it into life anew, wafts fumes and smoke up to me. What is that hovering there, approaching shadow-like?

IT IS NOW MIDNIGHT.

Enter four women in gray (not that they have been burned out, and are seeking temporary shelter, although there is no telling what spectres may have been banished into those old church edifices, that seek the open air on the very first opportunity).

Of the four, Care alone finds an entrance into the palace of Faust, and that through the key-hole. In conversation with her he remarks:

Faust. “As for myself, I have rushed through life like a whirlwind; at first in a grand style, but now more leisurely, with more circumspection. I am well enough acquainted with this world, and beyond that our sight is balked. A fool he who looks in that direction, and fables his like beyond the clouds. Here let him stand firm, and have his eyes about him. This world is not dumb for a man of parts! What business has he philandering about in eternity?

What he can know can be appropriated. Thus let him pursue the even tenor of his life. If spirits spook about, never mind them. Let him find good and evil fortune in striving forward—he, unsatisfied, at every step.”

There is for you, old Granny Care; you can follow your sisters—Want, Guilt, and Misery—orgo hang yourselves all in one batch! Our confession of faith does not recognize you or the like of you.”

“You spectres from the infernal, it is thus you treat the human race! Indifferent days, even, you fill with woe. Demons I know it is hard to get quit of; the close-drawn spirit tie cannot be severed. But, as for thy sneaking power, O Care! however great, I will never acknowledge it.” It finds no place in our creed.

Under no circumstance? And yet the desire, the anxiety to possess yourself of that linden-grove, with that bit of high ground on which it stood, in order to obtain a spot, a place to stand on—a standpoint, so to speak, from which the results of your labors should present themselves to the view of the observer, as a whole—the anxiety, the care for this, has brought you this visitor. It is but your own act wafted back to you in the form of sweltering fumes and smoke, as of burning, quivering human flesh, by that uncanny breath of air—your own act, that was to obtain for you a point of view, that blots out the external organs of view, your eyes, forever. It was your act that burned that rusty, rotten little chapel, where those ladies in gray lay in banishment under the spell of a power that can blot out an act; it was your act, you observe, that set them free, to bring home this act to your own breast, now its only lodging-place. It was this same care, it was this same visitor, that blinded you to the nature of that act; and thus, although you may think that your creed, well built on, well reduced to practice, will furnish a dwelling, a life-shelter, proof against these ladies in gray, you see there is no telling but what they may enter, though it were a palace, through the very key-hole—that small opening, you observe, left to operate the lock, the contrivance intended to fasten, to secure all—at that very point.

But the external view, or the possibility of such a view, was not the thing sought; it was the thing typified by that view; the logical relations that transmute the isolated results of our labors into a self-consistent whole, on the one side, and the good as final end of these labors that transfigures them into its own eternal image, on the other; it was this that was the object sought. For the attainment of this, the typified, the external eye is of no consequence, and its loss no hindrance. Instead of the good swept away by the rash act—although we did not intend to destroy, we only meant that it was not the highest good—only meant to substitute "Fruit" in its stead, and leave the antiquated to die a natural death; still, that is past and gone, and we now have *our* good. And although under existing circumstances, the condition of our eyes, it may be more than questionable whether we shall ever see "Fruit" make a whole of anything, yet that scaffolding, that look-out:

"Although the night seems to penetrate deeper and deeper, within there is a blaze of light. What I have thought out I hasten to accomplish, and in such matters the master's word alone has weight—that we still can build—but what is that? While examining the ground for this very thing, behold! see over yonder, where these our dominions are bounded by the ancient highland of Truth. There, over on the verge of the horizon? What is that fuming with mist and fog, with miasma, dire and deadly? Another 'there!'—a poisonous marsh of metaphysics! threatening death and destruction—ruin, blank ruin, to all our achievements. It must, it shall be drained: all hands to work! You, foreman, get men; hire, coax, press, reward—money is no object." Indeed!

"That once drained, and—" Alas! yes, Mr. Faust, that once drained! The "here" freed from the "there," from the yonder; the "now" from the not "now." But, as your eyes are now shut, and this poisonous swamp dawns on your inner eye only, do you not recognize the locality? Do you not see that it was here, in this very marsh, we first heard of you as being lost, where you met that very foreman of yours, whom you now address, and who answers you in this remarkable manner?

Meph. "Hither, hither! You, all of you. You, you loafing rapscallions, you rag-tag misbegotten abortions—patched together out of dry bones, sinews, and muscles—hither, I say, from your dissecting-tables, your anatomical museums; hither with your implements!"

Do you not see that we have got back to the very beginning, and therefore to the end?

Note 1 to Letter XIX.—Of all words, so far as I know, this is the most unsatisfactory—"congregation"—a mere mechanical outside aggregation; a many together at hap-hazard. Yet the thing to be designated is the being together in the highest union—the only true being possible for man on earth. The family has a common heart; society, common means; the State a common will; but the congregation alone a common heart, common means, and will. In it the whole man—the man as man—realizes his oneness with all through all. In it he is whole—holy. It is here, and here alone, where all the former mediations are mediated; their

finite sides, and consequent collision, resolved. Hence it is the abyss, the oblivion of all that is finite—the realized universal, the eternal on earth. The family has love; society, means; the State, justice; but the congregation has love, charity, and mercy. It, **and it alone, can and does control those unblest spectres, as Faust calls them—Want (in the sense of misery), Care, and Guilt.** Understand, however: the congregation in this sense only mediates the mediations of the family, society, and the State. It neither does nor can mediate aught else. It does not supersede these mediations; it presupposes them; and without them it has no function—is not, and cannot be. But with them it is the pure, cloudless universal; the perennial fountain of infinite courage to the State, of ceaseless industry and frugality to society, of constant conjugal love and parental affection to the family.

It reveals the true end of these institutions—the true end, the birth of the rational, the universal, the eternal into time. The birth of the rational, of which the family, society, and the State are but the processes of mediation through which it arrives from potentiality to reality, and from individuality to universality; of which the beautiful is but the form, the good the character, and the truth the pure, cloudless vision. In this vision which the congregation reveals to itself, it lives, moves, and has its being; in it the last vestige of individuality imbued with the universal through the former mediations is transfigured into absolute adequacy to its content—into absolute beauty, goodness, and truth.

In this attitude it receives the castaway, the eternal born into time; and at the end renders back the elements dismissed from their unwilling service with reverence due that service, and with a renewed demonstration at its feet of its own eternal supremacy over time.

It is to this mediation, which spans life, not from its beginning to the end, but from before its inception to beyond its duration, to which life is but a passing incident; it is to this that the nameless wanderer refers, as having been “intrusted with the solution of that fearful adventure” called life.

XX. .

Contents: The happiest, highest moment of Faust's life is that in which he hears the “cheerful rattling of spades” actually digging his grave; the marginal arabesques in

which Goethe has framed his poem; (1) Mephisto and his world, (2) Ancient Greece, (3) Christianity, (4) top of the frame the Queen of Heaven, motherhood; all in the "cloudless clearness of the brightest day"; summary of the collisions of the poem.

At the conclusion of our last letter, dear H., we observed how the sightless Faust discovered that marshy fen—that foul cesspool, as he calls it, meandering along the foot of that highland over yonder; cutting off his achievement from communication, except by contrivances more or less precarious, with that ancient knoll, that outlying border of the world, habitable before his acquisitions were made. We also saw with what zeal, with what promptness, he proceeded at once, after discovery made, to drain or make arrangements to drain the no less unsightly than actually dangerous mephitic locality. In the midst of this, the crowning effort of his life, in his own estimation, an event happens which for a time diverts the resources of man and material on hand into a different channel. For when he, blind now, gropes his way along the door-post of his palace out into the open air, and calls out:

"Ha! what cheerful music there is in the rattling of those spades!"—those spades are actually digging his grave. Yes; by the hands of those "rascallions, patched together out of dry bones, ligaments, and muscles," who reported so promptly for duty.

Lemurs. "Here at hand; and is it true we are to make a great acquisition? We heard a rumor to that effect. Have brought sharpened stakes and chains to fix metes and bounds. But why we were called in, that we have forgotten." By the very hands of these, by whom, under the guidance of Mephisto, that task *was* to be performed—that cesspool threatening to poison, to ruin all, *was* to be drained—this task *is* performed. Your grave is dug.

Under this misapprehension of fact he enjoys the happiest, the highest moment of life—its end; and the poem shades off into marginal arabesques. For the picture is not merely completed, but such is the care of the artist that he himself, with his own hand, frames it, and hangs it in its proper place in the gallery of time. The lower third of the marginal circle we see occupied by Mephisto and his world; the right ascending third by the Christian world of aspiration; and the left by the world of aspiration of ancient Greece, as we observed in the sphere of the

beautiful. Where these two meet at the apex, the artist places the Christian ideal of the beautiful—the Queen of Heaven, motherhood. To her right, Gretchen, the unfortunate but forgiven bride; to her left, Helena, the ever-blooming bride of Greece. The picture thus framed he suspends from that marvellously carved peg (carved not by him, but brushed off) which he found in the picture-gallery mentioned—the conception of the highest—with a cord of his own twisting, and supports it with the three brackets—in the centre the poet, to the right the theatre manager, and to the left the jolly companion. The light indicated is, “The cloudless clearness of the brightest day.”

Thus, my friend, we have seen the theme develop itself:

FIRST.—Into the collision within the individual, Faust, between his conviction that truth is not attainable for man, and his aspiration toward the true—his aspirations toward the True, and its embodiment in the good and the beautiful. The result of this collision is, the birth and development of Mephisto, as the trusted and only trustworthy guide through the labyrinth of life for man.

SECOND.—Into the collision with the real world, or institutional world of man:

1. With the family: result, negation, destruction.
2. With society: result, industrial collapse.
3. With the State: result, anarchy made perpetual.

THIRD.—Into the collision with the actual world, or the ideal world of man:

1. With art: result, form without content.
2. With religion: result, destruction of the congregation.
3. With philosophy: result, physical science, so called, with its eyes, the good, the final end, put out, and with a pestilential swamp of metaphysics separating it from self-conscious intelligence, undrained.

This is the Idea that created the poem called “Goethe’s Faust.”

PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY.

BY H. N. DAY.

The very timely work of Professor Bowne, "Introduction to Psychological Theory,"¹ invites a careful survey of the conditions in the present stage of scientific progress favorable to a reconstruction of mental science. This work professes to be but an introduction. It is not a theory itself; it is not the formal presentation of any theory of mind, or of any theory of the science of mind. It has for its aim simply "an understanding of principles." The design of the present article is not at all a critical review of the book. Neither its merits, except simply to recognize the fact that they are great, nor its defects, if any, or whatever they may be, will command our attention. Our sole interest is in the subject-matter itself of the book—psychological theory. We shall use the book mainly as a leader and a help. Accepting it as an exposition more or less accurate and full of the prevalent views in this field of knowledge, we avail ourselves of its suggestions in an endeavor toward attaining a still more advanced theory of psychological science.

We understand by the phrase *psychological theory* simply and exactly a view, a survey of the science or doctrine of the human mind. It imports that survey which one would propose to himself to take, in order to the readiest and most accurate construction, in thought or in formal exposition, of a science of mind. It denotes a theory, not as determined from the point of view from which the matter of the science is studied, as, for example, from psychology rather than from physiology, but from the subject-matter itself—a theory of psychology. It denotes accordingly not a theory of the mind immediately and directly, but a theory of a science or doctrine of the mind. If it be asked what are the materials out of which such a theory should be formed, the answer is at hand. It would be constructed out of the accumulated observations and ratiocinations of the past, gathered, arranged, and used by the most advanced skill in the investigation and ascer-

¹ "Introduction to Psychological Theory." By Borden P. Bowne, Professor of Philosophy in Boston University. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1887.

tainment of knowledge. In other words, all attained light and knowledge in the studies of the mind itself, and of all related subjects of knowledge—as employed by the most perfect instrumentalities of science-construction—will be the constituents of the theory. As psychological science is ever advancing, never in fact more rapidly than at present, it is plain that psychological theorizing must ever be advancing, and the best and fullest psychological theory of to-day cannot be expected to hold its rank in the developments and growths of to-morrow. With all this we must suppose a limitation to this psychological theorizing which shall hold good for all practical uses. A psychological theory may, supposably at least, to-day, in the present advanced stage of the science, so far embrace the great determining features of the science of mind as to forbid the expectation of any considerable improvement for a long time to come—possibly for all time. The day may not be distant when the science of the mind, having its great boundary-lines fixed and its significant divisions for the uses of the science itself established, the progress of the science may be confined to the perfecting of the details and the determining of the relations between the parts themselves of the science and between it as a whole and other co-ordinate sciences.

The particulars embraced in the theory will be: the specific end proposed in the construction of the science; the subject-matter of the science as to its essential character and its co-ordinations; its sources and channels of light and evidence; its method of procedure under the proposed specific end; its tests and validations; its relations to co-ordinated sciences.

I. The End in Psychological Science.

It is obvious that there may be manifold ends of which any one may legitimately be pursued in the construction of a science of mind. The particular end chosen must of course govern throughout, determining more or less the selection, the arrangement, and the use of the materials, and thus shaping and characterizing the construction. One of these ends manifestly may be simply science itself—knowledge for its own sake. Other more generic ends supposable are those of practical ability or artistic skill. More subordinate ends might be the science of some particular department of mental study, as, for example, of theology or ethics;

or some special use in the ordering of conduct or practice, as in teaching or in medicine, or in artistic interpretation and creation. The present discussion will confine itself to that specific theory or survey of the work in constructing the science which regards it as proceeding throughout under the guidance and control of the first-named of these ends—viz.: to give the fullest and most perfect knowledge of the mind for the sake of that knowledge itself. This kind of theory keeps in view science or knowledge and its interests alone as governing. It will be characterized as employing the proper methods of proper knowledge, observing the principles of thought, and employing the processes of thought as scientifically established, in all its work.

II. *The Subject-Matter of Psychological Science.*

A theory of psychological science, availing itself, as it should, of all the light and knowledge that human thought has already attained, must assume something as known in regard to the nature and general characteristics of that of which it treats; it must answer to itself, more or less definitely, the question, What is the human spirit, or soul, or mind? The construction of the science can hardly move a step until this question is answered; and the entire development of the science must proceed under the sway of this initial and dominant thought. It is by no means to be required that universal assent should have been reached. There is no one, even of the most advanced sciences, which can show an unqualified agreement in the minds of all men as to the precise nature of its subject-matter. Nor is it indeed requisite, in order to the general validity of the science, that all the questions that it is possible to raise as to the nature of its subject-matter should have been resolved. Very possibly the solutions might not materially change the character of the developed science. But on psychological doctrine can reasonably expect general acceptance, or can promise to itself to be of much service in any way which does not assure itself to some extent of the nature of that of which it treats. A science of the mind must recognize the mind, either as a reality or as merely a phantasm; as substance or as only a mode; as a distinct entity, or only as an indistinguishable part of a universal whole; and as a spiritual or a material entity. Professor Bowne's theory distinctly adopts the former of these

several alternative views. "We have a logical right," he says, "to assume the reality of the mind." And in the same chapter, on "The Subject of the Mental Life," he effectively meets and confutes the claims of that materialistic speculation which "rejects the reality of the mental subject." "In spontaneous thought and consciousness the mental subject is given as active and abiding."

Psychological theory is justified in assuming still further, as settled beyond any formidable controversy in regard to essential attributes of the mind, that its real and abiding activity is diversely functional. Of well-nigh universal acceptance is the doctrine that the mental life manifests itself in the threefold ways or modes of feeling, knowing, and willing, just as the bodily life manifests itself in the several ways of respiration, nutrition, and locomotion. The questioning here will only take some such specific forms as these: Are these three functional forms of mental activity the comprehensive and complementary forms? Do they constitute the most important order of specific functional activities if some other order be conceivable? What is the exact organic relationship between these specific functions respectively with one another and the mind itself? It is within the bounds of reason to affirm, leaving minor questionings, that the threefold functional activity of the human mind in knowing, feeling, willing, is so fundamental and so conditional to any worthy science of mind, and at the same time so generally accepted, that any deserving psychological theory should distinctly and formally make it a very corner-stone of its scientific system. Introspection observes this threefold diversity; the actions of men reveal it; language recognizes it, universal experience affirms it. It is safer also to affirm that every act and affection of the human mind is reducible to one or the other, or to a combination of these functional manifestations. Unlike, perhaps, the alleged threefoldness of bodily functions, the threefold form of specific mental activity can, at the present stage of the science, be postulated without fear of any reasonable opposition. Mr. Bowne's "Introduction" is far from putting forth in form this demand; it recognizes the truth here and there in a passing way, and perhaps in more decisive implication in its method, particularly by devoting separate chapters to the Thought-Factor, the Feelings, and the Will, but it gives no

intimation of his making it fundamental and determinative in scientific construction. But the considerations that enforce this radical treatment of the minor threefold functional activity in a science of mind are overpowering. As intimated, the universal consciousness of man has recognized it, and expressed itself in language, art, social life, everywhere. Mental science in its earliest days recognized it, both subjectively as by Aristotle, who enumerates expressly the æsthetic, noetic, imaginative, and the orectic, as the four forms of mental activity, easily reducible to the three we have named, and also objectively, in its enunciation of the true, the beautiful, and the good, as demonstrably the three comprehensive objects respectively of a corresponding functional mental activity. And down through its progress the science has moved on toward a more distinct recognition of the truth and a more complete harmonizing with it and reduction under it of specific phenomena which were at first seemingly in some aspects irreconcilable with it.

There are, however, certain mental phenomena which, it must be allowed, psychological science has for the most part hitherto found it difficult to bring under this enumeration of specific mental functions. They are what have been vaguely denominated the representative states of mind as distinguished from the so-called presentative acts and affections. These representative states are particularly exemplified in memory and imagination, with their diverse modifications in the mental life. For the most part these phenomena have been treated as belonging to the cognitive class. They have been also presented as distinct and unrelated phenomena. Psychologists have, indeed, been greatly puzzled where to place them and how to treat them. In fact, as Mr. Bowne remarks, "there is no consistent terminology" accepted by them, showing that the whole matter still lies to their vision in the deep darkness. That the mind is retentive of the acts and affections which it experiences is the fundamental fact, and this fact probably all will admit. Memory, as retentive, is accordingly nothing else than the abiding mind itself, as it has come to be by virtue of its original nature and the modifications of this nature in its history and growth. The mind lives on, holds on, and all its past abides in it—all its affections, all its specific activities. Its life goes on thus shaped, putting forth fresh activities or receiving

fresh impressions from within and from without. It is this form of the mind, thus determined by its past, as it presents itself at this present moment as the dividing point in its onward life, in its specific determinations, that constitutes the object of what is regarded in an act of proper memory. So we have the fact that memory, as retentive, is simply mind as retentive. This is the accepted basic fact. But all modifications of the mental life are included—states of feeling and of willing, as of knowing. This basic retentive memory embraces all. Now, with the more or less distinct recognition of this fundamental truth of memory, psychologists lay hold on different features or modifications in their explanations, and easily glide into conflictive opinions. This retentive memory, as object, thus is taken up and presented to consciousness, and this conscious act, this consciousness of the actual present mental condition, determined, of course, necessarily by its past, is accepted as making up the whole of memory. The retentiveness of mind is thus thrown into the background, while consciousness being regarded as a knowing power or state, memory comes to be subordinated to the cognitive function. The evil resulting from this way of sinking out of view this most significant fact of mind—its retention of all its experience—is incalculable. With this great basic truth before us, that the entire mental life, as the outgrowth and body of all its past, ever lies before the eye of consciousness as a familiar landscape before the outer bodily eye, psychological science easily disposes of those vexatious questions about “latent modifications of consciousness,” “subconscious states,” “the association of ideas,” “mental reproduction.” The whole field of the mind’s history, with its infinitude of particular objects, is before the eye of consciousness, and there exists among their manifold and ever-varying degrees of contiguity and consequent suggestiveness; but the eye itself, although subject to the conditions of the finite and the dependent, is, after all, the supreme determining factor as to what objects shall engage its vision. The great governing principles of mental reproduction are chiefly to be sought in the active life of the mind, only in a very subordinate degree in the objects of mental activity. The treatment of the memory, also, as a special subordinate cognitive function in this way, is vague and defective. Other experiences than those of proper knowledge are shut out from the scope of memory; and

the memory itself is left unrelated to consciousness, as also to the mental life generally. In truth, the field of memory can not be regarded otherwise than as identical with the field of consciousness—the term *memory* only more explicitly suggesting the relation to the past as outcome and product.

Neither is the imagination to be regarded as a specific function of the intelligence. The science has hardly yet accepted in its fullness the doctrine, which bears the unmistakable signs and promise of coming prevalence, that the imagination is the active as the sensibility is the passive side of what has been styled the mental function of Form, co-ordinate with the other two functions of the mental life—the Intelligence and the Will. The mind certainly interacts with other realities, and can also make itself in any specific act an effective object to itself—can, in a true sense, interact with itself. That characteristic of the mind which qualifies it for this interaction, that element of its nature, through which it imparts and receives, moves and is moved, can not be regarded as a subordinate function. It must be accepted as one of these great functions of the mental life. The sensibility conceived as passive or capacity answers exactly to the imagination conceived as active or faculty—*forma formata* to *forma formans*. Accordingly, in mental apprehension we apprehend not the essence of the object, not the brass or the silver of the ring, to use the fine illustration of Aristotle, but only the form, the image, engraven on the ring.

Still further, any worthy theory of psychological science must of necessity recognize, beside those more essential elements of the mental life which is the subject-matter of the science, the determining relations of the mind to other realities. The human mind, as one and individual, exists and lives in correlation with other realities, interacting, as we have seen, with them. It is thus a part of the universe of reality. The scientific exposition of it must, therefore, proceed under the full control of those great laws of thought which respect the relations of a part as part, both to the whole of which it is a part, and also to the other parts, for these laws prescribe the fundamental conditions of all true knowledge of things. The necessity of this defining process in the science cannot, for want of space, be illustrated here further than as it respects the relation of the mind to exterior realities interacting with it through the bodily sense. We are prompted to remark

in passing, however, that the interaction, immediate and direct, between the human mind and other minds, between it and the divine mind, is a subject which is pressing itself with ever-increasing urgency on the consideration of psychological science. Sensation is accepted as the border-land in most of the interaction of the mind with outer things, and the difficulty arises as to the exact location and direction of the dividing-line, on the one side of which is the reality of the mind itself, and on the other side of which are the outer things with which it interacts. A recent speculation with considerable pretension has taken to itself the denomination of a "Physiological Psychology." It starts with the generally accepted teaching that the mental life begins with sensation, and proceeds to expound the phenomena of its subsequent development and experience in the terms of physiology. A psychology, so far as may be determined from a physiological point of view, may be a most valuable and trustworthy department of human knowledge, for all things and all sciences alike are co-ordinated and reciprocally determine one another. A psychology that is itself wholly determined by physiological laws is quite another thing. To identify the psychical with the physical—*ψυχή* with *φύσις*—the soul with nervous organism—is the legitimate tendency, if not the designed intent, of this kind of speculation. Psychological theory must take sides here. The soul is spiritual or it is material, until the uses of language make the terms matter and spirit identical; a materialistic psychology is a contradiction in terms, and science cannot build itself on a fundamental contradiction. The only alternative would be to reconstruct language, and, consequently, to reconstruct human consciousness. Psychology is not and, until language and consciousness change, cannot be mere physiology. The spirit of man is more than sensible organism. It has its life, for the present at least, conditioned more or less by the body as its medium of interaction with other realities, but it is itself separable from this conditioning body. In fact, the scientist who would trace all mental experience to cells and fibres finds himself obliged to restrict his explication of mental phenomena to those which are recognized as taking place in the brain or nervous organism as the medium of interaction between the mind and outer things. He can find for all those acts and affections of the human soul, which are confined

to itself and are not in interaction with outer things, no terms other than those which pure spiritualistic science has framed, and precisely because he cannot trace these experiences into the nervous organism. In truth, the body is most correctly viewed as simple medium of communication between the mind and outer realities, for the mind's communion with itself, the brain has no fitness or function. The mind knows that it has thoughts and aspirations which lie outside of all nervous affection, however true it is that the bodily life is for the present at least bound up with that of the soul in general sympathy, and that many specific phenomena of the mind lie in the realm of determining interaction between mind and body. Mr. Bowne's "Introduction" is most commendably emphatic in separating psychological science from all physiological speculation. "Our complete ignorance of what takes place in the nerves is no psychological loss. For practical purposes, we should be no wiser if we had the profoundest insight into the action of the external stimulus; and psychologically, also, we should be no better off if we knew all about the form of the nervous action in any special experience and the place of its location." The boundary-line of psychology lies in the mind side of the interaction between body and mind. The science lies wholly on that side. It has nothing to do with extra-mental facts and conditions in themselves, but only as they may serve to identify and define the mental affection or the mental energy, or perhaps illustrate their nature by general analysis. The bodily life has its own phenomena and its own laws; the mental life has its also; to bring them together into the same science is confusing, misleading, pernicious to each science.

Psychological theory, in fine, is warranted in the present stage of knowledge to define its subject-matter as that real and, consequently, active nature the essence of which is *intelligence*, as endowed with a self-directive trend, which appears in a complexity of instincts, propensities, desires, and is under the general governance of the *will*, and as interacting with other realities, as also with itself in imparting and receiving impression, putting itself forth, in the former case, actively in the imagination, and yielding itself, in the latter case, receptively in the sensibility, these two constituting the two sides—active and passive—of the comprehensive *function of form*. The mental activity, accordingly, as tri-

functional, involves a corresponding threefoldness of object, the intelligence or inner essence interacting with the true, the will with the good—*summum bonum*—and the sensibility and imagination with the beautiful or the perfect in form.

III. *The Sources of Light in Psychological Science.*

Psychology, as has been shown, has to do with a real as its subject-matter, consequently with facts. But the real facts are known only as they are revealed. The inquiry for the sources of light in psychological science, accordingly, is simply the inquiry for the revelations of mind; where and how does the mind reveal or manifest itself, and where can we find these manifestations? The answer at once is: We find them, in part at least, in ourselves, in our own experience, in our own feelings and thoughts and determinations. And this we undoubtedly say is the primal, chief, perhaps, conditioning source of light in the study of mind. But there are other minds besides our own, and these manifest themselves so that they can be observed in the study of mind. There are, in fact, manifestations of mind everywhere in human life—individual and social. In language, conspicuously, the mind of man as a thought-function manifests itself as it determines and shapes out in the manifold forms of articulated sound the specific forms of its own living activity. Language is essentially but an aggregate of word-forms as the embodiments of thought-forms. In science generally, also, we have the manifestations of mind characteristically in its cognitive activity. In art, too, we have the manifestations of mind conspicuously through its function of form—the creative imagination addressing the æsthetic susceptibility or receptive sense. In morals and religion the mind reveals itself in the self-directive function acting on the instinctive trend of mental life—the orectic nature. In some the mental nature, or, as we should perhaps here style it, the rational nature, manifests itself everywhere in more or less specific forms throughout the personal and social life and history of man.

We possess in our day an immeasurable amount of evidence gathered from all those sources of light from which a psychological theory should take its start, availing itself of all these results of the labors of the greatest minds and the accumulations of the vastest thought devoted to any humane pursuit in the centuries of

the past. It is time, one would think, that psychological theory should set forth a clear and authoritative determination of the nature and scope and validity of perhaps each of their several sources of light to the science, but especially of that confessedly primal, chief, yes, conditional source or channel, as furnished us in introspection, recognized under the denomination of the consciousness. Yet just here we meet much diversity of view with much very inconclusive discussion. In popular discourse the use of the term *consciousness* is, for the most part, unambiguous, giving but small opening for mistake, except, perhaps, that the term is confusedly applied sometimes to mind as conscious subject, and sometimes to mind as object of which we are conscious. But in science the term, like other terms of the same order, has divers allowable uses, both simple and metaphorical, and we have in consequence a diversity of theories. Mr. Bowne has, with his characteristic dialectic skill, exposed much of the misconception that has corrupted the science of mind from this source; but he fails to give entire satisfaction. Indeed, after laborious effort he is at last constrained to make the humiliating confession that "consciousness can be neither defined nor deduced." The best he can do is to describe it in varying phrase as "the specific feature or condition of all mental states"; as "that element which constitutes them mental states"; "that element which makes an act of knowing knowing, an act of feeling feeling, and an act of willing willing"; "an implication of the other faculties"; "an essential property of mental processes." There is here, assuredly, little of definition and little of clear and profitable explication. The more prevalent definition of consciousness, "as the knowledge the soul has of its own acts and states," he rejects on the ground that "it limits consciousness to knowing." This, he says, is "an arbitrary limitation of consciousness to one phase of knowing." But, as he himself maintains that consciousness respects only mental states, his only objection falls away entirely before his better teaching. Since there are two "phases" of knowledge determined as to object—one in which the object is the *ego* itself, or its states and acts, the other that in which the object is the *non-ego*—consciousness, no one doubts, is but "one phase of knowing"—that phase which has mental facts as its object.

Consciousness is not, indeed, so far as a knowing faculty, a sepa-

rate faculty in addition to the other faculties of knowing, feeling, willing. Such a supposition is as absurd as needless. Nor is it, in scientific exactness, "a light," in which we see ourselves; nor yet "a condition" of mental life; nor a mere "implication" in this life; for all these utterances are meaningless but as confessions of ignorance. It is impossible to imagine anything essential in consciousness other than this simple introspection, internal perception, or, in a more precise nomenclature as used in English literature, intuition. Unless taken as a well-nigh insignificant truism, the formal statement seems strange and utterly inadmissible that "the general form under which consciousness exists is that of the antithesis of subject and object—that is, the object of which we are conscious must be distinguished from self as its subject, and objectified to itself either as its state or act or as a quality of external things." It is no part of consciousness to *distinguish* more than it is of simple perception. *Distinguishing* comes in after perception; it is a subsequent stage in the process of a full knowledge. Consciousness is simple apprehension of its object; the mind or self is the subject, and the mind or self in its acts or affections is the object. This object may have a manifoldness of content; consciousness takes it in as one undivided concrete. Distinguishing and judging come in only after this conscious apprehension. The several elements which make up this concrete content in an object of consciousness—in any mental affection, for instance—are, of course, apprehended in the apprehension of the whole affection. The distinguishing process may select and bring out one or another of these constituent elements, and then this element, as thus distinguished, comes more fully into the view of consciousness. The self as the subject of the affection may be distinguished, in reflective analysis of the concentered affection, from the object affecting it in the interaction, and then we have the state of self-consciousness; in the stricter sense, of consciousness of self. Or some attribute of the object, engaging the mind's activity, may be distinguished after the first apprehension of the affection, and of this, as separate from the self, we may then be distinctly conscious.

But, it is allowable to remark here, we need to avoid the monstrous error of Hamilton in holding that we are conscious of the external object itself, understood as meaning that when I see an

inkstand before me, I am conscious of the inkstand. Consciousness is restricted to that phase of knowledge which concerns itself with the mind's own states and acts. On the other hand, however, we must not deny that consciousness reaches to something beyond the mind itself. There is in sensation—as, for example, in the sight of the inkstand—an interaction between some external reality and the mind. This external reality and the mind, of course, meet; both are alike present in the sensation. But not as Hamilton holds, not necessarily is the inkstand itself bodily present in the interaction; but an energy, issuing, it may be, from the inkstand, to which the mind traces back the affection of the sense as to its source—an energy external to the mind. Of this external energy—this outer reality—thus affecting the sense we are unquestionably conscious. It is true, therefore, that we are conscious of external reality, but only as it is presented in the simple form of a specific energy interacting with the mind. The interpretation of this interacting energy, leading to the source or object from which it directly or remotely proceeds, is subsequent to the affection of which we are conscious.

Self-experience is, in veriest truth, “the original and irreducible factor of self-consciousness,” in the sense that the self is conscious only of what itself experiences. It is not true in the sense that in all conscious experience there is an actual distinguishing of the self from the object with which it interacts; for, as Mr. Bowne affirms, “the small child, who has not the least idea of self and not-self as formal conceptions, has yet the liveliest experience of itself in its feelings of pain and pleasure.” It knows it feels, is conscious that it feels, while yet it may never have recognized itself as subject distinct from the feeling as object. This conceptual process is of a later stage.

A peremptory necessity is laid upon psychological theory to declare and establish an exact and definite notion of consciousness. It is the accepted chief and primal source of all its knowledge of the mind; it is the one sole original witness—the only one that knows from “personal knowledge,” from immediate observation. If its character as a witness be not understood, if this one original witness come whence no one knows and goes no one knows whither, its testimony is as the empty wind; and the science that founds upon it as its chief support is unsubstantial and worthless. Psy-

chological science is not reduced to this miserable plight of having no voucher but a mysterious stranger and no treasures but the bills of credit from an unknown drawer. Most truly, says Mr. Bowne: "All our knowledge of mind must come back to consciousness"; "psychology is finally based on introspection." Moreover, "the proper facts of consciousness admit of no scepticism." This is just because all men know and accept the testimony of consciousness as a known and trusted witness. But only a knower can be a witness; consciousness is thus a knower, and no one questions this. A part, at least, of its office-work is to testify what it knows. If a knower, consciousness constitutes, so far at least, a part of the knowing functional activity of the human mind; it is then a cognitive function, a knowing power; and there is but one cognitive, knowing function in mind, as there can be in its essence but one knowledge. It is as preposterous to suppose a plurality of cognitive powers as a plurality of knowledges distinguished in their essence. Knowledge may be modified in respect to object: it may be external or sensible, or it may be inward—introspection. As part of an organic whole, the cognitive or knowing power in man, moreover, is modified by its union in life or outworking more or less with the other organic functions—as when in union with will it becomes attention, or with feeling it becomes feeling consciousness, or conscious sense. But consciousness is in essence only a knower. It is mysticism and illusion to imagine any other element in it. No observation certainly ever detected any such element, and therefore it cannot be accepted in any form or shape in a science which is professedly a science of observed facts. Consciousness is introspection, internal perception, intuition. This view seems to be incontrovertible, and it is a view which imparts to psychological science simplicity, consistency, clearness, validity, and possesses this high voucher for its correctness.

The conclusion is that psychological theory can, and therefore should, claim as settled the following particulars respecting consciousness:

Consciousness is a cognitive function, its special sphere is the mind's own acts, affections, and states, and is, accordingly, precisely co-ordinated with external perception; it gives apprehensive or perceptive, and therefore only incomplete, knowledge, not the

mature knowledge of complete thought which emerges only in the judgment; it varies in vigor, and lacks even the omniscience which takes with its distinct vision all the minutest points of mental experience; it is fallible, as is human nature generally, but is yet the least fallible and by far the most trustworthy of all the sources of knowledge for man. Self-consciousness, in the stricter sense, as consciousness of self, is attained only as the result of a discrimination between the self and its own act or affection. It is consciousness of self as a factor or element essential in all mental experience, and consequently ever discoverable there in thorough analysis.

IV. *The Method in Psychological Science.*

A theory of psychological construction must of course determine its method. If the end in the construction be science or knowledge for its own sake, and if the subject-matter be accepted to be the facts of mind, the controlling method is at once determined; it must be characteristically the method of simple observation. It starts from fact as observed in its accepted light, proceeds by the accumulation and arrangement of fact, and leaves as its completed work its subject-matter, the human mind, unfolded both in its essential and its relative attributes, a comprehensive whole of all observed facts set forth in progressive logical co-ordination both of its intrinsic constituents and also of its extrinsic relationships to other realities. It is proper just here to call attention to the last-named requisite in a scientific construction of psychological science. The human mind is recognized as essentially a trifunctional activity. The three mental functions—knowing, feeling, willing—constitute the great substantial departments of the science. Hitherto it has been thought that the full treatment of these specific functional activities, especially if they are presented in their organic combinations one with another, exhausts the demands of the science. It has escaped recognition that an organic whole is more than the sum of the organic parts, however much may be allowed for the modification of these particular functions by the incidental conjunction of two or more in a single experience. A psychological construction, to be logically complete, must exhibit the soul as one organic whole. This is more than the mere aggregation of its particular members; the physiology

of the mind as one living organism is more than the conjoined physiologies of the several functional parts.

The method indicated—the method of observation, where the end or object is science or truth for its own sake—may properly be denominated the *method of realism*. It received its earliest and most characteristic elucidation and exemplification in Aristotle. With him the essence—*τὸ ὄν*—commanded the view in psychological study; and the science has chiefly grown as it has adopted this method. The distinction, however, which he made between the essence—*οὐσία*—of objective reality and the essence of subjective thought has unfortunately been overlooked by succeeding psychologists, to the most serious detriment of the science. Thought and objective reality being confounded, both have lost greatly in their proper significance and worth in the study. German speculation has gone so far as, in the person of one of its recent leading thinkers, cited as authority largely in Great Britain and in this country, formally and expressly in logical teaching to deny the necessity of any positive element in thought, the mere juxtaposition of two concepts sufficing to constitute a perfect thought or knowledge. Hamilton himself, in the same way, failing to note this radical distinction, was borne along, as by a logical necessity, to his monstrous doctrine of “the unconditioned.” It might indeed be shown that not only the agnosticism or nescience of the present day, but also the doubt, the shaky uncertainty, even the strange yet ready acceptance by some of contradictories as each equally true, which are glaring characteristics of modern science everywhere, in physics and metaphysics, can be largely accounted for on the ground of this confusion of the being in thought and the being in objective reality. The evil has been aggravated and extended by another closely connected error springing from a misconception, or rather utter perversion, of Aristotelian teaching, that the category or generic attribute is the primal source, the logical and chronological principle, of human thought—a most groundless and preposterous assumption, and irreconcilably opposed to the method of observation which in the case of the finite human mind begins with the single and the simple. It was this perversion of the Aristotelian doctrine and practice that exalted the deductive method to a supreme and well-nigh sole governance in thought. Let science ever venerate the name

of Hamilton for his service in exposing the weaknesses of this gigantic system of *barbarism* in its mere formal working; its spirit unhappily still lives, vitiating, more or less, scientific thought.

This method of realism, it will be borne in mind, admits of three entirely distinct movements of thought, each governed by its own laws, and each giving perfectly legitimate results, and each equally requisite for the perfecting of the science. Any one of these subordinate methods may be relatively more or less prominent, and the general method be accordingly so far modified. These subordinate methods are (1) the method of deduction, recognized from the time of Aristotle, and the one logical method prevalent till the time of Bacon; (2) the method of generalization, or the movement of thought from part to whole, the method particularly recommended by Bacon in his "*Novum Organum*"; and (3) the method of induction, or the movement of thought from part to part, with which the Baconian method has often been confounded, and which, although hardly recognized as yet in logical systems, is the crowning method in recent science. Psychological theory cannot be esteemed to be complete, or to have adequately comprehended its work in the construction of the science, without a full, practical recognition of each of these subordinate processes of thought, at least implicitly if not in formal direction and rule. The construction of the science will be pretty sure to stumble and stray unless each movement is well in hand and ready for use at every step of progress. Pre-eminently, however, psychological science, as a science of fact, must begin with the single and the simple, with the past, and accordingly must proceed either by the Baconian method, from part to whole on logical generalization, or by the more recently prevalent method of co-ordination or logical induction. "The deductive movement can be admitted only as the general has been attained, from previous particular observation by legitimate process of thought. Some facts of mind, more or less generic, may, of course, properly be assumed as already settled by the observed experiences of the race. But even such assumption must squarely rest on the primal observation."

Psychological method, further, may be more or less modified by the way in which it approaches its subject-matter, and the idiosyncrasies or condition of the individual investigator may de-

termine this way of approach. The human mind may be approached in study thus in a threefold different way, and be viewed predominantly as an essence or a form, or a telic or orectic activity. The Aristotelian, as intimated, looked more exclusively at the essence. The liability in the use of this method is to a cold and stiff abstractedness, lacking life and interest. The Platonist regarded more the form—*τὸ εἶδος*—with him the corresponding subjective state being the *idea*. His, characteristically, is the method of idealism. Its end is the noble, the beautiful, the perfect in form—a worthy method, a fascinating method, an ennobling method. Its completed work should, however, be in loving accord with that of realism. Its liability is to empty phenomenalism, idle sentimentality. Then there is the modification of method which may be styled the method of practical wisdom. It contemplates the spirit of such predominantly as a self-regulated activity subject to growth, with a native set or trend toward a perfect manliness. Its goal is the supreme good of man as consisting in the full development and exact co-ordination of all the capabilities of his nature. It is characteristically the Hebrew and the Christian method. Its workings and its attainments must be, if legitimate, in perfect harmony with those of the other methods indicated; for the true, the beautiful, and the good dwell together in harmonious conjunction and sympathy in all real being, just as the knowing, the feeling, and the purposive functions congruously unite in the functional life of the soul.

Mr. Bowne's "Introduction" does not in form set forth or discuss the matter of method in psychological science. He declares at the start that "psychology deals with mental facts and processes," and that "the method must be introspective." "Sensations constitute a first order of mental reaction against external action. These in turn become the ground of a second order of mental reaction," consisting "in a working over of the sensations into rational forms." "In this process appears a new factor, which we call the thought-factor." Thus far we recognize the method of observation as that which his theory would enforce if it had been led to consider the matter in a formal way. But this so-named thought-factor is the one science-builder. The full exposition of its working must accordingly bring to view the plan, materials, construction—the whole character of psychology as a science. His treat-

ment of the thought-process becomes thus both exposition and exemplification to a large extent of his psychological theory. If we mistake not, the possibility of any worthy science anywhere, certainly the validity of any particular science of the human mind, hinges upon the principles involved in this exposition. It demands a close and careful scrutiny.

Mr. Bowne winds up the introductory matter in his chapter on the "Thought-Factor" in these words: "We conclude, then, that the mental life reveals two entirely distinct processes: (1) the movements and affections of the sensibility, and (2) an activity upon them which results in the judgment, the establishment of relations, and thus in rational knowledge. This activity is essentially what we mean by the thought-process." We deem it very unfortunate that in expounding this second order of mental activity a phrase of such large indefinite comprehensiveness as "the establishment of relations" should have been introduced. Under its cover and sanction a skilful dialectician could weave out the most fantastic of fabrics. But, leaving this, we advert to the fact that in the exposition of this second order one sole element is recognized—"an activity," with its diversified functions. This "activity" is given as the single constituent of the thought-process, and in interpreting it we are not justified in putting into it any extraneous element. We have, then, in our study of the entire thought-process only the two elements—the *datum* from the sense and the thought-activity upon it. In truth, simple introspection apprehends nothing more than these two—an object from sense and the movement of thought upon it. A science of observation is thus precluded from admitting anything more. And in another connection we find it expressly affirmed: "Of course, relations could not be established if the things were not in themselves relatable." The relations, it would seem from this, must have their origin in the things, not in the thought, and must accordingly be presented to the thought through the sense. This would seem to be decisive of the whole question. But there is some reservation here, or a retraction; for the expression appears, "those general relations which thought finds or establishes among its objects," and those general relations alluded to which are of special importance to the science are precisely not those which "thought finds." These general relations, he says, are variously called "the cate-

gories of thought, norms of distinction and comparison, regulative ideas, etc." Of these he selects for notice (for he deems a complete system to be impossible) those which he styles "the leading relations under which knowledge is constituted." His conception of the nature of these relations thus seems to be that they underlie the constitution of knowledge. If so, they cannot be themselves knowledges. But what they are as to their proper nature is left in mystery. They are not facts, for then they should be attained by observation. They are not truths, for then they would be, when apprehended by the mind, knowledges. They are said to be relations, but between what things—facts, truths, or what—is not revealed. They seem to be the relations which the thought-factor finds, and which are to be taken as ultimates concerning which no more is to be asked, because lying back and beneath all knowledge. His enumeration of these leading relations embraces "likeness and unlikeness," "time and space," "number," "cause and substance."

It is very obvious that Mr. Bowne, in this exposition of the thought-process, is engratting on the method of observation an entirely different movement. He assumes, on no warrant of observation or of deduction, certain "general relations" under which all knowledge is constituted. This method, which is not an infrequent characteristic of scientific speculation, we may denominate, for the sake of distinction, the *absolute a priori method*. There is another legitimative movement of thought which we will distinguish from this as the *relatively a priori method*; for thought itself has its own properties which must consequently characterize every thought-product; these are pre-eminently, if not exclusively, the "same things which the mind can know on its own account." These properties are learned only by observation of actual thinking, and are consequently in themselves *a posteriori*. But, as they are essential in all thinking, they condition and characterize all thought-products, and are to them relatively *a priori*. They are the proper categories of pure thought, being those generic attributes or predicates which, as essential in all thought—in pure thought—must belong to all products of thought. In this sense, as stated, they condition all actual thinking, inasmuch as without them thought would lack an essential quality—be, in fact, no thought at all. They are reducible, it is believed, to the three, as

at least the most fundamental and generic, viz. : those of Identity, Quantity, and Quality.¹

But, further, the object gives to the sense the other factor in the thought-process, has its essential attributes, also attained by observation, therefore really *a posteriori*, but relatively *a priori* to any thought of the object. Of these the two most fundamental and comprehensive are Reality and Activity. No object can be given to the sense to be apprehended by it except in its interaction with the mind. This involves the reality of the object, since that is the very meaning and sign of reality in an object that it impresses the sense. This again involves activity, the actual working on the sense.

Still further, the result of the thought-process—the object as thought—has its two fundamental categories—those of cause and substance. Since every object, by being thought, becomes object under attribution, observation teaches us that the essential attributes thus attached to an object in thought are the two of action and quality; and object-thought under the attribute of action is cause, and under that of simple quality is substance.

In Mr. Bowne's enumeration "Likeness" and "Number" are given as generic. They are given above as specific—one of "Identity," likeness being but partial identity, and the other of "Quantity," which is both numerical and spatial as well as intensive. He gives no hint of the genesis of these ideas further than this: that they are, as already indicated, antecedent to knowledge and absolutely *a priori* as principles by which knowledge is constituted. Those enumerated are to be received as fair specimens of those so-called categories or norms, or regulative ideas, of which no complete system is, in his opinion, possible, but which are to be accepted without question as the constitutive principles of all knowledge. He discusses at considerable length the nature and genesis of the ideas of Time and Space. They are affirmed, after the Kantian theory, to be *a priori* contributions of the mind. "Time is primarily the law or principle which compels the mind to connect its experiences and all conceptions of events in general under the form of antecedence and sequence. Secondly, time is the

¹ See the writer's treatment of the Categories in his "Mental Science" and "Science of Thought." Editions of 1886.

form of this synthesis." Similarly: "All perception of extension rests on a synthesis of parts." The method exemplified in this exposition is characteristically what is familiarly known as the absolute *a priori* method as distinguished from that which we have noted as the relatively *a priori* method. It assumes certain truths or principles as existing in the mind which are antecedent and conditional to all experience. Its soundness and value may be fairly weighed as it is exemplified by Mr. Bowne, who is as competent as any one, perhaps, to work the method to its best achievements. The objections may be summarily presented as follows:

1. We have nothing here but bare assumption without ground in fact or in legitimate deduction. Its only support is the claim that it accounts for the genesis of certain ideas in the only way possible to the human mind.

2. The theory seeks to solve one difficulty simply by bringing in another far more formidable. The genesis of these ideas is less mysterious than the genesis of the alleged law or principle in the thought-factor; than its mode of existence before any exertion of the activity; than its application to experience.

3. It makes the thought-factor a magazine of ideas—of ideas as diverse and indeterminate as the relations in the objects that can be presented to thought, of ideas already stored and held before any exertion of its activity. It puts the product-ideas before the producing, and converts, if we may use Aristotelian phraseology, a potency into an entelechy without becoming an energy.

4. It ranks and treats the ideas of time and space as categories of thought; that is, as generic attributes of pure thought, which he erroneously conceives to be attainable by the human mind before experience of the particulars which compose the generic.

5. It grounds the necessity of the *a priori* method in a misconception of the nature of the ideas of time and space as they are generally held. The theory supposes these ideas to be intrinsic to the objects given in experience; and, as an analysis of our sensations of objects does not find either time or space and a complete abstraction of all the attributes of the object as given to the sense leaves an utter blank or zero, it rejects the common view as untenable, and seeks rest in the *a priori* assumption as the only alternative. This is wholly a mistake. Time and space are not held the common-sense view to be intrinsic to the objects given in

sensation. Time, thus, is not an intrinsic property of bird, nor yet of moving bird. Time is not in the bird; it is in time; its motion is in time. Time, accordingly, conceived as an attribute, as it may be legitimately, is not an intrinsic but an extrinsic attribute—an attribute of condition. Finite sense cannot take in any object entirely apart from its environment. It can apprehend but a part of the universe of object. It must apprehend its object as such part; and the sense of a part involves a sense of what is related to it as a containing whole, which, as whole, is to its part of indefinite extent. We cannot see a star without something of the sky in which it is set. Human sense, thus, from the necessities of its finite nature, apprehends an object only as it exists in relation—as in its setting, its environment. All motion is thus correctly apprehended as being in time as its setting or external condition.

6. The theory attributes to the thought-activity an utter impossibility in the alleged construction of the ideas of time and space—"all perception of extension rests upon a synthesis of parts." Sensations are momentary, instantaneous; apprehensive only of points. The thought-factor is assumed to be the only principle of conjunction for the human mind. These moments or instants of the sense are conjoined by this thought-factor, and as the result of this synthesis so we get our ideas of duration and extension—time and space. But this speculation overlooks the utter impossibility of constructing non-quantitative points into the extended and quantitative. If the instants and moments of sense are quantitative, then the element of extension, of duration, of space and time, of quantity, is already given in the sense, antecedent to thought; and the speculation fails because it is uncalled for. On the other hand, if these instants and moments are themselves mere points, then all such synthesis of them as makes them actual quantitative extension is entirely illegitimate. An infinity of mere points can never avail to an infinitesimal of an extended space or line.

7. The theory misses entirely the true genesis of these ideas of time and space. It is affirmed that "no inspection of consciousness will reveal to us the origin of this idea [of time], inasmuch as the idea is always there long before the reflective consciousness begins the inquiry. We can only study some of its logical conditions." But surely all this is as true of all our leading ideas. The objects which produce them are given to the sense when its

capacity to receive and retain is at its weakest, when the discriminative and properly thinking activity is also at its weakest, when, consequently, the idea is so dim and dull that a weak infantile consciousness is incompetent to grasp it. This faint idea, only by much repeated impression and repeated thought-action and but gradually and slowly, grows into that full distinctness which consciousness can apprehend. We have thus the idea of weight—of gravity growing up from imperceptible beginnings. Doubtless it was in the mind long before “the reflective consciousness could begin the inquiry” into its origin and genesis. Yet, probably, no one will deny that the genesis of this idea is within the grasp of proper introspection. One experience of the rise of this idea must be essentially the same in its constituent elements as any other—the last must be the exact counterpart of the first; a heavy body impresses the sense alike in every case; and from this sense-impression as the single source comes all the material for the thought-process. This process involves no *a priori* form or principle of gravity as already possessed by the thought-function which in its action it contributes, from itself and from its own stores, to the sensation. Just so with the genesis of the ideas of time and space. One instance of experiencing the rise of these ideas in the mind is essentially the same as every other, having the same elements. Any moving thing impressing the sense gives rise to the idea at the first and ever after. So, as a matter of fact which cannot in reason be controverted, we may and do witness with an attained maturity of mental life the rise of these ideas in all the fulness of their essential factors and conditions. The consciousness of the experience gives a simple unimpeachable testimony. I see a bird at rest on the tree before my window; my sense receives the impression, and the thought-process acts on the sense-impression. I have an idea of bird. Then the bird flits before my window. My sense receives now a new and a different impression. I have an idea of moving bird. The sense of motion is added to the former sense of bird, and the idea of bird changes to the idea of moving bird. But this idea of motion contains within itself divers elements discernible in easy analysis; and among these constituent elements is that of continuous duration.

The vicious character of this whole *aprioristic* method is significantly exemplified still further in Mr. Bowne's exposition of the

ideas of "substance" and "cause." What is conceived to be the true exposition of the nature and genesis of these ideas has already been given. As pertaining not to the thing given as object to the sense, nor yet to the thought-activity directed upon the object as apprehended in the sense, but to the thought-thing as result of the interaction between these two factors, they are readily understood. A failure to view them in this natural way naturally leads to mistiness and confusion, which are worse for truth and science than positive error. Of course, in this confusion and darkness, difficulties present themselves to the investigating mind. And here as elsewhere the Gordian-knot solution seems to have been accepted as the readiest and easiest—viz., that the thought-factor should create these ideas like those of time and space; this method has in other lines been accepted as legitimate and valid; habit has facilitated the use of it. Yet how viciously it works here as everywhere may be shown, particularly in the theory given by Mr. Bowne of the genesis of the idea of reality in the mind. There is some cloudiness thrown over his exposition by his recognizing an ontological and a metaphysical reality as distinct from proper psychological reality. The distinction is beyond our comprehension as it is beyond our present field of inquiry. The question here is, How does the mind of man get its idea of a reality external to itself? Of course, it is implied that a true exposition will impart to that idea, as it exists in the mind, legitimacy and validity. If the idea comes lawfully into the mind, it is true and valid, and there is a real external world; it is not a figment of the mind; the outer world has attested itself in a way to command the mind's assent. Now, according to this *aprioristic* method, "this idea can get into the experience only as the mind brings it in." Substance, by which "is meant reality in reference to its attributes," is regarded "as primarily a mental principle, and secondarily as an ontological reality." "We have the idea of causation," and "by cause is meant reality in reference to its activities." "This principle is no datum of experience, but a mental contribution." "It cannot be abstracted from experience, for the reason that it cannot be found in experience until the mind puts it there." All that there is of reality in the outer world for us, for our minds and souls, is thus made to be the mere fabrication of our own thinking. Surely it would seem as if this denial of reality as an

attribute pertaining to the outer world in itself, irrespectively of our thinking, must, if anything, "lead to nihilism and solipsism." Yet the facts which reveal beyond all doubt the actual genesis of this idea are patent facts; they are admitted facts. And, as was noticed in Kant's search for the idea of time in the experience, the explanation why "the idea cannot be found in experience" is simply that the vision is not turned to where it actually is. "All perception," it is affirmed in truth, "rests upon an interaction between the soul and the world of things." "To be perceived, a thing must act upon us; and to be perceived as this or that, it must act upon us in a manner corresponding thereto." Here, then, if we "construe the facts as they are given us," are "things" interacting with our minds, determining in our minds so that they are differently affected by this and by that. We accordingly have things, actions, mental affections. But, succeeding these mental affections, thus immediately resulting from the interaction, there are certain mental activities which are determined to be of this or that character, according to the character of the interaction and the affection. This part of the experience Mr. Bowne seems to exclude from his view. There is the activity of the thing, and that is followed at once by an activity of the mind. But nothing is recognized as intermediate; there is no proper effect produced in the mind by the thing from which effect the perception comes; the thing acts; the mind acts; nothing connects them. It is, however, admitted that the action of the thing is the condition of the minds reacting. But what meaning is there in this, unless the action of the thing produces a feeling in the mind, and unless it is this—the feeling—the action as felt—that is, a state in the mind itself—which is the object of the perception? So it is admitted that the mind has sensations, and they are the condition of all perception. Further than this, a thing manifests its own inherent reality as a thing by acting upon our minds, and the mind is conscious of this action upon it from an external object. But the vision of the *a priori* theorist is turned away from the interaction itself, the actual meeting of the two interacting factors, and consequently from the conscious sense, which, it may be remarked, sometimes abides without any perception immediately following from all this consciousness of external energy in actual operation on and in the sense. It takes no note of this. The method seems

to be color-blind; it does not discern what is obvious to sound vision.

The old Kantian speculation is summarily and characteristically given by Mr. Bowne as it is adopted by him: "Our objectified representations constitute for us the external world. This does not forbid that the world may be as real as common sense assumes; it only points out that to perceive the outer world we must think it or construct it in thought. The mind can never grasp the object other than through the conception, and the object exists for the mind only through the conception." The natural interpretation of this language must take it to teach simple nihilism. We take the ideas as representations of our own minds—objectify them—make them objects to our own mental view, and these constitute all there is of an external world; the external world is nothing, so far as we know, in itself; it is only our own ideal fabric; there is no real world for us; all that is a real nothing; this is the natural common-sense interpretation of the teaching. Consciousness here goes for nothing; for, if we are conscious of anything, it is that, when we are violently struck, some real thing outside of us interacts with us. Consciousness being thus belied, all knowledge of the mind, all psychological science fails, and, of course, with it all science, and we have left us as our only portion pure nescience. Our perceptions do not condition and determine our thought, our knowledge, but our thought-constructions determine them. Perception, indeed, is made to be only a "rationalizing process," or application of certain assumed judgment-relations, called "the categories." "The mind can never grasp the object other than through the conception." The conception, accordingly, must exist before the object is apprehended, and determine its existence for us and fix its nature; and so we find reiterated the teaching that the external object has no existence and no character of its own. Moreover, this all-determining "conception"—this antecedent to all knowledge—is, as presented to us, entirely sourceless and characterless. It is, in fact, absolutely incogitable, as it makes a product its own producer. A thought, as every principle which must be a form of knowledge, and every generic attribute which must be a constituent element in a knowledge, is made to be its own originator, for, we are taught, an object cannot be grasped except through the conception

already existing in the mind. It reverses and so belies the universally recognized process of knowing. A man hitherto blind, for instance, for the first time sees the sun; it is bright to him. The theory interprets the experience thus: The sun is presented to his sense; he has already in his mind, inner, inherited, transmitted, acquired in some unknown way, the conception of "brightness," and so he comes to know that the sun is bright. In this way the teaching denies to the human mind all power to know things as they are, and makes all human knowledge uncertain by making it to depend for all that is intrinsic and essential in the objects of knowledge as arbitrary, baseless, characterless conceptions. The teaching, of course, if as erroneous as it would seem to common sense and all reason, will reveal inconsistencies or contradictions here and there. Particularly we may notice here that it admits that the "raw material" which the thought-process works up is given by the sensibility. This raw material must be real—that is, if anything is real. If it be allowed to be real, then, inasmuch as it exists before the thought-process begins, and is not, therefore, created or made real by thought, the conclusion would seem to be inevitable that there is reality external to thought and independent of it. So the theory stumbles fatally over its own teachings.

The *a priori* method, thus shown to be untrustworthy as it is exemplified in a vital doctrine concerning true knowledge, although applied by eminent ability, may be reasonably expected to reveal fatal weaknesses in whatever application. It professes to found knowledge on an ultimate basis; it aims to effect its object by the simple expedient of assuming a principle or law or generic conception antecedent to all mental activity. The illusiveness of the process is shown at once in the fact that this fundamental conception, assumed to have a pre-existence in the mind, must be ever the product of the mind itself, for no other origin can in reason be assigned to it. It is originated for a special application, probably in all unconsciousness, out of a general unscientific survey of the subject-matter, and constructed, of course, so as supposably to embrace all the particulars. The true process of knowledge from its very nature prescribes the reverse of this—that it must begin with the object of the knowledge as given and as observed, and is effected first by observing or apprehending this object as having

some attribute or character, and then by identifying the object and attribute as one. This is the one essential characteristic relation in thought or knowledge—that which makes a knowledge to be a knowledge. To think, to know, psychologically, to judge, is essentially to attribute, and all attribution is simply identification of an object with some or other of its attributes. The judgment is, indeed, essentially thus a relating activity. It is illegitimate to make it the factor of any and all relations. It is more grossly illegitimate to make it the factor in any case of the attribute as one of the constituents in this relation. The judgment never creates the content of the attribute in a knowledge. That it can attain only as it is given in the presentation of the object to the judging activity. To what preposterous length the theory that the attribute in a judgment must be already in the mind before the object is presented to the sense logically leads is shown in the very reasoning of Mr. Bowne. "The universal form of knowledge," he says, truly, "is the judgment." "But judgments are impossible without the ideas united in them. I cannot say this is red or green without having some idea of red or green." "The universal antedates reflective thought, and is a necessity of all thinking." "Whenever reflection begins we find ourselves already in possession of a mental world." "The world of things exists for us only as we construct it in thought by bringing into sensation the categories of the intellect. Besides these, we find a world of ideas which lay no claim to substantive existence. These mental products are all universals." "Red" and "green" thus are universals already in the mind before any red thing or green thing has ever been presented to the sense; they emerge from the mind's treasure-house when the external object is presented.

Assuredly this is not the method of certain knowledge. Hardly can it be allowed as "*belle et probabiliter opinari*." Very far is it from the Baconian method of observation and realism, the goal of which is *certo et ostensive scire*. In truth, to rest any intellectual structure, any system of doctrine, any form of knowledge whatever respecting any real thing, on assumption, is to build on sand—an utterly unstable and untrustworthy foundation. The first grand aphorism of the "*Novum Organum*"—that human knowledge, respecting mind and outer things, is conditioned by observation—is a first principle for all stable science. The assumption of

universals not only violates this law of knowledge, but itself involves what is utterly incogitable—viz., that an attribute can exist apart from the subject to which it belongs, except, of course, in the abstractions of thought. Those universals which most commonly now creep into speculation with most vicious effects, such as “infinite,” “absolute,” “perfect,” although in themselves of negative import, easily take on a positive form, and then as easily admit the idea of the real. Thus, by a subtle paralogism, out of an utterly groundless assumption is built up a system of doctrine respecting God, the universe, nature, the mind, pompous and plausible, yet only pretentious and illusive. The vicious logical principle corrupts and spoils the entire body of doctrine into which it is admitted.

V. The Validation of Psychological Science.

The hopeful and successful builder of science must feel assured that his work is right, and therefore must give valid results. He must have a just confidence that the science, after having been built up of the fitting materials in the method of tested skill, must be veritable and, therefore, enduring science. If his facts are the facts of mind, accurately and fully observed, and if they have been constructed by the known methods of the one science-builder—thought—his work must abide. He needs thus only to test his observations and his reflective thought-movements, his deductions, his generalizations, his inductions, confining himself to observed fact as his material, and ever beginning with that. Observation as a valid ground and condition of knowledge cannot be questioned. Human fallibility must, of course, ever be recognized, and proper provisions and allowances be made for this. But, after all, truth is attainable by the human mind, and it may be known to be truth by decisive tests. We do know some things, and we know that we know them; and this simply because this knowledge that we have has all the essential characters of a true knowledge. This is the one comprehensive and conclusive test. As I know an orange to be an orange because it has the essential properties of an orange, so I know that the knowledge I have is a true knowledge because it possesses the known properties of a knowledge. It has proceeded from an observed fact, and my mind, as capable of knowing the fact, has worked up the fact into a true knowledge.

These are manifold specific tests of valid observation. They need not be enumerated here. And the testing of the thought-movement can be satisfactorily accomplished in the light of the established laws of thought. The builder of science has accordingly the means of testing his work in his own hands, and may rest content with his work if he find it to have been founded on assumed observation of fact, and to have been carried forward by a legitimated skill. The pretended science that threatens an assault on a knowledge thus built up of assured observation and in sound logic will have committed suicide before it can deal its threatened blow.

It were hardly necessary to call particular attention to this validation of the science in psychological theory but for the fact that the attempt has been so often made to construct the science in open violation of a fundamental principle of scientific construction by founding it upon an alleged principle, not exclusively on observed fact. This method of procedure, characterized as the *a priori* method, has been already sufficiently considered in its vitiating effect on psychological science. It is necessary here only to reiterate the affirmation, that any alleged science founding itself on any assumption whatever, by whatever name it may be designated, as first truth, necessary principle, or otherwise, builds itself on sand, and has no real stability. It is mortally vulnerable for this one of divers reasons, that he who controverts it has equal right to assume, and there is no superior authority to adjudicate with which party lies the better claim. A particular science may, indeed, found on what has already been established; it is not required to relay foundations already laid. // But primarily and originally all science for man must repose on fact attained by legitimate observation. // Thought must accept this observation in implicit faith. Scientific observation has, indeed, its regulative laws, and these must be found in the testing to have been obediently followed. Thought itself has, too, its regulative laws, which must, in securing a validated knowledge, be found, as well, to have been obediently followed. Thought itself must have been observed, its nature ascertained. The essential characteristics observed in this ascertained nature of thought must, of course, appear in every instance of legitimate thought. Here, in these essential characters, we alight upon principles which must precede and condition

all thought, and which will be found as attributes of every thought-object. These principles of thought, thus attained by observation, are properly denominated *a posteriori* in respect to their own origin, but, being prerequisite in all actual thinking, are *a priori* in reference to all the results of such thinking. These fundamental principles are those already named as the categories of pure thought—Identity, Quantity, Quality. These principles may rightfully be taken as the corner-stones of sound knowledge. They are not, however, assumptions; and the allowed free use of them by no means justifies the use of other assumptions that have no ascertainable basis in the nature of thought or in legitimate observation.

Science, thus knowing what scientific observation is and what true thought is, knows what true knowledge when attained is. The decisive validation of science is thus in its own power. There is none that can rise up to dispute its sovereign rule.

VI. *Relationships of Psychological Science.*

Psychology bears divers and complicated relationships in its properly scientific character. It is a part of a larger whole of science; and it has to do with a part of the general subject-matter of science. These relationships are organic as parts of the one great body of knowledge which has the universe of being—being of thought as well as being of reality—for its subject-matter. In these co-ordinations reciprocity of vital force must exist, and science-construction must recognize the fact and hold itself free to impart and to receive light and help as their organic connections may allow. Psychology is thus to be co-ordinated with Metaphysical Science, Fundamental Philosophy, Ontology—by whatever name it may be known. It bears here a double and an opposed relationship, as both originative and subordinate, parental and filial. It is the subordinate as constituting only a part of universal science; it is yet the originative source and ground of logic as the science of thought which is the universal and only science-builder, for thinking is an essential function of mind which is the proper subject-matter of psychology. The nature of true thought and so the determination of all true knowledge thus are to be learned primitively and authoritatively from psychological science. Logic, or the science of thought, is thus its own mother; the mother and

offspring at once of psychology; and, moreover, the one mother of universal science.

It is inadmissible here, in the limited space allowed, to enter into a more detailed explication of the organic relationships subsisting between psychology and other branches of knowledge. It must suffice simply to indicate the fact of those divers relationships, that so the construction of the science proceed in full recognition of the various and complicated co-ordinations determining and shaping more or less the spirit and character, and the defining boundaries of the science. The successful builder of psychological science must be in intelligent sympathy and organic communication with all embodiments of truth and sound knowledge. More and more fully is the long-observed principle of co-ordination as governing alike throughout the universe of being and of thought coming into recognition and effective use—the principle that in every organic whole each part conditions and determines, more or less, every complementary part.

NOTES AND DISCUSSIONS.

A THEORY OF INSANITY.

It is clear that man uses corporeal senses as instruments with which to learn the external world. Nerves are the avenues of sense-impressions. Nerves receive impressions from the external world, and the mind infers the properties and qualities of existence from the character and quality of the nerve impressions.

Now, it is obvious that, besides sound, healthy nerve function, there may be diseased function. In case of disease the nerve may be sensitive to its corporeal environment as well as to the external world. The lesions of diseased nerves will seem to the mind to be impressions from without, and will be interpreted as perceptions of external existence; thus, severed limbs often seem to be felt even in the lost extremities, because the nerve is affected at its end in the stump of the amputated limb.

These lesions of diseased nerves will most likely be more vivid than in healthy nerve-action, and will be interpreted as perceptions of more vivid realities. They will apparently reveal to the mind a world of distortions, hideous forms, threatening the safety of the person thus diseased. This person will thus be *insane*. His sense data do not reveal facts, and hence he acts on wrong premises, and acts absurdly, in reality, although very rationally, in view of what he sees to be the reality. Insanity of this kind will pass away when the nerves of sensation are made healthy.

Not only is sense-perception conducted through corporeal organs in its beginnings, but former perception is also recalled by means of action of those organs caused, more or less, by the excitation of the will. Recollection is, like sense-perception, a seizure of a direct, immediate, particular fact or object, and not an apprehension of something general or universal. Not only can the effect of a former lesion on the sense-organ be renewed at will through the act of recollection, but, by power of the will, the sense-organ may be framed or determined into original shapes called fancies, which seem when the subject is conscious of direct control over them by the will, to be purely subjective. But disease of the brain can also produce fancies not dependent on the will, called "fixed ideas." These form *hallucinations*, the second form of insanity.

This brain disease may arise from general causes, or it may be pro-

duced directly by the brooding of the mind upon an important object or event for so long a time that partial congestion of the brain-organ supervenes, and inflammation causes the image to persist in the mind and mix with most or all of its experiences. A permanent image existing through the mental experience furnishes a sort of axis for this experience. And the mind dwells on that image and finds the relations of it to all of its experience; in fact, giving unity to its experience through that image. Hence the image comes to be attached closely to the personal identity, and, if the image of a person, may often be adopted as the supposed identity of the person himself, who then believes himself to be St. Paul, Napoleon, or even Jesus Christ.

In all cases of hallucination, as well as in all cases of delirium, there is primarily a diseased nervous organism, which, instead of being set into activity by the environment of the body, is organically put in action by the disease on its own account and furnishes illusions.

The soul is rational, only its data are incorrect. Insanity, therefore, does not offer any support to the materialistic theory of the mind, but the contrary. If the mind itself were diseased its categories of causality, quantity, quality, space, and time would be affected, and it would invert its rational procedures, and omit some phases, and reason incorrectly from data. But of this we have no evidence. The disease appertains to the body, and affects only the data of relation to the external world.

From these theoretic principles some results follow as regards the treatment of insanity:

1. The disease of the nerves—inflammation or whatever it is—should be removed.

2. The mind should never be allowed to brood long at a time over objects and events. Diversion is essential to prevent insanity, and diversion should be the first thing sought in the treatment of insanity.

3. In case of chronic morbid lesion, which produces the persistent presence of some image, there should be attempts to lead out from this image to its environment, and thus to change its structure by development of the conception, unfolding the idea by related ideas into a system of ideas, and thus overcoming the fixed character of the idea and restoring freedom. The relations should be often canvassed, and the patient's reason encouraged to infer results near and remote. Sometimes such a lesion would be cured by creating a new one of equal importance by a fright; but such violence is avoided because of the possibility of increasing the disease.

The art of creating new mental images and ideas should be studied in order properly to treat the insane. These can arise from without

through bodily influences, and within through self-determination of the mind, which chooses to brood over an image. Both of these methods should be used to controvert diseased brain spectres. From the fact that drugs have the power to produce mental spectres, it has been inferred that the mind is no self-determining entity, but a product of bodily functions. The distinction between sense-data and the process of inference and will removes this materialistic implication. The sense-data are all corporeal, and may be sound and valid, or may be only delusive, as in case of drug-excitement of the nerves. The mind infers and wills in view of its data, whether real or delusive. Moreover, the mind through its self-determination, in case of brooding, can even create the disease which gives rise to hallucination.

W. T. HARRIS.

September, 1881.

BOOKS RECEIVED.

Mrs. Herndon's Income. A novel. By Helen Campbell, author of the "What to do Club." Boston: Roberts Brothers. 1886. [A very able discussion of the questions of wealth and poverty that are coming to the front in our local politics.]

Thomas Carlyle's Counsels to a Literary Aspirant (a hitherto unpublished letter of 1842), and what came of them, with a brief estimate of the man. By James Hutchison Stirling, LL. D. Edinburgh: James Thin, South Bridge. 1886.

The Community of Property: Nationalization of Land. By J. H. Stirling. Edinburgh: Oliver & Boyd, Tweeddale Court. 1885. Pp.1-40. [A discussion of the positions taken by Mr. Henry George in his lectures in Edinburgh.]

The Re-organization of Philosophy. An address delivered before the Aristotelian Society, November 8, 1886 (being the annual address for the eighth session of the society), by Shadworth H. Hodgson, LL. D., President. Williams & Norgate. 1886.

Journal of the American Akademie. October, 1886. Vol. III, No. 1. Alexander Wilder, editor. Contents: Plato, frontispiece; Foreword; Ancient Symbolism and Serpent-worship, by A. Wilder; Conversation; The American Akademie.

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A STUDY OF THE ILIAD.

BY DENTON J. SNIDER.

Book Sixth.

This Book is perhaps the favorite Book of the "Iliad" with most readers. It has a character of its own throughout; in spite of all diversity, its parts hold together in a common soul. That soul we shall try to feel afresh in modern ways of thinking and speaking. The first line utters a fundamental fact, which holds good to the end: "The Gods withdrew from the conflict between Greeks and Trojans." Accordingly, we shall see no divine intervention in this Book; the struggle is handed over to mortals, to be carried on or to be reconciled by them as best they can. The withdrawal of the Gods, announced at the start and intended by the poet, is one of the facts which keep the various portions of the Book in unity with itself.

The connection with the preceding Book is close and multifarious. Diomed is still the central figure, though he is now to undergo a change. He has put down two divinities that were partisans of Troy; clearly he is the man whom the Trojans must fight, or conciliate, if possible. Both Diomed and Troy show a new aspect into which they unfold from their antecedent phase. If Mars and Venus were the sole Gods of Troy, the city would now

fall ; but there is something else unconquered there which at present comes into the foreground, and which Diomed is not able to subdue. We have already noticed that there is a Trojan deity, Apollo, from whom he fled ; but Apollo has quit the conflict along with the other Gods, and does not appear in this Book.

Not a God, then, but a man now appears in Troy, Hector ; we have seen him a number of times hitherto as the brave captain of his people, who is trying to repel the invaders of his country ; we have also seen him as a bitter denouncer of Paris. Now he is to be shown as the one whom we may call the ethical hero of Troy, the bearer of all its noble instincts ; with him in it, the city cannot be taken by Diomed, or by anybody else. He is the one Trojan man who has to perish before his country can perish. In the present Book he is called to be a mediator ; he invokes the Family, all the domestic life of Troy, to pacify the wrathful Goddess, Pallas, who has lent such power to Diomed. He will be shown in his own home, as son, as husband ; his brother, Paris, will be held up before us in contrast ; thus the inner ethical scission in Troy will be made manifest, revealing the two parties and the two tendencies of the city. A religious man, a domestic man, a patriotic man we behold in Hector ; we may truly call him the Greek in Troy.

Yet just in this lies the limit on which he breaks, which makes him tragic. He does not believe in the detention of Helen, yet he fights for the nation which detains her ; it is, alas ! his own nation. His conviction clearly is, that the Greek cause is right ; still he assails that cause in the defence of his country. In nobly maintaining his own Family and State, he is led to assail the principle of Family and State. His very virtue whelms him into guilt, and this is his tragedy.

Of all the Iliad, this is the Book of the Family. The inner condition of Troy is brought before us ; we see the home in the midst of war ; we see especially the woman in her domestic life ; yet this life is one of terrible anxiety, and perpetually threatens to become death. The Greeks in their camp have not the Family, and, hence, cannot show this domestic phase of the conflict. Still, the Family is the heart of their cause ; are they not fighting for its integrity ? But Troy alone can show the home, in its deep antagonism to war—*bella detestata matribus*. This Book, accord-

ingly, has a conciliatory character; the Family seeks the peace of life, the mother will keep her son, the wife will keep her husband. Emotions averse to home-destroying battle we feel everywhere; the prayer goes up to the Gods that they would ward off the fateful stroke from the Family. It is the deepest truth that the poet invokes woman with her domestic institution as the mediatorial principle which seeks to conciliate the conflict. Yet these sad, piteous Trojan women are tragic too, their very supplication is its own denial; they, praying for the safety of Troy and of themselves, pray for the detention of Helen and the destruction of the Family. Can the Goddess listen to such a petition? Note, too, the place of the Book; it is put between Books of war; thus it gives relief from the bloody strain of battle; we tarry upon it as a peaceful oasis before plunging into the storm which rages around it.

The object of the Book, then, is the conciliation of Diomed, who has conquered the Trojans' deities of sensuous love and of blind violence—deities whom every Greek Hero must put down ere he can truly fight for Helen, who is to be rescued from the domination of just those two Gods. Accordingly, the opposite principle in Troy, the pure and peaceful element of the Family, must next be called up to try to save the city. Will the plan be successful? Yes and no; this double answer leads us to consider the double nature of Diomed, and the new turn which his character now takes.

Diomed has already shown two sides, the divine and human, both of which were active in him during his grand career in the Fifth Book. The poet tells us that the hero repeatedly received suggestions from Pallas; by her aid he conquered Mars and Venus, she being the Goddess of war and wisdom combined, and at the same time a virgin unstained. Thus she is the antagonist of those two Trojan deities in her very nature. Now Diomed has Pallas in him, he sees her form and hears her voice, she animates him; this is his divine side which raises him above himself. Yet she is outside of him too, she is the spirit abroad which puts down the Trojan, she is the Greek spirit which will conquer Troy, or that portion of Troy represented by Mars and Venus. When she leaves him, he is human, is but Diomed, the individual, not a great warrior, or at least not so great as when the divine energy is working

in him, and hurling him against the Gods themselves. He, as individual, has these friendly, paternal, ancestral ties; he is connected in some way, as all the Greeks are, with the Trojans; on this personal side he may be approached and be reconciled.

But the reconciliation of Diomed, in order to be complete, must be double, must include both the divine and human elements. It must first seek to placate Pallas, the divine element not merely of the Hero, but, to a certain extent, of the whole Greek enterprise; she is not only in him, but in the entire cause. After that Diomed, the person, may be conciliated. Of the two attempts, the former does not succeed, cannot succeed, if Greece is to endure; Pallas will reject the Trojan prayer, and the war must go on. But the latter attempt succeeds, in part at least; Diomed, the individual, no longer knows the voice of the Goddess, stops in the midst of the conflict, and is reconciled. We shall hear of him again, but he will never fully recover his divine energy.

We are now to see this thought taking body in the structure of the Book. Four divisions of it are plainly marked: 1. A series of bitter single combats (1-72). 2. The sending of Hector (73-118). 3. The meeting of Glaucus and Diomed (119-236). 4. Hector in the city (237-529). But these four divisions all stand in relation to one thought, that of reconciliation, which has the two sides, human and divine. From the first to the second division is a movement which passes from the unreconciled human element to the attempt to reconcile the divine element. From the third to the fourth division is another movement which passes from the reconciled human element to the unreconciled divine element. The sweep of the whole Book is, that though individuals may make peace and drop out of the conflict, the Gods will not be reconciled, the spiritual principle in this Trojan War cannot be compromised. The noblest character in Troy forbodes that the city must be destroyed. These four organic portions may now be unfolded.

1. In a series of bloody single combats we see the unreconciled nature of the struggle between individual Greek and Trojan. For the Gods have withdrawn and turned the conflict over to men, who surge in battle through the plain. It is a contest of individual strength and courage without direct divine interference on either side. The most important Greek heroes, Ajax, Diomed—note

that Diomed now comes after Ajax, an ominous hint of what is to follow—Euryalus, Ulysses, and others, are brought before us in rapid pictures, each hero slaying his man, or two or even four men. A fierce, gory time of which the reader soon has enough.

But the most prominent and the typical instance is the fate of Trojan Adrastus, who, being overturned in his chariot, is taken alive by Menelaus, and offers large ransom. Menelaus is inclined to be merciful, when his brother, the leader of the Greeks, runs up and rebukes him: "Let none escape, not even the babe in its mother's womb." Then he smote the cowering prisoner, and, putting his heel on the breast of the fallen man, jerked out the ashen spear. As an image of implacable temper, this will suffice. Old Nestor, too, who is usually the reconciler among the Greeks, is full of the spirit of the time: "Let no man tarry behind for plunder, but let us slay men, and afterward at leisure strip the dead." The whole stress here is the human struggle unreconciled and without mercy.

2. Now comes the attempt on the part of the Trojans to reconcile the divine element which has animated the Greeks, and specially Diomed, in the preceding Book. If they can take away that power from their enemy, they can indeed win. Will they do works meet for reconciliation? Such is the underlying question of the whole Book. The matter is not to be settled by an expiatory ritual, but by a complete undoing of the wrongful deed.

Hector is taken from the front of battle and sent to the city. This is the suggestion of Helenus, "the very best of augurs," the man of religion who well knows that some divine power is fighting for the Greeks, even though the Gods have outwardly withdrawn from the contest. He has the gift of vision, and sees the very divinity who has been helping Diomed. This is Pallas, who must now be propitiated by the Trojans with a grand procession and sacrifice. The Goddess is to be taken away from the Greek hero, if possible, that he be shorn of his strength, and become like another man. It should be noticed that Helenus considers Diomed the greatest hero of the Greeks, greater than even Achilles, "whom men say to be Goddess-born." The fact that a Goddess helps Diomed, does not detract from his greatness; indeed just that constitutes his greatness. Thus the poet naively takes for granted that the deity must be in the man as well as outside of him, and

that he whom the Gods help most is the mightiest individual. Man is truly free and himself just through divine aid.

So the Trojans are going to try to conciliate Pallas Athena, the divine element of Diomed, and partly of the whole Hellenic world. We have already seen that she is a strong Greek partisan among the Gods on Olympus; still she has her temple in Troy, in the sacred precinct of the acropolis. It is an indication that both Greek and Trojans belong to the same race, have the same worship, language, customs mainly; have the same Gods, who, however, are divided upon this cause of Helen, as the Hellenic race itself is divided for the same reason, and split into two hostile tendencies. Well is it then for the Trojans to propitiate the Greek Goddess in Troy.

But why should Hector be selected, the mighty chieftain, and taken away from the head of his troops in the field? Why should not Helenus himself, the man of religion, go to perform a religious mission? Hector is altogether the proper person, and none other; and Helenus knows it. Hector is the Greek in Troy, opposed to Paris, opposed to keeping Helen. In his heart he believes that the Greeks are right; still as a patriot he fights them when they assail his country. In his conviction, Hector is most friendly to the Greek Gods; truly they are his, and not Venus, not Mars. He is the man of all others in Troy, to conciliate these Greek deities; in spirit he is most theirs, far more than Helenus the soothsayer. Hector is the bearer of the Greek, *versus* the Asiatic influence in Troy. Pallas will listen to him, if she will listen to any Trojan. It is true that the offering is to be made by his mother, but he brings it about, he is just the one who might be expected to order such a sacrifice; he is the mediator, through whose kindred soul the Greek Gods will speak, if they speak at all, to the Trojans.

Before departing, he, by a special effort, puts his troops in good spirits, and places them in a secure position. He animates his people till they drive back the Greeks who "think that one of the immortals had descended from the starry heaven to help the men of Troy." Besides, he leaves Æneas behind, who is coupled with him in courage, fame, and command. But, while he is gone, Diomed, losing in some way his divine companion, is individually reconciled.

3. The story of the meeting of Glaucus and Diomed on the field of battle, seems, at first sight, an episode disconnected from the main action; but its spirit is in unison with the present Book, and, moreover, it is completely in Homer's manner, which often reflects the whole struggle in some far-off legend of other days. We behold the reconciliation of a Greek and Oriental, or better, of an Eastern and Western Greek, by referring to the personal relations of their ancestors, who were in the olden time allied by ties of hospitality. It is another declaration that Greek and Trojan are kin, both of one race; in the preceding Book we saw the same fact imaged in the story of Tlepolemus and Sarpedon, son and grandson of Zeus, fighting each other on the plain of Troy. In the present instance the legend will throw a deep glance into the meaning of the whole war, with the scission of the Hellenic people into East and West. In this story three mythical strands are twisted together; the legend of the Thracian king told by Diomed, the legend of Bellerophon told by Glaucus, the legend of ancestral friendship ending in the reconciliation of the descendants.

a. The speech of Diomed is remarkable; it indicates a great change in the hero of the Fifth Book. There Pallas had lent him the gift of knowing Gods from mortals in battle; but now he cannot tell whether Glaucus be man or deity. There he assailed and put down Mars and Venus, and showed in that deed his highest heroism; but now he says, "I shall not war with the Gods of heaven." Something has happened to him manifestly. He cites the instance of Lycurgus, the Thracian king, who resisted the Bacchic cult and drove out the God, and who in consequence, did not live long. Here we have a case of a Greek ruler who is punished for his opposition to an Asiatic divinity, for Bacchus came to Greece from Asia, and is barely known to Homer. So at present Diomed would not fight a Trojan God; he is terror-stricken at the fate of Lycurgus, who assailed an Oriental divinity that was entering European Greece. This is not our former Diomed; he is now afraid of calamity, afraid of not living long. Pallas has left him, the divine element has gone out of him, and we see only the human Diomed. He can now be reconciled.

How shall we consider this change in Diomed? German criticism, which is inclined to find many Homers everywhere in Homer,

declares, in a number of representatives, that a new poet composed this famous episode, one who did not know, or disregarded the hero of the Fifth Book. But such a way of interpretation ignores the procedure of Homer in a hundred places, and indeed of all supreme poets. These introduce great changes into their characters which the reader must poetically, and the interpreter logically, justify. In "King Lear," how different is Cordelia of the First Act when she disappears, from Cordelia of the Fourth Act, when she appears again! It is no explanation to say that there are two Cordelias and two Shakespeares. And in the present case it lands us in the Kingdom of Nowhere to say that there are two Diomedes and two Homers. Under this difference we must see the unifying reason, and then we shall behold one character and one poet.

If we look back at the Fifth Book, we find that this change in the man has been amply prepared. He does not attack Venus nor Mars till Pallas comes to him and specially inspires him. His susceptibility to the divine influence is distinctly marked and limited; without the Goddess he is but a common mortal, a good fighter still against men, but not against Gods. He cannot command the celestial spell; at present the superhuman power has left him, and he knows it well. He will fight a mortal even now, but not a Trojan deity, as he has before done. He has manifestly reached his limit; those two Gods of Troy, Mars and Venus, are all that lie within the range of his heroism.

It is evident that the poet has in mind the divine energy, which, when it seizes the individual, fills him with what is universal, both in power and vision. Or we may call it a demoniac possession, which makes the man more than himself—clearer, mightier, even taller in stature. When this power is off, the individual is like the rest of us; thus it has happened to Diomed. In the Fifth Book he is held up and driven forward by a tremendous God-sent might; in the Sixth Book there is still the memory of it among the Trojans, but he has lost it. This is his change and none other.

b. We now come to the speech of Glaucus and the marvelous tale which it contains. It begins sad, he speaks mournfully of the generations of men, transitory as the leaves on the trees. Why such a mood? Glaucus has already a presentiment of his Trojan destiny, and he strikes the elegiac tone; indeed, his whole story

is one of tragedy, which unconsciously includes himself. His family is a famous one, his ancestor came from Greece and settled in Lycia; now he, the descendant, is fighting for Asia against his kindred and his nation. This is his fate to which his first words are a pensive overture; he has Orientalized and he will perish, just as Troy, which has done the same thing, must be destroyed.

But how did this retrogression to the East come about? Here the legend enters which tells of Bellerophon, the ancestor who made the change, and who was entangled in the fateful coils of the Orient. Bellerophon was a typical Greek Hero, of the highest family, of unstained character, of surpassing beauty and manly strength. Anteia, the king's wife—she was an Oriental woman, married in Greece—was madly enamored of him, tried to tempt him, but without success. Then she falsely accused him to her husband the king, and Bellerophon had to suffer for wrongs which he never did. Here the legend touches another famous Oriental story, that of Potiphar's wife. Bellerophon is sent by the king to Lycia in Asia Minor, the home of Anteia, where the father-in-law, who is ruler of that country, receives a communication, by signs scratched on a tablet, that the bearer, who is Bellerophon, should perish.

This passage has become famous, inasmuch as it introduces the question of Homeric writing, and the further question whether the poems of Homer were written in the beginning. It is plain that these signs were a means of communication between absent people. But what was the nature of these signs? Three main views have been held concerning them: first, that they were alphabetic; second, that they were a cipher, agreed upon, and known to those persons alone who communicated; thirdly, that they were a kind of picture-writing. Let the reader take his choice; any one of the three will do for the passage. To us the second view seems the most probable; it holds that these signs were a conventional cipher not intelligible to their bearer, Bellerophon, who could doubtless have read the alphabet or the pictures, or, at least, would not naturally have been entrusted with them.

In consequence of the false accusation, Bellerophon has to undergo the severest trials; hardships were put upon him, that he might perish, yet he, the Greek Hero, must stand the Oriental

test. In him the old poet shows how the best man, guiltless, must suffer, yet in his suffering triumph. It is this which proves that he is "the son of a God," though sprung of a mortal father, the elder Glaucus. His labors are three, all significant of Greek heroism. First he slays the Chimæra, a monster made up of a lion, goat, and dragon, breathing forth fire—a mixture of animal forms common to the mythology and art of the East. This Oriental horror it is just the function of Greece and the Greek Hero to suppress; they must put down the beast and become ethical, they must put down the ugly and become beautiful. In many ways Greek legend has celebrated this triumph of Hellas over Asia; the story of Troy is its completest expression. Nor is it carrying the thought too far if we consider the character of the three commingled animals, the lion, the goat, and the dragon—violence, salacity, the fire of the destroyer. At least, the bestial side of the world and of man as well as of art and of religion must be subordinated by the true Hellenic soul.

The next task of Bellerophon was to subdue the Solymi, who, according to Herodotus, were the primitive inhabitants on the border of Lycia; wild men we must consider them, whom the Greek Hero has to bring under the State and civilized order. Thirdly, he slew the Amazons, wild women, hostile to the Family, as they are represented in Greek legend. Thus it is seen that the Greek Hero is producing the institutional world; he has performed three typical deeds, he subjects the animal, he vindicates State and Family; moreover, in these actions he calls forth a new realm, that of beauty. Greek art springs into existence just at this point; Greek mythology gives its own origin mythically: and the greatest poem of Hellas sings itself into being. In his final deed, Bellerophon touches the summit; those of his own race—the Lycians here—who would kill him stealthily, and destroy his cause, he slays to the last man. He is now the triumphant Greek Hero, having put down the foe within and without, even in the Orient, and is recognized as "the son of a God."

But this is just where fatality enters; adversity cannot conquer the Greek Hero, but prosperity can. Bellerophon takes land and authority in Lycia, takes a wife and has children; he marries the king's daughter, a sister of that ill-famed Anteia, who was the beginning of all his woes. He enters the Family which has been

his curse and the State which has tried to destroy him; out of Hellas he sinks into the embraces of the Orient. Like Themistocles, like Alexander, he Orientalized even in victory; truly a typical Greek Hero, though thrown far back into Greek legend. How well does the old bard know his own race and its besetting temptation, especially the temptation of its great men! Writing of a remote mythical past, he casts his light forward into the historic future, and prophetically reveals the destiny of his mightiest countrymen.

Fate now overtakes the Greek Hero just in those institutional relations which he had once so valiantly maintained in their Hellenic spirit. The wild men, the Solymi, again make war; his son perishes in conflict with them. His daughter is slain by Artemis for violation of the precepts of the chaste Goddess. Where now is the triumph of the Greek Family and State? Bellerophon himself goes crazy; has he not already surrendered the rational principle of his life? He roams the Aleian plain, "hateful to all the Gods, consuming his mind, shunning the paths of men." Again we have to think he is the tragic image of the Greek Hero, who has renounced his Hellenic heritage and joined the Orient.

But this Glaucus who is talking—what shall we say to him, the grandson of the great Bellerophon? He, too, has lapsed, he is fighting against the Greek cause, and for the detention of Helen. He has just told his own story in that of his grandfather; he is also fated to go the same way, and he has a strong presentiment of his destiny. Hence the melancholy tinge which colors his whole speech; it is as if he were making his own funeral oration. So the poet himself felt, we must think; a little later Glaucus perishes. Tradition makes Homer a native of the islands of the *Ægean*, or even an Asiatic Greek; certainly he must have lived somewhere on the borderland, for he feels the struggle on both sides to its very heart-throb. With what sympathy, yet with what truth, he portrays the conflict! In fact, his feelings seem rather to lean toward the Trojan side, though his head is always with the Greeks. The story of Bellerophon is a picture in miniature of the whole Trojan War, and his fate foreshadows its outcome: the Trojans, too, are Greeks who have cast away the Greek heritage, and must perish. Many such little pictures, framed in some re-

mote legend, we find in the "Iliad"; they are in the poet's mythical manner, and they bind the poem together in a new unity. In spite of critical scruples, we can think of only one man writing the great Trojan story and the little Lycian story, so closely is the meaning of both knit together.

c. Diomed listens to the tragic tale; he will not fight, but "plants his spear in the earth, and addresses the shepherd of the people with gentle words." He knows that the ancestors of himself and Glaucus were guests, and exchanged hospitable presents, one of which has descended to him, and with it the friendly relation. They, too, pledge faith not to slay one another, and exchange gifts as their ancestors had done, though the poet says that the gift of Glaucus was by far the more valuable. Does not this hint that Diomed, in his present condition, has got the best of the bargain by a cessation of the combat? At least, Diomed, the former fierce warrior, is reconciled with a man warring for Troy; he has allowed personal ties to turn aside his zeal from the universal cause. If such considerations were to prevail, there would be no restoration of Helen, in fact, no Greek world. Pallas appears to him no longer, the divine has gone out of his soul; in the future, though he will again show bravery in battle, he will soon be wounded and withdraw from the struggle.

4. The individual Greek Hero is now reconciled with an individual Trojan warrior; we are next to see how the attempt of Troy to reconcile the divine element of the Greek side will succeed. When Hector enters the city from the place of war, the women gather around him, asking after husbands, sons, brothers, friends. We witness the domestic forces of conciliation, which would put an end to the bloody struggle. But of these women three are selected typical women, with whom Hector is brought into relation during his visit. The war primarily sprang from the wrong done to the domestic principle by Troy; now we see the Trojan Family whirled into the tragic circle of the guilty act of Paris.

Three families are brought before us in these three women, representing three phases of the domestic institution in Troy. The first is that of Hecuba, the queen, or at least the wife of the king of the city, out of whose fifty sons she is the mother of nineteen. A glimpse of the Oriental harem is seen; the one wife of the

household is degraded into being one of many wives. Second, is the family of Helen, estranged, in self-opposition, a family based upon the ruins of the Family. The third family is that represented by Andromache, wife of Hector, the true family, yet tragic to the last degree through its political environment.

a. Hector first sees his mother at the palace of Priam; this palace, with its fifty chambers for the king's children, is also significant. The son bids her take the fairest robe, "the one which is dearest to her," and make an offering of it to Pallas, that "she may keep off Diomed from the sacred city." This robe is laid on the lap of the Goddess by Theano, the priestess and the wife of Antenor, who is a leader of the Greek party in Troy together with Hector. Thus Pallas is besought by those nearest to her in the hostile walls to have mercy on "city, wives, and children of the Trojans."

But the Goddess refuses; why? She could do naught else without destroying herself. What is Troy doing? Has it had pity? Did it restore the stolen Helen to husband and child, when peacefully demanded back before the war? Is it not engaged in battle at this moment to keep the Family asunder? The prayer is a contradiction; if it be answered and Troy be successful, the home is indeed disrupted. No wonder that Pallas "shook her head." Behold now the reason.

b. This is Helen to whom Hector next comes in his visit, for the purpose of bringing Paris back to the war. She is the woman whose presence in Troy is a violation of all the Trojan prayers to save Family and State. Hector is brought face to face with that which nullifies his mission, which gives the lie to his hope of aid from the Goddess. Troy will not undo the wrong, and a prayer for Troy is a prayer for the disruption of the home. Hector knows the guilt of his city, and feels it deeply; in fighting for his own Andromache he is compelled to fight against the restoration of the wife.

Here is the man, Paris, who has thrown him into such a contradiction. No wonder Hector wishes that "the earth might gape open" for that baneful brother, the cause of the war, "whom Zeus reared to be the destruction of Troy, Priam, and Priam's sons." Paris embodies the tragic guilt of the whole city. Since the conflict with Menelaus he has shunned the war, he seems to be

sulking in a kind of shame. It is clear that Paris is an important man in Troy, a political rather than a military leader; his party evidently controls the city; his presence is necessary, though he be not a very good fighter; at least, he is an uncertain combatant, sometimes brave, and sometimes not. When he arrives with Hector (see beginning of the next Book) he revives the drooping spirits of the army, but his warlike exploits are confined to one small feat of arms. There is no necessary inconsistency between his character here given and that given in the Third Book, as some critics would make out. We find a difference, it is true, but this difference comes only through an added trait; we see the man in a new situation, and for a new situation or turn of character, we need not conjecture a new Homer, nay, not even for an inconsistency.

Helen is repentant, tearful, full of self-reproach, quite as we saw her in the Third Book. The presence of Hector, the ethical Hero, doubtless calls forth this strong confession of her internal state. But Hector himself is not without his struggle of soul; he is by no means at peace with his own conduct, as we see by his forebodings. At present he gives to Helen neither praise nor censure; unhappy is her lot, and he is fighting to keep her thus. Still she, the beautiful woman in tears, does not lose the desire to please; she is still conscious of her beauty, and its power, nay, is aware of her fame present and future. She tries her magic spell upon Hector, but his answer is: "Do not ask me to sit, though loving me; thou shalt not persuade me." His mind is on his country, he will hasten to the battle-field "that I may defend the Trojans"; but just now he is thinking of wife and child, whom he hurries forth to see. Thus Hector is not detained by the blandishments and beauty of Helen from duty to Family and to State; he is master over sensuous charms, still he, too, has his limit and his conflict.

c. The third woman whom Hector meets is Andromache, his wife, who has gone forth from her home to the city walls, weeping, because she has heard that the Trojans were hard pressed by the Greeks in battle. Husband and wife are seeking and thinking of one another; we behold the true relation of the Family, in contrast to that of Helen and Paris, even to that of Hecuba and Priam; moreover, the child is now present, while

the marriage of Paris is fruitless, and that of Priam is quite too fruitful.

Her speech tells the whole domestic tragedy of the Trojan war; father, brothers, even mother have perished in this fateful struggle between East and West. Hector is now all these and husband too. She tries to keep him from exposing himself to danger in the war. But he must go though he feels most profoundly her appeal. She is the tragic woman, whose institution is immolated in war that it may be preserved in the end. The relief from their sorrow is furnished by the child; he is still their hope, and brings them in their tears to a smile, and to happier thoughts. Hector can pray to the Gods that the Trojans may say of his son: "This man is much better than his father," the noblest of heathen prayers, and sounding like an ancient stray note of the Paternoster, if we elevate it into its highest significance out of its bloody setting.

But the gloomy foreboding of Hector is the true voice of his situation and comes from his heart:

Yet well in my undoubting mind I know
The day shall come in which our sacred Troy,
And Priam, and the people over whom
Spear-bearing Priam rules, shall perish all.

He feels that the Gods, Pallas and even Zeus cannot support Troy without stultifying themselves. How can they protect the families of that Troy which wages a fierce war to disrupt the Family? Repentant Helen is seeking to be what Andromache is, and Hector is standing in the way, contrary to his own conviction; well may he utter the bodeful prophecy which contains the doom of himself and his city.

Hector, therefore, is a tragic character in the loftiest sense of the word; the outer war has its spiritual image in the inner war of his own soul, and it is this inner war which is slaying him. He feels that the Greeks are right in demanding the restoration of Helen; they are really fighting for his tenderest relation—husband, wife, and child; truly the Greeks are fighting for Hector, Andromache, and Astyanax in principle. On the other hand, Hector goes to war to save his country, a high and noble action; but this very action turns to wrong through the overshadowing wrong of the country. All this the hero feels; he knows his city

must perish, and he must be included. The ethical order of the world is paramount; Troy and all who maintain its violation must sink under the judgment of Zeus. Hector is so profoundly tragic because he, true to family and country in the highest degree, is driven to violate something still truer and higher—the supreme movement of the race above family and country, yet including them. He knows it, he fights his own true self, his victory would be his own ethical death. Harmony with Zeus alone is not tragic.

What then, can Hector do? Change sides, and make war with the Greeks against his people? Thus he would assail his own individual family and nation; he would have to turn against father, wife, kindred, and countrymen. He is held fast in the vise of fate—if he fights for the Greeks, he fights against parent and people; if he fights for Troy, he fights against the restoration of the wife. He is caught in the mill of the Gods; nor can he withdraw and be neutral in the war which is to settle this great question of Family; that were indeed his spiritual death. Manifestly there is but one way to avoid being tragic, that is, to take sides with Zeus. But then Hector would not be Hector; losing his tragic limit he would lose the character which rouses such a deep human interest, for we all have a possible tragic limit located somewhere in ourselves.

The wife, and with her the Trojan women, are caught in the conflict between the State and Family; their city will not do justice in the case of the great domestic violation, and so destroys the domestic institution. But the husband is caught in the conflict between his nation and the ethical order of the world; the State will not do the universal right, and so falls under the doom of Zeus. The good men and women of Troy are tragic, they are ground to death in the conflict which Paris and the party of violation have called into existence.

Still, there is one person in the city not destined to perish, but to be restored—that person is Helen. She is repentant, struggling to get rid of her thralldom, inner and outer, as yet without success; still she is striving. Whatever stands in the way of the estranged soul's returning to its true life, must go down; such is the final decree. Troy stands in the way, Hector stands in the way; the poet with all his sympathy registers the judgment against both.

But in the Greek camp there is also a wrong which cannot be allowed to live. It is the wrong done by the Leader to Achilles. Troy cannot be taken till that violation be gotten rid of. Zeus is now disciplining the Greeks, his own people, to that end. But in Troy there is a greater wrong which they are called to put down; still they must set their own house in order before they can march to victory. This house-cleaning process is what Zeus has in hand just now; his method is to purify the Greeks through defeat. We see that the Greek divine principle will not be reconciled with Troy; war must be renewed by the weary human combatants; wherewith we have reached the next Book. The Gods must come forward again; in the Sixth Book there was not one divine interference; though much besought, they did not appear, they are not to be conciliated.

SHAKESPEARE'S "SONNETS."

BY GERTRUDE GARRIGUES.

"Lo, I come to do thy will, O God!" There are not many of us who, if told in a way we could not question, that God had provided us a work to do for him would hesitate, for a moment, to undertake it. We would never think whether it was high or low, small or great. The direct command of God, the knowledge that it emanated from him, that it was intended for us and us alone, would sanctify and glorify it to us and to all beholders how mean soever it might otherwise appear. And yet, how we despise our daily tasks!

The here and now is our world, "the task that lies nearest our hand," is the work that God has chosen for us, and it is only by doing it, and doing it well, devoting to it all the resources of our being, that we can hope to be great or good or blest—to enjoy satisfaction ourselves or participate in the satisfaction of others. There is, there must be some one thing, at least, which each of us can do well; but, unhappily, it is seldom the thing we desire to do, and the conflict, the result of which we like to call the "choice"

of a vocation, but which is really the gradual recognition and final acceptance, by each individual, of his own limitations, grows out of this fact.

The thing we desire to do is our ideal, and we adorn it with every grace and credit it with every possibility. The thing we must do we hate and decry. It is the dark and ugly real from which we are constantly endeavoring to escape until, in some luminous hour of life, we discover that we have been fighting a shadow, that the antitheses have been reconciled, that it is only through the real that the ideal can become actual.

The solution of this problem is a necessary phase in the life of every being who rises above the plane of sense-certitude, and the manner of its solution will index what his future development is to be. So long as he elects to regard what keeps him from the realization of his ideal as a necessity or fate outside of himself, so long his soul will be filled with discord, disharmony, and unrest; but once he gains a glimpse of the truth, once he recognizes that his limitations lie within himself, he is on the road to peace. He may sink for a moment beneath his sense of nothingness, but it will be only for a moment. All true humility is an invitation to Grace. And Grace, the universal Good, flowing into the soul, raises it above all petty, sordid thoughts of self, at the same time that it unites it with the common brotherhood of humanity. It takes man out of his small personal self that it may ingratiate him into that larger self through which alone the ideal is attainable.

We know almost nothing of the private life of Shakespeare. No author was ever more impersonal. Dante and Goethe have left a mass of prose writing, by means of which we are able to interpret their poetic symbolism; but Shakespeare, who lived between the two and nearer Goethe, has left scarcely more by which we can judge the man himself than did old Homer. The dedications to his two poems and the "Sonnets" are all.

There are many opinions in regard to the "Sonnets," but their critics, nevertheless, naturally divide themselves into two classes—those who believe them to be autobiographical and those who believe them to be dramatic, vicarious. With the ordinary sense in which they are considered to be autobiographical we have nothing to do. Indeed, we consider it inadmissible, and a gratuitous

insult to the memory of a man the whole course of whose life, so far as we know it, was bound up in duty and high thoughts.

The glory of Shakespeare, the crowning quality which distinguishes his genius, which separates him immeasurably from his contemporaries, is the estimate which he placed upon woman. No glance, before or since, has ever sunk so deep into the soul of womanhood. He was the first, we had almost said the last, to discern that it is through her will that woman is strong. Others place what strength they allow her in her affections. In her affections, on the side of sensibility, she is weak, weak and unstable as water. On the intellectual side she may or may not be strong, but will is her province. This is true, even as regards the immediate phase of will. No one will deny her caprice, or the power of satisfying that caprice; but it is in the mediated stages, in the reflected forms of will, on her moral side, that woman is great.

Shakespeare saw this and said it, again and again, through all his noble gallery of woman characters. All poetry must be experience first. To portray them as he did, Shakespeare must have known good women. "Do men gather grapes of thorns, or figs of thistles?" That matchless hand that could paint an Imogen, a Portia—either Italian or Roman—or even a simple Hero:

"Is my lord ill that he doth speak so wide?"

that man a slave of the senses? Perish the thought!

We believe the "Sonnets" to have been autobiographical, however, though in a different sense. They were written, as were Michael Angelo's, to give expression to the feelings for which these solitary beings—solitary in their greatness—could find no confidant. We believe we can trace in these the soul life of our great poet—the early enthusiastic desire for a contemplative life; the strong impelling force, which lay within himself, and drove him into activity; the vain struggle and suffering; the renunciation and reconciliation:

"O, benefit of ill! now I find true,
That better is by evil still made better;
And ruined love when it is built anew,
Grows fairer than at first, more strong, far greater,

So I return rebuked to my content,
And gain by ill thrice more than I have spent."¹

The Renaissance reached England late. In Italy it had attained its zenith and was already beginning to decline, when its first influence began to be felt in the northern country. As an art period its best results in Italy were plastic, its full literary fruition was only reached in England. Various causes led to this result. Plastic art is largely the handmaid of religion, literature chronicles the whole life of humanity. Art disappeared before the middle ages to reappear centuries afterward under vastly different circumstances. It disappeared as the attendant of a religion in which the universal and individual—nature and spirit—combined, without losing their respective rights, and had for its principle the perfect identification of idea and form—of spiritual individuality—with material form. It reappeared in the service of a doctrine which was supposed to hold that the soul or spirit, although it appears in the external, should at the same time show itself to be returned back, out of this material state, into itself.

In plastic art Italy assimilated the classic models and gave them a new character—a new form indeed, painting instead of sculpture. The literary revival in Italy was pedantic, and foreign to the new spirit. It was a copy, more or less, of the Classic models, and so lacked genuine interest. The form though was good, and when it reached England, as it did in company with the antique models, translated into English and liberally diffused by the printing-press, it found its best issue in the influence it exerted there.

England had only just passed through her epic period, the War of the Roses had been successfully terminated, and the Tudors firmly established upon the throne, when the Reformation reached her. It first communicated itself to the throne, and from that descended to the people. It was accomplished, therefore, without any considerable violence or disorder.

In 1564 the long peace, which characterized the early part of the reign of Elizabeth and which was only terminated by the splendid episode of the Armada, had begun. It was an age of great mental excitement. The translation and general dissemination of the Bible and the freedom with which religion was discussed

¹ CXIX "Sonnet," 9-14

gave a new impetus to thought. The secularization of the monasteries typified the secularization of the intellect of the period. The Church was not denied, it was simply disregarded. The invention of gunpowder, of the printing-press, and of the mariner's compass—which made the navigation of the ocean, the discovery and exploration of distant continents, as well as the closer intercourse of adjacent peoples practicable—all tended to foster that spirit of independent personality which is the leading characteristic of the north. The minds of men were fully and fairly awake; they saw and felt much, and believed in all they felt and saw. The possibilities of the individual was the one absorbing theme. And it was into this magnificently affirmative age that the great secular poet of all time, that "unutterable Shakespeare," was born.

Shakespeare was an Englishman to the core. English in his feeling of nationality, in his love of home, in his belief in the sanctity of the family, the integrity of the state, the limit of individual freedom—to the point that it does not conflict with society. English in his appreciation of the northern virtue, chastity, and in his recognition of woman. Given all these properties in their highest degree, and we have the character which appears to us under the name of the man Shakespeare. All of his contemporaries, who have spoken of him at all, bear witness to his moral worth, his generosity and warmth of heart, his manly and graceful demeanor, his "respectability" among a class that were at that time notably lax and disreputable—authors and actors.

He was known as the "gentle Shakespeare," which meant, not merely that he was mild-mannered, but, in Dante's sense, that he was possessed of all true and noble dignity. Although necessarily an associate of the wildest and most profligate spirits of his time, he was not a victim to their perverted morals. Their "wit-combats" and social pyrotechnics amused, and possibly instructed him, and for these he frequented their assemblies, though he was a stranger to their dissipations. He was in their world but not of it, and the effort made by some critics to prove the contrary is useless. We have had enough of the statement that it is necessary for a man to experience all vileness before he is able to picture all good. Man may be great in spite of evil, never because of it.

The taste for dramatic representation belongs to man by right of his imitative faculty. The drama is a symbol to him. He en-

joys seeing in it the reflection of his own thoughts and acts without being obliged to suffer from their consequences. He is content, in the drama, to learn through the experience of others. In England during the Elizabethan age the stage was a passion. The first importations of the Classic drama, or rather its feeble imitations, were soon outgrown. The Classic ideal, with its system of gods, all liable, like its purely human characters, to a fate outside of themselves, could find but little sympathy among a people where the apotheosis of the individual was the leading thought. In the Classic drama, too, the form is all in all, and only that content which is capable of a certain treatment can be seized upon and produced; in Romantic art, on the contrary, all things have their place. The essential element for representation is the subjective internality of the soul, and this internality is able to present itself under all conditions and to adapt itself to every circumstance.

When Shakespeare came to London, about 1586, he found his audience and the subject-matter of his plays awaiting him. The old chronicler Aubrey, says of him: "This William, being inclined naturally to poetry and acting, came to London, and was an actor at one of the play-houses, and did act exceeding well." And this is probably the whole truth, despite the many apocryphal stories told to explain his advent there.

The path to the stage was not a difficult one for Shakespeare. James and Richard Burbage, the latter the principal actor of his time and the original impersonator of many of Shakespeare's greatest tragic rôles, were from the same county as he; and Thomas Greene, another member of the company and its leading comedian, was from the same town. James Burbage, the father of Richard, was at the head of the company at the "Blackfriars," the theatre at which Shakespeare first engaged, and in which he soon, if not at once, became a stockholder. The term dramatist at that time included both author (dramatic) and actor, and that Shakespeare was both, almost from the first, is likely.

Shakespeare's youth was spent in one of the most picturesque parts of picturesque England, in a locality beside of intense historical interest—Warwick Castle was in his own county, and Bosworth Field only thirty miles away. His home was sufficiently far from the turmoil of great cities to make it possible for its in-

habitants to live the life of English yeomen. In this atmosphere of natural beauty, of historical association, and simple rustic manners, Shakespeare's character was shaped and moulded during this, his sense-period, to the noble proportions that made his future possible.

The drama was to that time what the newspaper is to ours. As the newspaper carries to remotest villages an echo of what is happening in the great centres of thought and deed, so the strolling-players carried to Stratford the first glimpse of that intellectual life which lured our poet to London. Once there, we can imagine how eagerly and swiftly he absorbed the material at his hand. It is necessary to remember always that Shakespeare was, first of all, a poet; a great intellectual, musical being, who, because he wrote in a time when deeds were to be noted, was obliged to use that form of poetry which best delineates action—the dramatic; but his genius was none the less lyric.

It is tolerably well proved that the *Taming of the Shrew*, *Titus Andronicus*, the first part of *King Henry the Sixth*, *The Comedy of Errors*, *The Two Gentlemen of Verona*, and *Love's Labor Lost*, were all written by 1592. To have made such an immense stride in so short a time, considering that he was also an actor, Shakespeare must have been absorbingly occupied. Yet no one, who knows his works, can doubt that he was also a voluminous reader. The first part of Spenser's *Faerie Queen* was published in 1590. Can we doubt that Shakespeare was one of its earliest admirers, or that his soul was fired to emulation?

That plays at that time were not considered literature is well known, and the utter disregard which Shakespeare showed to his dramatic works, and which, among critics, has been a subject of general surprise, is easily explained upon this ground. It also explains how he, having discovered his ability to write, and feeling within himself the boundless invention, the unrivalled power of expression which are his characteristics, should pant for the opportunity to give them, what seemed to him, the only adequate form. Besides, to a man of his character, his native and acquired refinement, his pure morality, the companionship and the position in society that the stage forced upon him was in the highest degree repugnant; while the social position, acquired at a price, which to us, looking at it from a distance, seems so inordinate,

that Spenser reached, through his success as poet, may have seemed to him, at that time, an object of worthiest ambition.¹

The "Sonnets" were first published in 1609, but we know that some of them were in private circulation as early as 1598² and a few found their way into a piratical work, "The Passionate Pilgrim" in 1599. They bear internal evidence of having been written at widely different times and under vastly different circumstances. When they were published they appeared with a dedication, unique in its kind: "To the onlie begetter of these insuing Sonnets, *Mr. W. H.*, all happinesse and that eternitie promised by our ever-living poet, wisheth the well-wishing adventurer in setting forth. *T. T.*" (Thomas Thorpe).

This dedication has been the despair of critics. It is not worth while even to mention the various theories regarding it. They all turn upon the definition of "begetter." Herr Barnstorff³ has had an immense amount of ridicule wasted upon him for venturing to suggest that "Mr. W. H." might mean "Mr. William Himself"; but, if we are to take begetter as meaning *producer*, there is no further question. Though there are few of the dramas over which the battle as to their genuineness has not been fought, and though there are those who would rob Shakespeare of all property whatever in the plays, no shadow of doubt has ever been cast upon the authorship of the "Sonnets." The dedication is by the bookseller, undoubtedly, but it would have been quite in Shakespeare's punning vein to have mystified that worthy by the enigmatical "Mr. W. H.," especially if the "Sonnets" conveyed, as we think, a more or less personal narrative.

If begetter is defined *procurer*, it will be seen that there is no end to which conjecture may not reach, and it is entirely immaterial to us now who procured them. We have them, and they are Shakespeare's.

Whatever may be said about the arrangement of the second series (CXXVII-CLIV), the first shows unmistakable evidence of design. They are consecutive in thought, if not in time, and represent a

¹ For his repugnance to the stage and his feeling of social degradation from being connected with it, see "Sonnets" CX and CXI.

² Francis Meres, in his "Palladis Tamia," speaks of Shakespeare's "sugard sonnets among his private friends."

³ "Schlüssel zu Shakspeare's Sonetten." Bremen, 1860.

totality; are, in short, in themselves a work of art. The second series are, no doubt, a collection—not a sequence—many of them written at the same time and under the same circumstances, if not exactly in the same spirit, as those of the first series, but rejected from it in the final arrangement. Some were, no doubt, occasional poems, introduced here by the poet because this was a complete edition of his sonnets—for we do not entertain the absurdity that the author, who was still a resident of London and actively interested in all literary affairs, was ignorant of their publication.

The first series (I-CXXVII) then is the real subject of our study, and we shall merely use the sonnets of the second part as aids to an interpretation.

In 1592 England was sorely visited by the plague. The theatres were closed, and all performances interdicted. Shakespeare was now, probably, for the first time since his removal to London, at leisure. In the following year the "Venus and Adonis" appeared, and its author in his dedication of it to his patron, the Earl of Southampton, calls it the "*first heir of his invention*"—which can mean nothing else but *his first literary work*. We have already seen that he did not consider his dramas such.

That the first seventeen sonnets contain a seemingly parallel motive to the one in this poem has been observed by many critics, and they have drawn from it the conclusion that they were written about the same time and were an offshoot from the poem. We venture the theory that they were written immediately before, and suggested the poem. Daniel's "*Sonnets to Delia*," traces of which we discover in Shakespeare's (that incomparable borrower's) earlier sonnets, was published early in 1592. They probably suggested the form for the poetical work which we are supposing Shakespeare, at his first moment of leisure, hastening to attempt.

The sonnet was an exotic in England, and, though some of her poets have breathed rich and glowing thoughts into its narrow compass, their passion is too often only a "painted fire." Shakespeare knew this right well, and in his contempt for "mistress-sonnetting" chose a male object for his muse. He thus threw a stumbling-block of huge proportion in the pathway of interpretation. The discussion as to what manner of *man* was the object of Shakespeare's passion has been conducted *ad nauseam*. We

hope to prove that the divinity that Shakespeare worshipped, the "master-mistress" of his passion was none other than his ideal of art—with him, poetry ; and that the first seventeen sonnets are an invocation to that ideal to give itself form, to make of itself an actuality—in other words, to write, through him, a poem that should live. The same thought is repeated through all their exquisite, musical forms, and might express itself in the words of Carlyle : " Produce ! Produce ! Were it but the pitifullest, infinitesimal fraction of a Product, produce it in God's name."

Take the first sonnet : " From fairest creatures "—highest ideals—" we desire increase"—a product, some expression of themselves. " That thereby beauty's rose"—truth—" might never die." " But as the ripener should by time decrease, his tender heir might bear his memory"—old truths become obsolete and require new statement. " But thou"—Shakespeare's poetic ideal—" contracted to thine own bright eyes"—lost in reverie, self-contemplation—" feeds't thy light's flame with self-substantial fuel"—is only of service to itself. And, on to the last two lines, which contain the invocation :

" Pity the world, or else this glutton be
To eat the world's due, by the grave and thee."

With the eighteenth sonnet, this motive is dropped, and is not again recurred to, and it is at this point that we suppose Shakespeare to have relinquished any intention he may have cherished to use the sonnet as a vehicle to fame. His sonnets, after this, are self-communings, and form a diary of that portion of his life during which they were written.

In his dramas, Shakespeare has given us his convictions upon all the great ethical questions. He has represented human life in its totality, not to justify or to condemn, but, like Nature herself, he offers to all men the contemplation of a universal destiny whose standpoint is necessity—the necessity which imposes upon the individual the result of his own deed, and which is therefore the highest freedom. But this view of life is not an inspiration, it must be learned, lived, and understood, before it can be taught.

All his greatest dramas represent the collisions of individuals with institutions, and their consequent discomforture. But where and how did the poor player gain this insight ? How did he

learn that the individual in himself is powerless? That it is only through the universal, in combination with his fellows, that he can find validity? By experience? He lived it, and the "Sonnets" chronicle the process. They portray his collision with himself. In the dramas he is not known, but in the sonnets it is himself alone that is known.

In the eighteenth sonnet, as we have said, the content is changed. There is a ring of exultation here. Something has been produced :

"So long as men can breathe and eyes can see,
So long lives this and this gives life to thee."

He has written the "Venus and Adonis," we will suppose, and carried it to London. The next seven sonnets are full of satisfied desire and growing confidence, which culminate in the twenty-fifth :

"Let those who are in favor with their stars,
Of public honor and proud titles boast,
Whilst I, whom fortune of such triumph bars,
Unlooked for joy in that I honor most.
Great princes' favorites their fair leaves spread,
But as the marigold at the sun's eye ;
And in themselves their pride lies buried,
For at a frown they in their glory die.
The painful warrior, famoused for fight,
After a thousand victories once foiled,
Is from the book of honor razèd quite,
And all the rest forgot for which he toiled.
Then happy I, that love and am beloved,
Where I may not remove or be removed."

The twenty-sixth has frequently been called a poetic version of the dedication to "Lucrece," and was probably addressed to his Muse as the prose one was to his friend and patron, Southampton. After this the whole tone alters. The happy confidence is gone, and from the twenty-seventh to the ninety-seventh there is a gradual culmination of bitterness, when again the tone changes, and the last thirty sonnets glow with reconciliation.

These three divisions, which bear some correspondence to the three periods to which critics assign his plays, could not be more distinctly marked. The second and third divisions are spoken of

by critics generally as the "first and second absence." We accept the name although we refuse the deduction of a material absence from a material object, and interpret instead that press of practical business forced Shakespeare to absent himself from his favorite pursuit—the production of semi-classic poems.

In December of 1593, the theatres in London were reopened after the plague. The "Venus and Adonis" had been published almost a year before (April, 1593), and "Lucrece" appeared a few months after (May, 1594). Both of these poems, especially the former, were immensely popular from the start, and, during the poet's life, were considered superior to his plays. The theatre was his means of livelihood, however, and his plain duty, the proper support of his family, Shakespeare never shirked.

At the reopening of the "Blackfriars," he found himself again engaged. Shortly after he became also a sharer in the "Globe," and thus called upon to do double duty. Robert Greene, the dramatist, in his "Groat's Worth of Wit," published 1592, calls Shakespeare, even then, a "Johannes Factotum," and we may easily believe that his ready tact, his fertile invention, his quick discernment, and unerring judgment, would make him the helpful man of every company and every occasion.

This strong practical bias, united to a theoretical comprehension almost unrivalled, marks him the inimitable man as well as poet. A man of thought, he was born for action, and these two sides warred within him until he discovered the deep identity underlying their difference. Before he came to London, he had lived a simple, sensuous life; the vigor, the warmth and glow of the intellectual excitement which he found there dazzled and overcame him, and, for a time, he lived in the intellect alone. But intellect, unless reënforced by the will, intellect without morality—the only form in which will can act without contradicting itself—is a snare. Intellect, of itself, is cold, solitary, individual, self-contemplative; it must come out of its isolation, combine with its like, become active, if it would become valid.

Had Shakespeare been suffered to follow his own bent, he would have gone entirely out of the line of tendency. Spenser, great poet as he was, did not express the spirit of the time. He was an offshoot of the Italian Classic Revival, and his debt to Tasso and Ariosto is almost immeasurable. He has never been dear to the

common heart, for in him the interest of real life is entirely lacking.

Shakespeare was born to be the poetic revelation of the English people. In that direction all things favored him; in any other direction everything was against him. He could not understand this then, probably never did. He felt the obstacles that fate seemed to throw in the way of his "better angel," the "man, right fair"; and struggled manfully to free himself from the "woman, colored ill"—the real, the world and its distractions, his profession, to which he was devoted despite his abuse of it. For the theoretical and practical were equally potent in Shakespeare, and he must needs have loved them both.

At first, he only complains of absence from his ideal—want of leisure for writing poems. His soul's "imaginary sight" presents its shadow to his "sightless view," but the heavy journey of the day's toil renders him unfit for communion with it:

"But day doth daily draw my sorrows longer,
And night doth nightly make grief's strength seem stronger."

Life does not fulfil its promise. He is growing famous in a profession that he does not honor, and his success is attracting the envy and malice of others. He meets with disappointment and disillusion on every hand. The time he wishes to spend in giving form to his ideal is wasted, as he thinks, in the battle for existence; but his love clings to his art, and when he thinks of it "all losses are restored and sorrows end."

Now he reproaches it that it merely gave him a taste of fame; for he confesses that he suffers from the "uncertain, sickly appetite to please," only to cheat him with a barren hope:

"Why did'st thou promise such a glorious day,
And make me travel forth without my cloak,
To let base clouds o'ertake me in my way,
Hiding thy bravery in their rotten smoke!"

Now weighed down with contempt for his paltry life, he calls upon his "angel" to leave him: "Let me confess that we two must be twain"; now glorying so infinitely in its "worth and truth":

"That I in thy abundance am sufficed,
And by a part of all thy glory live."

Now reproaching, now forgiving the ideal for its "sensual sin"—its union with the real in his work; for to Shakespeare it seemed a degradation of his art to use it in producing plays:

"But yet be blamed if thou thyself deceivest
By wilful taste of what thyself refusest."

The sonnets of the second series addressed to the "woman, colored ill" undoubtedly belong to this period and are the most intense and passionate of the whole collection. He feels himself being drawn into the maelstrom of active life at the same time that he is being drawn away from his inner world of beauty, and he agonizes at the thought—the more so that, though overwhelmed with remorse, he is powerless against the charms of the real. The one hundredth and forty-fourth sonnet—usually called the "key sonnet"—expresses more clearly than any other the true nature of his interior conflict:

"Two loves I have of comfort and despair,
Which like two spirits do suggest me still;
The better angel is a man right fair,
The worser spirit a woman, colored ill,
To win me soon to hell, my female evil
Tempteth my better angel from my side,
And would corrupt my saint to be a devil,
Wooing his purity with her foul pride,
And whether that my angel be turned fiend,
Suspect I may, yet not directly tell;
But being both from me both to each friend,
I guess one angel in another's hell;
Yet this shall I ne'er know, but live in doubt,
Till my bad angel fire my good one out."

The theme changes. His love for his art and his sorrow at separation fill his verse: "I must attend time's leisure with my moan." Now he is uncertain whether it is the form or content of poetry, "The clear eye's moiety or the dear heart's part," that he loves better. Now he is fearful that "truth may prove thievish for a prize so dear." Now he pictures himself as journeying from his good: "The beast that bears me, tired with my woe, plods dully on." Now, as having leisure to return.

"Then should I spur, though mounted on the wind."

A softer mood succeeds. His old confidence revives and hope seems rekindled. The fifty-fifth sonnet resembles the eighteenth in tone and has even a stronger ring, and the fifty-sixth, "Sweet love, renew thy force," has all the effect of a new invocation. But a fresh sorrow confronts him. Hitherto it has been the poet who has been absent—who has found no leisure to devote to poetry; now it is the Muse who is away and will not come at call. Further on, the poet accuses himself of "idle-hours." Heretofore he has blamed occasion, circumstances were against him; now he begins to feel in himself an impediment. He acknowledges his self-love and self-seeking, but excuses himself on the ground of his lofty aim:

"'Tis thee (myself), that for myself I praise."

He is fearful that he shall lose his love for the ideal—"That Time will come and take my love away." He describes himself as old, as one whose "youthful morn has travelled on to age's steepy night," and we know this can be only a figure which describes the state of his mind and hopes, not the physical age of a man barely forty-five when these poems were published.

The sixty-sixth sonnet is an outcry against the "times"—always the butt of the self-discordant. All honesty is dead, and he would desire death, too, only that he should leave his love alone. The world is dead to the ideal, he thinks, and even he debases it:

"For I am shamed at that which I bring forth,
And so should you to love things nothing worth."

This is the grief that confronts him oftenest; he may not write poems to secure his own immortality, but he must write dramas destined for the multitude. Nor is it strange that he should feel thus, for does not Emerson say of him: "It must even go into the world's history that our best poet lived an obscure and profane life, using his genius for the public amusement!"

Now he is undecided whether his enjoyment is complete in the mere possession of his inner world of beauty—whether the spiritual life is, in itself, sufficient, or whether it is worthless unless it can be seen—unless its presence in a form shall give him fame:

"Now counting best to be with you alone,
Then bettered that the world may see my treasure."

And now he is angry that "every alien pen hath got my use."

This prepares us for the final catastrophe. He is not able himself to produce a poem that shall honor his thought, but another does so. The second part of Spenser's "*Faerie Queen*" appeared in 1596, and, though we do not wish to push an analogy too far, we must believe that none but he can be the "better spirit" that moved our poet to jealousy if not to envy. He is the only poet of the time of whom it is likely Shakespeare would write:

"My saucy bark, inferior far to his,
On your broad main doth wilfully appear,
Your shallowest help will hold me up afloat,
Whilst he upon your soundless deep doth ride."

And we have already seen that he had no ambition as a dramatist, even if the period—Marlowe being dead—had afforded any whose competition could have troubled him.

He rouses himself in one sonnet—

"Or I shall live your epitaph to make
Or you survive when I in earth am rotten,"

only to lapse, in the next, into the same jealous mood which culminates in:

"You to your beauteous blessings add a curse,
Being fond on praise, which makes your praises worse."

The two following sonnets (LXXXV and LXXXVI) acknowledge his inferiority to the "better spirit," and the third is saddest of all. It begins: "Farewell! thou art too dear for my possessing," and ends:

"Thus have I had thee, as a dream doth flatter,
In sleep a king, but, waking, no such matter."

He dwells upon his own unworthiness, and is ready to pardon the Muse because of it: "For thee against myself I'll vow debate." He is gradually more and more overcome with the belief that the ideal has deserted him, and ceases to write—even sonnets.

The second division is as sharply defined as the first, and its expression necessarily much more involved. It represents the purely negative side of life, needful to development but something to be worked out of as soon as possible. To remain in such a

condition is the saddest of all possible fates, though life exhibits to us many who are so unfortunate. But Shakespeare was too strong and sweet a soul to place himself long in opposition to that Higher Principle which alone has in itself entire validity. We have already seen how rational and just he grew to consider the world order, how his latest and greatest plays all discover such an insight into the reasonableness of the ethical laws that bind the social whole as could never have emanated from one who regarded them as alien constraints.

To take the affirmative position, to acknowledge our limitations, is to place ourselves within the stream of wisdom, power, and love, and be carried by it into peace and perfect living—freedom. In the second part, we have followed Shakespeare through every grade of unhappy thought. We have seen him struggle to make his own laws, to create his own conditions, to accomplish his own aims, to compass something other than the plain duty that his talents and the popular feeling pointed out for him. At one moment he has blasphemed fate, at another he has writhed under the conviction of its power. Now he has grovelled beneath it, now he has become heroic and defied it. But the heroism that can make its appearance here is by no means a heroism that can establish its own regulations, that can create or transform its own environment. It is a heroism of submission. If a man desires that his deed shall have actuality, that it shall become a power in the world, he must bring it into harmony with the universal and necessary.

Whenever the concluding sonnets of the second division were written, it is evident that from that time their author submitted to the inevitable. With the ninety-seventh sonnet we seem to enter a new atmosphere. The turbid, restless, uneasy style is exchanged for one clear and sunny. This is now, indeed, "our Shakespeare," calm, serene, cheerful, "wise with all wisdom of the intellect and heart" and will, for he has also found his moral side. Again he has been absent, but during this absence he has rid himself of the desire for fame. He is now content only to be "obsequious in thy heart," in a "mutual render, only me for thee." He has suffered:

"What potions have I drunk of Syren tears,
 Distilled from limbecs foul as hell within,
 Applying fears to hopes and hopes to fears
 Still losing where I saw myself to win ;"

but he has learned the true mission of suffering—growth. It has taught him patience, too—patience with himself as well as with others :

"I am that I am, and they that level
 At my abuses reckon up their own."

The ninety-second sonnet contains the germ of the happy certainty to which he has now attained : "But do thy best to steal thyself away, for term of life thou art assured mine." He saw the truth even then, as in a flash ; the ideal—the good, the beautiful, and the true—does not depend upon its expression in a form. A man may carry it with him and live by it unsuspected ; "I see a better state to me belongs than that which on thy humor doth depend." He can faithfully fulfill all the duties of life and so be enabled, without disturbance from without, to retire into the depths of his own soul, there to hold communion with all that in the outer world is denied him. By this means he will convert the ideal into the true real ; or, rather, he will see that they are interchangeable terms and really have no separate existence.

"Poor soul, the centre of my sinful earth,
 Fooled by these rebel powers that thee array,
 Why dost thou pine within, and suffer death,
 Painting thy outward walls so costly gay ?
 Why so large cost, having so short a lease,
 Dost thou upon thy fading mansion spend ?
 Shall worms, inheritors of this excess,
 Eat up thy charge ? Is this thy body's end ?
 Then, soul, live thou upon thy servant's loss
 And let that pine to aggravate thy store ;
 Buy terms divine in selling hours of dross ;
 Within be fed, without be rich no more ;
 So shalt thou feed on Death, that feeds on men,
 And, Death once dead, there's no more dying then."

A UNIVERSAL TELOS THE PRESUPPOSITION OF ALL INQUIRY.¹

BY WILLIAM BOULTING.

Any act of thought, however simple, expresses the confidence which reason reposes alike on its own activity and on the object of reason as the correlate of that activity. The exercise of thought implies the interdependence of phenomena and the unity of the phenomenal world. Without this sublime confidence in the efficiency of thought, this presupposition that the process and the object of thought are of the self-same nature, we could not think at all. All thought is an effort to explain, to make clear, to arrive at a sufficient reason in which the movement shall receive its satisfaction and justification.

The refutation of scepticism involves the recognition that everything has a ground or reason. The philosophic aim is ever to arrive at some truth or series of connected truths which shall embrace the universe and leave nothing outside of itself; and, while the philosopher may doubt, with Lotze, whether the human orbit has sufficient sweep to give so vast a parallax, he never loses the conviction that such truth *is*, even if it be but very partially obtainable by man.

This reliance of thought on itself means more than the assertion that A is A; it states more than that experience shows that similar results may be expected to follow similar conditions. It ever attempts to arrive at an explanation of the relations of phenomena which shall be self-evident and conclusive; which shall be such a sufficient reason as shall admit of no further questioning. This is ever the goal of thought; the presupposition which underlies its activity. It can never be proved, because it is the very ground of the processes of logic; because it is the self-begotten confidence on which the search for truth depends. In so much as the object of inquiry is so far completely recognized that the demands of thought are satisfied, that no further explanation is necessary, we deem that we possess a complete explana-

¹ A paper read before the London Philosophical Society, June, 1887.

tion—truth. But, if we are unable so completely to exhaust the inquiry as to arrive at this result, we do not, therefore, suppose, with the sceptics, that the explanation does not exist—that there is no truth. We never lose our confidence that there is truth, though as yet undiscovered by us.

Thought, then, presupposes its own efficiency and the reasonableness implied, if not wholly revealed, in its object. It does not presuppose the infallibility of its exercise, but it confidently rests on the postulate that when the data given in the world are sufficient and are properly taken, then the world will exhibit itself as reason—a reason which will explain even the errors and shortcomings of the search for truth. Without this underlying confidence the exercise of thought would be impossible. The very first act of thought as a relationing activity presupposes its supreme and indisputable authority in the domain of experience; the last act of thought could only take place when the self-evidence of the universe—the recognition of its nature as self-complete, as a fact of Perfect Reason, had been attained. Thought, then, presupposes its own efficiency and the reasonableness of its object.

Hence it is that the transcendentalist clings with unswerving faith to what Mr. Rigg has aptly called the “Rock of Self-Consciousness.” An analysis of mental states reveals the fact that the knower must be eternally present to the series of the known. Further analysis is unnecessary, because, once perceived, the explanation, in so far as it has been required, leaves nothing further to be explained. The philosophical inquiry issues in a result sufficient and self-evident—just the kind of result the true nature of which Descartes imperfectly grasped when he insisted that the trustworthiness of ideas depended on their being “*claires et distinctes*.” The question of *how* has been answered by the Transcendental student in so far as it has been asked. But the question of *why* has not even been put. It is a question which belongs to the wider series of problems relating to the unifying of the object of consciousness and what that object points to. When the unity of the one subject of experience is ascertained, what further unity must be ascribed to the phenomenal universe yet remains a problem unsolved.

The mere formal unity of self-consciousness does not give a final solution to the problem of philosophy. The rational consistency

and vital meaning of the universe remains unexplained. If we once refuse to acquiesce in the self-refutation that lies perdu in scepticism there is no other goal for thought than a direct and full perception of its own self-consistence. In other words, the requirements of reason and the obviousness of the fact that the limitations of reason are one with itself demand a unity of being wherein knowledge shall be a complete and all-embracing system of rational relations, and the broken and fragmentary experiences, the intolerable contradictions, the sin and sorrow, the fever and fret of the particular life, shall receive full justification. Whatever philosophical refinements may be introduced, whatever philosophical discoveries remain to be made, I take it that no sober thinker would ever dream of a time when the mere human might be enabled to view the whole as from the throne of Omniscience, and pronounce it "very good." The very incompleteness and impossibility of completeness of the merely human life demands and points to God as the Reason which, whatever else He may be, implies and fulfils the particular determinations of the one spirit in His human life.

And here there arises a difficulty. For the question naturally arises whether we are to regard God as eternally become, and if so, whether it is possible to conceive of the changing phenomenal world as deducing itself from an eternally complete fact of knowledge; or whether we are to conceive of God as the eternal Knower, not merely of the reason for His varied human life, but of that life as dependent on process. In other words, are we to conceive of the ground of our knowing as itself a process? I approach this difficult and perhaps insoluble problem with no little diffidence and hesitation. It seems to me that the difficulty of deducing becoming from an eternally complete truth arises from ignoring the fact that the presupposition of the validity of thought lies deeper than the category of time. Our knowledge, which is timeless, though of time, is indeed ever unexhausted and inexhaustible, and we can only represent to ourselves this incomplete and insoluble character of it in a time and space form. But the self-confidence of our reason is presupposed in, and lies deeper than, its time or space exercise, and there are antinomies in our cosmological conceptions, the necessary solution of which seems to me to imply some higher category in which they find their unification.

That our human life has a meaning, and that that meaning must be known to the one Knower, is, in my thinking, transparently clear; and this implies that our human life in time does not pass into nothingness, but is a means whereby that Will of Perfect Reason, which is its ground and end, possesses itself. And while we know from experience that this necessary and divine meaning implies process in man, I cannot pretend to the philosophical acumen of those who would exhibit it as itself a process. But let us suppose that the view I have just expressed be incorrect, and the opposite opinion be accepted, namely, that God, regarded as the synthesizing Knower of His life in man, is also the Knower of infinite change, I must confess that, for my own part, I do not exactly see why we should be compelled to posit a changing life beside the eternal and complete meaning, and the human life which that meaning involves. But if this view be insisted on, as it is, doubtless, as the issue of much reflection, then I am bold enough to give no hesitating reason for my confidence that such a view cannot but imply that the changes of the divine life must be so interconnected that they are expressive of one complete meaning which involves them, and which they fulfil. For if there is not present to this everchanging life of Deity the eternal reason for itself, it is manifest that there is an unreasonable and capricious element in the Divine Life. But caprice is the illusion of a limited experience, and is inconsistent with that confidence in the reason that is immanent in the world which lies as the very heart of philosophic as of all inquiry.

While we are bound to ascribe to God the fulfilment of all his manifestations in you and me, it seems to me that we cannot pretend to discover the concrete actuality of His thought. Yet we can, as I venture to think, confidently refute the view that the Divine Life is an endless becoming to which we need attribute no permanent direction. We cannot envisage the demands of our reasonable faith in God in such a conception. An analysis of the human mind does, indeed, point to an actual awareness which is its ground. Whether this awareness is to be thought of as itself process it is, perhaps, impossible for man to determine, though it seems to me (and I shall further develop my position in the course of this paper) that the balance of evidence is against such a view. But even if the data are adequate to the absolute determining of

this problem, the human experience, as dependent and contingent, can never yield concrete and precise knowledge of that actuality which derives its being from no source but itself.

Our attempt at knowledge of any kind presupposes that the object which reveals itself is already in some form or other there-existent—and efficient to produce knowledge in us. Our gradual entrance into knowledge—becoming—is a category whereby the already there, which implies it, enters into human knowledge. Our thought, as human and particular, is not an all-embracing, synthesizing activity, and hence can never realize God's nature in its concrete actuality. But what we can be quite sure of is, that the presupposition, without which we could not think at all, and the essential oneness of the Thinker, and of the Thinker and his thought, point with an infallible certitude to an existence—self-consciousness—on which this little round of human consciousness is dependent, and in which it finds its absolute fulfilment. The fundamental presupposition of thought implies a self-consistent, self-dependent knowledge, leaving nothing outside itself. It implies but it does not expound.

The scientific conception of the universe is too often appealed to even by men of some metaphysical insight as if it were an infallible canon. That science has genuine actuality and affirmative reality is indisputable. But the exact nature of its validity is yet a desideratum in philosophy, and perhaps will remain so until further discoveries re-create the current concepts which the best informed scientists are aware to be for the most part provisional and hypothetical only. Again, it is obvious that a cosmology as based on effects wrought on us can never give us the concrete actuality which produces them in us. A completely satisfying knowledge about the universe would not be the same as the awareness which it reflects. It must be of the same nature, but it cannot be the same thing. The knowledge of an act is not the act.

Nevertheless, there is one point in the philosophy of scientific method which I think it will be fruitful to consider, because, even if it does not (as it appears to me distinctly to do) throw considerable doubt on the legitimacy of the transfer of process from the phenomenal world to its ground, it certainly does give warrant to the belief in a permanent direction in that process if it exists.

An event is only comprehended in so far as it takes its place in a system of knowledge in which it becomes more than itself. Hence that uniformity of Nature which is explicated by the scientist and which is implied in the confidence of reason in itself is more than a mere recognition of the law of identity; more even than an admission that uniform precedents are invariably followed by uniform consequents if there be no external interference. It assumes (and this assumption Science may or may not formulate but invariably trusts in her inquiries), it assumes that even the disturbing and interfering elements are subject to law; that change, too, is uniform; that change of law is again due to law. Science supplies herself with the self-same large imagination as Laplace, and supposes with him the world at any one moment to be the necessary outcome of all its antecedent, and the necessary condition of all its future, states. Any one moment stands in relation to an infinite series extending in both directions.

Now, while our knowledge must enter into the very nature of the awareness from which, as its ground, it derives itself, it would seem to me to be an eminently pregnable and unwarranted assumption to posit any kind of direct correspondence or transfigured identity between events in the phenomenal universe and events as they may occur in the supposed "life" of God. But if this huge assumption is made in order to give a support to science (which in my humble judgment stands in no need of such a crutch,) then, as an idealist, I am unable to understand what this conception of the relations of this infinite series may mean, except that, as related, they are *uno ictu* and eternally present to a mind. Science happily occupies herself but little in the construction of philosophical flying-machines, but if we choose to fasten on her an indication of a changing life for God, then our bold philosophy will at once receive a challenge from the absolute relatedness of God's entire universe and we shall be checked by the inscrutability of the way in which the meaning of the whole is ever preserved in the changing universal life.

But does science in any way point to process as the ground of process? Continuity in the representation is of course indispensable to a being who rises from sensible appearances in time-relation to supersensible concepts; but deeper far than continuity

in time and space, lies that presupposition of Unity which is the *sine qua non* of science no less than of philosophy.

Science, as the effort of man to universalize himself, rises from the sensibles of experience to the supersensible. But in the fair, undisputed, and logical pursuit of her abstractions, she soon finds herself involved in inexplicable and probably contradictory results. From the limited data of sense-experience Science is perpetually soaring only to impale herself on the horns of dilemmas. Unless she refutes herself with the sceptic she must either retrace her steps or place in God as the ground of our finite apprehension a perfect logical harmony, unifying what is for us contradictory. It would seem as if in many cases the last alternative is the only mode of escape. The space and time forms yield an abundance of antinomies, and the logical mind of Jevons, in his examination of scientific method, was forced to recognize this fact. He even went so far as to say that, "For all that I can see, then, there may be intellectual existences in which both time and space are nullities." ("Principles of Science," chap. xxxi.) Of course, from my point of view, the Divine Knowing must always be *of* time and space, inasmuch as it is the completion and unifying of God's particular life in man; but it need not be itself a process in time and space.

But, to return to an examination of the procedure of the scientific thinker. Science receives her impetus and has achieved her successes by conceiving of the whole universe as a universe of events everywhere connected; and she forthwith proceeds, by means of the hypothetical judgment, to discover these connections, explanations of observed facts, or laws; and from these again to foretell facts not yet experienced. The scientific conception is not merely that of the invariability of similar results under similar conditions, but that all change whatever is expressible in the form of that abstract reconstruction or method of valid registration which we call Law. Law is led up to by the hypothetical judgment, but its ultimate guarantee is other than mere experience or experiment. The hypothetical judgment may yield and experiment confirm a rule, but the guarantee of a true law is its self-evidence, the reduction to plain absurdity of any other explanation. No fresh laws can obtain any more than fresh phenomena can arise except as ever implied and involved in all an-

tion of thought—its self-consistence—which issues in the transcendental discovery of the Unity of the One Thinker, and of the Thinker with his Thought, seems to me to indicate with an irresistible confidence that there is an awareness in which the human life finds its fulfilment and meaning; while the boundaries set to our conscious experience as limited and particular, prohibit the entrance of the fulness of the nature of God into the passing show of His temporal life in us.

LEIBNITZ'S CRITIQUE OF LOCKE.¹

TRANSLATED FROM THE FRENCH BY ALFRED G. LANGLEY.

NEW ESSAYS ON HUMAN UNDERSTANDING.

BOOK I.—INNATE IDEAS.

CHAPTER II.

No Innate Practical Principles.

§ 1. *Philalethes*. Ethics is a demonstrative science, and has no innate principles. And, indeed, it would be very to produce a rule of ethics of a nature to be settled by as general and as prompt as this maxim: Whatever is, is

Theophilus. It is absolutely impossible that there be reason as evident as those which are identical or immediate, although you can truly say that ethics has principles not demonstrable, and that one of the first and most proper that you ought to pursue joy and avoid sorrow, it is to add that this is not a truth which is known purely by reason; it is based upon internal experience, or upon confused knowledge for you do not feel what joy or sadness is.

Ph. It is only through processes of reasoning, through and through some mental application, that you can be assured of practical truths.

Th. Though that were so, they would not be less innate. However, the maxim I just adduced appears of another nature; it is

¹ Continued from "The Journal of Speculative Philosophy," vol. xix, No. 2, July, 1885.

not known by the reason, but, so to speak, by an instinct. It is an innate principle, but it does not form a part of the natural light, for it is not known luminously. However this principle is stated, you can draw from it scientific consequences, and I commend most heartily what you just said of ethics as a demonstrative science. Let us note also that it teaches truths so evident that thieves, pirates, and bandits are forced to observe them among themselves.

§ 2. *Ph.* But bandits keep the rules of justice among themselves without considering them as innate principles.

Th. What matters it? Does the world concern itself about questions of theory?

Ph. They observe the maxims of justice only as convenient rules, the practice of which is absolutely necessary to the conservation of their society.

Th. ¹[Very well. You could say nothing better in general in respect to all men. And it is thus that these laws are written in the soul, namely, as the consequences of our preservation and of our true welfare. Do you imagine that we suppose that truths are in the understanding as independent the one of the other as the edicts of the prætor were on his placard or white tablet? I put aside here the instinct which prompts man to love man, of which

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I shall presently speak, for now I wish to speak only of truths in so far as they are known by the reason. I admit, also, that certain rules of justice could not be demonstrated, in all their extent and perfection, without supposing the existence of God and the immortality of the soul, and these, where the instinct of humanity does not impel us, are written in the soul only as other derivative truths.] However, those who base justice only upon the necessities of this life and upon the need they have of it, rather than upon the pleasure they ought to derive from it, which is the greatest when God is its ground, are liable to resemble a little the society of bandits.

"Sit spes fallendi, miscebunt sacra profania."¹

§ 3. *Pl.* I agree with you that Nature has put in all men the desire for happiness and a strong aversion to misery. These are the truly innate practical principles, and principles which, according to the purpose of every practical principle, have a continual influence upon all our actions. But they are inclinations of the soul toward the good, and not impressions² of some truth which is written in our understanding.

Tl. [I am delighted, sir, to see that you admit in effect innate truths, as I shall presently say. This principle agrees sufficiently with that which I just indicated, which prompts us to seek joy and shun sorrow. For felicity is only a lasting joy. However, our inclination does not tend to felicity proper, but to joy—that is to say, to the present; it is the reason which prompts to future and enduring welfare. Now, the inclination, expressed by the understanding, passes into a precept or practical truth; and if the inclination is innate, the truth is innate also, there being nothing in the soul which may not be expressed in the understanding, but not always by a consideration actually distinct, as I have sufficiently shown. The instincts also are not always practical; there are some which contain theoretical truths, and such are the internal principles of the sciences and of reasoning, if, without recognizing the reason in them, we employ them by a natural instinct. And

¹ Compare Hor. i, Epist., 16, 54. Horace has "*miscebis*."—*Tr.*

² Erdmann's and Jacques's text has "*des imperfections de quelque vérité*." Gerhard reads, "*des impressions de quelque vérité*." Locke has "impressions of truth." Book I, chap. 3, § 8. Vol. I, p. 158, line 5, Bohn's edition.

in this sense you cannot dispense with the recognition of innate principles, even though you might be willing to deny that derivative truths are innate. But this would be a question of name merely after the explanation I have given of what I call innate. And if any one desires to give this appellation only to the truths which are received at first by instinct, I shall not contest the point with him.]

Ph. That is well. But if there were in our soul certain characters imprinted there by Nature, like so many principles of knowledge, we could only perceive them acting in us, as we feel the influence of the two principles which are constantly active in us—namely, the desire of happiness and the fear of misery.

Th. [There are principles of knowledge which influence us as constantly in our reasoning processes as these practical principles influence us in our volitions; for example, everybody employs the rules of deduction by a natural Logic without being aware of it.

§ 4. *Ph.* The rules of Morality need to be proved; they are then not innate, like that rule which is the source of the virtues which society regards as such: Do to another only what you would have him do to yourself.

Th. You always make me the objection which I have already refuted. I agree with you that there are moral rules which are not innate principles; but that does not prevent them from being innate truths, for a derivative truth will be innate, supposing that we can draw it from our mind. But there are innate truths, which we find in us in two ways—by insight and by instinct. Those which I have just indicated, show by our ideas what natural insight accomplishes. But there are conclusions of natural insight which are principles in relation to instinct. It is thus that we are prompted to acts of humanity, by instinct because it pleases us, and by reason because it is just. There are then in us truths of instinct, which are innate principles, which we feel and approve, although we have not the proof of them which we obtain, however, when we give a reason for this instinct. It is thus that we make use of the laws of deduction conformably to a confused knowledge, and as by instinct, but logicians show the reason of them, as mathematicians also give a reason for what they do without thinking in walking and leaping. As for the rule which states that we ought to do to others only what we would have them do

to us, it needs not only proof, but, further, it needs to be proclaimed. One would wish too much for one's self if one could have one's own way; shall we say then that one also owes too much to others?' You will tell me that the rule requires only a just will. But thus this rule, very far from being adequate to serve as a measure, would itself need one. The true sense of the rule is, that the place of another is the true point of view for equitable judgment when you attempt it.]

§ 9. *Ph.* Bad acts are often committed without any remorse of conscience; for example, when cities are carried by storm, the soldiers commit, without scruple, the worst acts; some civilized nations have exposed their children, some Caribbees castrate theirs in order to fatten and eat them. Garcilasso de la Vega reports that certain peoples of Peru took prisoners in order to make concubines of them, and supported the children up to the age of thirteen, after which they ate them, and treated in the same manner the mothers so soon as they no longer bore children. In the voyage of Baumgarten it is related that there was a Santon² in Egypt who passed for a holy man, *eo quod non foeminarum unquam esset ac puerorum, sed tantum asellarum concubitor atque mularum.*

Th. Moral science (over and above the instincts like that which makes us seek joy and shun sadness) is not otherwise innate than is arithmetic, for it depends likewise upon demonstrations which internal insight furnishes. And as the demonstrations do not at once leap into sight, it is no great wonder, if men do not perceive always and at once all that they possess in themselves, and do not read quite readily the characters of the natural law, which God, according to St. Paul, has written in their minds. However, as morality is more important than arithmetic, God has given to man instincts which prompt at once and without reasoning to some portion of that which reason ordains. Just as we walk in obedience to the laws of mechanics without thinking of these laws, and as we eat, not only because eating is necessary for us, but further and much more because it gives us pleasure. But these instincts do not prompt to action in an invincible way; the passions may resist them, prejudices may obscure them, and contrary customs alter

¹ This sentence is found in the texts of Erdmann and Gerhardt; it is wanting in that of Jacques.

² Mahometan monk.

them. Nevertheless, you agree most frequently with these instincts of conscience, and you follow them also when stronger impressions do not overcome them. The greatest and most healthy part of the human race bears them witness. The Orientals and the Greeks or Romans, the Bible and the Koran agree in respect to them; the Mahometan police are wont to punish the thing Baumgarten tells of, and it would be needful to be as brutalized as the American savage in order to approve their customs, full of a cruelty, which surpasses even that of the beasts. However, these same savages perceive clearly what justice is on other occasions;¹ and although there is no bad practice, perhaps, which may not be authorized in some respects and upon some occasions, there are few of them, however, which are not condemned very frequently and by the larger part of mankind. That which has not been attained without reason, and was not attained by reasoning alone, should be referred in part to the natural instincts. Custom, tradition, discipline, are thus intermingled, but it is due to instinct (*le naturel*) that custom is turned more generally to the good side of these duties. In the same way,² the tradition of God's existence is due to instinct (*le naturel*). Now Nature gives to man and also to most of the animals affectionate and tender feeling for those of their species. The tiger even *parcit cognatis maculis*; whence comes this *bon mot* of a Roman jurisconsult, *Quia inter omnes homines natura cognationem constituit, unde hominem homini insidiari nefas esse*. Spiders form almost the only exception, and these eat one another to this extent that the female devours the male after having enjoyed him. Besides this general instinct of society, which may be called philanthropy in man,

¹ Compare J. G. Schurman's "The Ethical Import of Darwinism," pp. 256-260. He states that "some gropings amid the general darkness incline me, at least tentatively, to the belief that, apart from the domestic virtues, there is no such great difference between the morals of Christians and the morals of savages" (p. 256). This statement is modified further on pp. 258-259, and finally takes the following form: "The fighting men, actual and potential, in every uncivilized community recognize the same rights, obligations, and duties toward one another as constitute the essence of civilized morality. You never find a man without a moral nature, a nature essentially like our own; but the objects he includes within the scope of its outgoings vary" (p. 259). For the real significance of such facts see "Principles and Practice of Morality," by Pres. E. G. Robinson, of Brown University (p. 43).—T.R.

² Gerhardt's text reads, "*C'est comme le naturel*," etc.

there are some more particular forms of it, as the affection between the male and the female, the love which father and mother bear toward the children, which the Greeks call *στοργήν*, and other similar inclinations which make this natural law, or this image of law rather, which, according to the Roman jurisconsults, Nature has taught to animals. But in man in particular there is found a certain regard for dignity, for propriety, which leads him to conceal (the) things, which lower us, to be sparing of shame, to have repugnance for incests, to bury dead bodies, not to eat men at all nor living animals. One is led further to be careful of his reputation, even beyond need, and of life; to be subject to remorse of conscience, and to feel these *laniatus et ictus*, these tortures and torments of which Tacitus, following Plato, speaks; besides the fear of a future and of a supreme power which comes, moreover, naturally enough. There is reality in all that; but at bottom these natural impressions, whatever they may be, are only aids to the reason and indices of the plan of Nature. Custom, education, tradition, reason, contribute much, but human nature ceases not to participate therein. It is true that without the reason these aids would not suffice to give a complete certitude to morals. Finally, will you deny that man is naturally led, for example, to withdraw from vile things, under a pretext that races are found who like to speak only of filth, that there are some, indeed, whose mode of life obliges them to handle excrements, and that there are people of Boutan, where those of the king pass as an aromatic. I think that you are of my opinion at bottom in regard to these natural instincts which tend toward what is right and decent; although you will say, perhaps, as you have said with regard to the instinct which prompts to joy and felicity, that these impressions are not innate truths. But I have already replied that every opinion is the perception of a truth, and that the natural opinion is the (perception) of an innate truth, but very often confused, as are the experiences of the external senses; thus you can distinguish the innate truths from the natural insight (which contains only the distinctly knowable), as the genus should be distinguished from its species, since the innate truths comprehend both the instincts and the natural insight.]

§ 11. *Ph.* A person who knew the natural limits of justice and injustice, and (who) would not cease confusing them with each

other, could only be regarded as the declared enemy of the repose and the welfare of the society of which he is a member. But men confuse them every moment, consequently they do not know them.

Th. [That is taking things a little too theoretically. It happens every day that men act contrary to their knowledge in concealing these (limits) from themselves when they turn the mind elsewhere, in order to follow their passions; otherwise, we would not see people eating and drinking what they know must cause them sickness and even death. They would not neglect their business; they would not do what entire nations have done in certain respects. The future and reason rarely make so strong an impression as the present and the senses. That Italian knew this well, who, before being put to torture, proposed to have the gallows continually in sight during the torments in order to resist them, and they heard him say sometimes, "*Io ti vedo*," which he explained afterward when he had escaped. Unless you firmly resolve to look upon the true good and the true evil with the purpose of following or shunning them, you find yourself carried away, and it happens, with regard to the most important needs of this life, as it happens with regard to paradise and hell in the case of those, indeed, who believe in them the most :

Cantantur haec, laudantur haec,
Dicuntur, audiuntur.
Scribuntur haec, leguntur haec,
Et lecta negliguntur.]

Ph. Every principle which you suppose innate can only be known by each one as just and advantageous.

Th. [You always return to this supposition, which I have refuted so many times, that every innate truth is known always and by all.]

§ 12. *Ph.* But a public permission to violate the law proves that this law is not innate; for example, the law requiring love and preservation of children was violated among the ancients when they permitted their exposure.

Th. [This violation supposed, it follows only that you have not well read these characters of Nature written in our souls, but sometimes obscure enough by reason of our excesses, not to mention that, in order to have a perfectly clear perception of the necessity

of duties, men must see the demonstration of them—a condition that is rarely fulfilled. If geometry were as much opposed to our passions and present interests as is ethics, we should contest it and violate it but little less, notwithstanding all the demonstrations of Euclid and of Archimedes, which you would call dreams and believe full of paralogisms; and Joseph Scaliger, Hobbes, and others, who have written against Euclid and Archimedes, would not find themselves in such a small company as at present. It was only the passion for glory, which these authors believed they found in the quadrature of the circle and other difficult problems, which could dazzle to such a point persons of so great merit. And if others had the same interest, they would make use of it in much the same manner.]

Ph. Every duty carries the idea of law, and a law would not be known or supposed without a legislator who has prescribed it, or without reward and without punishment.

Th. [There can be natural rewards and penalties without a legislator; intemperance, for example, is punished by disease. However, as this injures no one at first, I admit that there are few precepts to which you would be indispensably bound if there were not a God who leaves no crime without chastisement, no good act without reward.]

Ph. It is necessary then that the ideas of a God and of a life to come be also innate.

Th. [I am agreed in the sense in which I have explained myself.]

Ph. But these ideas are so far from being written by Nature in the mind of all men, that they do not appear even very clear and very distinct in the mind of several students, who also profess to examine things with some accuracy; so far are they from being known by every human being.

Th. You return again to the same proposition, which maintains that what is not known is not innate, which I have, however, refuted so many times. What is innate is not at first known clearly and distinctly as such; often much attention and method is necessary in order to their perception, the student-class do not always adduce them, still less every human being.

§ 13. *Ph.* But if men can be ignorant of or call in question that which is innate, it is in vain for you to speak to us of innate prin-

ciples, and to claim to show us their necessity; very far from being able to serve as our instructors in the truth and certitude of things, as is maintained, we shall find ourselves in the same state of uncertainty in regard to these principles, as if they were not in us.

Th. You cannot call in question all the innate principles. You were agreed in regard to identical propositions or the principle of contradiction, admitting that there are incontestable principles, although you would not then recognize them as innate; but it does not at all follow that everything which is innate and necessarily connected with these innate principles, is also at first indubitably evident.

Ph. No one that I know of has yet undertaken to give us an exact catalogue of these principles.

Th. But has any one hitherto given us a full and exact catalogue of the axioms of geometry?

§ 15. *Ph.* My Lord Herbert has been pleased to point out some of these principles, which are: 1. There is a supreme God. 2. He ought to be served. 3. Virtue united with piety is the best worship. 4. Repentance for sin is necessary. 5. There are penalties and rewards after this life. I agree that those are evident truths and of such a nature that when well explained a reasonable person can scarcely avoid giving them his consent. But our friends say that they are very far from being so many innate impressions, and if these five propositions are common notions written in our souls by the finger of God, there are many others which you ought also to put into this class.

Th. I agree with you, sir, for I take all the necessary truths as innate, and I connect with them also the instincts. But, I agree with you, that these five propositions are not innate principles; for I hold that they can and ought to be proved.

§ 18. *Ph.* In the third proposition, that virtue is the worship most agreeable to God, it is not clear what is meant by virtue. If you understand it in the sense most commonly given to the term, I mean that which passes as praiseworthy according to the different opinions which prevail in different countries, this proposition is so far from being evident that it is not even true. If you call virtue the acts which are conformed to the will of God, this will be almost *idem per idem*, and the proposition will teach us noth-

ing of importance; for it would mean only that God is pleased with that which is conformed to his will. It is the same with the notion of sin in the fourth proposition.

Th. I do not remember to have remarked that virtue is commonly taken as something which depends upon opinion; at least, the Philosophers do not make it that. It is true that the name of virtue depends upon the opinion of those who give it to different habits or actions, according as they deem them good or bad and use their reason; but all are sufficiently agreed as to the notion of virtue in general, although they differ in its application. According to Aristotle and several others, virtue is a habit of restraining the passions by the reason, and still more, simply a habit of acting according to reason. And that cannot fail to be agreeable to him who is the supreme and final reason of things, to whom nothing is indifferent, and the acts of rational creatures less than all others.

§ 20. *Ph.* You are wont to say that the custom, the education, and the general opinions of those with whom you converse may obscure these principles of morality which you suppose innate. But if this reply is a good one, it annihilates the proof which you pretend to draw from universal consent. The reasoning of many men reduces to this: The principles which men of right reason admit are innate: We and those of our mind are men of right reason; consequently our principles are innate. A pleasant method of reasoning, which goes straight on to infallibility!

Th. For myself, I make use of universal consent, not as a principal proof, but as a confirmatory one; for innate truths taken as the natural insight of reason bear their marks with them as does geometry, for they are wrapped up in the immediate principles which you yourselves admit as incontestable. But I grant that it is more difficult to distinguish the instincts and some other natural habits from custom, although it may very often be possible so to do. For the rest, it appears to me that people who have cultivated their minds have some ground for attributing the use of right reason to themselves rather than to the barbarians, since in subduing them almost as easily as they do animals they show sufficiently their superiority. But if they cannot always succeed in this, it is because just like the animals they conceal themselves in the thick forests, where it is difficult to hunt them down and the

game is not worth the candle. It is doubtless an advantage to have cultivated the mind, and if we may speak for barbarism as against culture, we shall also have the right to attack reason in favor of the animals, and to take seriously the witty sallies of M. Des Preaux, in one of his satires, where, in order to contest with man his prerogative over the animals, he asks, whether,

The bear is afraid of the passer-by or the passer-by of the bear—
And if by decree of the shepherds of Libya
The lions would vacate the parks of Numidia, etc.

However, we must admit that there are some points in which the barbarians surpass us, especially as regards vigor of body; and as regards the soul even we may say that in certain respects their practical morality is better than ours, because they have not the avarice of hoarding nor the ambition of ruling. And one may even add that the conversation of Christians has made them worse in many respects.¹ They have taught them drunkenness (when carrying them the water of life), swearing, blasphemy, and other vices, which were little known to them. There is with us more of good and of evil than with them: a bad European is worse than a savage—he refines upon evil. However, nothing should prevent men from uniting the advantages which Nature gives to these peoples with those which reason gives us.

Ph. But what reply do you make, sir, to this dilemma of one of my friends? I would be pleased, he says, to have the advocates of innate ideas tell me whether these principles can or cannot be effaced by education and custom. If they cannot be effaced we ought to find them in all men, and they should clearly appear in the mind of each particular man. If they can be altered by extraneous ideas, they ought to appear more distinctly and with more lustre the nearer they are to their source. I mean in children or illiterate people, upon whom extraneous opinions have made less impression. Let them take which side they please, they will clearly see, he says, that it is contradicted by indubitable facts and by continual experience.

Th. I am astonished that your clever friend has confounded obscurity with effacement, as some in your party confound non-

¹ Gerhardt has *respects: they (chooses: on leur a appris)*. Compare J. G. Schurman's "The Ethical Import of Darwinism," pp. 256-260 as above.—Tr.

being with non-appearance. Innate ideas and truths would not be effaced, but they are obscured in all men (as they are now) by their inclination toward the needs of the body, and oftener still by the occurrence of bad customs. These characteristics of the internal light would always be shining in the understanding and would give fervor to the will, if the confused perceptions of sense did not engross our attention. It is the struggle of which Holy Scripture no less than ancient and modern philosophy speaks.

Ph. Thus, then, we find ourselves in darkness as thick and in uncertainty as great as if there were no such light.

Th. God forbid; we should have neither science nor law, nay, not even reason.

§ 21, 22, etc. *Ph.* I hope that you will at least admit the force of prejudice, which often causes that to pass as natural which has come from the bad instruction to which children have been exposed, and the bad customs which education and association have given them.

Th. I admit that the excellent author whom you follow says some very fine things upon that subject, and which have their value if they are taken as they should be; but I do not believe that they are opposed to the doctrine properly understood of nature or of innate truths. And I am confident that he will not extend his remarks too far; for I am equally persuaded that a great many opinions pass for truths which are only the effects of custom and of credulity, and that there are many such opinions, too, which certain philosophers would fain account for as matters of prejudice, which are, however, grounded in right reason and in nature. There is as much or more ground for defending ourselves from those who through ambition oftenest make pretensions to innovation, than for challenging ancient impressions. And after having meditated sufficiently upon ancient and modern thought, I have found that the majority of the received doctrines may bear a good sense. So that I could wish that men of sense would seek to satisfy their ambition by occupying themselves rather in building and advancing than in retrograding and destroying. And I (could) desire that they resemble the Romans who constructed beautiful public works, rather than that Vandal king whom his mother charged to seek the destruction of these grand structures, since he could not hope for the glory of equalling them.

Ph. The aim of the clever class who have contended against innate truths has been to prevent men from handing round their prejudices and seeking to cover their idleness beneath this fair name.

Th. We are agreed upon this point, for very far from approving that doubtful principles be received, I would, for myself, seek even the demonstration of the axioms of Euclid, as some ancients also have done. And when you ask the means of knowing and examining innate principles, I reply, following what I said above, that with the exception of the instincts whose reason is unknown, you must try to reduce them to first principles, that is to say, to axioms identical or immediate by means of definitions, which are nothing else than a distinct exposition of ideas. I do not doubt even but that your friends who have hitherto been opposed to innate truths, would approve this method, which appears consonant with their principal aim.

CHAPTER III.

Other Considerations touching Innate Principles, both Speculative and Practical.

§ 3. *Ph.* You wish to reduce truths to first principles, and I grant you that if there is any such principle, it is without gainsaying this; it is impossible for a thing to be and not to be at the same time. It appears, however, difficult to maintain its innate character, since you must be convinced at the same time that the ideas of impossibility and identity are innate.

Th. It is quite necessary that those who favor innate truths maintain and be convinced that these ideas are also innate, and I admit that I am of their opinion. The ideas of being, of possibility, of identity are so completely innate that they enter into all our thoughts and reasonings, and I regard them as essential to our mind; but I have already said that you do not always pay them particular attention and that you discern them only with time. I have said hitherto that we are, so to speak, innate unto ourselves, and since we are beings, the being we is innate; and the knowledge of being is wrapped up in that knowledge which we have of ourselves. There is something similar in the case of other general notions.

§ 4. *Ph.* If the idea of identity is natural, and consequently so evident and so present to the mind that we ought to recognize it from the cradle, I would be pleased to have a child of seven years, and even a man of seventy, tell me whether a man who is a creature consisting of body and soul, is the same (man) when his body is changed, and whether, metempsychosis supposed, Euphorbus would be the same as Pythagoras.

Th. I have stated sufficiently that what is natural to us is not known to us as such from the cradle; and even an idea may be known to us without our being able to decide at once all questions which can be formed thereupon. It is as if some one should pretend that a child could not have a knowledge of the square and its diagonal, because he will have difficulty in recognizing that the diagonal is incommensurable with the side of the square. As for the question itself, it appears to me demonstratively solved by the doctrine of *Monads*, which I have elsewhere shown in its true light, and we shall speak more fully of this matter in the sequel.

§ 6. *Ph.* [I see very well that to you I should object in vain that the axiom which declares that the whole is greater than its part is not innate, under pretext that the ideas of whole and part are relative, dependent upon those of number and extension; since you would apparently maintain that there are ideas conditionally innate, and that those of number and extension are to such a degree innate.¹]

Th. You are right, and indeed I rather believe that the idea of extension is posterior to that of whole and part.

§ 7. *Ph.* [What say you of the truth that God should be worshipped; is it innate?]

Th. I believe that the duty of worshipping God declares that on occasion you ought to show that you honor him beyond every other object, and that this is a necessary consequence of the idea of Him and of his existence; which signifies with me that this truth is innate.

§ 8. *Ph.* But the Atheists seem to prove by their example that the idea of God is not innate. And without speaking of those

¹ French text is: "*puisque vous soutiendrés apparemment, qu'il y a des idées innées respectives, et que celles des nombres et de l'étendue sont innées aussi.*"

whom the ancients have mentioned, have there not been discovered entire nations, who have no idea of God nor of the terms which denote God and the soul, as at the bay of Soldania, in Brazil, in the Caribbee islands, in Paraguay?

Th. [The late Mr. Fabricius, a celebrated theologian of Heidelberg, has made an apology for the human race in order to clear it of the imputation of atheism. He was an author of great accuracy, and decidedly above much prejudice; I do not, however, pretend to enter into this discussion of facts. I grant that entire peoples have never thought of the supreme substance, nor of the nature of the soul. And I remember, that when you wished at my request, countenanced by the illustrious Mr. Witsen, to obtain for me in Holland a translation of the Lord's Prayer into the language of Barantola, you were stopped at this point, "hallowed be thy name," because you could not make the Barantoli understand what hallowed means. I remember also that in the creed made for the Hottentots you were obliged to express Holy Spirit by words of the country which signify a pleasant and agreeable wind. This was not unreasonable, for our Greek and Latin words *πνεῦμα*, *anima*, *spiritus*, mean ordinarily only the air or wind we breathe, as one of the most subtile things which we know through the senses; and you begin through the senses to lead men little by little to what is beyond the senses. However, all this difficulty which you find in attaining abstract knowledge effects nothing against innate knowledge. There are people who have no word corresponding to that of being; do you doubt that they do not know what being is, although they think but little of it separately? Besides I find what I have read in our excellent author on the idea of God ("Essay on Understanding," Book I, chapter 3,¹ § 9) so beautiful and so to my liking that I cannot refrain from quoting it.² Here it is:

"Men can scarcely avoid having some kind of idea of things of which those with whom they converse often have occasion to speak under certain names, and if the thing is one which carries with it the idea of ex-

¹ Chap. 4, in Locke's treatise, Bohn's edition.—Ta.

² The French translation of Locke's original, is, in my judgment, clearer in form of statement and style than Locke himself. Hence I have retranslated the French into English. If any reader prefers Locke's original, he can easily find it in Bohn's edition of the Philosophical Works, Vol. I, p. 188.—Ta.

cellence, of grandeur, or of some extraordinary quality which interests in some point and which impresses itself upon the mind under the idea of an absolute and irresistible power which none can help fearing" (I add: and under the idea of a superlatively great goodness which none could help loving), "such an idea ought, according to all appearances, to make the strongest impression and to spread farther than any other, especially if it is an idea which accords with the simplest insight of reason, and which flows naturally from every part of our knowledge. Now such is the idea of God, for the brilliant marks of extraordinary wisdom and power appear so plainly in all the works of the creation that every rational creature who will reflect thereupon cannot fail to discover the author of all these marvels; and the impression that the discovery of such a Being must naturally make upon the soul of all those who have once heard him spoken of is so great and carries with it thoughts of so great weight and so adapted to spread themselves in the world that it appears to me wholly strange that an entire nation of men can be found upon the earth so stupid as to have no idea of God. That, I say, seems to me as surprising as to think of men who should have no idea of numbers or of fire."

I would I might always be allowed to copy word for word a number of other excellent passages of our author, which we are obliged to pass by. I will say only here, that this author, in speaking of the common light of reason, which agrees with the idea of God, and of that which naturally proceeds from it, appears to differ but little from my view of innate truths; and, concerning that which appears to him so strange, *viz.*, that there may be men without any idea of God, that it would be surprising to find men who had no idea of numbers or of fire, I would remark that the inhabitants of the Marian Islands, to which you have given the name of the Queen of Spain, who has protected missions there, had no knowledge of fire when they were discovered, as appears from the narrative which R. P. Gobien, a French Jesuit, charged with the care of distant missions, has given to the public and sent to me.]

§ 16. *Ph.* If you are right in concluding that the idea of God is innate, from the fact that all enlightened races have had this idea, virtue ought also to be innate because enlightened races have always had a true idea of it.

Th. [Not virtue, but the idea of virtue, is innate, and perhaps you intend only that.]

Ph. It is as certain that there is a God, as it is certain that the opposite angles made by the intersection of two straight lines are equal. And there has never been a rational creature who applied himself sincerely to the examination of the truth of these two propositions who has failed to give them his consent. However, it is beyond doubt that there are many men who, having never turned their thoughts in that direction, are ignorant equally of these two truths.

Th. [I admit it; but that does not prevent them from being innate—that is to say, does not prevent you from being able to find them in yourself.]

§ 18. *Ph.* It would be more advantageous to have an innate idea of substance; but it turns out that we do not have it, either innate or acquired, since we have it neither through sensation nor reflection.

Th. [I am of opinion that reflection suffices to discover the idea of substance within ourselves, who are substances. And this notion is the most important. But we shall speak of it, perhaps more fully, in the sequel of our conference.]

§ 20 (Gerhardt). *Ph.* If there are innate ideas in the mind without the mind's being actually aware of their presence, they must at least be in the memory, whence they must be drawn by means of reminiscence—that is to say, be known, when memory recalls them, as so many perceptions which have been in the mind before, unless reminiscence can subsist without reminiscence. For this conviction, where it is an inwardly certain one, that a given idea has previously been in our mind, is properly what distinguishes reminiscence from every other kind of thinking.

Th. [In order that knowledge, ideas, or truths be in our mind, it is not necessary that we have ever actually thought of them; they are only natural habitudes; *i. e.*, dispositions and aptitudes, active and passive, and more than a *Tabula rasa*. It is true, however, that the Platonists believed that we have already actually thought of that which we recognize in ourselves; and to refute them it is insufficient to say that we do not at all remember, for it is certain that an infinite number of thoughts recur to us which we have forgotten that we had. It has happened that a man believed that he had composed a new verse, which it turned out he

read word for word a long time previous in some ancient poet. And often we have an extraordinary facility of conceiving certain things because we formerly conceived them without remembering them. It may be that a child, having become blind, forgets ever having seen light and colors, as happened at the age of two and a half years from small-pox, in the case of the celebrated Ulric Schoenberg, a native of Weide, in the Upper Palatinate, who died at Königsberg, in Prussia, in 1649, where he taught philosophy and mathematics to the admiration of every one. It may be that such a man has remaining effects of former impressions without remembering them. I believe that dreams often thus revive in us former thoughts. Julius Scaliger, having celebrated in verse the illustrious men of Verona, a certain self-styled Brugnolus, a Bavarian by birth, but afterward established at Verona, appeared to him in a dream and complained that he had been forgotten. Julius Scaliger, not remembering to have heard him spoken of before, did not allow himself to make elegiac verses in his honor in consequence of this dream. At length, the son, Joseph Scaliger, travelling in Italy, learned more particularly that there had been formerly at Verona a celebrated grammarian or learned critic of this name, who had contributed to the re-establishment of polite literature in Italy. This story is found in the poems of Scaliger the father, together with the elegy, and in the letters of the son. It is related also in the *Scaligerana*, which are culled from the conversations of Joseph Scaliger. It is very likely that Julius Scaliger had known something of Brugnol which he no longer remembered, and that the dream was partly the revival of a former idea, although he may not have had that reminiscence, properly so called, which makes us know that we have already had this same idea; at least, I see no necessity which obliges us to assert that there remains no trace of a perception when there is not enough of it to remind you that you have had it.]

§ 24. *Ph.* [I must admit that your reply is natural enough to the difficulties which we have framed against innate truths. Perhaps, also, our authors do not contest them in the sense in which you maintain them. Thus I return only to say to you, sir] that you have had some reason to fear that the view of innate truths serves as a pretext for laziness, for exempting one's self from the trouble of research, and gives opportunity to-

masters and teachers to lay down as a principle of principles that principles must not be questioned.

Th. [I have already said that if it is the aim of your friends to advise the search for the proofs of the truths which they can receive, without distinguishing whether or not they are innate, we are entirely agreed; and the view of innate truths, of the manner in which I take them, should deter no one from such search, for, besides being well to seek the reason of the instincts, it is one of my great maxims that it is good to seek demonstrations of the axioms also, and I remember that at Paris, when the late Mr. Roberval, already an old man, was laughed at because he wished to demonstrate those of Euclid after the example of Apollonius and Proclus, I illustrated the utility of this investigation. Nevertheless, whatever the principle of those who say that it is wholly unnecessary to argue against the one who denies principles, it has no authority whatever in regard to these principles which could receive neither doubt nor proof. It is true that, in order to avoid scandal and disturbance, regulations may be made regarding public disputations and some other lectures, in virtue of which the discussion of certain established truths may be prohibited. But this is rather a question of police than of philosophy.]

CORRIGENDA.

The following corrections are to be made in the text of the first instalment of this translation, and the accompanying note, published in "The Journal of Speculative Philosophy," vol. xix, No. 8, July, 1885, pp. 275 sq.

In Prefatory Note: Page 277, line 24, instead of "district," read "Quarter."

Page 277, line 25, *dele*, "Spiers and Surenne's French Dictionary."

Page 278, lines 11, 12, instead of "might give him (Leibnitz) the urgent advice," read "would urgently advise him (Leibnitz)."

Note 1, page 278. W. T. H. suggests that perhaps the reading was *besogne* (work)—instead of *besoin*. So that the passage would read, "researches which required more work (or labor)."

In text of translation: Page 280, line 8, instead of "without" read "notwithstanding."

Page 280, line 38, instead of "triumphs" read "will triumph."

Page 281, line 18, instead of "anew," read "as a piece of news."

Page 281, line 20, instead of "elsewhere," read "for the rest."

Page 281, line 32, read "harmony pre-established by the primitive Substance."

Page 281, lines 34, 35, the sense is, and the text should therefore read, "you can say that all things are of one and the same kind, differing only in degrees of perfection."

Page 281, line 38, instead of "at the house of Pliny," read "according to," or "in the writings of Pliny."

Page 282, line 27, instead of "you. If only," read "you, except that."

Page 283, lines 1-5. After the words "have always," read "the purest kind of spirits, notwithstanding our [physical] organs, which cannot, by any influence of theirs, interfere with the laws of our [spiritual] spontaneity. I find void and atoms excluded from (or, in) my theory, in quite another way than by the sophism of the Cartesians," etc.

Page 283, line 18, instead of "Finally," read "In brief."

Page 283, line 21, instead of "should not know how to conceal," read "cannot conceal."

Page 283, line 27, instead of "elsewhere," read "formerly."

Page 283, line 31, instead of "But these new lights have cured," read "But this new light has cured."

Page 283, line 37, insert after "a little," "too much."

Page 284, line 1, instead of "assuming," read "favorable."

Page 284, lines 17, 18, read "retained even its expressions."

Page 284, lines 19, 20, instead of "as in some encounters," read "except at certain junctures."

Page 284, line 23, instead of "therein," read "therefrom."

Page 285, line 13, instead of "will have stirred," read "doubtless stirred."

Page 285, line 14, instead of "He will have chosen," read "No doubt he desired."

Page 285, line 32, insert after "even" "from."

Page 287, line 23, instead of "could not come from any other place," read "could not elsewhere arise (or appear)."

Page 291, line 36, instead of "them," read "it."

Page 293, line 1, instead of "cross-grained," read "complicated," "intricate," or "involved."

Page 295, line 2, insert after "these" "truths."

Page 294, line 22, *dele* "even."

I should add that I am again debtor to the courtesy of Harvard College Library for the use of Gerhardt's edition of the text of the *Nouveaux Essais*.—TRANSLATOR.

THE SOUL'S PROGRESS IN GOD.

TRANSLATED FROM THE LATIN OF BONAVENTURA ("ITINERARIUM MENTIS IN DEUM") BY
THOMAS DAVIDSON.

John Fidanza (1221-1274), better known as Saint Bonaventura and the Seraphic Doctor, Cardinal and General of the Franciscan order, stands beside the great Dominican Doctor, Thomas Aquinas, whose intimate friend he was, as one of the two bright lights of mediæval thought. They represent its two chief directions. Thomas is a scholastic, Bonaventura a mystic. Of the numerous works of the latter, the best known and most admired are his "Breviloquium" and his "Itinerarium Mentis in Deum." Of these, the great French chancellor Gerson says: "Bonaventura's two little works—the 'Brevi-

loquium' and the 'Itinerarium'—are divinely composed with such compendious art that above them there is nothing."

The following is an attempt at a translation of the latter. I say "an attempt," because I am fully aware that it is far from being a complete success. And for this there are several reasons. In the first place, the Saint wrote such poor Latin that it is sometimes hard to discover what he means. In the second, the printed texts of his works literally swarm with misprints, some of which render sentences ingrammatical. I have used two texts, that of Severino Frati, which is accompanied by an Italian translation, and that of C. J. Hefele. It is curious to find the same misprints in both, even in quotations from the Bible.

Imperfect as my translation is, I hope it will help to call the attention of the religious world to a work which, among all the writings of Roman Catholic Christianity, stands next to the "Imitation of Christ." It is, of course, a very different work from the latter, and meant for readers of a different order of mind. The "Imitation" is intended for edification; the "Itinerary" for mystical enlightenment. It is, indeed, a manual of instruction in mystical contemplation, and, as such, has, I believe, no equal.

I had intended to accompany my translation with explanatory notes, which, indeed, are very necessary; but I soon found that I could not do this without occupying more space than the "Journal of Speculative Philosophy" could spare. I may hereafter publish the translation in book-form, with extensive notes.

A literal translation of the title would have been "The Mind's Itinerary to God," but I think the one I have chosen sufficiently expresses the purpose of the work and means more to us.

I have tried to make my translation as literal as possible, and this for the reason that I could hardly do otherwise without departing from the meaning of the original. Old thoughts can hardly be expressed in new words, and therefore I have retained the author's diction sometimes even where it compelled me to use obsolete or unusual English words, such as *assumption*, *dijudicate*, and the like. All such words are intelligible enough, and most are properly enough defined in the dictionaries. There is one exception—viz., *synderesis* (usually written *synderesis*, that is, *συνεργισμός*). Gerson's definition is: "An appetitive faculty of the soul, receiving from God a certain natural inclination to the good; a natural stimulus to good." Thomas Aquinas defines it thus: "*Synderesis* is not a kind of special power higher than the reason, like nature; but a kind of natural possession of principles of practice, just as the intellect is a possession of principles of theory, and not any kind of power." (See p. 294.)

PROLOGUE.

In the beginning¹ I invoke the First Principle, from whom, as from the Father of Lights,² descend all illuminations, from whom is every best and every perfect gift—that is, I invoke the Eternal Father, through his Son, our Lord Jesus Christ, that, by the intercession of the Most Holy Virgin Mary, Mother of the same God and our Lord Jesus Christ, and by that of the Blessed Francis, our guide and father, He would illuminate the eyes of our soul,³

¹ John, i, 1.

² James, i, 17.

³ Luke, i, 79; Philip, iv, 7; John, xiv, 27.

to guide our feet into the way of that peace which passeth all sense, the peace which our Lord Jesus Christ preached and gave, of which preaching our father, Saint Francis, was the repeater, in every sermon proclaiming peace at the beginning and end; in every salutation wishing peace; in every contemplation sighing for ecstatic peace, as a citizen of that Jerusalem, whereof it is said by that Man of Peace, who was peaceful with them who hated peace: "Seek ye those things which are for the peace of Jerusalem."¹ For He knew that the throne of Solomon was only in peace, as it is written: "In Salem (peace) also is his Tabernacle and his dwelling-place in Zion."² When, therefore, according to the example of our most blessed father Francis, I panted after this peace—I, a sinner, who, though in all respects unworthy, have succeeded, the seventh in order since his transition, in the room of that most blessed Father,³ to the general ministry of the brethren—it happened that by the Divine will, in the thirty-third year after the transition of this blessed father, I, desiring to find peace of spirit, withdrew to Mount Alvernia as to a quiet place; and while I abode there and was considering in my mind certain mental ascensions to God, there occurred to me, among other things, that miracle which in the above-mentioned spot happened to the blessed Francis, namely, the vision of a winged seraph in the form of a crucifix. And, as I reflected thereupon, it immediately appeared to me that this vision typified the uplifting of our father in contemplation and the way that leads thereto; for by the six wings we may rightly understand the six upliftings of illumination, whereby, as by a kind of steps or paths, the soul is disposed to pass upward to peace through the ecstatic transports of Christian Wisdom. But there is no way save through most ardent love for the Crucified, who so transformed Paul, when caught up to the third heaven,⁴ into Christ that he said: "I have been crucified with Christ; and I live no longer as I, but Christ liveth in me."⁵ He likewise so absorbed the mind of Francis that it revealed itself in the flesh, inasmuch as he bore the most sacred stigmata of the Passion in his body for two years before his death. The figure, therefore, of the six seraphic wings implies the six degrees of illumination, which, beginning with cre-

¹ Psalms, cxxii, 6.

² Psalms, lxxvi, 3.

³ See Pref., p. 288.

⁴ 2 Cor. xii, 2.

⁵ Gal. ii, 20.

ated things, lead up even to God, to whom no one rightly enters except through the Crucified. "For he that entereth not by the door into the fold of the sheep, but climbeth up some other way, the same is a thief and a robber; but he that entereth in by the door shall go in and out and shall find pasture."¹ Wherefore John saith in the Apocalypse: "Blessed are they that wash their robes in the blood of the Lamb; that they may have the authority over the tree of life, and may enter in by the gates into the city."² As if He said that the heavenly Jerusalem cannot be entered by contemplation except through the blood of the Lamb as a gate; for no man is in any way disposed to divine contemplations which lead to mental transports, unless with Daniel³ he be a man of desires; for desires are kindled in us in two ways—through the cry of prayer, which maketh us roar from anguish of heart, and by the lightning of speculation, whereby the mind is turned altogether directly and intently to the rays of light. Wherefore, to the groaning of prayer through Christ crucified, through whose blood we are cleansed from the defilements of sin, I first of all invite the reader, lest he should, perchance, think that reading will suffice without unction, speculation without devotion, research without admiration, circumspection without exultation, industry without piety, knowledge without charity, intelligence without humility, study without divine grace, the mirror without divinely inspired wisdom. To those, therefore, who are subjects of prevenient grace, the humble and pious, the contrite and devout, to those who are anointed with the oil of divine joy, to the lovers of divine Wisdom, and to them who are kindled with the desire thereof, and who wish to devote themselves to magnifying, loving, and trusting God, I offer the following speculations, at the same time warning them that the mirror held up outside availeth little or nothing, unless the mirror of our minds be clean and polished. Exercise thyself, therefore, O man of God, upon the rankling prick of conscience, before thou raisest thine eyes to the rays of divine Wisdom reflected in her mirror, lest haply, from gazing at these rays, thou fall into a deeper pit of darkness.

I purpose to divide my treatise into seven chapters, prefixing to each a title for the easier understanding of the things treated

¹ John, x, 1, 2.² Rev. xxii, 14.³ Dan. ix, 23; x, 11.

therein. I beg my readers, therefore, that they will regard the intention of the writer more than his work, the meaning of his words more than his uncouth speech, truth more than elegance of style, exercise of affection more than erudition of intellect. Those who will do this must not run lightly over the course of these speculations, but must with all care ruminate upon them.

THE SPECULATION OF THE POOR MAN IN THE WILDERNESS.

CHAPTER I.

ON THE DEGREES OF ASCENSION TO GOD, AND THE BEHOLDING OF HIM THROUGH HIS FOOTSTEPS IN THE UNIVERSE.

“Blessed is the man whose strength is in thee; in whose heart are the highways to Zion. Passing through the valley of weeping, they make it a place of springs.”¹ Since bliss is naught but the enjoyment of the Supreme Good, and the Supreme Good is above us, no one can become blest unless he ascend above himself, with ascension not of the body, but of the heart. But we cannot be lifted above ourselves, save through a higher power lifting us up. For, however much our inward steps may be ordered, nothing is done unless divine aid accompany. But divine aid accompanies those who ask it from the heart, humbly and devoutly, and this is to sigh for it in this vale of tears—which is done by fervent prayer. Prayer, therefore, is the mother and source of uprising to God. Wherefore Dionysius, in his “Mystic Theology,” wishing to instruct us in the way to attain mental transports, sets down prayer as the first step. Let us each, therefore, pray and say to our Lord, God: “Lead me, O Lord, in thy way, and I will walk in thy truth. Let my heart rejoice to fear thee.”² In praying this prayer, we are illuminated to know the steps of ascension to God. For, inasmuch as, in our present condition, this Universe of things is a stair whereby we may ascend to God; and, since among these things some are his footprints, some his image, some corporeal, some spiritual, some temporal, some eternal; and, hence, some outside of us, and some inside; in order that we may attain to the consideration of the First Principle, which is altogether spiritual, eternal, and above us, we must pass through the footsteps, which are corporeal, temporal, and outside of us; and this is to

¹ Psalms, lxxxiv, 4-6.

² Psalms, lxxxvi, 11.

be led in the way of God.¹ We must also enter into our own minds, which are the image of God, eternal, spiritual, and within us; and this is to enter into the TRUTH of God. We must also rise aloft to the eternal, which is purely spiritual and above us, by looking at the First Principle; and this is to rejoice in the KNOWLEDGE of God and in REVERENCE for his majesty. This, then, is the three-days' journey in the wilderness. This is the threefold illumination of one day; the first is as the evening, the second as the morning, and the third as noon-day. This has regard to the threefold existence of things; that is, in matter, in intelligence, and in the divine art, as it is written: "Let there be made; He made, and it was made."² This also has regard to the triple substance in Christ, who is our stair—that is, the corporeal, the spiritual, and the divine.

According to this triple progress, our minds have three principal outlooks. The first is toward corporeal things without, and with reference to this it is called animality or sensuality. The second is directed inward upon and into itself, and with reference to this it is called spirit. The third is directed upward above itself, and in reference to this it is called mind. With all these it must dispose itself to ascend to God, that it may love him with the whole mind, the whole heart, and the whole soul, in which consist at once perfect observance of the law and Christian Wisdom.

But, since every one of the aforesaid modes is doubled, according as we come to consider God as *Alpha* and as *Omega*, or according as we come to see God in each of the above modes through a glass and in a glass, or because each of these considerations has to be commingled with the other that is joined to it, and also to be considered in its purity, so it is necessary that these three grades should rise to the number of six; whence, as God finished the universal world in six days and rested on the seventh, so the smaller world is led in the most orderly way, by six successive grades of illumination, to the rest of contemplation. Typical of this are the six steps leading to the throne of Solomon:³ the six-winged Seraphim which Isaiah saw;⁴ the six days after which God called Moses from the midst of the darkness;⁵ the six days after which-

¹ John, xiv, 6.

² Gen. i, 2, 3.

³ 1 Kings, x, 19.

⁴ Isaiah, vi, 2.

⁵ Exod. xxiv, 16.

as we read in Matthew, Christ led his disciples up into a mountain, and was transfigured before them.¹

Corresponding, therefore, to the six grades of ascension into God are the six grades of the powers of the soul, whereby we ascend from the lowest to the highest; from the external to the most internal; from the temporal to the eternal; namely: sense, imagination, reason, intellect, intelligence, and the apex of the mind, or the spark of synteresis.² These grades are implanted in us by nature, deformed by sin, reformed by grace, to be purged by justice, exercised by knowledge, perfected by wisdom. For, according to the first institution of nature, man was created fit for the quiet of contemplation; and, for this reason, God placed him in a Paradise of delights; but, turning away from the true light to mutable good, he himself was made crooked through his own fault, and his whole race through original sin, which infected human nature in two ways—the mind with ignorance, and the flesh with concupiscence; so that man, blinded and bowed down, sits in darkness and sees not the light of heaven, unless he be aided by grace with justice against concupiscence, and by knowledge with wisdom against ignorance. All this is done through Jesus Christ, “who for us was made wisdom from God and justice and sanctification and redemption.”³ He, being the Power and Wisdom of God, the incarnate Word full of grace and truth, made grace and truth. To wit, he infused the grace of charity, which, when it comes “of a pure heart, a good conscience, and faith unfeigned,”⁴ rectifies the whole soul, in its threefold outlook above mentioned. He also taught the knowledge of truth, according to the three modes of Theology—that is, symbolic, proper, and mystical—so that, through symbolic theology, we might rightly use sensible things; through theology proper, intelligible things; and, through mystical theology, might be caught up into supermental ecstasies.

Whoever, therefore, would ascend to God must avoid deforming sin and exercise the above-named natural powers, with a view to reforming grace, and this by prayer; with a view to purifying justice, and this in conversation; with a view to illuminating science, and this in meditation; with a view to perfecting wisdom, and this in contemplation. Therefore, even as no one comes to

¹ Matth. xvii, 1.

² See p. 289.

³ 1 Cor. i, 30.

⁴ 1 Tim. i, 5

wisdom save through grace, justice, and knowledge, so no one comes to contemplation save by clear meditation, holy conversation, and devout prayer. As grace, therefore, is the foundation of rightness of will, and of the clear illumination of reason, so we must first pray, then live holily, and, thirdly, attend to the manifestations of truth; and, so attending, we must gradually rise, till we reach the high mountain, where the God of Gods is seen in Zion.

And, since we must ascend Jacob's ladder, before we descend, let us place the first step in the ascent at the bottom, holding up this whole sensible world before us, as a mirror, through which we may rise to God, the supreme artificer, that we may be true Hebrews, passing forth from Egypt to the land promised to our fathers; also that we may be Christians, passing forth with Christ from this world to the Father; and that we may be lovers of Wisdom, that calleth and saith: "Come unto me all ye that desire me, and be ye filled with mine offspring."¹ "For, from the greatness and beauty of created things, their Creator may be seen and known."² The supreme power, wisdom, and benevolence of the Creator is reflected in all created things, as is reported in threefold fashion by the sense of the flesh to the interior sense. For the sense of the flesh lends itself to the intellect when it investigates with reason, believes with faith, or contemplates with intellect. In contemplating, it considers the actual existence of things; in believing, their habitual course; in reasoning, their potential pre-excellence.

The first point of view, which is that of contemplation, considering things in themselves, sees in them weight, number, and measure; weight, which marks the point to which they tend; number, whereby they are distinguished; measure, whereby they are limited; and hereby it sees in them mode, species, order, as well as substance, virtue, and action, from which it may arise, as from footsteps, to understand the power, wisdom, and boundless goodness of the Creator.

The second point of view, which is that of faith, considering this world, attends to its origin, course, and termination. For by faith we believe that the ages were arranged by the Word of Life;³

¹ Sirach, xiv, 20.

² Wisdom, xiii, 5.

³ Heb. xi, 3.

by faith we believe that the epochs of the three laws—the law of nature, the law of scripture, and the law of grace—succeed each other and have elapsed in the most perfect order; by faith we believe that the world will be terminated by a final judgment. In the first we observe the power; in the second, the providence; in the third, the justice of the Supreme Principle.

The third point of view—that of reason—investigating, sees that some things are only, and some are and live only, whereas some are, live, and discern; and that the first are inferior; the second, middle; the third, superior. It sees, likewise, that some are only corporeal, and some partly corporeal, partly spiritual; whence it concludes that there are some purely spiritual, as better and worthier than either. It sees, moreover, that some are mutable and corruptible, as terrestrial things; others mutable and incorruptible, as celestial things; whence it concludes that some are immutable and incorruptible, as supercelestial things. From these visible things, therefore, it rises to consider God's power, wisdom, and goodness, as being, living, and intelligent, as purely spiritual, incorruptible, and intransmutable. This consideration, again, is extended according to the sevenfold condition of created things, which is the sevenfold witness of the divine power, wisdom, and goodness, if we consider the origin, magnitude, multitude, beauty, plenitude, action, and order of all things. For the origin of things, in respect to creation, distinction, and adornment, as far as the works of the six days are concerned, proclaims the divine power, producing all things from nothing; the divine wisdom, as clearly distinguishing all things; the divine goodness, as generously adorning all things. The magnitude of things—in respect to the bulk of length, breadth, and depth; in respect to the excellence of the power extending itself in length, breadth, and depth, as is manifest in the diffusion of light; in respect to the efficacy of action, intimate, continuous, and diffused, as is manifested in the action of fire—clearly indicates the immensity of the power, wisdom, and goodness of the threefold God, who exists uncircumscribed in all created things, through power, presence, and essence. The multitude of things—in respect to their diversity, general, special, and individual, in substance, in form or figure, and in efficacy, beyond all human estimation—manifestly involves and displays the immensity of the three above-named conditions in God.

The beauty of things—in respect to the variety of lights, figures, and colors, in bodies simple, mixed, and organized, as in the heavenly bodies and minerals, as in stones and metals, plants and animals—plainly proclaims the above three things. The plentitude of things—in that matter is full of forms, in respect to seminal reasons, form is full of virtue as to active power, and virtue is full of effects as to efficiency—manifestly declares this same thing. Action, manifold, according as it is natural, artificial, or moral, by its most manifold variety, shows the immensity of that power, art, and goodness which indeed is to all things the cause of being, the ground of understanding, and the order of living. Order, in respect to the ratio of duration, situation, and influence—that is, to sooner or later, higher or lower, nobler or baser—in the book of creation, clearly manifests the primacy, sublimity, and divinity of the First Principle in regard to infinity of power, while the order of the divine laws, precepts, and judgments, in the book of Scripture, manifests the immensity of his wisdom; and the order of the divine sacraments, benefits, and retributions in the body of the Church manifests the immensity of his goodness, so that order itself most evidently leads us by the hand to that which is first and highest, mightiest, and wisest and best. He, therefore, who is not enlightened by all these splendors of created things is blind; he who is not waked by such callings is deaf; he who from all these effects does not praise God is dumb; he who after such intimation does not observe the First Principle is foolish.

Open, therefore, thine eyes; draw near thy spiritual ears; unseal thy lips, and apply thy heart, that in all created things thou mayest see, hear, praise, love, magnify, and honor God, lest, peradventure, the universal frame of things should rise up against thee. Yea, for this the universe will fight against them that are without senses, whereas to them that have senses it will be a matter of glory, who can say with the Prophet: "Thou, Lord, hast made me glad through thy work; I will triumph in the works of thy hands."¹ "O Lord, how manifold are thy works! In wisdom hast thou made them all. The earth is full of thy riches."²

¹ Psalms, xcii, 4.² Psalms, civ, 24.

CHAPTER II.

ON THE BEHOLDING OF GOD IN HIS FOOTSTEPS IN THIS SENSIBLE WORLD.

But since, as regards the mirror of sensible things, we may contemplate God, not only through them, as through footprints, but also in them, in so far as he is in them by essence, power, and presence, and this consideration is loftier than the preceding; wherefore this kind of consideration occupies the second place, as the second grade of contemplation, whereby we must be guided to the contemplation of God in all created things, which enter our minds through the bodily senses.

We must observe, therefore, that this sensible world, which is called the macrocosm—that is, the long world—enters into our soul, which is called the microcosm—that is, the little world—through the gates of the five senses, as regards the apprehension, delectation, and distinction of these sensible things; which is manifest in this way: In the sensible world some things are generant, others are generated, and others direct both these. Generant are the simple bodies; that is, the celestial bodies and the four elements. For out of the elements, through the power of light, reconciling the contrariety of elements in things mixed, are generated and produced whatever things are generated and produced by the operation of natural power. Generated are the bodies composed of the elements, as minerals, vegetables, sensible things, and human bodies. Directing both these and those are the spiritual substances, whether altogether conjunct, like the souls of the brutes, or separably conjunct, like rational souls, or altogether separate, like the celestial spirits, which the philosophers call Intelligences, we Angels. On these, according to the philosophers, it devolves to move the heavenly bodies, and for this reason the administration of the universe is ascribed to them, as receiving from the First Cause—that is, God—that inflow of virtue which they pour forth again in relation to the work of government, which has reference to the natural consistence of things. But, according to the theologians, the direction of the universe is ascribed to these same beings, as regards the works of redemption, with respect to which

they are called "ministering spirits sent forth to do service for the sake of them that shall inherit salvation."¹

Man, therefore, who is called the lesser world, has five senses, like five gates, through which the knowledge of all the things that are in the sensible world enters into his soul. For through sight there enter the sublime and luminous bodies and all other colored things; through touch, solid and terrestrial bodies; through the three intermediate senses, the intermediate bodies; through taste, the aqueous; through hearing, the aërial; through smell, the vaporable, which have something of the humid, something of the aërial, and something of the fiery or hot, as is clear from the fumes that are liberated from spices. There enter, therefore, through these doors not only the simple bodies, but also the mixed bodies compounded of these. Seeing, then, that with sense we perceive not only these particular sensibles—light, sound, odor, savor, and the four primary qualities which touch apprehends—but also the common sensibles—number, magnitude, figure, rest, and motion; and seeing that everything which moves is moved by something else, and certain things move and rest of themselves, as do the animals, in apprehending through these five senses the motions of bodies, we are guided to the knowledge of spiritual motions, as by an effect to the knowledge of causes.

In the three classes of things, therefore, the whole of this sensible world enters the human soul through apprehension. These external sensible things are those which first enter into the soul through the gates of the five senses. They enter, I say, not through their substances, but through their similitudes, generated first in the medium, and from the medium in the external organ, and from the external organ in the internal organ, and from this in the apprehensive power; and thus generation in the medium, and from the medium in the organ, and the direction of the apprehensive power upon it, produce the apprehension of all those things which the soul apprehends externally.

This apprehension, if it is directed to a proper object, is followed by delight. The sense delights in the object perceived through its abstract similitude, either by reason of its beauty, as in vision, or by reason of its sweetness, as in smell and hearing, or by reason

¹ Heb. i, 14.

of its healthfulness, as in taste and touch, properly speaking. But all delight is by reason of proportion. But since species is the ground of form, power, and action, according as it has reference to the principle from which it emanates, the medium into which it passes, or the term upon which it acts, therefore proportion is observed in three things: It is observed in similitude, inasmuch as it forms the ground of species or form, and so is called speciosity, because beauty is nothing but numerical equality, or a certain disposition of parts accompanied with sweetness of color. It is observed in so far as it forms the ground of power or virtue, and thus is called sweetness, when the active virtue does not disproportionally exceed the recipient virtue, because the sense is depressed by extremes and delighted by means. It is observed in so far as it forms the ground of efficacy and impression, which is proportional when the agent, in impressing, satisfies the need of the patient, and this is to preserve and nourish it, as appears chiefly in taste and touch. And thus we see how, by pleasure, external delightful things enter through similitude into the soul, according to the threefold method of delectation.

After this apprehension and delight there comes discernment, by which we not only discern whether this thing be white or black (because this alone belongs to the outer sense), and whether this thing be wholesome or hurtful (because this belongs to the inner sense), but also discern why this delights and give a reason therefor. And in this act we inquire into the reason of the delight which is derived by the sense from the object. This happens when we inquire into the reason of the beautiful, the sweet, and the wholesome, and discover that it is a proportion of equality. But a ratio of equality is the same in great things and in small. It is not extended by dimensions; it does not enter into succession, or pass with passing things; it is not altered by motions. It abstracts, therefore, from place, time, and motion, and for this reason it is immutable, uncircumscribable, interminable, and altogether spiritual. Discernment, then, is an action which, by purifying and abstracting, makes the sensible species, sensibly received through the senses, enter into the intellective power. And thus the whole of this world enters into the human soul by the gates of the five senses, according to the three aforesaid activities.

All these things are footprints, in which we may behold our

God. For, since an apprehended species is a similitude generated in a medium and then impressed upon the organ, and through that impression leads to the knowledge of its principle—that is, of its object—it manifestly implies that that eternal light generates from itself a similitude, or splendor, coequal, consubstantial, and coeternal, and that He who is the image and similitude of the invisible God, and the splendor of the glory, and the figure of the substance which is everywhere, generates, by his first generation of himself, his own similitude, in the form of an object in the entire medium, unites himself, by the grace of union, to the individual of rational nature, as a species to a bodily organ, so that by this union he may lead us back to the Father as the fontal principle and object. If, therefore, all cognizable things generate species of themselves, they clearly proclaim that in them, as in mirrors, may be seen the eternal generation of the Word, the Image, and the Son, eternally emanating from God the Father.

According to this mode, the pleasing species—as specious, sweet, and wholesome—implies that the first speciosity, sweetness, and wholesomeness are in that first species in which are the highest proportionality and equality to the Generant Principle; in which is virtue gliding into the apprehension, not through phantasms, but through truth; and in which is an impression, saving, sufficient, and expelling all want on the part of the apprehender. If, then, delight is the conjunction of the suitable with the suitable, and only the similitude of God forms the ground of that which is supremely specious, sweet, and wholesome, and is united according to truth, to inwardness, and to fulness filling all capacity, we may see clearly that in God alone is fontal and true delight, and that we are led to seek this by all delights.

But, by a still more excellent and more immediate mode, discernment leads us to a surer beholding of eternal truth. For, if discernment is conducted by reason abstracting from place, time, and mutability, and hence from dimension, succession, and transmutation, by reason immutable, uncircumscribable, and interminable—and there is nothing at all immutable, uncircumscribable, and interminable save the eternal—and all the eternal is either God or in God; if, therefore, we discern by this sort of reason whatever we discern with clearness, it is plain that He is the reason of all things, the infallible rule, and the light of truth, in which all

things are reflected infallibly, indelibly, indubitably, irrefragably, indijudicably, unchangeably, unconfinally, interminably, indivisibly, and intellectually. And, therefore, those laws whereby we judge with certainty concerning all the sensible things which come under our consideration being infallible and indubitable to the intellect of the apprehender, indelible from the memory of the recollector, as being always present, irrefragable, and indijudicable to the intellect of the judger, because, as Augustine says, no one judges concerning them, but only through them, they must needs be unchangeable and incorruptible, as being necessary; unconfinal, as being uncircumscribed; interminable, as being eternal; and hence indivisible, as being intellectual and incorporeal; not made, but increate; existing eternally in the eternal art, from which, through which, and according to which all specious or beautiful things are formed. And, therefore, they cannot with certainty be judged except by that which was not only the form producing all things, but also the form preserving and distinguishing all things, inasmuch as it is being, which in all things is form, directive rule, and that whereby our minds distinguish all those things that enter them through the senses.

But this speculation is extended according to the consideration of the seven differences of the numbers by which, as by seven steps, we ascend to God, as Augustine shows in his work "On True Religion" and in the sixth book of his treatise on "Music," wherein he fixes the differences of the numbers that gradually ascend from these sensible things to the artificer of all, so that God is seen in all things. He says that there are numbers in bodies, and especially in sounds and voices, and these he calls sonant numbers; that there are numbers abstracted from these and received into our senses, and these he calls occursors; that there are numbers proceeding from the soul into the body, as is shown in gestures and dances, and these he calls progressors; that there are numbers in the delights of the senses and in the turning of the intention to the received species, and these he calls sensual numbers; that there are numbers retained in the memory, and these he calls memorial numbers; and, finally, that there are numbers by which we judge concerning all these things, and these he calls judicial numbers. These, as has been said, are necessarily above the mind, as being infallible and indijudicable. By these

are impressed upon our minds the artificial numbers, which Augustine does not enumerate among those grades, because they are connected with the judicial numbers; and from these emanate the progressors, from which are created the beautiful forms of artificial things; so that there is an orderly descent from the highest, through the medial, to the lowest. To these also let us ascend from the sonant numbers, through the occursors, the sensual, and the memorial.

Since, therefore, all things are beautiful and, in a certain way, delightful, and since beauty and delight are inseparable from proportion, and proportion is primarily in numbers, all things must of necessity be full of number. For this reason, number is the chief exemplar in the mind of the artificer, and in things the chief footprint leading to wisdom. Since this is most manifest to all and most close to God, it leads as most closely and by seven differences to God, and makes him known in all things, corporeal and sensible. And, while we apprehend numerical things, we delight in numerical proportions, and judge irrefragably by the laws of these.

From these first two steps, whereby we are guided to the beholding of God in his footprints, after the manner, as it were, of the two wings descending about the (seraph's) feet, we may gather that all the created things of this sensible world lead the mind of the contemplant and wise man to the eternal God, and this for the reason that of this First Principle, mightiest, wisest, best, of this eternal origin, light and fulness, of this art efficient, exemplar, ordinar, they are shadows, echoes, and pictures, footprints, images, and spectacles, set before us for the beholding of God, and signs divinely given. These, I say, are, so to speak, exemplars, or rather examples, set before minds still rude and sensual, so that, through the sensible things which they see, they may be transported to intelligible things which they do not see, as through signs to the things signified. And such created things of this sensible world signify the invisible things of the invisible God, partly because God is the origin, exemplar, and end of all created things (and every effect is a sign of its cause, an example of its exemplar, and a path to the end whereunto it leads), partly through representation proper, partly through prophetic prefiguration, partly through angelic action, and partly through superadded instruc-

tion. For every creature is by nature an effigy and similitude of that eternal Wisdom; but especially so is that creature which in the book of Scripture was assumed by the spirit of prophecy for the prefiguration of spiritual things; more especially those creatures in whose effigy God was willing to appear for the angelic ministry; and most especially that creature which he was willing to set forth as a sign, and which plays the part not only of a sign, as that word is commonly used, but also of a sacrament. From all this we gather that "the invisible things of God, since the creation of the world, are clearly seen, being perceived through the things that are made,"¹ so that those who will not observe these things and recognize, bless, and love God in all these things, are without excuse, since they will not be transported from darkness to the wondrous light of God.² But, thanks be to God, through our Lord, Jesus Christ, who has transported us from darkness into His wondrous light, inasmuch as we are disposed, by these lights given from without, to re-enter the mirror of our minds, in which the divine things are reflected.

CHAPTER III.

ON THE BEHOLDING OF GOD THROUGH HIS IMAGE IMPRESSED UPON THE NATURAL POWERS.

But, since the two grades above described, leading us to God by his footprints, whereby he is reflected in all created things, have guided us to the point where we entered into ourselves—that is, into our minds, in which the divine image is reflected—we must now, in the third place, enter into ourselves, and leaving, as it were, the forecourt outside, endeavor, through a mirror, to see God in the Holy Place—that is, in the forepart of the Tabernacle—wherein, as from a candlestick, the light of truth is reflected on the faces of our minds, in which, indeed, is resplendent the image of the most blessed Trinity.

Enter, therefore, into thyself and see that thy mind loves itself most fervently, and could not love itself if it did not know itself, or know itself if it did not remember itself, since we seize nothing through intelligence that is not present in our memory. And hereby thou perceivest, not with the eye of flesh, but with the eye

¹ Rom. i, 20.

² Rom. i, 21.

of reason, that thy soul has a threefold power. Consider, therefore, the operations and habits of these three powers, and thou wilt be able to see God through thyself, as through a likeness, and this is seeing him through a glass and in a riddle.¹

But the operation of memory is retention and re-presentation, not only of things present, corporeal, and temporal, but also of things successive, simple, and sempiternal. For the memory retains past things through recollection, present things through susception, future things through foresight. It retains also simple things; for example, the principles of continuous and discreet quantities, as point, instant, unity, without which it is impossible to remember or to think the things which have these for their principles. No less does it retain, as sempiternal and sempiternally, the principles and dignities of the sciences, because it can never so forget them, while it uses reason, that it will not accept them and assent to them, as soon as it hears them, and this not as if it perceived them afresh, but as recognizing them to be innate in itself and familiar. This becomes clear as soon as we propose to any one a choice between affirmation and negation with regard to anything, whether "every whole is greater than its part," or whatever other dignity, being above contradiction, is admitted by reason. From the first actual retention, therefore, of temporal things—that is, of things past, present, and future—it receives an image of eternity, whose indivisible present extends to all times. From the second it appears that it must not only be informed from without, through phantasms, but also from above, by taking up and having in itself simple forms which cannot enter through the gates of the senses and the phantasms of sensible things. From the third we learn that it has present in it an unchangeable light, in which it remembers the unvarying truths. And thus, through the operations of the memory, it appears that the mind itself is an image of God, and a similitude so present to him, and having him so present to it, that it actually grasps him, is potentially capable of holding him, and may become a partaker in him.

Again, the operation of the intellective power consists in the perception of the meaning of terms, propositions, and inferences. But the intellect seizes the meanings of terms when it compre-

¹ 1 Cor. xiii, 12.

hends, by definition, what any particular thing is. But a definition can be made only through higher notions, and these have to be defined by still higher ones, until we arrive at the highest and most general, without a knowledge of which the lower ones cannot be definitely understood. Unless, therefore, we know what being-in-itself is, we cannot know the definition of any special substance. But being-in-itself cannot be known unless it is known along with its conditions, which are unity, truth, and goodness. But, since being can be thought as diminished and as complete, as imperfect and as perfect, as potential and as actual, as relative and as absolute, as partial and as total, as transient and as permanent, as through another and as through itself, as mixed with non-being and as pure, as dependent and as absolute, as posterior and as prior, as mutable and as immutable, as simple and as compound—since the privations and defects can in no degree be known save through the positions, our intellect, as being purely analytical, does not attain an understanding of any created entity, unless it be aided by the understanding of that being which is altogether pure, altogether actual, altogether complete and absolute, which is simply and eternally being, in which are the grounds of all things in their purity. How, indeed, should our intellect know that this being is a defective and incomplete being, if it had no knowledge of that being which is without all defect? And so on of the other conditions above specified. But our intellect is then said to comprehend truly the meaning of propositions when it knows with certainty that they are true; and to know this is to know, since it cannot be deceived in that comprehension; for it knows that that truth cannot be otherwise. It knows, therefore, that this truth is unchangeable. But since our minds are changeable, they cannot see that truth unchangeably reflected except by some other light which radiates altogether unchangeably, and this cannot possibly be a mutable, created thing. It knows, therefore, in that light which lighteth every man as he cometh into the world.¹ This is the true light, which in the beginning was with God.² Our intellect, then, truly perceives the meaning of an inference when it sees that the conclusion necessarily follows from the premises. This it sees not only in necessary, but also in contingent, terms; as, for exam-

¹ John, i, 9.

² John, i, 1.

ple, in this: If a man runs, a man moves. Again, he perceives this necessary habit not only in things that are, but also in things that are not. For example, the affirmation: If a man runs, a man moves, is equally true whether a man exist or do not exist. Hence the necessity of this sort of inference does not come from the existence of the thing in matter, because that is contingent; nor from the existence of the thing in the soul, because then it would be a fiction, if it were not in the thing. It comes, therefore, from the exemplarity in the eternal art, according to which things have mutually an aptitude and habit for the representation of that eternal art. Hence, as Augustine says in his treatise on "The True Religion," the light of every man who reasons truly is lit by that truth, and endeavors to arrive at that truth; from which it is obvious that our intellect is joined to the eternal truth itself, inasmuch as it can grasp no truth with certainty except through its teaching. Thou mayest, therefore, of thyself see the truth which teaches thee, if appetites and phantasms do not prevent thee and interpose themselves, as clouds, between thee and the ray of the truth.

The action of the power of choice is observed in counsel, judgment, desire. Counsel consists in inquiring which is better—this or that. By "better" we mean approaching more closely to the best. But approach implies greater assimilation. No one, therefore, knows whether this is better than that, unless he knows that it more closely resembles the best. And no one knows that one thing more closely resembles another, unless he knows that other. For I do not know that this man resembles Peter, unless I know or am acquainted with Peter. Every one, therefore, who takes counsel is impressed with the knowledge of the highest good. But any certain judgment with respect to things about which counsel can be taken must follow some law. And no one judges with certainty according to a law, unless he is certain that that law is right, and that he must not judge it. But our minds judge with regard to themselves. Since, then, they may not judge the law according to which they judge, that law is superior to our minds, and by this they judge according as it has been impressed upon them. And nothing is superior to the human mind save him alone who made it. Therefore, in judging, our deliberative power ascends to the divine laws, if it analyze with complete

analysis. Desire, again, is chiefly directed to that which most deeply moves it. But that moves it most deeply which is most deeply loved; and that which is most deeply loved is happiness. Again, happiness is not possessed except through the highest and ultimate end. But human desire craves nothing save the highest good, or what is co-ordinated with it, or what has some resemblance to it. Such is the power of the highest good that nothing can be loved by the creature save through the desire of that good. The creature is deceived and errs, when it accepts the semblance and image for the truth.

Behold, therefore, how near the soul is to God, and how memory leads to eternity, intelligence to truth, and power of choice to the highest goodness, according to their operations. Again, according to the order, origin, and habit of these powers, it leads up to the Blessed Trinity itself; for from memory arises intelligence, as its offspring; because then we understand, when a similitude which is in the memory, results in clearness of intellect, which is nothing else than the Word. From memory and intelligence is breathed forth love, as the bond between the two. These three—the generant mind, the word, and love—are in the soul as memory, intelligence, and love, which are consubstantial, coequal, and coeval, reciprocally passing in each other. If, therefore, God is perfect spirit, he has memory, intelligence, and will; he has the begotten Word and the breathed Love. These are necessarily distinguished, since the one is produced by the other, not essentially, not accidentally; therefore, personally. When, therefore, the mind considers itself, it rises through itself, as through a mirror, to behold the blessed Trinity of Father, Word, and Love—three persons coeternal, coequal, and consubstantial—so that each of the three is in each of the other two, whereas one is not the other, but these three are one God.

To this beholding of its own principle, three and one, through the trinity of its own powers, whereby it is the image of God, the soul is aided by the lights of the sciences, which perfect and inform it, and in three ways represent the most blessed Trinity; for all Philosophy is either natural, or rational, or moral. The first treats of the cause of being, and therefore leads to the Power of the Father; the second, of the ground of understanding, and therefore leads to the Wisdom of the Word; the third,

of the order of living, and therefore leads to the Goodness of the Holy Spirit. Again, the first is divided into metaphysics, mathematics, and physics. Of these, the first treats of the essences of things, the second of their numbers and figures, the third of their natures, powers, and diffusive actions. Hence, the first leads to the First Principle, the Father; the second to his Image, the Son; the third to the Gift of the Holy Spirit. The second is divided into grammar, which imparts power of expression; logic, which imparts perspicacity in argument; rhetoric, which imparts skill in persuading or moving; and these, in like manner, involve the mystery of the Most Blessed Trinity. The third is divided into monastics, economics, and politics. The first of these involves the innascibility of the First Principle; the second, the familiarity of the Son; the third, the liberality of the Holy Spirit. But all these sciences have fixed and infallible rules, as lights and rays descending from the eternal law into our minds. And thus our minds, being irradiated and superfused with so many splendors, may, if they be not blind, be led through themselves to the contemplation of that eternal light. And the irradiation and consideration of this light lifts up the wise into admiration, whereas it leads the foolish, who do not believe that they may understand, into confusion, so that the saying of the Prophet is fulfilled: "Thou shinest wondrously from the eternal hills: all the foolish were confounded in their hearts."¹

CHAPTER IV.

ON THE BEHOLDING OF GOD IN HIS IMAGE, AS REFORMED BY GIFTS OF GRACE.

But since, not only by passing through ourselves, but also within ourselves, we may behold the First Principle, and this vision is superior to the preceding, this mode of consideration occupies the fourth grade of contemplation. Strange it seems, when it has been shown that God is so near to our minds, that so few are able to behold the First Principle in themselves. But the reason is not far to seek. The human mind, distracted by cares, does not enter into itself through memory; beclouded with phantasms, it does not return to itself through intelligence; allured by appe-

¹ *Psalms*, lxxvi, 5, 6.

tites, it does not revert to itself through desire for internal sweetness and spiritual joy. Wherefore, being totally prostrate among these sensible things, it cannot enter in into itself, as into the image of God.

And since a man must lie in the spot where he falls, unless some one sets to work and helps him to rise, our souls could not be perfectly raised from these sensible things to the intuition of itself, and of eternal truth in itself, had not Truth, taking on human form in Christ, become a stair for it, repairing the former stair, which in Adam had been broken down. Hence, however far a man may be illuminated by the light of nature and acquired science, he cannot enter into himself, to enjoy himself in the Lord, save through the mediation of Christ, who says: "I am the door; by me if any man enter in, he shall be saved, and shall go in and out and shall find pasture."¹ But we do not approach this door unless we believe in him, hope for him, love him. If, therefore, we wish to re-enter to the fruition of truth, as into Paradise, we must go in through faith, hope, and love toward the mediator between God and man, Jesus Christ, who is, as it were, the tree of life in the midst of Paradise.

The image of our mind, therefore, must be clothed with the three theological virtues, whereby the soul is purified, illuminated, and perfected, and thus the image is reformed, repaired, and made suitable for the heavenly Jerusalem, and a part of the Church militant, which, according to the Apostle, is the offspring of the heavenly Jerusalem. For he says: "The Jerusalem that is above is free, which is our mother."² The soul, therefore, that believes in, hopes for, and loves Jesus Christ, who is the Word of the Father, incarnate, uncreated, inspired—that is, the way, the truth, and the life—does three things. In believing, through faith, in Christ as the uncreated Word, which is the word and glory of the Father, it recovers spiritual hearing and sight—hearing to receive the sayings of Christ, sight to behold the glories of his light. In longing with hope to receive the inspired word, through desire and affection it recovers its spiritual scent. In embracing with love the incarnate Word, as deriving delight from it, and in passing over into it through ecstatic love, it recovers spiritual taste and touch.

¹ John, x, 9.

² Gal. iv, 26.

Having recovered these senses, and seeing, hearing, smelling, tasting, and embracing its spouse, it is able to sing, like a bride, the Song of Songs, which was composed for the exercise of contemplation in this fourth grade, which no one comprehends save him who receives it, because it consists rather of affectional experience than of rational reflection. For in this grade, having recovered its interior senses, so as to see that which is supremely beautiful, to hear that which is supremely harmonious, to smell that which is supremely odoriferous, to taste that which is supremely sweet, to apprehend that which is supremely delightful, the mind is disposed to mental ecstasies—that is, through devotion, admiration, and exultation, according to the three exclamations uttered in the Song of Songs.¹ Of these, the first is uttered through superabundance of devotion, whereby the soul becomes like a rod of smoke from the perfumes of myrrh and frankincense. The second is uttered through excellence of admiration, whereby the soul becomes as the dawn, the moon, and the sun, according to that process of illuminations which lift up the soul to consider and admire its spouse.² The third takes place through superabundance of exultation, whereby the soul becomes rich in the joys of the sweetest delight, resting wholly upon its Beloved.³ Having acquired these things,⁴ our spirits become hierarchic to ascend aloft, through conformity to that supernal Jerusalem into which none enters, unless it first descend into his heart through grace, as John saw in his Apocalypse.⁵ But it descends into the heart when, through reformation of the image, through the theologic virtues, and through delights of the spiritual senses and upliftings of ecstasies, our spirits become hierarchic—that is, purged, illuminated, and perfected. Thus, likewise, it is marked by the grades of the nine orders, inasmuch as within it are disposed, in due order, annunciation, dictation, guidance, ordination, invigoration, command, acceptance, revelation, unification, which, in their grades, correspond to the nine orders of the Angels, so that the grades of the three first named have regard to the nature of the human soul; the three following grades, to its industry; the last three to grace. Possessing these, the soul, when it enters into itself, enters the

¹ Song of Songs, iii, 6.² *Ibid.*, vi, 9.³ *Ibid.*, viii, 3.⁴ Sum. Theol., I, q. cviii, art. 1.⁵ Rev. xxi, 27.

supernal Jerusalem, where, considering the orders of the Angels, it sees in them God, who, dwelling in them, performs all their actions. Whence Bernard says to Eugenius that God in the Seraphim loves as charity; in the Cherubim knows as truth; in the Thrones sits as equity; in the Dominions rules as majesty; in the Principalities guides as principle; in the Powers preserves as health; in the Virtues acts as virtue; in the Archangels reveals as light; in the Angels assists as piety.¹ From all these God is seen as all in all, through contemplation of him in those minds in which he dwells through gifts of the most abounding charity.

For this grade of speculation the special and principal aid is the consideration of Holy Scripture divinely inspired, just as Philosophy was the chief aid for the preceding grade; for Holy Scripture deals chiefly with works of reparation; whence it treats mainly of Faith, Hope, and Charity, and most especially of Charity. Of this the Apostle says: "The end of the charge is love out of a pure heart and a good conscience, and faith unfeigned."² It is the fulfilment of the law,³ as he likewise says. And our Saviour himself asserts that all the Law and the Prophets hang upon his two precepts—that is, on love to God and our neighbor. These two are implied in the one spouse of the Church, Jesus Christ, who is at once our neighbor and God; at once our brother and Lord; at once the Word increate and incarnate, our former and reformer, Alpha and Omega. He is also the supreme hierarch, purging, illuminating, and perfecting his spouse—that is, the whole Church and every holy soul. Wherefore, of this Hierarch and this ecclesiastical Hierarchy the whole Scripture treats, by which we are taught to purge, illuminate, and perfect ourselves; and this according to the threefold law laid down in it, the natural law, the written law, and the law of grace; or, rather, according to its threefold principal part—viz., the Mosaic law, purging; the prophetic revelation, illuminating; and the Gospel teaching, perfecting; or, still rather, according to its triple spiritual meaning, the tropologic, which purges to honesty of life; the allegorical, which illuminates to clearness of understanding; the anagogic, which perfects through mental ecstasies and the sweetest participa-

¹ "De Consideratione," bk. v, chap. v.

² 1 Tim. i, 5.

³ Rom. xiii, 10.

tions in wisdom ; according to the three theological virtues above-named, the spiritual senses as reformed, the three ecstasies above mentioned, and the hierarchic acts of the mind, whereby our minds revert to interior things, in them to behold God in the glories of the saints, and on them to sleep and rest in peace, as on couches, their spouse adjuring them not to stir, until they please.¹

From these two middle steps, over which we pass to the contemplation of God within us, as in mirrors of created images, and, as it were, after the manner of wings outstretched for flight—wings holding the middle place—we may understand that we are led to divine things through the natural powers of the rational soul, in accordance with their operations, habitudes, and scientific habits, as appears from the third grade. We are led, in the same manner, through the hierarchic acts of human minds—viz., purgation, illumination, and perfection ; by the hierarchic revelations of the Holy Scriptures, given to us through the Angels, according to the saying of the Apostle, that “the law was ordained through angels by the hand of a mediator” ;² and, finally, we are led through the hierarchies and hierarchic orders, which in our minds have to be disposed after the manner of the heavenly Jerusalem. Our minds, filled full with all these lights, are inhabited by the divine Wisdom, like houses of God, being made daughters, spouses, and friends of God, members, sisters, and co-heirs of Christ the head, and, likewise, temples of the Holy Spirit, founded by faith, reared by hope, and dedicated to God by sanctity of mind and body. All this is accomplished by the perfectly sincere love of Christ, “shed abroad in our hearts through the Holy Ghost which was given to us,”³ and without which we cannot know the secret things of God. For, as no one can know the things of a man, save the spirit of man which is in him, even so the things of God none knoweth, save the Spirit of God.⁴ Let us, therefore, be rooted and grounded in love, that we may be strong to apprehend, with all the saints, what is the length of eternity, the breadth of liberality, the height of majesty, and the depth of judging wisdom.⁵

¹ Song of Songs, ii, 7.

² Gal. iii, 19.

³ Rom. v, 5.

⁴ 1 Cor. ii, 11.

⁵ Eph. iii, 17, 18.

CHAPTER V.

ON THE BEHOLDING OF THE DIVINE UNITY, THROUGH ITS PRIMARY NAME, WHICH IS BEING.

But, inasmuch as we may contemplate God, not only without us and within us, but also above us—without us, by his footsteps, within us, by his image, and above us, by the light which is impressed upon our minds (which is the light of eternal truth, since these minds of ours are formed directly by the truth itself)—those who are exercised in the first have entered the court in front of the tabernacle;¹ those who are exercised in the second have entered the Holy Place; while those who are exercised in the third enter with the High Priest into the Holy of Holies, where above the ark are the cherubim of glory, overshadowing the mercy-seat.² These we understand to mean two modes or grades of contemplating the invisible and eternal things of God. One of these relates to the essential attributes of God; the other to the special attributes of the (three) persons. The first mode first and chiefly fixes our vision upon Being itself, telling us that *THAT WHICH IS* is the first name of God. The second mode fixes our vision upon *THE GOOD* itself, telling us that this is the first name of God. The first looks specially toward the Old Testament, which chiefly proclaims the unity of the Divine Essence; whence it was said to Moses: “I am that am.”³ The second looks to the New Testament, which determines the plurality of the (divine) persons, baptizing in the name of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit. Wherefore, our master, Christ, wishing to lift up to the perfection of the gospel the young man who had observed the law, ascribed to God chiefly and alone the attribute of goodness. He says: “None is good save one, even God.”⁴ Damascenas, therefore, following Moses, says that *HE WHO IS* is the first name of God; Dionysius, following Christ, says that *THE GOOD* is the first name of God.

Let him, therefore, who desires to contemplate the invisible things of God, as regards unity of essence, first fix his eyes upon being itself, and see that it is so absolutely certain in itself that it cannot be thought not to be; because, being absolutely pure, it

¹ Exod. xxvii, 9.² Exod. xxv, 8-20.³ Exod. iii, 14.⁴ Mark, x, 18.

presents itself in the complete absence of non-being, just as naught presents itself in the complete absence of being. Even, therefore, as pure naught contains naught of being or of its conditions, so, on the contrary, being contains naught of non-being, either actually, or potentially, either according to the real truth, or to our estimate. But since non-being is a privation of being, it enters our intelligence only through being. Being, on the other hand, does not enter our intelligence through anything but itself, because everything that is understood, is understood either as not-being, or as being potentially, or as being actually. If, therefore, non-being can be understood only through being, and potential being only through actual being, and being designates the pure act of that which is, it follows that being is what first enters the intellect, and this being it is that is pure act. But this is not particular being, which is limited being, because it is mixed with potentiality; nor is it analogous being, because this has least of actuality, being that which in the smallest degree is. It remains, therefore, that this being is the divine being.

Strange, therefore, is the blindness of the intellect, which does not consider that which it first sees, and without which it can know nothing. But as the eye, when intent upon various differences of colors, does not see the light whereby it sees all other things, and if it does see it, does not notice it, so the eye of our mind, being intent upon these particular and universal things, does not notice that being which is outside all genus, although it first occurs to the mind, and all things are known through it. Hence, it most truly appears that as the eye of the bat is related to light, so the eye of our mind is related to the most manifest things of nature. The reason is that, being accustomed to the darkness of beings, and the phantasm of sensible things, when it sees the light of the highest being, it seems to see nothing (not understanding that this darkness is the highest illumination of our minds), just as when the eye sees pure light, it seems to see nothing.

Behold, therefore, this absolutely pure being, if thou canst, and it will be plain to thee that it cannot be derived from aught else; and it is necessarily thought as in every respect first, because it can neither be from nothing nor from anything else. For what is through itself, if being be not through itself and from itself? It will present itself to thee as altogether free from non-being, and,

hence, as never beginning, never ending, and, therefore, as eternal. It will likewise present itself to thee as in no way containing anything but being itself, and, hence, as not compounded with anything, but perfectly simple. It will further present itself as containing naught of possibility, because every possible in some way contains somewhat of non-being; hence, it will appear as supremely and completely actual. It will present itself as containing no defectibility, and, hence, as absolutely perfect. Finally, it will present itself as having no diversity, and, hence, as supremely one.

The being, therefore, which is pure being, being simply, and being absolute is being primary, eternal, superlatively simple, actual, perfect, and one. And these things are so certain that the opposite of them cannot be thought by him who understands being. From one of them, likewise, the rest may be inferred. For, since being is being simple, it is simply first; because it is simply first, it is not made by aught else, nor could it be made by itself; therefore, it is eternal. In like manner, since it is first and eternal, it is not composed of other things; therefore it is perfectly simple. Again, since it is first, eternal, and perfectly simple, it contains no possibility intermingled with its actuality; therefore it is perfectly actual. Since it is first, eternal, perfectly simple, and perfectly actual, therefore it is altogether perfect; such a thing neither lacks aught, nor can aught be added to it. Since it is first, eternal, perfectly simple, perfectly actual, and altogether perfect, therefore it is in the highest degree one; for that which is called omnifarious superabundance is so called with respect to all things. Also, that which is called superabundance simply cannot possibly belong save to one being. Hence, if God is the name for being, primary, eternal, altogether simple, altogether actual, altogether perfect, it is impossible that he should be thought not to be, or not to be one, and no more. "Hear, therefore, O Israel! the Lord our God is one God."¹ If thou beholdest this in pure simplicity of mind, thou art in some sort suffused with the illumination of the eternal light. But thou hast wherewithal to be uplifted into admiration; for being is first and last; it is eternal and altogether present; it is most simple and greatest; it is alto-

¹ Deut. vi, 4.

gether actual and altogether immutable ; it is altogether perfect and infinite ; it is in the highest degree one, and yet in all modes. If thou admirest these things with a pure mind, thou art suffused with a greater light, because thou seest, further, that it is last because it is first. For, because it is first, it performs all things by reason of itself, whence it must be the ultimate end, the beginning and consummation, Alpha and Omega. It is most excellent, because it is eternal. For, because it is eternal, it is not limited by another ; it does fail from itself ; it does not pass from one thing to another. Therefore, it has neither past nor future, but is solely present. It is greatest, because it is altogether simple. Because it is altogether simple in essence, it is greatest in virtue ; inasmuch as virtue is the more nearly infinite, the more it is united. It is altogether immutable, because it is altogether actual. For, because it is altogether actual, it is pure act, and, because it is such, it acquires nothing new, and loses nothing which it has ; hence it cannot be changed. It is infinite, because it is altogether perfect. For, because it is altogether perfect, nothing better, nobler, or worthier than it can be thought ; hence, nothing greater. And every such thing is infinite. It is in all modes, because it is in the highest degree one. For, because it is in the highest degree one, it is the universal principle of all multiplicity, and, for the same reason, it is the universal cause of all things—efficient, formal, and final—as likewise the cause of being, the ground of understanding, the order of living. It is, therefore, in all modes, not as the essence of all things, but as the altogether superexcellent, altogether universal, and altogether sufficient cause of all essences. Its virtue, because in the highest degree united in essence, is in the highest degree infinite and manifold in efficacy.

Turning back, let us say : Because being altogether pure and absolute—that is, being simply—is first and last, it is the origin and consummating end of all things. Because it is eternal and altogether present, it includes and pervades all durations, as if it were at once their centre and circumference. Because it is altogether simple and greatest, it is wholly within everything and wholly without everything ; hence it is an intelligible sphere, whose centre is everywhere and whose circumference is nowhere. Because it is altogether actual and immutable, while remaining motionless, it imparts motion to the universe. Because it is altogether perfect

the part, that same which is kept is given, and given entire. Therefore the emanating and the producing are both distinguished by properties and are essentially one. Since, therefore, they are distinguished by properties, they have properties of persons, plurality of hypostases, emanation of origin, order not of posteriority, but of origin, and emission, not of local change, but of gratuitous inspiration, by reason of the authority of the producer—an authority which the sender exercises over the sent. But, since they are one substantially, they must have unity in essence, form, dignity, eternity, existence, and incircumscribability. When, therefore, thou considerest these things one by one, thou hast wherewithal to contemplate the truth. When thou comparest them mutually with each other, thou hast wherewithal to arise to the highest admiration. And, therefore, that thy mind may arise through admiration to admirable contemplation, these things must be considered together; for this is indicated by the Cherubim, which looked at each other.¹ Nor is it a thing without mystery that they looked at each other with their faces turned toward the mercy-seat, that it may be fulfilled, which is spoken by the Lord in John:² “This is eternal life, that they should know thee the only true God, and him whom thou didst send, even Jesus Christ.” For we must admire God’s essential and personal conditions not only in themselves, but also in comparison with the superadmirable union of God and man in the person of Christ.

For, if thou art the one Cherub, contemplating the essential things of God, and wonderest because the Divine Being is at once first and last, eternal and most present, most simple and greatest or uncircumscribed, wholly everywhere and comprehended nowhere, most actual and never moved, most perfect, without excess or defect, and yet immeasurable and infinite without bound, supremely one and yet omnifarious, as containing all things, as being all power, all truth, all good—look at the mercy-seat and behold with wonder that therein the first principle is joined to the last term—God with man formed on the sixth day—the eternal joined to temporal man, born of a virgin in the fulness of time; the most simple with the most composite; the most actual with the most passive and dead; the most perfect and infinite with the

¹ Exod. xxv, 20.

² John, xvii, 8.

modified ; the absolutely one and omnifarious with the individual composite and distinct from all others, with man, with Jesus Christ.

If thou art the other Cherub, contemplating the special attributes of the (three) persons, and wonderest that communicability co-exists with property ; consubstantiality with plurality ; configurality with personality ; co-equality with order ; eternity with production ; co-intimity with emission (for the Son is sent [forth] by the Father, and the Holy Spirit by both, while, nevertheless, he is always with them and never departs from them), look at the mercy-seat and behold with wonder how in Christ personal unity co-exists with trinity of substances and duality of natures ; omnifarious agreement with plurality of wills ; compredication of God and man with plurality of properties ; co-adoration with plurality of nobilities ; co-exaltation above all things with plurality of dignities ; condominium with plurality of powers. But in this consideration is the perfection of mental illumination ; the mind, as on the sixth day, sees man made in the image of God. For, if image is expressive similitude, when our mind contemplates in Christ, the Son of God (who is by nature the invisible image of God) our humanity so wonderfully exalted, so ineffably united, seeing at once in one the first and the last, the highest and the lowest, the circumference and the centre, Alpha and Omega, the cause and the caused, the Creator and the creature—in a word, the book written within and without—it has already arrived at a certain perfect thing, arriving with God at the perfection of its illuminations, in the sixth grade, on the sixth day. And nothing more remains but the day of rest, on which, through mental ecstasy, the perspicacity of the human mind may rest from all the works which it has performed.

CHAPTER VII.

ON MENTAL AND MYSTIC ECSTASY, WHEREIN REST IS GIVEN TO THE INTELLECT, THE AFFECTION PASSING WHOLLY OVER, THROUGH ECSTASY, INTO GOD.

After our mind has passed through these six considerations, which are like the six steps to the throne of the true Solomon,¹

¹ 1 Kings, x, 19.

whereby there is an ascent to peace, wherein the true man of peace rests in a peaceful mind, as in an inner Jerusalem; like the six wings of the Cherub, by which the mind of the true man of contemplation, full of the enlightenment of supernal wisdom, may be able to rise aloft; like the first six days, in which the mind is exercised, that finally it may attain to the Sabbath of rest—after our mind has beheld God outside of itself, by his footsteps and in his footsteps; within itself, through his image and in his image; above itself, by the similitude of the divine light reflected above as, and in that light, as far as is possible, according to the stage of progress and the exercise of our mind, when at last, on the sixth day, it shall have reached such a point as to behold in the first and highest principle and in Jesus Christ, the mediator between God and man, those things the like of which can in no degree be found in created things, and which go beyond all perspicacity of the human intellect, it remains that, beholding these things, it shall transcend and pass beyond, not only this sensible world, but also itself; in which transition Christ is the way and the door, Christ is the stair and the vehicle, as the mercy-seat placed above the ark of God, and the sacrament hidden from before the ages. He who looks at this mercy-seat, gazing with his face fully turned at Him who hangs on the cross, through faith, hope, and charity, through devotion, admiration, praise, and jubilation, makes the passover, that is, the transition, with him, so that through the rod of the cross he passes over the Red Sea from Egypt into the desert, where he tastes the hidden manna,¹ and rests with Christ in the tomb, being, as it were, outwardly dead, nevertheless feeling, as far as is possible in the condition of pilgrimage, what was said on the cross to the robber who clung to Christ: "This day shalt thou be with me in Paradise."² This also was shown to the Blessed Francis, when, in the ecstasy of contemplation on the lofty mountain (where I thought out these things which are written), there appeared to him a six-winged Seraph, fastened to a cross, as I and many others heard from a companion of his, who was with him at the time when he passed over into God through ecstasy of contemplation, and was set forth as an example of perfect contemplation, as formerly he had been of perfect action, like a second Jacob changed into Israel,³ that through him God might invite all

¹ Rev. ii, 17.² Luke, xxiii, 43.³ Gen. xxxv, 10.

truly spiritual men to this kind of trance and mental ecstasy, more by example than by word. But in this transition, if it is to be perfect, all intellectual operations must be left behind, and the whole apex of affection transferred and transformed into God. But this is a mystical and most secret thing, which no one knows save him who receives it; and no one receives it save him who desires it; and no one desires it save him whom the fire of the Holy Spirit, sent upon earth by Christ, inflames to the very marrow; and therefore the Apostle says that this mystical wisdom is revealed by the Holy Spirit.¹ Since, therefore, in this, nature can do nothing, and industry but little, little heed must be paid to inquiry and much to unction; little to language and very much to internal joy; little to words and writing and the whole to the gift of God—that is, to the Holy Spirit; little to created things and all to the creative essence, the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, while we say with Dionysius to God the Trinity: “Superessential Trinity and Over-God, better than best overseer of Christian theosophy, direct us to the more than unknown, the superluculent and supersublime apex of mystical utterances, where the new and absolute and inconvertible and unchangeable mysteries of theology are hid in the superluculent darkness of occult-teaching science, which is supersplendent in the perfect, supermanifest gloom, in which all things are reflected, and which overfills the invisible intellects with the splendors of the invisible overblest.” So much to God. But to the friend, to whom these things are written, let us say with the same: Do thou, O friend, proceeding boldly on the way to mystic visions, abandon the senses and the operations of the intellect; abandon things sensible and things invisible, and all non-being and being; and, as far as possible, unknowingly restore thyself to the unity of Him who is above all essence and all science. For in rising, by an immeasurable and absolute ecstasy of pure mind, above thyself and all things, thou shalt ascend, abandoning all things and freed from all things, to the superessential ray of divine darkness. But if thou wouldst know how these things are done, ask grace, not learning; desire, not intellect; the groaning of prayer, not the diligence of reading; the spouse, not the master; God, not man;

¹ 1 Cor. ii, 10.

darkness, not clearness; not light, but fire totally inflaming and transporting into God by excessive unctions and most ardent affections. This fire, indeed, is God, and his way is toward Jerusalem, and it was kindled by the man Christ, in the fervor of his most ardent passion—a fervor of which he alone truly partakes who says: “My soul hath chosen strangling and my bones death.”¹ He who chooseth this death may see God, because it is true beyond doubt: “Man shall not see me and live.”² Let us die, therefore, and enter into darkness. Let us impose silence on our anxieties, our appetites, and our imaginings. Let us pass with Christ crucified from this world to the Father, that when the Father is shown to us we may say with Philip: “It sufficeth us.”³ Let us hear with Paul: “My grace is sufficient for thee.”⁴ Let us exult with David, saying: “My flesh and my heart faileth; but God is the strength of my heart and my portion forever.”⁵ “Blessed be the Lord for evermore: and let all the people say: Amen and Amen.”⁶

NOTES AND DISCUSSIONS.

KANT'S ETHICS: THE CLAVIS TO AN INDEX.

[We print the circular issued by Messrs. F. F. Hansell & Brother, announcing the publication by them of the great storehouse of ethical writing collected by Mr. James Edmunds under the above title.—EDITOR.]

“The undersigned, booksellers and publishers, 28 and 30 Camp Street, New Orleans, La., controlling the edition of ‘Kant’s Ethics,’ by Prof. Edmunds, and being desirous of placing this monument of philosophical research before the reading and thinking people of this country, respectfully call attention to the following notices from distinguished representative scholars throughout the United States. Before giving these notices it may be proper to state that the author labored with great zeal, limited means, and many discouragements for seventeen years in the undertaking, publishing in detail, page by page, chapter by chapter, until the work was complete. Rescuing this work

¹ Job, viii, 16.

⁴ 2 Cor., xii, 9.

² Exod. xxxiii, 22.

⁵ Psalms, lxxiii, 26.

³ John, xiv, 8.

⁶ Psalms, lxxxix, 52.

from obscurity, and placing it before the intelligence of the country, is the object of this circular. The work makes about 900 pages octavo, and is bound in full leather. It will be mailed to any address on receipt of the price, \$5.

"Address

"E. F. HANSELL & BRO.,

"Publishers, New Orleans.

"INTRODUCTORY REMARKS BY THE AUTHOR.

"THE PHILOSOPHICAL SYSTEM OF IMMANUEL KANT.—A minute and elaborate exhibit of the philosophical system of the celebrated German metaphysician, Immanuel Kant, covering both its theoretical and its practical aspects, occupies about 380 pages of *The Clavis*.

"NINE GREAT PHILOSOPHICAL SYSTEMS AND RELIGIONS OF ANTIQUITY are fairly and adequately represented in *The Clavis* by literal selections from the original sources. These extracts fill more than 500 pages of *The Clavis*, and in the case of each religion or philosophical system they constitute a complete and sufficient exhibition of doctrine, which may be separately taken and separately studied without any regard whatever being paid to its place in *The Clavis*, or to its relation to the remaining contents of *The Clavis*.

"THE PHILOSOPHICAL SYSTEM OF THE STOICS.—The principles of the stoical philosophy, systematically described and illustrated by the greatest philosopher and statesman of ancient Rome, Marcus Tullius Cicero, occupies 77 pages of *The Clavis*.

"THE SOCRATIC SCHOOL.—The most brilliant outcome and most enduring development of the Socratic School is represented in *The Clavis* by 100 pages from the hand of the most perfect philosophical writer of the ancient world, Aristoteles of Stageira.

"PHILOSOPHY FOR YOUNG BEGINNERS.—The most agreeable introduction to the study of philosophy contained in the literature of any nation is represented in *The Clavis* by 86 pages from Xenophon's faithful *Memorabilia* of Socrates.

"THE ZOROASTRIAN RELIGION, which dominated the Persian empire at the period of its greatest extent and power, is represented in *The Clavis* by 76 pages from the sacred scriptures of the Mazdayasnians.

"THE BUDDHIST RELIGION, alleged to have 340,000,000 of adherents at the present day, is fully represented in *The Clavis* by more than 20 pages of the undoubted words of the master himself.

"THE CONFUCIAN RELIGION is fully represented in *The Clavis* by 33 pages from the hands of his grandson and others of his immediate disciples, authentically recording the words of the master himself.

"THE MOHAMMEDAN RELIGION is fully exhibited in *The Clavis* by about 50 pages of extracts from the Koran.

"THE JOURNAL OF SPECULATIVE PHILOSOPHY, edited by Prof. William T. Harris, says of *The Clavis*: 'It is an enormous work of industry and erudition, inspired by religious piety and a profound faith in Kant's ethical views, supplemented by a speculative insight into the identity of all ethical doctrines that the sages, east and west, have taught. . . . No earnest student of Kant can afford to be without this book.'

[To this circular are appended communications of a commendatory character, addressed to the author, by Prof. F. Max Müller; Presidents J. H. Seelye, David J. Hill, Alexander Martin, Joseph F. Tuttle, Joseph Cummings, Franklin Carter, and W. G. Eliot; from Profs. G. H. Palmer, Henry E. Robins, R. L. Dabney, and W. T. Harris.]

BOOK NOTICES.

LA REVUE PHILOSOPHIQUE DE LA FRANCE ET DE L'ÉTRANGER. Paraissant tous les mois.

Dirigée Par Th. Ribot. Paris: Germer Ballière et Cie.

"La Revue Philosophique" for February, 1883, contained:

"Moral Responsibility in Dreams," by F. Bouillier. The psychology of dreams is a subject much more discussed than formerly, the author states, and the continuance of the moral nature and our degree of responsibility therefore in dreams is thoughtfully considered by him. He holds us more or less responsible for the character of our dreams, since dreaming is the image of life, and believes that the physician of the soul should study dreams to gain a true knowledge for the proper treatment of his subjects. "The Annihilation of Will," by Th. Ribot. "The Origins of Right in their Integrality," by J. Joly.

Books examined are:

"The Rôle of Earth-worms in the Formation of the Vegetable Earth," French translation from Charles Darwin, with a preface by M. Perrier. "The Fundamental Problems of Logic," by J. Bergmann (Ger.). "On the Question of the Reform of Logic," Nicholas Gote (Russian).

"La Revue Philosophique" for March, 1883, contains:

"Personality and Memory in Somnambulism," by Charles Richet. "A Critique on the Idea of Penalty," by M. Guyau. "As the idea of penalty is one of the principles of human morals, it is also found at the basis of every religion. There is not one which does not admit a providence, and providence is only a kind of distributive justice, which, after having acted incompletely in this world, takes its revenge in another; this distributive justice is what moralists mean by penalty or reward." The author discusses the penalties of defying moral laws, and logical as well as moral consequences. "Contemporary Philosophers," M. Lachelier.

Books examined are:

Max Müller's "Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, with an Historical Introduction by L. Noire" (Eng.). "Treatise on Orthophony," by E. Colombat. "Philosophie elliptique du Latent Opérant," by the Marquis de Scaoane (Fr.). "The New Contemporary Realism," by Cesca (Ital.).

"La Revue Philosophique" for April, 1883, contains:

"Psychological Articles in Favor of Free-will," by A. Fouillée. "The Metaphysics of Eudemonism, Pessimism, and the Categorical Imperative," by Ch. Secrétan. "Reasoning in the Perceptions," by A. Binet. "Perception is the result of a certain effort of the mind." The nature of this effort is fully discussed by this author, and the part that the senses have in acting upon the mind, and what is external or simply mechanical in the impressions upon the senses.

Notes and Discussions:

"On the Artificial Modifications of Character in Somnambulism," by M. Guyau.

Books examined are:

"The True Conscience," by F. Bouillier (Fr.). "M. Littré and Positivism," E. Caro (Fr.). "Essay on Philosophic Poesy in Greece," by G. Breton. "Critical History of the

Pedagogical Theories in Relation with Political and Social Sciences," by P. Siciliani (Ital.).

"La Revue Philosophique" for May, 1883, contains:

"The *Æsthetic Life*," by Ch. Bérnard. The author questions whether there is an æsthetic life as there is a moral, political, religious, economic, or industrial life, and should it have a serious, moral character with its chief end the moral perfection of man, the softening and ennobling of his manners, or hidden instruction under attractive forms? Then it would have gained nothing as to itself; it is confounded with the moral, political, scientific, or religious life. For it to really exist it should be considered as a special organ in the total organism of human life, individual and general. Without being isolated from other organs, it should, according to the laws of organism, have its determined aim and proper function, and no doubt being linked to other organs, receiving from and furnishing to them what is necessary, preserve in this mutuality or reciprocity, its entire liberty and vitality in performing the particular function which it is to fill in its life total. Such is the theory of Karl Köstlin, whose work on æsthetics M. Bérnard regards as one of great importance in Germany. He discusses the work and also the views of Kant on æsthetics.

"Moral Obligation from the Intellectual Standpoint," by Fr. Paulhan. "What we consider as obligatory now," says the author, "is the realization of an ideal which each of us possesses more or less consciously, and which is certainly not without analogy with the instincts which determine the acts of animals. M. Taine's theories on the productions of works of art that certain conditions of existence determine an *ensemble* of tendencies, and certain sentiments are manifested in individuals which are reproduced in art and literature and are condensed in an ideal personage who is born in each epoch and varies and changes with the social state, and in morals as well as literature is to be found this ideal personage.

"The Contradictions maintained by Descartes," by Fonségrove. The author examines the conclusions of various philosophers in regard to Descartes, and finds that they do not study the text of his writings with sufficient thoughtfulness. He finds that before knowing God, Descartes did not know what God was, and thus he established a perfect science on an imperfect science, and this is what he has been accused of and from which he has defended himself.

Notes and discussions:

"The Logical Origin of the Doctrine of Parmenides."

Books examined are:

"Physiology of the Nerves and Muscles," by Ch. Richet. "On the Moral Intention," by Vallier (Fr.). "Aristotle's Psychology," by Wallace (Eng.).

Bibliographical notices.

"La Revue Philosophique" for June, 1883, contains:

"Free-will and the Future Contingency," by A. Fouillée. The author treats this subject as a problem which he examines theoretically and scientifically, also giving the views of determinists. "On the Comparison of the Time of Reaction for Different Sensations," by Beaunis, Professor of Physiology at the Faculty of Medicine at Nancy. "Studies of Ancient Philosophy: Anaximenes and the Unity of Substance," by P. Tannery. M. Tannery credits Anaximenes with originality and considerable scientific exactness, and compares his views with those of other men of his time as to heavenly bodies, scientific facts, etc. "The Contradictions maintained by Descartes" (concluded), by Fonségrove.

General review:

"Several Italian Criminal Writers of the New School," by G. Tarde.

Books examined are:

"On the Will of Animals," by G. H. Schneider. "On the Will of Men from the Standpoint of Darwinism," by G. H. Schneider. "Unpublished Correspondence of Condorcet and Turgot," by Ch. Henry.

VIRGINIA CHAMPLIN.

PHILOSOPHY OF LANDSCAPE PAINTING. WILLIAM M. BRYANT. Published by the Author, St. Louis, Mo., 1882.

LANDSCAPE painting is peculiarly a modern form of art. But few works even dealing with it in a descriptive fashion—historically, and none at all treating of its philosophy, are extant. Mr. W. M. Bryant's essay, published in a neat little volume of some three hundred pages, a few years ago, in St. Louis, is the first monograph on the subject which we remember to have seen. As a pioneer work in a new field—apart from its real value, which is great—it deserves attention.

The author first traces the development of the *idea* of landscape painting and of the conditions necessary to its maturity; then, after establishing beyond much probability of question that "the modern scientific view of nature, together with its necessary complement, the scientific view of man, must first have been developed before true landscape art could exist," proceeds to name "the elements, external and internal, which enter into works of art of this class; to indicate the relation of landscape painting to other forms of art; and to define and account for the types into which the products of this form of art naturally fall." His analysis completed, he establishes his theory by presenting a brief sketch of the actual historical development of landscape painting.

The method pursued, as the author distinctly informs us (page 140), is that enunciated by Hegel in his great work on the philosophy of art (*Ästhetik*). The fundamental classification of the various forms of art, (a) symbolic, (b) classic, (c) romantic, is retained and applied to the particular form treated. Landscape painting, like the other forms, passes through these various phases and may be said to contain them all; still, through its internality—its power of expressing spirituality—it belongs essentially to the romantic; but to the advanced stage of the romantic which, for lack of a better name, might be called the *Human*.

The author says (page 45): "It can scarcely have been a mere accident that the philosophical systems of Descartes and Spinoza should have been developed contemporaneously with the sudden and fairly exuberant unfolding of landscape painting in the seventeenth century. The philosophical systems on the one hand and the landscape painting on the other were but two modes of expressing the new conception of the perfect unity and harmony of the world, physical and spiritual—the one mode appealing to the Reason, the other to the Imagination. The one begins with spirit and finds that spirit necessarily includes nature; the other begins with nature and finds that nature leads onward and upward to Spirit, as the only possible solution of the world."

But enough has been said to warrant our concluding, in addition to the excellent treatment of its own special subject, the plan which is followed in this little book is so great a one in itself and is so systematically and thoroughly developed that such a work can not fail to be valuable as an introduction to the philosophy of art in general.

GERTRUDE GARRIGUES.

BOOKS RECEIVED.

George Eliot and her Heroines. A Study by Abba Goold Woolson. New York Harper & Brothers. 1886.

Publications of the Washburn Observatory of the University of Wisconsin. Vol. IV. Madison, Wis.

A Study of the Parliament of Paris, and the other Parliaments of France. A Thesis presented to the Faculty of the College of Liberal Arts of the Syracuse University, for the Attainment of the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy, by Jane M. Bancroft, of the Northwestern University, Evanston, Ill. 1884.

The Ruling Principle of Method applied to Education. By Antonio Rosmini Serbati. Translated by Mrs. William Grey. Boston: D. C. Heath & Co., 1887.

Baldwin: Being Dialogues on Views and Aspirations. By Vernon Lee. Boston: Roberts Brothers. 1886.

Scraps of Philosophy. For Skeptics. By "Rudolf," Deist. Knoxville, Tenn.: published by J. R. Zuberbuehler, Drawer 26. 1887.

Gladstone on the New "Locksley Hall." (Reprinted from the "Nineteenth Century.") New York: Brentano Brothers. 1887.

Tanglewood Tales. For Girls and Boys. Being a Second Wonder-Book. By Nathaniel Hawthorne. Part II. Circe's Palace; The Pomegranate Seeds; The Golden Fleece. Boston and New York: Houghton, Mifflin & Co. 1887.

The Relation of Evolution to Religious Thought. By Prof. Joseph Le Conte, LL.D. University of California. San Francisco: C. A. Murdock & Co.

Letters to and from Hegel. Edited by Karl Hegel. In two volumes. Volume I, containing a portrait of Hegel. Leipzig: Duncker & Humblot. 1887.

On the Physiology of Exercise. By Edward Mussey Hartwell, Ph. D., M. D., Associate in Physical Training in the Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore. (Reprinted from the "Boston Medical and Surgical Journal" of March 31, and April 7, 1887.) Boston: Cupples, Upham & Co., publishers. Old Corner Bookstore, 1887.

The Principles of Morals. Part II (being the body of the work). By Thomas Fowler, D. D. Oxford: at the Clarendon Press. 1887.

The Philosophy of Law. An Exposition of the Fundamental Principles of Jurisprudence as the Science of Right. By Immanuel Kant. Translated from the German by W. Hastie, B. D. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark. 1887. New York: Scribner & Welford.

The Foundations of Ethics. By John Edward Maude, M. A. Edited by William James, Professor of Philosophy in Harvard College. New York: Henry Holt & Co. 1887.

Outlines of Æsthetics. Dictated Portions of the Lectures of Hermann Lotze. Translated and Edited by George T. Ladd, Professor of Philosophy in Yale College. Boston: Ginn & Co. 1886.

The Conception of the Infinite, and the Solution of the Mathematical Antinomies: A Study in Psychological Analysis. By George S. Fullerton, A. M., B. D., Adjunct Professor of Philosophy in the University of Pennsylvania. Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott, Co. 1887.

Grammar and Language. An Attempt at the Introduction of Logic into Grammar. By Ed. L. Starck. Boston: Clarke & Carruth. 1887. Price \$2.50. Edition limited to 500 copies.

Nineteenth Century Sense: The Paradox of Spiritualism. By John Darby. Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott Co. 1887.

A Review of Edmund Gosse's "From Shakespear to Pope." By Henry E. Shepherd, LL. D., President of the College of Charleston, Charleston, S. C.

The Perfect Way: or the Finding of Christ. By Anna Bonus Kingsford and Edward Maitland. New York: Scribner & Welford. 1887. (Revised and Enlarged Edition.)

Rules of Conduct, Diary of Adventure, Letters and Farewell Addresses by George Washington. With Introductions and Notes. Boston and New York: Houghton, Mifflin & Co. 1887.

The Succession of Forest Trees and Wild Apples. By Henry D. Thoreau. With a Biographical Sketch by Ralph Waldo Emerson. Boston and New York: Houghton, Mifflin & Co. 1887.

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LEIBNITZ'S CRITIQUE OF LOCKE.

TRANSLATED FROM THE FRENCH BY ALFRED G. LANGLEY.

NEW ESSAYS ON HUMAN UNDERSTANDING.

BOOK II.—IDEAS.

CHAPTER I.

Which treats of Ideas in General, and examines by the Way whether the Mind of Man always thinks.

§ 1. *Ph.* Having examined the question of Innate Ideas, let us consider their nature and their differences. Is it not true that the Idea is the object of thought?

Th. [I admit it, provided that you add that it is an immediate internal object, and that this object is an expression of the nature or the qualities of things. If the idea were the *form* of the thought, it would spring up and cease with the actual thought to which it corresponds; but being the *object* it may exist previous to and after the thoughts. External sensible objects are only media because they cannot act immediately upon the soul. God is the only external immediate object. You may say that the soul also is its own immediate internal object; but it is this in so far as it contains ideas, or what corresponds to things. For the soul is a little world, where distinct ideas are a representation of God, and where confused ideas are a representation of the universe.]

§ 2. *Ph.* We who suppose that at the beginning the soul is a

tabula rasa, void of all characters and without an idea, ask how it comes to receive ideas, and by what means it acquires this prodigious quantity of them? To that question the reply in a word is: From experience.

Th. [This *tabula rasa* of which you speak so much, is in my opinion only a fiction which Nature does not admit, and which is based only upon the imperfect notions of philosophers, like void, atoms, and the repose, absolute or relative, of two parts of a whole, or like primitive matter which is conceived as without form. Uniform things and those which contain no variety are always only abstractions, like time, space, and the other entities of pure mathematics. There is no body whatever whose parts are at rest, and there is no substance whatever which has not what may distinguish it from every other. Human souls differ, not only from other souls, but moreover among themselves, although the difference is not at all of the kind called specific. And, according to the proofs which I believe we have, every substantial thing, be it soul or body, has its own characteristic relation to every other; and the one must always differ from the other by intrinsic connotations. Not to mention the fact that those who speak so frequently of this *tabula rasa* after having taken away the ideas cannot say what remains, like the scholastic philosophers, who leave nothing in their primitive matter. You may perhaps reply that this *tabula rasa* of the philosophers means that the soul has by nature and originally only bare faculties. But faculties without some act, in a word the pure powers of the school, are also only fictions, which Nature knows not, and which they obtain only by the process of abstraction. For where in the world will you ever find a faculty which shuts itself up in the power alone and does not besides perform some act? There is always a particular disposition to action, and to one action rather than to another. And besides the disposition there is a tendency to action, of which tendencies there is always an infinity in every subject at once; and these tendencies are never without some purpose. Experience is necessary, I admit, in order that the soul be determined to such or such thoughts, and in order that it take notice of the ideas which are in us; but by what means can experience and the senses give ideas? Has the soul windows, does it resemble tablets, is it like wax? It is plain that all who so regard the soul, represent it as at bottom corporeal. You op-

pose to me this axiom received by the philosophers, *that there is nothing in the soul which does not come from the senses*. But you must except the soul itself and its affections.

Nihil est in intellectu, quod non fuerit in sensu, excipe: nisi ipse intellectus. Now the soul comprises being, substance, unity, identity, cause, perception, reason, and a multitude of other notions which the senses cannot give. That sufficiently agrees with your author of the Essay, who seeks the source of a good part of ideas in the spirit's reflection upon its own nature.

Ph. [I hope, then, that you will agree with this skillful author that all ideas come through sensation or through reflection, that is to say, from observations which we make either upon objects exterior and sensible or upon the inner workings of our soul.

Th. [In order to avoid a discussion upon what has delayed us too long, I declare to you in advance, sir, that when you say that ideas come to us from one or the other of these causes, I understand their actual perception, for I think I have shown that they are in us before they are perceived so far as they have any distinct character.

§ 9. *Ph.* [In the next place let us inquire when we should say that the soul begins to perceive and actually to think of ideas. I well know that there is an opinion which states that the soul always thinks, and that actual thought is as inseparable from the soul as actual extension is from the body. § 10. But I cannot conceive that it is any more necessary for the soul always to think than for the body always to be in motion, perception of ideas being to the soul what movement is to the body. That appears to me very reasonable at least, and I would gladly know your view, sir, thereupon.

Th. You have uttered it, sir. Action is no more connected with the soul than with the body, a state without thought in the soul and an absolute rest in the body appear to me equally contrary to Nature, and without example in the world. A substance once in action, will be so always, for all impressions continue and are merely mingled with other new ones. Striking a body you arouse or determine rather an infinity of vortices as in a liquid, for at bottom every solid has a degree of liquidity and every liquid a degree of solidity, and there are no means of stopping entirely these internal vortices. Now you can believe that if the

body is never at rest, the soul, which corresponds to it, will never be without perception either.]

Ph. But it is, perhaps, a privilege of the author and conservator of all things, that being infinite in his perfections, he never slumbers nor sleeps. This is not granted to any finite being, or at least not to such a being as is the soul of man.

Th. [It is certain that we slumber and sleep, and that God is exempt from both. But it does not follow that we have no perception while asleep. The proof rather turns out altogether the contrary, if you consider it carefully.]

Ph. There is something in us which has the power to think; [but it does not thereby follow that it is always in action.]

Th. [Real powers are never simple possibilities. They have always tendency and action.]

Ph. But this proposition—the soul always thinks—is not self-evident.

Th. I do not say it is. A little attention and reasoning is necessary to discover it; the common people perceive it as little as they do the pressure of the air or the roundness of the earth.]

Ph. I doubt if I thought last night; this is a question of fact, it must be decided by sensible experiences.

Th. [It has been decided as it has been proved, that there are imperceptible bodies and invisible movements, although certain persons treat them as absurd. There are also perceptions little noticed without number, which are not sufficiently distinguished to enable one to perceive or remember them, but they become known through certain consequences.]

Ph. There was a certain author who raised the objection that we maintain that the soul ceases to exist, because we are not sensible of its existence during our sleep. But this objection can arise only from a strange prepossession, for we do not say that there is no soul in man because we are not sensible of its existence during our sleep, but only that man cannot think without being aware of it.

Th. [I have not read the book which contains this objection, but you would not have been wrong if you had merely raised the objection that it does not follow because the thought is not perceived, that it ceases for that reason; for otherwise you could assert for the same reason that there is no soul during the time in which you are not aware of it. And to refute this objection it is

necessary to point out in particular the thought which it is essential that you be aware of.]

§ 11. *Ph.* It is not easy to conceive that a thing can think and not be conscious that it thinks.

Th. There is, doubtless, the knot of the affair and the difficulty which has embarrassed scholars. But here are the means of extricating ourselves therefrom. You must consider that we think of a quantity of things at a time, but we attend only to the thoughts which are most distinct, and the process cannot go on otherwise, for if we should attend to all we would have to think attentively of an infinite number of things at the same time, all of which we feel and which make an impression upon our senses. I say even more: there remains something of all our past thoughts, and none can ever be wholly effaced. Now when we sleep without dreaming and when we are stunned by some blow, fall, or other accident, an infinite number of little confused feelings take form within us, and death itself can produce no other effect upon the souls of animals, who cught, doubtless, sooner or later, to acquire distinct perceptions, for all goes on in an orderly way in Nature. I admit, however, that in this state of confusion, the soul will exist without pleasure and without pain, for these are notable perceptions.

§ 12. *Ph.* Is it not true that those with whom we have at present to do, [*i. e.*, the Cartesians, who believe that the soul always thinks], grant life to all animals, differing from man, without giving them a soul which knows and thinks; and that these same (Cartesians) find no difficulty in saying that the soul can think independently of a body?

Th. [For myself, I am of another opinion, for although I agree with the Cartesians in their affirmation that the soul thinks always, I am not agreed with them in the two other points. I believe that the beasts have imperishable souls and that human and all other souls are never without some body. I hold also that God alone, as being an *actus purus*, is wholly exempt therefrom.]

Ph. If you had been of the opinion of the Cartesians, I should have inferred therefrom, that the bodies of Castor or Pollux could be sometimes with, sometimes without a soul, though being always alive, and the soul having the ability also to be sometimes in such a body and sometimes elsewhere, you might suppose that

Castor and Pollux had only a single soul, which was active alternately in the body of these two men sleeping and awake by turns; thus it would be two persons as distinct as Castor and Pollux could be.

Th. I, in my turn, will make you another supposition, which appears more real. Is it not true that you must always allow that after some interval or some great change, you may fall into a state of general forgetfulness? Sleidan (they say), before dying, forgot all he knew; and there are many other examples of this sad event. Suppose that such a man became young again and learned all anew, will he be another man on that account? It is not then memory which, properly speaking, makes the same man. However, the fiction of a soul which animates different bodies in turn, without concerning itself in one of these bodies with that which happens to it in the other, is one of those fictions contrary to the nature of things which arise from the imperfect notions of philosophers, as space without body and body without motion, and which would disappear if it were searched a little deeper; for you must know that each soul preserves all preceding impressions, and cannot divide itself equally in the manner you have just mentioned; the future in each substance is perfectly united to the past; this is what makes the identity of the individual. Memory, however, is not necessary, nor even always possible, because of the multitude of present and past impressions which co-operate in our present thoughts, for I do not believe that there are in man thoughts of which there is not some effect at least confused or some remnant mixed with subsequent thoughts. You can easily forget things, but you can also remember them long after if you would recall them as is needful.]

§ 13. *Ph.* Those who chance to sleep without dreaming can never be convinced that their thoughts are active.

Th. [One is feebly conscious in sleep, even when it is dreamless. The process of waking up likewise shows this, and the easier you are awakened the more you are conscious of what goes on without, although this consciousness is not always strong enough to cause you to awake.]

§ 14. *Ph.* It appears very difficult to conceive that the soul is thinking at this moment in a sleeping man and the next in one awake, without remembering its thoughts.

Th. [Not only is that easy to conceive, but also something like

it is observed every day that you are awake; for we always have objects which strike our eyes and ears, and, as a result, the soul is touched also, without our taking notice of it, because our attention is bent upon other objects, until this object becomes strong enough to draw it to itself, by redoubling its action or by some other means; it would be like a particular sleep with reference to that object, and this sleep becomes general when our attention ceases to regard all objects together. Division of attention, in order to weaken it, is also a means of putting yourself to sleep.]

Ph. I learned from a man, who in his youth had applied himself to study and had a tolerably felicitous memory, that he never had a dream until he had had the fever, from which he had just recovered at the time he spoke with me, aged about twenty-five or twenty-six years.

Th. [Some one has also spoken to me of a student, more advanced in years, who never had a dream. But it is not upon dreams alone that you must base the perpetuity of the soul's perception, since I have shown how, even while asleep, it has some perception of what goes on without.]

§ 15. *Ph.* To think frequently and not to recollect your thought, is to think in a useless manner.

Th. [All impressions have their effect, but all effects are not always perceptible; when I turn to one side rather than to the other, it is very often through a series of small impressions which I do not notice, and which render one movement a little more uncomfortable than another. All our unpremeditated actions are the result of a concurrence of little perceptions, and even our customs and passions, which influence so much our decisions, come therefrom; for these habits grow little by little, and, consequently, without the little perceptions, we should not arrive at these notable dispositions. I have already remarked that he who would deny these effects in the sphere of morals, should imitate the badly taught class who deny insensible corpuscles in physics; and meanwhile I see that among those who speak of liberty are some who, taking no notice of these unperceived impressions, capable of inclining the balance, imagine an entire indifference in moral action, like that of the ass of Buridan equally divided between two meadows. Concerning this we shall speak more fully later. I admit that these impressions incline without necessitating action.]

Ph. Perhaps we might say that in the case of a man awake

who thinks, his body counts for something and that memory is preserved by means of marks in the brain, but when he is asleep the soul thinks apart by itself.

Th. I am very far from saying that, since I believe that there is always an exact correspondence between the body and the soul, and since I employ the impressions of the body which are not perceived, whether awake or asleep, in order to prove that the soul has in itself similar ones. I maintain even that something goes on in the soul which corresponds to the circulation of the blood and to all the internal movements of the viscera, which are, however, never perceived, just as those who live near a water-mill do not perceive the noise it makes. In fact, if there were impressions in the body during sleep or waking hours, by which the soul was not touched or in any wise affected, limits would be given to the union of the soul and of the body, as if corporeal impressions required a certain form and size in order for the soul to perceive them; which is not at all tenable if the soul is incorporeal, for there is no relation between an incorporeal substance and such or such a modification of matter. In a word, it is a great source of error to believe that there is no perception in the soul besides those of which it is aware.¹

§ 16. *Ph.* The greater part of the dreams which we remember are extravagant and incoherent. We should then say that the soul owes the power of rational thought to the body, or that it retains none of its rational soliloquies.

Th. [The body responds to all the soul's thoughts, rational or not, and dreams have also their marks in the brain as well as the thoughts of those who are awake.

§ 17. *Ph.* Since you are so sure that the soul is always actually thinking, I wish you would tell me what the ideas are which are in the child's soul before it is united to the body, or just at the time of its union, before it has received any idea by means of sensation.

Th. It is easy to satisfy you by our principles. The soul's perceptions correspond always naturally to the constitution of the body, and when there are a multitude of movements confused and little distinguished in the brain, as happens in the case of those

¹ French is: "*qu'il n'y a aucune perception dans l'ame que celles dont elle s'aperçoit.*" Perhaps it would be better to translate "besides those which it perceives," and preserve similarity of expression.—*Tr.*

who have little experience, the soul's thoughts (following the order of the things) would not be more distinct. However, the soul is never deprived of the help of sensation, because it always expresses its body, and this body is always impressed by its surroundings¹ in an infinite number of ways, but which often give only a confused impression.

§ 18. *Ph.* But there is still another question which the author of this Essay asks. I very much wish (says he) that those who maintain so confidently that the soul of man or (what is the same thing) man thinks always, would tell me how they know it?

Th. [I do not know but that more confidence is necessary to deny that anything goes on in the soul of which we are not conscious; for² the remarkable thing is that, though destined to be composed of parts which have no existence, nothing can spring into being at once, thought as well as motion. In short, it is as if some one should ask to-day how we know the insensible corpuscles.

§ 19. *Ph.* I do not remember that those who tell us that the soul always thinks ever say that man always thinks.

Th. [I think that is because they understand their statement of the separated soul, and yet they voluntarily admit that man always thinks during the union. For myself, who have reasons for holding that the soul is never separated from the entire body, I believe that you can state absolutely that man always does and will think.]

Ph. To say that the body is extended without having parts, and that a thing thinks without being conscious that it thinks, are two assertions which would appear equally unintelligible.

Th. [Pardon me, sir; I am obliged to tell you that when you advance the statement that there is nothing in the soul of which it is not conscious, you beg the question which has already prevailed in all our former discussion, or you have been desirous to use it to destroy innate ideas and truths. If we agree to this principle, in addition to the fact that we believe it contrary to

¹ Gerhardt's text reads: "*frappé par les ambians d'une infinité de manières, mais qui souvent ne donnent qu'une impressions confuse*" (Vol. V., p. 107). Erdmann reads: "*frappé par les autres, qui l'environnent, de une infinité de manières, mais qui souvent ne font qu'une impression confuse*" (p. 226, a).

² Book II., Chap. I., § 18. *Th.* Erdmann's Ed., p. 226, a, ad med: "*Car ce qui est remarquable doit être composé de parties, qui ne le sont pas, rien ne sauroit naître tout d'un coup, la pensée non plus que le mouvement.*"

experience and reason, we should surrender without reason to our feeling, which, I believe, I have rendered sufficiently intelligible. But besides the fact that our opponents, skilful as they are, have brought no proof of that which they urge so often and so positively, it is easy to show them the contrary; i. e., that it is impossible always to think expressly upon all our thoughts; otherwise, the spirit would reflect upon each reflection to infinity without ever being able to pass to a new thought. For example, in my consciousness of some present feeling, I should always think that I think, and still think that I think of my thought, and thus to infinity. But it is very necessary I cease reflecting upon all these reflections, and that there be at length some thought which is allowed to pass without thinking of it; otherwise, you would dwell always upon the same thing.]

Ph. But would there not be as good ground for maintaining that a man is always hungry, by saying that he can be hungry without feeling it?

Th. There is just the difference; hunger has particular reasons which do not always exist. However, it is true also that even when you are hungry you do not think of it every moment; but when you do think of it you feel it, for it is a very marked disposition; there is always irritation in the stomach, but it is necessary for it to become very strong to cause hunger. The same distinction ought always to be made between thoughts in general and remarkable thoughts. Thus, what appears to put a ridiculous construction upon our opinion, serves to confirm it.]

§ 23. *Ph.* One can now ask, When man begins to have ideas in his thought? And it seems to me that the reply should be, When he has some sensation.

Th. [I am of the same opinion; but it is by a principle a little peculiar, for I believe that we are never without thoughts, and also never without sensation. I distinguish only between ideas and thoughts; for we always have all pure or distinct ideas independently of the senses; but thoughts always correspond to some sensation.]

§ 25. But the spirit is passive only in the perception of simple ideas, which are the rudiments or materials of knowledge, while it is active when it forms complex ideas.

¹ Erdmann reads: "*Je distingue seulement entre sensations et pensées*" (p. 226. b.); Gerhardt reads: "*Je distingue seulement entre les idées et les pensées*" (p. 108, *ad fin.*).

Th. [How can it be that the spirit is passive only with regard to the perception of all simple ideas, since, according to your own admission, there are simple ideas whose perception comes from reflection, and (how can it be) that the spirit (at least) ¹ gives itself also thoughts from reflection, for it is itself who reflects? Whether it can refuse these is another question, and doubtless it cannot (refuse them) without some reason, which turns it aside from them, when some occasion presents them.]

Ph. [It seems that hitherto we have discussed *ex professo*. Now that we are going to come to the detail of ideas, I hope that we shall be more agreed, and that we shall differ only in some particulars.]

Th. [I shall be delighted to see scholars adopting those views which I hold to be true, for they are adapted to improve them and to show them in a good light.]

CHAPTER II.

Simple Ideas.

§ 1. *Ph.* I hope then that you will admit that there are simple and complex ideas; thus heat and softness in wax and cold in ice furnish simple ideas, for the soul has a uniform conception of them, which is not distinguishable into different ideas.

Th. [I believe that you can affirm that these sense-ideas are simple in appearance, because, being confused, they do not give the mind the means of distinguishing their contents. In like manner distant things appear round, because their angles cannot be discerned, although some confused impression of them is received. It is manifest, for example, that green arises from a mixture of blue and yellow; thus it is possible to believe that the idea of green is also composed of these two ideas. And yet the idea of green appears to us as simple as that of blue or that of warmth. So you are to believe that the ideas of blue and warmth are not as simple as they appear. I readily consent, however, to treat these ideas as simple ideas, because at least our apperception does not divide them, but it is necessary to proceed to their analysis by means of other experiences and by reason, in proportion as they

¹ Erdmann reads: "*et qu'au moins l'esprit se donne*" (p. 226, b., *ad fin*); Gerhardt: "*et que l'esprit se donne*" (p. 108, *ad fin*).

can be rendered more intelligible.¹ And² it will be seen thereby that there are perceptions of which we are not conscious. For the perceptions of ideas simple in appearance are composed of perceptions of parts whose ideas are complex, without the mind's perceiving it, for these confused ideas appear simple to it.]

CHAPTER III.

Of Ideas which come to us by One Sense only.

Ph. Now you can arrange simple ideas according to the means by which we perceive them, for that is done, 1, by means of one sense only; 2, by means of more than one sense; 3, by reflection; or 4, by all the ways³ of sensation as well as by reflection. Thus of those which enter by a single sense which is particularly adapted to receive them, light and colors enter only by the eyes; all kinds of noises, sounds, and tones enter by the ears; the different tastes by the palate; and odors by the nose. These organs or nerves carry them to the brain, and if any one of these organs chance to be disordered, these sensations cannot be admitted by any artificial gate. The most considerable qualities belonging to the touch are cold, heat, and solidity. The others consist either in the configuration of the sensible parts, as smooth and rough, or in their union, as compact, hard, soft, brittle.⁴

Th. [I quite agree, sir, with what you say, although I may remark that, according to the experience of the late M. Mariotte concerning the defect of vision with regard to the optic nerve, it seems to me that the membranes receive the sensation rather than the nerves, and there is some artificial entrance for the hearing and the taste, since the teeth and the *vertex* assist in causing any sound to be heard, and that tastes make themselves known to some extent through the nose, by reason of the connection of these organs. But all that makes no change in the foundation of things

¹ Erdmann's and Jacques's texts of Chap. II end here.—Tr.

² Gerhardt's text adds the following: "*Et l'on voit encor par là qu'il y a des perceptions dont on ne s'apperoit point. Car les perceptions des idées simples en apparence sont composées des perceptions des parties dont ces idées sont composées, sans que l'esprit s'en apperçoive, car ces idées confuses luy paroissent simples.*]"

³ Locke's expression. Bohn's edition, Vol. I, p. 227.—Tr.

⁴ Locke uses these forms, instead of the more common abstract forms ending in -ness. Hence I have used them in the translation.—Tr.

as regards the explication of ideas. As for the qualities belonging to touch, you can say that smoothness or roughness, hardness or softness, are only modifications of resistance or solidity.]

THE SPIRITUAL SENSE OF DANTE'S "DIVINA COMMEDIA."

BY W. T. HARRIS.

PREFACE.

To this essay on the spiritual significance of the "Divina Commedia" I prefix a few words, interesting only to the few who study works of literature for spiritual insight. Such insight is of very slow growth, and though I cannot be permitted to claim anything more than a very feeble approach to it in the reflections which I bring forward here, yet I know that the theme dignifies the writer, and that the circumstances of a struggle to attain a high object are worthy of mention, even if the success of the struggle is not great.

My first reading in Dante began as early as 1858, and continued at intervals for four years, by which time I had completed only the "Inferno," studying it superficially in the original and using Carlyle's translation as a sort of dictionary and general guide to its meaning—perhaps better described in college slang as a "pony" or "crib." I read also the translations of Wright and Cary of the "Purgatorio" and "Paradiso" at this time.

The poem had attractive poetic passages for me at the time, but as a vision of the future state of any portion of mankind I could not accept it. Its horrors repelled me. After this I began to look for some point of view whence I could see a permanent truth in the poem. The possibility of an inner meaning that would reconcile me to the outer form of a work of art I had already learned in 1861 by studying landscape painting and afterward by a like study of Beethoven's masterpieces and, more especially, of Schumann's "Pilgrimage of the Rose" and Mendelssohn's "Song of Praise."

The "Last Judgment," by Michel Angelo, I had begun to

study as early as 1863 in an outline engraving, and by 1865 a permanent meaning had begun to dawn upon me. I saw that the picture presented symbolically the present condition of the saints and sinners, not as they seem to themselves and others, but as they are in very truth. It placed them under the form of eternity, to use the expressive phrase of Spinoza, "*Sub specie æternitatis*." At once Dante's "*Inferno*" also became clear, as having substantially the same meaning. I saw that the great sculptor and painter had derived his ideas from the poet. The ideas of Thomas Carlyle, in his chapter on "Natural Supernaturalism" in the "*Sartor Resartus*," seemed to me to offer a parallel thought to the "*Last Judgment*." Remove the illusion of time, and thus bring together the deed and its consequence, and you see it under the form of eternity. So, too, paint the deed with colors derived from all its consequences, and you will picture its final or ultimate judgment. This interpretation I wrote out in 1868 and read to a circle of friends, sometimes called "*The St. Louis Art Society*," and it was published in the April number of the "*Journal of Speculative Philosophy*" for 1869, under the title "*Michel Angelo's Last Judgment*." I quote below the passage in which I connected the views of the sculptor and the poet.

It was about this time (1869) that it occurred to me that there is a threefold view of human deeds. First, there is the deed taken with the total compass of its effects and consequences—this is the picture of the "*Inferno*."

Secondly, there is the evil deed seen in its secondary effects by way of reaction on the doer—a process of gradual revelation to the doer that his deed is not salutary either for himself or for others. The evil doer at first does not see that his being is so closely connected with the being of society that if he does injury to his fellows, thinking to derive selfish benefit at the expense of others, he always works evil to himself sooner or later. He thinks that his cunning is sufficient to secure the good to himself, and at the same time to avoid the reaction of evil on himself. But the real process of reaction which comes with time teaches him the lesson of the impossibility of divorcing the individual doer from the consequences of his deeds. This secondary process of reaction is a purifying process in so far as it teaches this lesson to the evil doer. He cannot escape purification to the extent that he becomes enlightened by the wisdom of this experience.

If he sees that he has to receive the consequences of his deeds, he must needs acquire the habit of considering the ultimate effects of actions; he will renounce deeds that can end only in pain and repression of normal growth.

Hence a third aspect of human deeds becomes manifest—the purified action which emits only such deeds as build up the social whole affirmatively, and consequently return upon the doer to bless him continually. The purified human will dwell in the "Paradiso," while during the process of purification it is in the "Purgatorio." It is in purgatory so long as it is in the state of being surprised by the discovery that its selfish deeds invariably bring their punishment upon the doer, and so long as the individual still hesitates to renounce utterly and entirely the selfish deed. This renunciation, of course, takes place when the soul has thoroughly accustomed itself to seeing the selfish deed and its consequences in one unity; then its loveliness has entirely departed. The taste of a poison may be sweet to the mouth of a child, but it soon produces painful gripes. The child learns to associate the sweet taste and the gripes with the mental picture of the poison, and now the very sight of it becomes loathsome. When temptation is no longer possible, the child is purified as regards this danger.

From 1870 to 1880 every year brought me seemingly valuable thoughts on some part of Dante's great work. I presented these views in lectures to audiences from time to time. In the summer and fall of 1883 I made new studies on the whole poem, and gave a course of ten lectures to a St. Louis audience in 1884 (January to March). The present paper, which was written in 1886 for the Concord School of Philosophy, is a summary of the St. Louis course, with marginal notes added at this time.

In 1886 I came into possession of a copy of Scartazzini's essay, "Ueber die Congruenz der Sünden in Dante's Hölle," and discovered that many of the conjectures as to the relation between sins and punishments in the "Inferno" which I had set forward in these lectures were already the property of the Dante public through that distinguished scholar's paper in the *Annual of the German Dante Society* ("Jahrb. d. deutschen Dante Gesellschaft," vol. iv, 1877). In this very valuable article Scartazzini frequently quotes with approval the interpretations of Karl Graul, who seems to have suggested many happy explanations of the sym-

bolism.' One would wish to see this work of Graul reproduced in English. Meanwhile I expect to publish in the next number of this Journal the essay of Scartazzini, which has been translated by Miss Thekla Bernays, of St. Louis, for the purpose.

Had I met with Graul's work twenty-five years ago, when I first began to see the inner meaning of the poem, I should have adopted it as my guide. Graul's volume bears the imprint of 1843; but Scartazzini's essay did not appear until 1877, or after my views had taken shape.

In matters of interpreting myths and symbols there is so wide a margin for arbitrary exercise of fancy that it must be regarded as a strong evidence of the probable truthfulness of a theory when two entirely independent readers arrive at the same results in detail. At least I have been much strengthened in my own views, and have gained in respect for my own way of studying the poem on reading the thoughts of the greatest of living Dante scholars and finding so many coincidences.

(From an Essay on Michel Angelo's "Last Judgment" in the "Journal of Speculative Philosophy" for April, 1869.)

"Michel Angelo passes by all subordinate scenes and seizes at once the supreme moment of all History—of the very world itself and all that it contains. This is the vastest attempt that the Artist can make, and is the same that Dante has ventured in the 'Divina Commedia.'

"In Religion we seize the absolute truth as a process going on in Time: the deeds of humanity are judged 'after the end of the world.' After death Dives goes to torments, and Lazarus to the realm of the blest.

"The immense significance of the Christian idea of Hell as compared with the Hades of Greek and Roman Mythology we cannot dwell upon. This idea has changed the hearts of mankind. That man by will determines his destiny, and that "between right and wrong doing there is a difference eternally fixed"—this dogma has

¹ In the "Harvard University Bulletin," "Biographical Contributions, Edited by Justin Windsor, No. 7, the Dante Collections in Harvard College and Boston Public Libraries, Part I, by William Coolidge Lane, 1885," I find the work of Graul named under No. 208: "Göttliche Komödie in's Deutsche uebertragen, und historisch, aesthetisch, und vornehmlich theologisch erläutert von Karl Graul. Leipzig, 1843." Only the "Inferno" published.

tamed the fierce barbarian blood of Europe and is the producer of what we have of civilization and freedom in the present time. In the so-called heathen civilizations there is a substratum of fate presupposed under all individual character which prevents the complete return of the consequences of individual acts upon their author. Thus the citizen was not made completely universal by the laws of the state as in modern times. The Christian doctrine of Hell is the first appearance in a conceptive form of this deepest of all comprehensions of Personality; and out of it have grown our modern humanitarian doctrines, however paradoxical this may seem.

"In this supreme moment all worldly distinctions fall away, and the naked soul stands before Eternity with naught save the pure essence of its deeds to rely upon. All souls are equal before God so far as mere worldly eminence is concerned. Their inequality rests solely upon the degree that they have realized the Eternal will by their own choice.

"But this dogma as it is held in the Christian Religion is not merely a dogma; it is the deepest of speculative truths. As such it is seized by Dante and Michel Angelo, and in this universal form every one must recognize it if he would free it from all narrowness and sectarianism. The point of view is this: The whole world is seized at once under the form of Eternity; all things are reduced to their lowest terms. Every deed is seen through the perspective of its own consequences. Hence every human being under the influence of any one of the deadly sins—Anger, Lust, Avarice, Intemperance, Pride, Envy, and Indolence—is being dragged down into the Inferno just as Michel Angelo has depicted. On the other hand, any one who practises the cardinal virtues—Prudence, Justice, Temperance, and Fortitude—is elevating himself toward celestial clearness.

"If any one will study Dante carefully he will find that the punishments of the 'Inferno' are emblematical of the very states of mind one experiences when under the influence of the passions there punished.

"To find the punishment for any given sin, Dante looks at the state of mind which it causes in the sinner, and gives it its appropriate emblem.

"The angry and sullen are plunged underneath deep putrid mud, thus corresponding to the state of mind produced by anger.

If we try to understand a profound truth, or to get into a spiritual frame of mind, when terribly enraged, we shall see ourselves in putrid mud, and breathing its thick, suffocating exhalations. So, too, those who yield to the lusts of the flesh are blown about in thick darkness by violent winds. The avaricious carry heavy weights; the intemperate suffer the eternal rain of foul water, hail, and snow (dropsy, dyspepsia, delirium tremens, gout, apoplexy, etc.).

“So Michel Angelo in this picture has seized things in their essential nature: he has pierced through the shadows of time, and exhibited to us at one view the world of humanity as it is in the sight of God, or as it is in its ultimate analysis. Mortals are there, not as they seem to themselves or to their companions, but as they are when measured by the absolute standard—the final destiny of spirit. This must recommend the work to all men of all times, whether one holds to this or that theological creed, for it is the Last Judgment in the sense that it is the ultimate or absolute estimate to be pronounced upon each deed, and the question of the eternal punishment of any individual is not necessarily brought into account. Everlasting punishment is the true state of all who persist in the commission of those sins. The sins are indissolubly bound up in pain. Through all time anger shall bring with it the ‘putrid-mud’ condition of the soul; the indulgence of lustful passions, the stormy tempest and spiritual night; intemperance, the pitiless rain of hail and snow and foul water. The wicked sinner—so far forth and so long as he is a sinner—shall be tormented forever, for we are now and always in Eternity. ‘Every one of us,’ as Carlyle says, ‘is a Ghost. Sweep away the Illusion of Time; glance from the near moving cause to its far-distant mover; compress the threescore years into three minutes—are we not spirits that are shaped into a body, into an Appearance, and that fade away again into air and invisibility? We start out of Nothingness, take figure, and are apparitions; ’round us, as ’round the veriest spectre, is Eternity; and to Eternity minutes are as years and æons.’

“Thus by the Divine Purpose of the Universe—by the Absolute—every deed is seen in its true light, in the entire compass of its effects. Just as we strive in our human laws to establish justice by turning back upon the criminal the effects of his deeds, so, in fact, when placed ‘under the form of Eternity,’ all deeds do

return to the doer; and this is the final adjustment, the 'end of all things'—it is the Last Judgment. And this judgment is now and is always the only actual Fact in the world."

(From an article on "The Relation of Religion to Art," "Journal of Speculative Philosophy," April, 1876.)

"This first great Christian poem (Dante's 'Divina Commedia') is regarded by Schelling as the archetype of all Christian poetry. . . . The poem embodies the Catholic view of life, and for this reason is all the more wholesome for study by modern Protestants. The threefold future world—Inferno, Purgatorio, Paradiso—presents us the exhaustive picture of man's relation to his deeds. The Protestant 'hereafter' omits the purgatory but includes the Inferno and Paradiso. What has become of this missing link in modern Protestant Art? we may inquire, and our inquiry is a pertinent one, for there is no subject connected with the relation of Religion to Art which is so fertile in suggestive insights to the investigator. . . .

"One must reduce life to its lowest terms, and drop away all consideration of its adventitious surroundings. The deeds of man in their threefold aspect are judged in this 'mystic, unfathomable poem.' The great fact of human responsibility is the key-note. Whatever man does he does to himself. If he does violence, he injures himself. If he works righteousness, he creates a paradise for himself.

"Now, a deed has two aspects: First, its immediate relation to the doer. The mental atmosphere in which one does a deed is of first consideration. If a wrong or wicked deed, then is the atmosphere of the criminal close and stifling to the doer. The angry man is rolling about suffocating in putrid mud. The incontinent is driven about by violent winds of passion. Whatever deed a man shall do must be seen in the entire perspective of its effects to exhibit its relation to the doer. The Inferno is filled with those whose acts and habits of life surround them with an atmosphere of torture.

"One does not predict that such punishment of each individual is eternal; but one thing is certain: that with the sins there punished, there is such special torture eternally connected. . . .

"Wherever the sin shall be, there shall be connected with it the

atmosphere of the Inferno, which is its punishment. The doer of the sinful deed plunges into the Inferno on its commission.

"But Dante wrote the 'Purgatorio,' and in this portrays the secondary effect of sin. The inevitable punishment bound up with sin burns with purifying flames each sinner. The immediate effect of the deed is the Inferno, but the secondary effect is purification. Struggling up the steep side of purgatory under their painful burdens go sinners punished for incontinence—lust, gluttony, avarice, anger, and other sins that find their place of punishment also in the Inferno.

"Each evil doer shall plunge into the Inferno, and shall scorch over the flames of his own deeds until he repents and struggles up the mountain of purgatory.

"In the 'Paradiso' we have doers of those deeds, which, being thoroughly positive in their nature, do not come back as punishment upon their authors.

"The correspondence of sin and punishment is noteworthy. Even our jurisprudence discovers a similar adaptation. If one steals and deprives his neighbor of property, we manage by our laws to make his deed glide off from society and come back on the criminal, and thus he steals his own freedom and gets a cell in jail. If a murderer takes life, his deed is brought back to him, and he takes his own.

"The depth of Dante's insight discovers to him all human life stripped of its wrappings, and every deed coming straight back upon the doer, inevitably fixing his place in the scale of happiness and misery. It is not so much a 'last judgment' of individual men as it is of deeds in the abstract, for the brave man who sacrifices his life for another dwells in paradise so far as he contemplates his participation in that deed, but writhes in the Inferno in so far as he has allowed himself to slip, through some act of incontinence.

"If we return now to our question, What has become of the purgatory in modern literature? a glance will show us that the fundamental idea of Dante's purgatory has formed the chief thought of Protestant, 'humanitarian,' works of art.

"The thought that the sinful and wretched live a life of reaction against the effects of their deeds is the basis of most of our novels. Most notable are the works of Nathaniel Hawthorne in this respect. His whole art is devoted to the portrayal of the

purgatorial effects of sin or crime upon its authors. The consciousness of the deed and the consciousness of the verdict of one's fellow-men continually burn at the heart, and with slow, eating fires, consume the shreds of selfishness quite away. In the 'Marble Faun' we have the spectacle of an animal nature betrayed by sudden impulse into a crime; and the torture of this consciousness gradually purifies and elevates the semi-spiritual being into a refined humanity.

"The use of suffering, even if brought on by sin and error, is the burden of our best class of novels. George Eliot's 'Middlemarch,' 'Adam Bede,' 'Mill on the Floss,' and 'Romola'—with what intensity these portray the spiritual growth through error and pain!

"Thus, if Protestantism has omitted Purgatory from its Religion, certainly Protestant literature has taken it up and absorbed it entire."

§ 1. *Introduction.*

That a poem should possess a spiritual sense does not seem to the common view to be at all necessary to it. It must have a poetic structure; but does a poetic structure involve a spiritual sense? It is essential that a poem should be built out of tropes and personification. Its real poetic substance, in fact, is an insight into the correspondence that exists between external events and situations on the one hand and internal ideas and movements of the soul on the other. Rhyme and rhythm are less essential than this. The true poet is a creator in a high sense, because he turns hitherto opaque facts into transparent metaphors, or because he endows dead things with souls and thus personifies them. The poet uses material forms, so that there glows a sort of morning redness through them.

There is something symbolic in a poem, but there is quite as much danger from symbolism and allegory in a work of art as from philosophy. If the poet can think philosophic ideas in a philosophic form he will be apt to spoil his poem by attempting to introduce them into its texture. An allegory is repellent to the true poetic taste. The music of a verse is spoiled by the evidence of a forced rhyme. So the glad surprise of a newly discovered correspondence between the visible and invisible is unpleasantly suppressed by an intimation that it is a logical consequence

of a previously assumed comparison or metaphor. To force a symbol into an allegory necessarily demands the sacrifice of the native individuality of the facts and events which follow in the train of the primary event or situation. They must all wear its livery, whereas fresh poetic insight is fain to turn each one into a new and original revelation of eternal beauty.

Neither philosophy as such nor allegory can be the best feature of a genuine poem. Nevertheless, there are certain great poems which owe their supreme pre-eminence to the circumstance that they treat themes of such universal significance that they reflect the operation of a supreme principle and its consequences in the affairs of a world, and hence exhibit a philosophy realized, or incarnated, as it were. Their events and situations, too, being universal types, may be interpreted into many series of events within the world order, and hence stand for so many allegories. Such poems may be said to have a spiritual sense. Homer's "Iliad," and more especially his "Odyssey," contain a philosophy and many allegories. Goethe's "Faust" contains likewise a philosophy, and its poetic types are all allegoric, without detriment to their genuine poetic value.

But of all the great world-poems, unquestionably Dante's "Divina Commedia" may be justly claimed to have a spiritual sense, for it possesses a philosophic system and admits of allegorical interpretation. It is *par excellence* the religious poem of the world. And religion, like philosophy, deals directly with a first principle of the universe, while, like poetry, it clothes its universal ideas in the garb of special events and situations, making them types, and hence symbols, of the kind which may become allegories.

Homer, too, shows us the religion of the Greeks, but it is an art-religion, having only the same aim as essential poetry—to turn the natural into a symbol of the spiritual. Dante's theme is the Christian religion, which goes beyond the problem of transfiguring nature and deals with the far deeper problem of the salvation of man. For man, as the summit of nature, transfigures nature at the same time that he attains the divine. The insight into the divine-human nature of the highest principle of the universe, and the consequent necessity of human immortality and possibility of human growth into divine perfection, includes the Greek principle as a subordinate phase.

It is proper, therefore, to study the spiritual sense of the great poem of Dante, and to inquire into its philosophy and its allegory. What is Dante's theory of the world and what manner of world-order results from it? Not that we should expect that the philosophic thought of a poet would be of a conscious and systematic order; that would not promise us so much. It is rather his deep underlying view of the world—so deep a conviction that he knows of no other adequate statement for it than the structure of his poem. If an artist does not feel that his work of art utters more completely his thought than some prosaic statement may do it, he is not an artist.

In fact, a poet may introduce a theory of the world into his poem which is not so deep and comprehensive as that implied in the spiritual sense of his poem. This, we shall see, is often true in the case of Dante—that his poetic vision has glimpses of a higher world-view than is contained in his interpretation of the philosophy of the school men; and his poetic discrimination of the states of the soul under mortal sin is deeper and truer than the ethical scheme which he borrowed from that philosophy.

Moreover, although allegory is the favorite vehicle for religious revelation, and we have in this, the most religious of poems, a predominating tendency toward it, yet his allegory does not cover (or discover) so deep a spiritual sense as the genuine art-structure of his poem reveals.

In the beginning, let us call to mind the fundamental distinction between Christianity and Eastern religions. In the latter the Absolute or Supreme Principle is conceived as utterly without form and void. It is conceived as entirely lacking in particularity, utterly devoid of attributes, properties, qualities, modes, and distinctions of any kind whatever. Such is the Brahman of the Hindoo or the subjective state of Nirvana of the Buddhists. Such is the western reflection of this thought at Alexandria and elsewhere in the doctrines of Gnosticism and Neo-Platonism. Basilides and Valentinus, Proclus and Jamblichus, all hold to an utterly indeterminate, formless first principle. As a result, it follows that they are obliged to resort to arbitrary and fanciful constructions in order to explain the origin of a world of finite creatures.

Quite different is the Christian view of the Absolute. It holds that the Absolute is not formless, but the very essence of all form—pure form, pure self-distinction, or self-consciousness, or reason.

For conscious personality is form in the highest sense, because its energy is creative of form ; it is self-distinction, subject and object, and hence in its very essence an activity ; an unconditioned energy—unconditioned from without but self-conditioned from within.

In this great idea, so radically differing from the Oriental thought, Christianity has a twofold support—the intuition of the Jewish prophets and the philosophy of the Greeks.

The survey of the entire realm of thought by Plato and Aristotle has settled the question as to the possibilities of existence. There can be no absolute which is utterly formless. Any absolute whatsoever must be thought of as self-determining ; as a pure self-active energy, of the nature of thinking reason, although in degree more comprehensive than human reason and entirely without its intermittencies and eclipses.

An Absolute which is absolute form—and this means self-formative, self-distinguishing, and hence self-particularizing, living, or, what is the same, conscious personal being—is essentially a Creator. Moreover, its creation is its own self-revelation, and, according to this, God is essentially a self-revealing God. Hence Christianity is in a very deep sense a “revealed religion,” for it is the religion not of a hidden God who is a formless absolute, but of a God whose essence it is to reveal Himself, and not remain hidden in Himself.

In the first canto of the “Paradiso” Dante reports Beatrice as laying down this doctrine of form :

“All things collectively have an order among themselves, and this is form, which makes the universe resemble God.”¹

Christianity has united in its views the Jewish intuition of holy personality with the Greek philosophic conception of absolute Reason. It has not *put these ideas together*—so to speak—but has reached a new idea which includes and transcends them. Moreover, the deepest thought of Roman national life is in like manner subsumed and taken up. While the Greek has theoretically reached this highest principle of *essential form* and the Hebrew has discovered it through his heart, the Roman has experienced it through his will or volition. He has discovered that the highest

¹ Le cose tutte quante Hann' ordine tra loro ; e questo è forma Che l'universo a Dio fa simigliante.

form in the universe is pure will. And this again is only a new way of naming pure self-determination, pure reason, or pure personality. It sees the absolute form from the standpoint of the will. According to this, all activity of the will returns to the doer. Whatever man as free will does, he does to himself. Here is the root of Dante's Divine Comedy.

Dante is a Roman, although he has Teutonic blood in his veins. The Roman world-view preponderates in Italy to this day. According to the view of the absolute first principle as Will, each being in acting acts upon itself and thereby becomes its own fate. It creates its environment. The responsibility of the free agent is infinite. If it acts so as to make for itself an environment of deeds that are in harmony with its freedom, it lives in the "Paradiso." If it acts so as to contradict its nature, it makes for itself the "Inferno." All acts of a free will that do not tend to create an external environment of *freedom* will, of course, result in limiting the original free will and in building up around it walls of *hostile fate*. Fate is only a "maya" or illusion produced by not recognizing the self-contradiction involved in willing in particular what is contrary to the nature of will in general.

Since the Absolute is free will, it energizes creatively to form a universe of free wills. But it cannot constrain wills to be free. A created being's will is free to contradict its own essence and to defy the absolute Free Will of God.

Here is the problem which exercised Paul and St. Augustine—and Calvin. What is the mediation between the free will of the Creator and the free will of the creature? There can be no constraint of the free will except through itself. It makes for itself its own fate. But can it relieve itself from its fate also by its own act? Here is the all-important question.

The creature is a part of creation—each man is only a member of humanity. His will utters deeds that affect for good or ill his fellow-men. He in turn is affected in like manner by the deeds of his fellows. Here is the secret of the method of the return of the deed upon the doer. The individual acts upon his fellow-men, and they react upon him according to the quality of his deeds.

Hence the individual man by his will creates his environment through and by means of society, so that his fate or his freedom is the reflection of what he does to his fellow-men. Only it is not

returned upon him by his own might, but by the freedom of his fellow-members of society.

Here is the clew to the question of salvation. The circle of a man's freedom includes not only his own deeds, but also the reaction of society. Inasmuch as the whole of society stands to the individual in the relation of infinite to finite (for he cannot measure its power), the return of his deed to him is the work of a higher power, and his freedom is the work of grace and not the result of his own strength. This is the conception of GRACE as it occurs in the Christian thought of the world. Man is free through grace, and he perfects himself through grace, or indeed suffers evil through grace; for this conception of Grace includes Justice as one of its elements.

Deeds, then, are to be judged by their effect upon society, whether they re-enforce the freedom of others or curtail that freedom. Man as individual combines with his fellows, so as to reap the results of the united effort of the whole. The individual thus avails himself of the entire species, and heals his imperfections.

Looking at human life in this way, Dante forms his views of the deeds of men, and slowly constructs the framework of his three worlds and fills them with their people. His classification and gradation of sins in accordance with their effect on society furnishes the structure of the first and second parts of the poem. His insight into the subjective effects of these sins—both their *immediate effect* in producing a mental atmosphere in which the individual breathes and lives his spiritual life, and their *mediate effect*, which comes to the individual after the social whole reacts upon him by reason of his deed—his insight into these two effects on the individual gives him the poetic material for painting the sufferings of the wicked and the struggles of the penitent.

There is in many respects an excess of philosophic structure in the "Divine Comedy." That there should be three parts to the poem does not suggest itself as a formalism. But that there should be exactly thirty-three cantos in each part and, adding the introductory canto, exactly one hundred cantos in the whole, seems an excess in this respect. So, too, when we are told that the triple rhyme suggests the Trinity, we find that the suggestion is a vague and trivial one, approaching a vulgar superstition. So, too, the fact that thirty-three years suggests the years of Christ's earthly

life. In the second Treatise (Chapter I) of his "Convito" Dante tells us that it is possible to understand a book in four different ways. There is in a poem a literal, an allegorical, a moral, and a mystical sense (*litterale, allegorico, morale, anagogico cioè sovra senso*). As the leading of Israel out of Egypt should signify, besides its literal meaning, mystically (anagogically) or spiritually the soul's liberation from sin—the exodus of the soul, as it were. He says the literal must go first, because you cannot come to the allegorical except through the literal; it is impossible to come to that which is within except through the without. "The allegorical is a truth concealed under a beautiful untruth." The moral sense of a book is its practical wisdom—what it contains useful for practical guidance (*a utilità di loro*). But, in spite of all his ingenuity, we must all, I think, confess that Dante's elaborate syntactical analyses of his love poems in the "Vita Nuova," as well as his disquisitions in the "Convito," seem much too artificial, and that they become soon repugnant to us. They seem a sort of trifling in comparison with the grim earnest which the "Divine Comedy" shows. And yet they furnish, after a sort, a key to be kept in hand while we accompany our poet on his journey.

Two things strike us most forcibly after we have begun to penetrate the inner meaning of Dante—namely, his fertility of genius in inventing external physical symbols for the expression of internal states of the soul, and, secondly, his preternatural psychological ability in discerning the true relation between acts of the will and the traits of character that follow as a result of the subsequent reaction. But our first impression of the poet must be one of horror at the malignancy of a soul who could allow his imagination to dwell on the sufferings of his fellow-men, and permit his pen to describe them with such painstaking minuteness. We see more of a fiend than a man on our first visit to Dante. But even thus early we are struck, in a few instances, with the apt correspondence between the punishments of the "Inferno" and the actual state of mind of the sinner on committing the sin. On a second acquaintance these instances increase, and the conviction gradually arises that Dante has done nothing arbitrary, but all things through a deep sense of justice and truth to what he has actually observed in the world about him. After we have come to this view we soon go further and begin to note the tenderness and divine charity of this world-poet, and finally we are persuaded

that we see his loving kindness in the very instances in which at first we could see only malignant spite or heartless cruelty.

I. THE "INFERNO."

§ 2. *Dante turns from Politics to Literature.*

In the year 1300, at the age of thirty-five, Dante found himself in the midst of a gloomy wood of terrestrial trials, his city, Florence, hopelessly divided between factions, and Italy itself in the midst of the terrible struggle between the secular and spiritual powers. The growing power of France, jealous of the Holy Roman Empire, wishes to keep Germany out of Italy. The Pope, likewise, seems obliged to find his interest in siding with France, at least temporarily. The Church seems to have no recourse for the safety of its spiritual interests except in grasping at civil power. The Crusades have brought immense wealth to the cities of Italy, which lie on the way between the East and the West. The upstart wealthy families in those cities contest the supremacy of the impoverished families of the old nobility. There is no solution of these evils. Each faction, if suppressed within the city, at once appeals to one of the parties into which Italy is divided. It obtains the aid of the Pope and France on the one hand, or of the Emperor on the other, and, thus aided, regains its power in Florence. Bloody retaliations, confiscations, conflagrations ensue. What can Dante as Prior of a city like Florence do? He banishes the leaders of both factions. But these factions are not isolated, local matters. They are merely symptomatic manifestations of the universal discord—the two political parties of Christendom—and cannot be cured by local surgery. France approaches to aid one of the banished parties, and the Pope, to whom Dante turns for aid, betrays his intention to take advantage of internal factions and foreign intervention in order to weaken the power of the Empire in Italy. The Church, having small political power in the way of direct control over large territories, is obliged to retain its influence through the next means—to wit, money and intrigue. It is evident enough that there is no honorable career left for Dante in his native city. He looks up to the lofty and shining heights of success, a worthy object for the ambition of a young man of ability, and sees in his way before him three obstacles. A leopard with spotted hide, white and black spots—

symbolic of the black and white factions of Florence¹—impedes his way, so that he is minded to go back and give up his worthy ambition to reach the shining heights, but rather to seek safety in the obscurity of private life. But his youth, the hour of the morning, and the sweet season fill him with hope that he shall be able to capture the leopard with his spots and bring peace and good government to his native city, when, lo! a lion, the symbol of France and French interests,² approaches with head erect and furious with hunger. The very air quakes. He turns away from before the lion, but only to meet a she wolf (the wolf of the capital at Rome, symbolic of that city, and hence suggesting the papal court),³ full of all cravings in her leanness, grasping for money and political power. Dante cannot ascend on that road to the glorious summit of a successful and honorable life. He turns from politics to literature. Virgil meets him and informs him that he must take another road if he would attain his object. He must try to make himself useful to his age by holding up to it its true image, as world-poet. He must collect and classify all manner of human deeds and all manner of states of the human soul (antecedent and consequent on *those deeds*) and paint a vast picture-gallery of characters for the education not only of his native city, nor even of all Italy, but of all Europe and of nations yet unborn.

¹ Symbolic of much else also, as commentators have shown: "Symbolic of worldly pleasure with its fair outside," and the quiet citizen life checkered with its small joys and alternating cares; symbolic of sensuality; also of the business of private life. The chief point is that the "*gaietta pelle*" distracts him from the ascent and impedes him so that he is often minded to return. The wolf and lion terrify him. But he hopes ("Inferno," xvi, 106-108), to capture the leopard with his girdle. He thought that he could, with the girdle of his own strength, conquer the factions of Florence, up to the time when he saw that these were backed by the wolf and the lion. Or does the girdle hint at a contemplated entrance of the order of Franciscans in order to overcome his passion for carnal pleasure? If for *la* we read *alla gaietta pelle*, the leopard should be overcome as something hostile and impeding; if *la*, then it is one of the causes of good hope—but hope of what? Certainly not of ascent of the hill!—But this will be discussed further in another note.

² The lion should be ambition or pride, according to commentators. But it is not ambition in general that Dante encountered, but the special instance of it in French interference.

³ So the wolf means avarice, but not avarice in general; it is only the special instance of it that Dante met when he applied to the papal court for aid in suppressing civil war in his native city. Note that the wolf will be chased into hell by the greyhound, so as to no more block the way to the shining heights.

Accompanied by Virgil, or the genius of literature, he comes to the Inferno and the Purgatory. Accompanied thereafter by the divine science "First Philosophy," in the person of Beatrice, he passes the terrestrial and celestial paradises. Although his life seems at first a failure, in that a public career is closed for him, yet it proves in the event a success in a far higher sense, for his service to mankind proves to be more enduring than he had planned. The Celestial Powers have overruled his counsels, led him through Eternal Places, and given him a more important place on the lofty hill whose shoulders were clothed with the rays of the celestial sun.

§ 3. *In what sense Hell is Eternal.*

Over the gate of the Inferno he reads the solemn words :

"Through me is the way into the doleful city ; through me the way among the people lost. Justice moved my High Maker ; Divine Power made me, Wisdom Supreme, and Primal Love. Before me were no things created, but eternal ; and eternal I endure. Leave all hope, ye that enter."—(J. C.),¹ iii, 1-9.

The Christian doctrine of Hell and everlasting punishment, at first so repugnant to the principle of divine charity and grace which is the evangel of the highest religion, needs philosophic interpretation in order that we may endure to accompany Dante further. In the first place, we remark that the doctrine of *Hell*, as opposed to the heathen notion of *Hades*, expresses the insight into the complete freedom of the human will. In the heathen view there is always a substratum of fate which limits man's freedom and prevents the complete return of his deed upon himself. It is in Christianity that religion, for the first time, conceives man as perfectly responsible, perfectly free—a spiritual totality. Hence, too, with Christianity there is possible now a doctrine of immortality that has positive significance. Before Christianity, immortality had not been "brought to light"—i. e., no immortality worth having. According to Christianity, man may go forward forever into knowledge and wisdom and mutual brotherly helpfulness in the universe, lifting up others, and himself lifted up by all the influences of an infinite Church, whose spirit is the Holy Spirit and God Himself.

¹ John Carlyle's translation is marked (J. C.).

If man can determine himself or choose freely his thoughts and deeds, he can join himself to the social whole, or he can sunder himself from it. He, on the one hand, can mediate himself through all men, placing his personal interest at the most distant part of the universe and seeking his own good through first serving the interest of all others; or he can seek his selfish interest directly and before that of all others and in preference to theirs. Thus he can make for himself one of two utterly different worlds—an Inferno or a Paradiso.

We are come to one of these places, as Virgil now informs Dante:

"We are come to the place where I told thee thou shouldst see the wretched people who have lost the good of the intellect."—(J. C.), iii, 16–18.

The "good of the intellect" refers to Aristotle's ethical doctrine of the highest good, which is that of the contemplation of God—the vision of absolute Truth and Goodness. The wicked do not see God revealed in the world of nature and human history. To them God is only another fiend more potent than the fiends of Hell. They are conquered, but not subdued into obedience. To them the good seems an external tyrant, oppressing them and inflicting pain on them. This state is Hell. But even Hell is the evidence of Divine love, rightly understood. For it was made not only by "Justice and Divine Power," but also "by Wisdom Supreme and Primal Love." Recall the doctrine already stated in regard to Form. A formless Absolute cannot create real creatures. They cannot participate in his substance, because that which is finite and limited can have no substance if God is without form and distinctions. With the Christian idea God has distinctions and self-limitations—pure form. With this idea the finite can participate in the divine substance without annihilation. Were this blessed doctrine not true, there could be no existence for finite creatures, even in Hell. For, unless the finite can subsist as real and true substance, there can be no free will and no rebellion of the individual against the species. Rebellion against the divine world-order would at once produce annihilation under the heathen doctrine of a formless God. Even imperfection without rebellion would produce annihilation.

But in Dante's Hell there is alienation from God as a free act of the sinners. But God's hand is under the sinner holding him

back from annihilation. Although you rebel against Me, yet you shall not drop out of My hand into the abyss of Nothingness, and My hand shall sustain you and give you participation in the divine substance. My hand shall sustain you, but it will burn you if you sin and so long as you sin, because your freedom is used against itself in the act of sin.

"Before me," says the inscription, "were no things created, but eternal; and eternal I endure." That is to say, with the creation of finite things Hell is created, because substance, actual divine substance and infinitude, is given to finite things. Hence, even their limitations are made to have essential being, and thus Hell is made by the very act of creating. It will exist, too, as long as the finite is created—that is, eternally.

A doctrine of the ultimate annihilation of the wicked is a survival of heathenism—a doctrine compatible only with the doctrine of a formless God. So, too, is the doctrine of the end of probation for the sinners in Hell. Hell signifies the continuance of free will supported by Divine Grace. Let free will cease, and Hell ceases. Let free will cease, and individual immortal being lapses out of spiritual being into mere physical existence, or at least into lower forms of life, and annihilation has taken effect, and the Christian idea of God as pure form, pure personality, at once becomes impossible.

Free will, therefore, necessarily remains to all people in Hell, and so long as Hell itself endures. Hence, also, probation lasts forever. But probation does not mean *enforced salvation*. That were equally impossible, and itself also the destruction of the Christian idea of God as pure form. Hell is the shadow of man's freedom; salvation is the substance of man's freedom. No sinner can be compelled to repent. He must be converted through his freedom and not against it.

The state of Hell is a state of rebellion against the divine world-order. The individual seeks his selfish good before the good of his fellow-men and instead of their good. Accordingly, he wills that humanity shall be his enemies. He is in a double state of self-contradiction—first, within himself he contradicts his own universality or his own reason; secondly, he contradicts his species as living in the world. This contradiction exists for him in the shape of pain and unhappiness—hellish torment. But this very torment is an evidence of grace. Were he unconscious of his con-

tradiction, he were free from torment. But such freedom from torment would be annihilation of his personality, for personality—let us define it—is individuality which feels its own individuality and at the same time its participation with all other individuals. All manner of appetite and desire even is the feeling of one's identity with some external or foreign being. Within the depths of one's self he feels that other. So pain is the feeling of the identity of the self with what is not one's particular self. It is the feeling of identity of the little self which we have really become, with that larger self which we are potentially but have not as yet become. Hence pain—spiritual pain—is evidence of capacity for growth that is not exercised.

Here we may see the difference between the state of Hell and the state of Purgatory. The sinner is in Hell when he looks upon his own pain, not as produced by his own freedom, but as thrust upon him undeservedly from without. His case is hopeless, because he must continually get more bitter by the contemplation of his own pain and its undeservedness. Could he by any means get an insight into the world-order and see it truly, he would see that his pain all comes from his own act of freedom—from his opposition to the social whole; then he would welcome his pain as the evidence of his own substantial participation in his race and in the Divine Being. Then at once he would be in Purgatory. All his pain then would become purifying instead of hardening to his soul. He would have arrived at the good of the intellect or the perception of the divine human nature of God. In Hell the individual looks upon himself as the absolute centre and measure of all things. In Purgatory the individual looks upon society as the centre and measure, and strives to rid himself of his selfishness. He strives to ascend from his little self to his greater self. He struggles against the lusts of the flesh and the pride and envy of his soul. Such lusts and passions now seem to him horrible when they arise within him, and this is the torment of Purgatory.

In Purgatory nothing can happen to the individual that is amiss, for all pain and inconvenience, all the ills of the flesh and of the soul, are made means of purification, means of conquest over selfishness.

It is obvious that to any sinner in Hell there may come this insight into his relation to his own misery, especially if the mission-

§ 6. *The Punishments of the Incontinent.*

Within the real hell of rebellious spirits, beyond the court of Minos, we enter first upon the circles—the second to the fifth circles—in which sins of incontinence are punished—"those who subjugate reason to appetite," as Dante tells us. In the second circle, which is the first of the "Inferno" proper, the lustful are driven through the darkened air, a long streak of them, borne on the blast like a flock of cranes. Their passions darken the intellectual vision and drive them about "hither, thither, up, down"—tossed on that strife of windy gusts of passion. The punishment is a realistic symbol of the soul filled with lust. It cannot see truth nor do works of righteousness, for its sky is dark with clouds and tempests. The gluttonous are in

"the third circle—that of the eternal, accursed, cold and heavy rain. Its course and quality is never new; large hail, and turbid water, and snow—it pours down through the darksome air. The ground on which it falls emits a putrid smell. Cerberus, a monster fierce and strange, with three throats, barks dog-like over those that are immersed in it. His eyes are red, his beard gory and black, his belly wide, and clawed his hands. He clutches the spirits, flays, and piecemeal rends them. The rain makes them howl like dogs. With one side they screen the other; they often turn themselves, the impious wretches."—(J. C.), vi, 7–21.

This description of the actual state of the intemperate in this life enables us to recognize the punishments which their sin brings on them. We see the diseases of the flesh personified in Cerberus—dyspepsia, gout, dropsy, delirium tremens, and what not. Intemperance is utterly hostile to the good of the intellect or to any sort of good whatever, and it steepes the soul in its turbid waters and drenches it with its chilly snows or racks it with fevers. In the fourth circle we meet the avaricious:

"As does the surge, there above Charybdis, that breaks itself against the surge wherewith it meets, so have the people here to counter-dance. Here saw I, too, many more than elsewhere, both on the one side and on the other, with loud howlings, rolling weights by force of chest. They smote against each other, and then all turned upon the spot, rolling them back, shouting, 'Why holdest thou?' and 'Why throwest thou away?' Thus they

returned through the hideous circle, on either hand, to the opposite point, shouting always in their reproachful measure. Then every one, when he had reached it, turned through his semicircle toward the other joust."—(J. C.), vii, 22–35.

The avaricious and prodigal are devoted entirely to the unspiritual occupation of heaping up pelf—they roll the weights by force of chest first one way and then another. Think of the human labor given to property as an end merely and not as a means! The struggle to gain property and save it—the absorption of time and attention required—suggested to Dante the exertion required to roll heavy weights. The wealthy must needs exert constant pressure to hold together their property; upon the slightest relaxation, the forces that act continually for the dissipation of wealth will gain the ascendancy and all will go speedily. The avaricious are engaged in resisting those who wish to have their property to spend for the gratification of want. Property can be gained and saved only by continual sacrifice of the appetite for creature comfort both in one's self and in others. But the longing for property in order to gratify desires has the same limiting effect on the soul as the struggle to save wealth for its own sake. In both cases it subordinates spiritual interests to the service of material things. "*Così convien che qui la gente riddi.*" It is the struggle of the hoarding propensity with the propensity to outlay for the gratification of present appetites which produces the vortex in which the avaricious and prodigal are punished. Ill-giving and ill-keeping (*mal dare, e mal tener*) has deprived them of the fair world—the Paradiso. Dante knows well the uses of property, as we shall see by the numerous punishments in the "Inferno" that relate to its abuse. Property or private ownership is one of the two instrumentalities of free will by which man achieves his freedom. In the circle of the violent, therefore, we see squanderers, robbers, and speculators punished; in the circles of fraud are punished simony, bribery, theft, and counterfeiters. There are seven punishments in all devoted to sinners against the sacredness of property rights and uses.

§ 7. *The Relation of Sloth to Anger among the Mortal Sins.*

In the fifth circle we come upon the river Styx and encounter the souls of the wrathful and melancholy.

"We crossed the circle to the other bank, near a spring, that

boils and pours down through a cleft which it has formed. The water was darker far than perse. And we, accompanying the dusky waves, entered down by a strange path. This dreary streamlet makes a marsh that is named Styx when it has descended to the foot of the gray malignant shores. And I, who stood intent on looking, saw muddy people in that bog, all naked and with a look of anger. They were smiting each other, not with hands only, but with head and with chest and with feet, maiming one another with their teeth, piece by piece. . . . There are people underneath the water, who sob and make it bubble at the surface, as thy eye may tell thee, whichever way it turns. Fixed in the slime, they say: Sullen were we in the sweet air, that is gladdened by the Sun, carrying lazy smoke within our hearts; now lie we sullen here in the black mire. This hymn they gurgle in their throats, for they cannot speak it in full words."—(J. C.), vii, 100–126.

The seven mortal sins should be lust, gluttony, avarice, sloth, anger, envy, and pride. In the "Purgatorio" (where each mortal sin appears as an inner tendency or incitement, but is not allowed to come to external acts or deeds) these seven sins are expressly enumerated and assigned each to its separate circle. But sloth is not assigned to a separate round of the "Inferno," nor indeed is envy or pride. These are punished in what the Scholastic theologians call the daughters of these mortal sins—that is to say, in their results.

But St. Thomas Aquinas names six daughters to sloth (*accidia*—*ἀκηδεια*)—malice, rancor, pusillanimity, despair, torpor, and wandering thoughts. Hence slothfulness is punished in its effects in sullenness and rancor, and also in the round of suicides in the circle of the violent, who take their own lives through despair. Moreover, its daughters pusillanimity, torpor, and scatter-brains are not admitted into Hell proper, but are pursuing the aimless, giddy flag around the shores of Acheron. Anger is punished directly in itself, in so far as it is a wrathful state of mind, by the muddy state of the soul which it engenders and by the thick, lazy smoke it causes in the heart. The wrathful is thus far removed from the celestial state of the soul, which discerns truth and wills the good.

The daughters of anger are punished in the rounds of violence below—the violent against God, against self, against one's neighbor.

The spiritual state of the soul under the influence of anger is well symbolized by immersion in the muddy pool, sobbing and bubbling; the comparison of a sullen disposition to a lazy smoke (*accidioso fummo*), which obscures the light of day and disinclines to all acts of duty, is felicitous. Anger is indeed the muddy state of the soul. No insight into truth or into reasonable practical works can exist in the angry soul.

§ 8. *What Form of Heresy is a Daughter of Sloth?*

To our surprise we come here, before reaching the circle of violence, upon heretics burned in tombs.

"As at Arles, where the Rhone stagnates, as at Pola near the Quarnaro Gulf, which shuts up Italy and bathes its confines, the sepulchres make all the place uneven; so did they here on every side, only the manner here was bitterer. For among the tombs were scattered flames, whereby they were made all over so glowing hot that iron more hot no craft requires. Their covers were all raised up, and out of them proceeded moans so grievous that they seemed indeed the moans of spirits sad and wounded. . . . These are the Arch-heretics with their followers of every sect; and, much more than thou thinkest, the tombs are laden. Like with like is buried here; and the monuments are more and less hot."—(J. C.), ix, 112-131.

"In this part are entombed with Epicurus all his followers, who make the soul die with the body."—(J. C.), x, 13-15.

Is heresy a daughter of sloth? It is supposed to be a daughter of the opposite of sloth—namely, of intellectual violence—and in that case it belongs to the progeny of anger. But it is not heresy in general that we have here in the sepulchres, but the heresy of disbelief in the immortality of the soul. Perhaps, however, this seemed in Dante's eyes the effect of intellectual sloth. To them who believe that the soul dies with the body this earth is only one vast tomb in which they are slowly consumed. So long as they live they sit and feel themselves wasting in tombs with the lids raised. At death the lids are to close forever upon them. Dante accurately depicts the spiritual state of the soul in this life when possessed of the conviction that materialism produces. He supposes this to be the doctrine of Epicurus—namely, that we die with the body. The sin itself is its own punishment.

Moreover, even the view that he takes of the world is to the materialist his hell.

A point of interest is found in the discourse of Farinata to the effect that spirits who can foretell particulars of Dante's exile yet do not know the present. Spirits, on separation from their bodies, it would seem, lose the instrument by which they read the processes going on upon the earth. They know the total possibility of all things, but do not know exactly where the present has brought the process of unfolding it. This is the doctrine of the Scholastics (and of Homer as well). After time—*i. e.*, after all possibility is unfolded—the portals of experience are closed (because there is nothing new any more to become event).

§ 9. *The Punishment of the Violent.*

The first round of the circle of violence contained murderers, tyrants, and robbers, quite as we should expect to find them, immersed in blood up to their eyebrows.

Next, the gloomy wood of self-murderers, the fruit of desperation chiefly caused by careless use of property. The suicides are pursued by hell-hounds, importunate creditors, no doubt, and the cares and worries that attend on poverty. With striking poetic justice those who slay themselves are placed, not in animal bodies, but in trees. Their punishment is to need their bodies. This also hints at the vegetative state—a sort of paralysis of will and sensibilities, of feeling and locomotion—of the soul which has come under the influence of settled melancholy.

In the third round of violence are punished the violent against God—the blasphemers.

“Over all the great sand, falling slowly, rained dilated flakes of fire, like those of snow in Alps without a wind. As the flames which Alexander, in the hot regions of India, saw fall upon his host, entire to the ground—whereat he with his legions took care to tramp the soil, for the fire was more easily extinguished while alone—so fell the eternal heat, by which the sand was kindled, like tinder beneath the flint and steel, redoubling the pain. Ever restless was the dance of miserable hands, now here, now there, shaking off the (flakes) fresh burning.”—(J. C.), xiv, 28–42.

Fierce arrogance, like that of Capaneus, attacks the divine mediation in the world in so far as it appears as benign influences, and this hostility turns such influences into tormenting flames.

This will be fully evident in considering the sin of Pride later on. In fact, it is not easy to distinguish the sin of Pride from this of violence against God. In fact, Dante makes Virgil speak of the pride of Capaneus (*la tua superbia*, xiv, 64) as that which chiefly punishes him.

The souls punished in the outermost verge of the seventh circle (xvii, 43-78) are the violent against art; they are usurers and injurious extortioners, or, perhaps, better designated now as speculators in the necessities of life—those who try to make fortunes by cornering the food and clothing of the market, and not capitalists who put their money to good uses. These usurers are not to be recognized by their faces, but solely by their money-bags and armorial bearings, behind which they are hidden. They sit crouched up on the burning sand quite subordinate to the pelf they are accumulating. They have lost human semblance, or their humanity has shrunk behind their nefarious occupation.

§ 10. *The Daughters of Envy: Ten Species of Fraud.*

The daughters of Envy, according to Dante, are ten species of fraud. These sins are punished in "malebolge," or evil ditches.

Horned demons scourge the seducers and panders. The flatterers wallow in filth. They are engaged in destroying the rational self-estimate of those that they flatter by calling good evil and evil good, and producing a confusion between clean and unclean. The Simonists buy and sell the gifts of the Church for money, and are plunged, like coin, head first into round holes or purses, while flames scorch the soles of their feet. As others follow them, they sink toward the bottom of the earth, gravitating toward pelf. Their deeds directly destroy the spiritual by making it subservient to money and material gain; they invert the true order of the spiritual and material, and symbolically place the head where the feet should be.

In the fourth ditch come the diviners, soothsayers, astrologers, or fortune-tellers, who make a trade of a knowledge of the future.

"Through the circular valley I saw a people coming, silent and weeping, at the pace which the litanies make in this world. When my sight descended lower on them, each seemed wondrously distorted from the chin to the commencement of the chest, so that the face was turned toward the loins; and they had to come backward, for to look before them was denied. Perhaps by force of

§ 11. *The Circles of Treachery, the Daughter of Pride.*

Envy is distinguished from Pride by the philosophers in a manner somewhat different from Dante's poetic treatment. Even Dante himself, defining as a philosopher, does not quite agree with himself as poet. One would say that Dante as poet conceives pride to indicate absolute selfishness, or rather concentration on self. Pride says, in fact, to the universe: "I do not want you or any of your good; I want no participation with you!" While envy wants the good of others, but wishes evil to be given to them in its stead. Thus, envy has some sociality about it, though of a negative sort. It is still interested enough in its fellows to wish them evil and to covet their good. As ordinarily defined, it would be easy to classify most of the instances of pride under envy.

Just as in the case of sloth, anger, and envy, so here pride is represented by its daughters, which are four species of treachery—treachery toward one's blood relatives in the family, treachery toward one's native country, treachery toward one's friends, and treachery toward one's masters or benefactors. Caina, named from Cain, holds the first; the Antenora (from Antenor, who betrayed Troy to the Greeks) holds the second class; the Ptolemæa, named from the captain of Jericho, who betrayed Simon, the high-priest, holds the third class, while the Judecca, named from Judas, holds the fourth class—Judas, Cassius, and Brutus being crunched in the three mouths of the monster traitor, Lucifer.

The entire circle of treachery is covered with ice, to symbolize the isolating and freezing character of the crime of treachery, the daughter of Pride. This sin alone completely isolates each man from every other. All the others attack the social bond, but are inconsistent, because they seek the fruits of society, though aiming a blow at its existence. Pride is consistent selfishness, because it makes itself sole end and sole means. It is frozen and it freezes all others.

The next branch of our subject is the new view of these mortal sins from the inner or subjective standpoint. After repentance begins there is no more sin uttered in deeds, but there yet remains the pain that comes from the repressed proclivity within. Hence a series of torments belong to the Purgatory, but essentially different from those of the Inferno.

II. THE PURGATORY.

§ 12. *The Spiritual Sense of Purgatory.*

The chief thought that has guided us in our interpretation of the "Inferno" is this:

Dante describes each punishment in such a manner that we are to see the essential condition produced in the soul by the sin. The sin itself is beheld as punishment, for each sin cuts off in some peculiar manner the individual from participation in the good that flows from society. In the social whole all help each and each helps all. Each one gives his mite to the treasury of the world, and in return receives the gift of the whole—he gives a finite and receives an infinite. Now, each one of the seven mortal sins obstructs in some way this participation.

Let us only look upon the mortal sin with wise illumined eyes—with a spiritual sense, as it were—and we see that the sin makes an atmosphere of torment and embarrassment within the soul, and an environment of hatred between the soul and society.

Dante, therefore, has only to look into the state of the soul under sin and describe by poetic symbols its condition. It is not the remote effects of the seven mortal sins, but their direct immediate presence that furnishes the punishments of the Inferno. The effects of sinful deeds return to the doer, and pain comes from this, too. But Dante has elaborated in symbolic description the internal state which constitutes the sin as being the state of torment. There are two attitudes of the soul, however, in the presence of sinful thoughts, and we have arrived at the second—at Purgatory.

We must read the "Divina Commedia" with this thought in mind: Punishment is not an extraneous affair that may be inflicted after sin, and on account of it. Such external infliction is not divine punishment. That is of a different sort; the punishment is the sin itself.

§ 13. *The Entrance to Purgatory.*

On emerging from the dark and gloomy depths of the Inferno, Dante and his guide again behold the stars.

"Of oriental sapphire that sweet blue
 Which overspread the beautiful serene
 Of the pure ether, far as eye could view
 To heaven's first circle, brightened up my mien,
 Soon as I left that atmosphere of death
 Which had my heart so saddened with mine eyes:
 The beauteous planet which gives love new breath
 With laughing light cheered all the orient skies,
 Dimming the Fishes that her escort made:
 Then, turning to my right, I stood to scan
 The southern pole, and four stars there surveyed—
 Save the first people, never seen by man.
 Heaven seemed rejoicing in their blazing rays."

—(T. W. Parsons' Transl.), i, 15-25.

The two poets have now come to a realm of hope and growth and morning-redness, on the dawn of Easter-day—a festival symbolic of the rise of the soul out of the Hell of sensuality. They meet Cato, the guardian of the place, his face illuminated by the holy lights of the four bright stars of the southern cross. These symbols of the four cardinal virtues—temperance, justice, prudence, and fortitude—flamed thus in the morning sky of the southern heavens, while the three great stars symbolizing the three celestial virtues—faith, hope, and charity—will be seen later, in the evening sky, as mentioned in the eighth canto. Directed by Cato, they proceed toward the shore of the sea, and after Virgil has washed the tear-stained cheeks of Dante with the purgatorial dews, he girds him with a smooth rush, the symbol of humility under chastisement. Dante had thrown his girdle of self-righteousness¹ into the pit of fraud on his descent. An angel appears,

¹ Carlyle suggests this meaning for the girdle which was thrown to the monster Geryon. He had once thought to catch the leopard with the painted skin by its aid—

"E con essa pensai alcuna volta
 Prender la lonza alla pelle dipinta."

It must be noted that there is a vast abyss separating the upper hell of incontinence from the lower hell of fraud and treachery—the hell of natural impulse and desire from the hell of considerate, calculating selfishness, which is conscious of the spiritual bond of society, and deliberately sacrifices it for selfish ends. It is the difference between the special or particular and the universal. Incontinence seeks the particular object of gratification, and simply neglects the social bond that would forbid it. But Envy, with its daughters, the ten species of fraud, does not attack the individual directly, but through and by means of the social bond itself. It uses the social bond as though it were not a means of existence for the social whole, but as though it were a means for

piloting swiftly over the waves a bark laden with spirits chanting the psalm of deliverance, "When Israel went out of Egypt, the house of Jacob from a people of strange language," celebrating their escape from the bondage of sin.

The first terrace of the steep mountain of Purgatory is devoted to the souls who procrastinated their repentance. Manfred tells them that one who dies in contumacy of the holy church must stay on the plain that surrounds the ascent for a period thirty times as long as the period of his presumption. And Belaqua, who has attained the first terrace, is obliged to wait, as we learn, on the first terrace a duration equivalent to the time he lost in his earthly life by procrastination. But it seems that the time of

the individual to use in seeking his private and exclusive ends. So, too, Pride, with treachery, its daughter, attacks the four forms of the social bond, directly seeking to put the individual in place of the social whole, and to set aside the social bond entirely. Now, the principle of this nether hell is not an animal or natural one, a yielding to native impulse, but a peculiarly human hell (xi, 25, "*Ma perchè frode à dell' ucm proprio male*"), a hell made by using the social bond against itself (fraud) or by seeking to destroy it utterly (treachery). The girdle (of self-righteousness, as Carlyle interprets it, following the hints of older commentators) might then be taken to signify the principle of Dante's actions—the aim of life which united or girded up his endeavors while a young man looking to wealth and luxury—creature comforts—individual happiness, in short. It was the principle of thrift that considers the pleasures which the sins of incontinence seek, to be legitimate ends for the pursuit of the soul. The love of sex, of food and drink, of money, of pure individual will (anger is based on this), is the object for which the girdle of thrift unites one's endeavors—it is a selfish aim, and while it may be ever so legitimate in its use of means for gratification, yet it is, after all, akin to envy, and this mortal sin is attracted to it and hopes to prevail upon it. The girdle of legitimate self-seeking, therefore, attracts Geryon, the monster of hypocrisy and kindred vices. Dante has recently seen the nature of these objects of gratification, and is ready to yield up to Virgil this girdle. Scartazzini, in his commentary (Nota A, Inf., xvi, 106), holds that the cord is not a mere symbol, but also a real cord—the cord of the Franciscan order, with which Dante had once (according to old tradition) girded himself in the habit of a novice, thinking to tame the appetites of the flesh (*prender la lonza*). "The cord has become superfluous since Dante has left behind the circles wherein luxury is punished." This cord is used merely to excite the attention of Geryon; or does it suggest to Geryon the approach of an apostate from the Franciscan order—one who has discarded his girdle of renunciation, a hypocritical Franciscan, secretly unfaithful to the rules of his order (as suggested by Philalethes in his commentary)? This is certainly better than the interpretation of those who take the girdle as a symbol of fraud, or of some virtue opposed to fraud, unless the leopard signifies Florence, and its spots denote the white and black parties, in which case the girdle may mean fraud in the sense of stratagem, or virtue in the sense of justice, or vigilance, or impartiality, as suggested by commentators. But the leopard doubtless suggests Florence and quiet citizen life, and also sensuous pleasure or luxury, and perhaps the factions of Florence also. Gayety and liveliness are emphasized in the beast. It is a complex symbol.

delay may be shortened by the prayers of pious people still on the earth.

Here we note a striking contrast between the souls that desire purification and those who peopled the rounds of the Inferno. The spirit of those in Hell is that of bitterness against others. They do not look for help from co-operation. Having attacked society by mortal sin, they find their deeds returned or reflected back upon them as pain and limitation. They curse their fellow-men and do not wish co-operation. But if it has attained the "good of the intellect," which is the recognition of the principle of grace (or beneficence) as the supreme principle of the universe, and its corollary of human freedom and responsibility, the soul is in Purgatory. It now sees all pain and inconvenience to be angels in disguise—to be, in fact, the necessary means of purification and progress. This mountain of purification is indeed the steepest ascent in the world, but, as Virgil assures Dante, "the more one mounts, the less it pains him," and "when it becomes as pleasant and easy to climb as it is to float down stream in a boat," then one has surely arrived at the end of his journey. He has rooted out not only the habits of sinning, but also all the proclivities and tendencies to it, and there is no longer any danger of temptation because the full light of the intellect enables him to see the true nature of all deeds, and he loves the good and hates the evil quite spontaneously.

The divine charity that prays for others and seeks their eternal good with missionary zeal avails to help them up the mountain of purification. As the souls who are detained on the first circle on account of their procrastination long for the time when they may enter upon their purgation, they chant the "*Miserere*," the Fifty-first Psalm, full of longing for purification: "Wash me thoroughly from mine iniquity, and cleanse me from my sin. For I acknowledge my transgressions."

§ 14. *Church and State.*

Dante's poem differs from all other works of art in the fact that he does not limit himself to the development of a single event or a single collision of an individual, but shows us in a threefold series more than half a thousand tragic and epic characters, so foreshortened in the perspective of the divine purpose of his poem as to be seen each at one glance of the eye as we pass on

our way. His supreme artistic power in this respect appears in his ability to trace all the essential outlines of a character in the fewest strokes. Examples of this abound throughout the poem. The picture of Sordello, as they met him on the first terrace, on the evening of the first day, is noteworthy, especially because of the fact that it betrays the pride of Dante's character in his loving description of the pride of another :

" But yonder, look ! one spirit, all alone,
By itself stationed, bends toward us his gaze :
The readiest passage will by him be shown.

We came up toward it : O proud Lombard soul !
How thou didst wait, in thy disdain unstirred,
And thy majestic eyes didst slowly roll !

Meanwhile to us it never uttered word,
But let us move, just giving us a glance,
Like as a lion looks in his repose."

—(T. W. P., Tr.), vi, 58-66.

The apostrophe to Italy that follows describes the civil factions and is one of many in which Dante proclaims his doctrine of the necessity of separation of Church and State, or say, rather, the co-ordination and independence of the two institutions. Human defect as sin must be adjudged and recompensed differently from human defect as crime. Sin is rebellion against the divine world-order, and cannot be atoned for by a finite measure of punishment, but may be escaped only by complete repentance, complete internal change. Sin is essentially internal, while crime consists essentially in the overt act. Crime must be measured and punished—measured by itself, and the deed or its symbolic equivalent returned upon the criminal. For one tribunal to take cognizance of both phases of defect is to confuse the standards of religion and civil justice. To treat sin as crime, and teach that it may be measured and condoned by some external fine or penance, destroys the religious consciousness. To treat crime as sin makes every slightest dereliction incur the last penalty of the law, and establishes the code of Draco. For the sinner is a rebel or traitor against God. He attacks his own essence, and if permitted to carry out his will would actually destroy his individual being. To return his act upon him is to inflict infinite punishment on him. Hence justice—*i. e.*, a formal return of the deed—cannot save the

sinner. But there is *grace*, which forgives the sin upon genuine repentance. The Church must look to the state of the heart—that is to say, to the disposition of the man. The civil power must look to the deed. If the Church administers the State, it looks too much toward the disposition, and makes too small account of the overt act. In correcting its procedure and in adapting itself to the needs of civil justice, it soon comes to neglect its divine functions, and reduce religion to an external ceremonial by degrading the idea of sin to the idea of crime, or external act. These thoughts weighed much upon the mind of Dante, and he often recurs to this theme.

The vale of the princes to which the three poets come on the close of the first day is in many respects the most charming scene in the “*Divina Commedia*,” although its intent appears to be the reproof of secular potentates for their hesitation, their procrastination, in asserting their divine co-ordination with the spiritual potentate, and thus bringing to an end the distraction of Italy. This suggestion also occurs in the psalm, “*Salve Regina*,” which the princes intone as they sit on the green turf amid flowers. It calls upon the Mother of Pity to save us poor exiles dwelling in this vale of tears—exiles also from our rightful thrones.

Moreover, the poem hints at the pathos, for Dante, himself an exile, on account of this procrastination of the princes to assume rightful authority and bring peace to the Italian cities.

“’Twixt steep and level went a winding path
Which led us where the vale-side dies away
Till less than half its height the margin hath.
Gold and fine silver, ceruse, cochineal,
India’s rich wood, heaven’s lucid blue serene,
Or glow that emeralds freshly broke reveal,
Had all been vanquished by the varied sheen
Of this bright valley set with shrubs and flowers,
As less by greater. Nor had Nature there
Only in painting spent herself, but showers
Of odors manifold made sweet the air
With one strange mingling of confused perfume,
And there new spirits chanting, I descried,
‘*Salve Regina!*’ seated on the bloom
And verdure sheltered by the dingle side.”

—(T. W. P., Tr.), vii, 70–84.

The sun goes down, and here no step can be taken with safety after the darkness comes on. The sun of righteousness shines intermittently on this round of ante-Purgatory, and strictest care must be taken to guard against the temptations that come up from the memories of the old life during the night intervals of the soul.

"'Twas now the hour that brings to men at sea,
Who in the morn have bid sweet friends farewell,
Fond thoughts and longing back with them to be;
And thrills the pilgrim with a tender spell
Of love, if haply, new upon his way,
He faintly hear a chime from some far bell,
That seems to mourn the dying of the day;
When I forbore my listening faculty
To mark one spirit uprisen amid the band
Who joined both palms and lifted them on high
(First having claimed attention with his hand)
And toward the Orient bent so fixed an eye
As 'twere he said, 'My God! on thee alone
My longing rests.' Then from his lips there came
'Te lucis ante,' so devout of tone,
So sweet, my mind was ravished by the same;
The others next, full sweetly and devout,
Fixing their gaze on the supernal wheels,
Followed him chanting the whole Psalm throughout.

Now, reader, to the truth my verse conceals
Make sharp thy vision; subtle is the veil,
So fine 'twere easily passed through unseen."

—(T. W. P., Tr.), viii, 1-21.

This hymn for the close of day prays for guardianship during the night of the soul from dreams, phantasms, and from the enemy. Temptation has for it the world-renowned symbol of the Serpent in the Garden of Eden.

"I saw that gentle army, meek and pale,
Silently gazing upward with a mien
As of expectancy, and from on high
Beheld two angels with two swords descend
Which flamed with fire, but, as I could descry,
They bare no points, being broken at the end.¹

¹ The guardian angels, whose swords of divine justice are blunted with mercy through the death of the Redeemer.—*Lombardo, quoted by Scartazzini.*

Green robes, in hue more delicate than spring's
 Tender new leaves, they trailed behind and fanned
 With gentle beating of their verdant wings.
 One, coming near, just over us took stand;
 Down to th' opponent bank the other sped,
 So that the spirits were between them grouped.
 Full well could I discern each flaxen head;
 But in their faces mine eyes' virtue drooped,
 As 'twere confounded by excess and dead.
 'From Mary's bosom they have both come here,'
 Sordello said—'this valley to protect
 Against the serpent that will soon appear.'"

—(T. W. P., Tr.), viii, 22-39.

The compline hymn prayed for protection, and it has been answered. Now the "enemy" appears.

"Sordello to his side
 Drew Virgil, and exclaimed: 'Behold our Foe!'
 And pointed to the thing which he descried;
 And where that small vale's barrier sinks most low
 A serpent suddenly was seen to glide,
 Such as gave Eve, perchance, the fruit of woe.
 Through flowers and herbage came that evil streak,
 To lick its back oft turning round its head,
 As with his tongue a beast his fur doth sleek.
 I was not looking, so must leave unsaid
 When first they fluttered, but full well I saw
 Both heavenly falcons had their plumage spread.
 Soon as the serpent felt the withering flaw
 Of those green wings, it vanished, and they sped
 Up to their posts again with even flight."

—(T. W. P., Tr.), viii, 95-108.

Within Purgatory proper we are told that there is no longer any temptation. The serpent appears no more after passing beyond the terrace of ante-Purgatory.

§ 15. *The Purgatorial Stairs.*

Dante is carried in sleep by Lucia (Divine Grace) to the gate of Purgatory, and on the morning of the second day he sees

" . . . a gate, and leading to it went
 Three steps, and each was of a different hue;
 A guardian sat there keeping the ascent.

As yet he spake not, and as more and more
Mine eyes I opened, on the topmost stair
I saw him sitting, and the look he wore
Was of such brightness that I could not bear.
The rays were so reflected from his face
By a drawn sword that glistened in his hand
That oft I turned to look in empty space."

—(T. W. P., Tr.), ix, 76-84.

"We therefore came and stood
At the first stair, which was of marble white,
So clear and burnished that therein I could
Behold myself, how I appear to sight.
The second was a rough stone, burnt and black
Beyond the darkest purple; through its length
And crosswise it was traversed by a crack.
The third, whose mass is rested on their strength,
Appeared to me of porphyry, flaming red,
Or like blood spouting from a vein."

—(T. W. P., Tr.), ix, 94-102.

In the "Summa Theologica" of St. Thomas Aquinas (iii, 90) Penitence, which is the theme of Purgatory, is defined as having three parts, *contrition*, *confession*, and *satisfaction*. Dante places the stair of confession first. It mirrors the individual as he appears. Contrition calcines the soul with humility and renunciation, and makes cross-shaped fissures in it where the human passions and appetites are burnt out. Satisfaction or penance is the third part of penitence, and is defined as, first, alms; second, fasting; and third, prayer. Satisfaction consists, therefore, in the repression of selfishness, and especially in the practical seeking for the good of others. Hence the third step flames red with the color of love.

Two keys, golden and silver, the latter of discernment of the heart and the former of authority to give absolution, are in the hands of Peter, the symbol of the power of the Church. Seven *p's* are inscribed on the forehead on entering Purgatory; one of these seven mortal sins (*peccata*) is to be purged away on each terrace of the mountain.

In the "Inferno" the seven mortal sins were not all punished directly in their abstract form as passions or appetites, but rather in their fruits; for example, "the daughters of anger, of envy, of

pride." Here, however, sin is not permitted to triumph and come to its fruitage; nay, it is not permitted even to fill the desires. It can only appear in the soul as an element of struggle in which the will for holiness is victorious.

In purgation from sin, therefore, the sin appears directly in its proper form, and the soul discerns it in its true character as embarrassment and hindrance to its higher life.

§ 16. *The First Terrace: Purification from Pride.*

On the lowest terrace souls are purified from pride. To the soul enlightened by the good of the intellect, selfish pride seems to convert human beings into caryatids or corbels bent to the earth by their loads. The soul that makes itself the centre of the universe and strives to live on that principle finds on his shoulders the entire weight of the world.

"As, to support a floor or roof by way of corbel, one sometimes sees a figure join the knees to the breast, the which, out of its untruth, causes a true discomfort in who sees it, thus saw I these shaped, when I well gave heed. True is it that they were more and less drawn together, according as they had more or less on their backs; and he who had most endurance in his mien, weeping, seemed to say, 'I can no more.'"—(A. J. Butler, Tr.), x, 130-139.

These proud souls, thus bowed down beneath the weight of the universe, chant the Lord's prayer—the prayer taught as the model of true humility in contrast to the prayer of the proud Pharisee. Dante's version of this prayer is not only a wonderful paraphrase, but, at the same time, a high order of commentary on its meaning.

Images of humility are sculptured on the cornice of the wall where those who are bent with pride have the greatest difficulty in seeing them. Ideals of humility are not easily formed in the soul when it is first resisting its inclinations to pride. It can then see only the effects of pride. Hence on the floor beneath their feet are sculptured the examples of pride brought low. These they can see readily when bowed to the earth. When they have recovered a more erect position they may see the examples of humility. The souls of this terrace feel the true relation of pride to the good of the intellect. They chant the hymn *Te Deum Laudamus*, recognizing God as infinitely exalted above them, while

the proud in the Inferno would not recognize God except by blasphemy and violence. At the holy stairs the poets hear the beatitude sung "Blessed are the poor in spirit," symbolizing the victory over pride.

§ 17. *Second Terrace : Purification from Envy.*

On the next terrace the rock has the livid hue of envy. The souls lean one upon another like blind men. "For in all of them a thread of iron bores the eyelid and sews it in such wise as is done to a wild falcon because he remains not quiet."—(A. J. B., Tr.), xiii, 70–72.

These souls perceive the spiritual effects of envy to be the blinding of the soul to all true and just estimate of their fellow-men. Whereas in the Inferno each envious soul rejoiced in his superior craft and tried to break the social bond by fraud, here they mutually support and are supported, and are conscious of their blindness.

As their sight is taken away, they do not behold sculptures, but hear voices in the air, first reciting examples of generosity and next examples of the dreadful fruits of envy.

On entering the stairway to the next terrace they hear the beatitude directed against envy: "Blessed are the merciful." Blessed are they who are considerate of the welfare of others. In spiritual things the more participation, the more each gives to all, the more all give to each, and the greater is the share of each, because the good that is enjoyed by one's fellows is reflected back from them (*E come specchio l'uno all' altro rende*), so that the individual is blessed by all the spiritual good possessed by the whole of society. Herein is contained the doctrine of "the Good of the Intellect" as regards the sin of envy.

§ 18. *Third Terrace : Dante's Purification from Anger.*

On the third terrace, within Purgatory proper, takes place the purification from anger. Dante himself has given us examples of anger, as we saw in the Inferno, for instance, in his treatment of Bocca degli Abati, whose hair he pulled so cruelly. In the round of anger, and still more in the round of treachery, he seemed to give way to anger. He made some effort to justify himself symbolically on the ground that it was his hatred of the sins that made

him mistreat the sinners. Even Virgil approves (Inf., viii, 44, 45) of his rage against Filippo Argenti, formerly an arrogant personage (*persona orgogliosa*) but now weeping (*vedi che son un che piango*). Why should he be spiteful toward some of the sinners in the Inferno and pitiful toward others? His own weaknesses and proclivities are painted by his sympathies and aversions. On this third terrace, however, he seems to confess his own sin and suffers the pain of purification like the other penitents.

"We were going through the evening, gazing onward, as far as the eyes could reach, against the late and shining rays, and beheld little by little a smoke draw toward us, as the night obscure; nor from that was there place to withdraw one's self; this took from us our eyes and the pure air."—(A. J. B., Tr.), xv, 139-145.

"Gloom of hell, and of a night bereft of every planet under a poor sky, darkened all that it can be by cloud made not to my sight so thick a veil as that smoke which there covered us, nor of so harsh a texture to feel; for it suffered not the eye to stay open; wherefore my learned and faithful escort moved to my side and offered me his shoulder. Just as a blind man goes behind his guide in order not to stray, and not to stumble against aught that can harm him or maybe slay him, I was going through the bitter and foul air listening to my leader, who said only: 'See that thou be not cut off from me.' I began to hear voices, and each appeared to be praying for peace and mercy to the Lamb of God who takes away sins. Only Agnus Dei were their preludes; one word in all there was, and one measure, so that there appeared among them all concord."—(A. J. B., Tr.), xvi, 1-15.

In this terrace examples of meekness, and of anger, its opposite, flash before the mind in visions as they walk onward through the stifling smoke. Dante listens eagerly to another discussion of the separate functions of Church and State and of the bad government in that State where "the shepherd who goes before may chew the cud, but has not the hooves divided." The leader ruminates (*i. e.*, chews the cud), or theorizes and comes to know divine wisdom as a teacher, but does not discriminate in temporal affairs and divide good from evil conduct (*discretionem boni et mali*, as St. Augustine suggests).

At the close of the second day they reach the stairway and hear the beatitude directed against anger: "Blessed are the Peace-makers!"

§ 19. *Fourth Terrace : Sloth and its Relation to the other Mortal Sins.*

On the fourth terrace Virgil explains to Dante the relation of the seven mortal sins to each other, newly defining them all. Love is the common ground. Love remiss is sloth, the mortal sin purged away on this terrace. Love perverted by selfishness, becomes love of evil to one's neighbor, and forms the essence of the three sins—pride, envy, and anger. Love excessive is the basis of the three sins of incontinence—lust, gluttony, and avarice.

These sins are called mortal or deadly because they attack the conditions of spiritual life, or, what is the same thing, the foundations of the institutions of civilization. Pride, the most deadly of the seven, strikes not only against the fruits of social union, but also against the essence of social union in itself. It refuses to associate. Its aim is to isolate itself from the universe. Hence its fruits are treachery in the family, the State, and the Church. It aims blows directly against the existence of the social bond. Its effect on the soul is symbolized by the frozen lake Cocytus.

Envy is not so deadly as pride, but far more fatal than anger. Envy, by means of fraud, strikes against the social tie that binds society together, while anger induces violence, which strikes only particular individuals and not the social bond. Envy strikes against the institution of property, rendering it insecure, and destroying the trust of men in the means of achieving their freedom from wants of food, clothing, and shelter. It attacks personality itself by hypocrisy, flattery, fraudulent impersonation, evil counsel, and schism, rendering every man distrustful of his fellows. But it does not isolate man so deeply and in so deadly a manner as Pride. Pride severs all social intercourse, while Envy desires to reap the fruits of social life, but at the expense of society itself, thus setting up a contradiction in the form of its effort. Envy wishes to appropriate the good of men, but through their loss; Pride wishes no share either in society or in its fruits.

Anger produces these evils in a less degree, because it is special in the character of its effects.

Avarice and Waste injure society by diverting property from its place as a means of realizing human freedom. The social interchange by which the individual is enabled to contribute something of his own deeds for the benefit of his fellow-men, and to

draw out in his turn from the market of the world his share in its aggregate of productions, is rendered possible by means of the institution of private property. There could be no transfer of the individual will to the social whole unless the individual could impress his will on things and make them his property. Consequently, without the institution of private property, he could not help society, and this would render impossible, on the other hand, his participation in the labor of the race—he could receive nothing from his fellow-men, because nothing could be collected or transmitted. Hence the significance of property, and hence the deadliness of the sin which perverts property from its usefulness by avarice or wastefulness.

Gluttony is more of a private nature than avarice. Avarice touches at once the material bond of the practical will-power of society, while gluttony or intemperance unfits the individual to fulfil his functions as a member of institutions, the family, civil society, the State, the Church. Consequently the good that would flow from him is greatly diminished or entirely cut off. He sinks down below the condition of a brute and follows appetite alone, thus paralyzing his will and cutting himself off from the dominion over nature in time and space.

Lust attacks the institution of the family. It is a deadly sin, because the family is the element of all other institutions, their material presupposition. It is placed above intemperance, because the latter is nearly as destructive to the family and directly more destructive to the industrial well-being of society, and because intemperance leads more directly to the sins of sloth and anger. Each nation has its besetting sins. Our Norman Anglo-Saxon race, most given to independent individuality of all races, is, perhaps, liable to pride and avarice more than other nations, showing its individuality against the State and using its free-will in creating an independence in the shape of a private fortune; and, on the other hand, it is perhaps more inclined than other peoples to respect the sacredness of the family. Hence, lust would change places with avarice or pride in the hierarchy of sins, as formulated by a theologian of Old or New England.

After the new definition of the mortal sins and their reduction to a system by Virgil, he proceeds in the eighteenth canto to discourse on ethics. The hour of midnight has approached and the poets, seated at the top of the stairway, are looking at the gibbous

moon in the west, when suddenly they are startled by a mighty rout of souls, who are purging away the sin of sloth by running furiously and shouting instances of zeal and energy. This example of zeal is all the more surprising after the words of Sordello relative to the effect of darkness on the soul in ante-Purgatory: "To go upward in the night is not possible; even this line thou couldst not pass after the set of sun." We note here that the moon, or the reflected light of mere forms and ceremonies, serves to guide the reformed slothful people.

Later in the night Dante dreams the dream of the Siren who (symbol of the sin here purged away) charms one aside from the labors of duty and plunges him in a dream of slothful ease and luxury. It is remarked that sloth assails the whole range of moral virtues, theoretical and practical.

§ 20. *Fifth Terrace: Purification from Avarice.*

On the fifth terrace Dante sees the purification from avarice, people realizing its grovelling nature as taking the mind off from spiritual things and placing them on things of earth earthy. In Canto XX we hear a brief *résumé* of French history—hinting of the relation of the French nation to avarice (its bribery by the papal court). The mountain trembles and the hymn "Gloria in Excelsis" peals out, and the shade of the poet Statius emerges from the terrace below into the fifth. All souls in a state of penitence rejoice and praise God when one of their number makes progress.

§ 21. *Sixth Terrace: Purgation of the Intemperate.*

On the sixth terrace the intemperate resist their inordinate appetites in the presence of food and drink that invite the senses. To them gluttony is a fetter fastening the spirit to food and drink so that it is not able to attend to spiritual matters. Instead of eating and drinking with their mouths, they recall the words of the Psalmist: "Open thou my lips and my mouth shall show forth thy praise." They hunger and thirst after righteousness and not after other food.

§ 22. *Seventh Terrace: Dante's Purification from Lust.*

On the seventh terrace the sin of lust is purged by fire. The souls realize that their lustful passions are consuming flames. Dante

himself receives purification on this terrace again. He passes through a fire of which he says: "I would have flung myself into boiling glass to cool me, so immeasurable was the degree of heat" in the purifying flame. And yet the souls are careful not to step out of the flame but to keep within its chaste pains and receive its purification. "Blessed are the pure in heart, for they shall see God" is the beatitude directed against lust. To see the eyes of Beatrice, or the Revelation of Divine Theology, Dante must pass through the flame of purification and become pure in heart. So Virgil, in the midst of the flames, discourses of Beatrice to encourage Dante.

§ 23. *The Terrestrial Paradise.*

In the Terrestrial Paradise, which is the place of transfigured and perfected human society on earth, Dante finds the Church. It is a complex symbol bodying forth the visible Church¹ and its history (as commentary has sufficiently shown).

¹ The seven candlesticks denoting the seven gifts of the Holy Spirit; the seven bands of color streaming out from them, the sacraments, or else the influences of the gifts; the ten paces, the ten commandments; the twenty-four elders, the twenty-four books of the Old Testament crowned with the lilies of faith; the four beasts (*quattro animali*) crowned with green leaves, the four gospels clad in the color of hope (or salvation); the six wings of protection extending in the six possible directions in space, and full of eyes for providential guardianship (?), or perhaps the wings denote inspiration and the eyes the fullness of divine vision; the car of the visible Church in their midst, on two wheels, the old and the new dispensations, or rather, as the wheels serve as the means by which the Church moves forward, they signify revelation and tradition (Philaletes) or the priesthood and the monks (Witte); the griffon with his two bodies signifies the divine-human founder of the Church; the lion's body, colored white (faith) and vermillion (charity or grace), symbolizes the human part and the eagle's head and wings of gold the divine part, the wings rising so high that their ends can not be seen extending into the mystic and incomprehensible Godhead; the wings, one of justice and the other of mercy, rise through the bands of influence that stream from the candlesticks, including one sacrament—that of repentance—between the wings as the most essential one of Purgatory, and three sacraments on each side of both wings; the griffon draws the car by its shaft, the cross, and attaches it to a tree—a tree that suggests the tree of knowledge of good and evil in Paradise, and yet it would seem that Dante refers to the fixing of the papal seat at Rome. Three dames—white, green, and red, to signify the three celestial virtues, faith, hope, and charity—dance by the side of the right wheel, while four dames, clad in purple, signify the four cardinal or secular virtues, one of whom (Prudence) has three eyes (counsel, agreement, and habit) dance by the left wheel. Then follow the symbols of the remaining books of the New Testament—St. Luke (of Acts), St. Paul, Saints Peter, John, James, and Jude for their epistles; a solitary old man sleeping, but with subtle countenance, for Revelation. Beatrice now descends crowned with olive (peace) over a white veil (faith), in a green mantle (hope), and clad in the color of a living flame

After Dante beholds the history of the Church symbolized and its future prophesied, great emphasis being placed on its relations to the Empire, he passes through the waters of Lethe and becomes oblivious of his mortal defects.

§ 24. *The Spiritual Sense of "Lethe."*

That Lethe is an essential product of the process of purification must be obvious to every one who reflects upon the nature of it. The river of forgetfulness does not destroy or impair in any way the recollection of deeds done in the body, but it changes essentially the quality of that memory. In the Inferno state of the soul sins had been committed as though they were the special private or personal interest of the individual doer, and their punishment was looked upon as though coming from an alien interest outside of the doer. The memory of the Inferno state of the soul, therefore, would preserve the dualism of the selfish me *versus* the avenging social whole. But Purgatory so eradicates this sense of dualism that it leads the individual to feel that his real essential self—his divine self, in fact—is the self embodied in the institutions of civilization. With this insight he comes to see all human history as his own history, and to sympathize with the action of the social whole in relation to the individual. Hence he adopts the action of the social whole as his own essential act and ignores his particular rights and wrongs as opposed to the universal right of society. He therefore loses the interest of personal memory in himself and looks upon himself as an alien personality quite out-

(love). She signifies divine theology or revelation (Scartazzini) or grace that perseveres (Philaethes), and much else no doubt—infinite aspiration of the soul. Dante is upbraided for unfaithfulness to this highest aspiration; he has pursued other aims, sought to capture the leopard; sought also to explain the world by an inferior philosophy (the *quella scuola ch' hai seguitata e sua dottrina* spoken of in XXXIII, 89, 90, and contrasted with the divine way). The reference to unfaithfulness in Canto XXX is perhaps the symbolic statement of what is literally named in Canto XXXIII as a philosophic doctrine, and this seems to be acknowledged by Dante (XXXIII, 92). It was perhaps some doctrine derived from the Arabian commentators like Averrhoës, who inclined toward Pantheism and denied individual immortality to men. In his commentary on Aristotle's psychology Averrhoës understands "the Philosopher" to prove that man has only a "passive" intellect which perishes at death, while the "active intellect," which is the soul of the world, alone possesses persistent being. This was also the interpretation of Alexander of Aphrodisias. St. Thomas Aquinas's greatest service to Christian Theology is his refutation of this error which places the principle of individuality in the passive rather than in the active part of the human soul.

side of his new self that has grown as a second nature, a regenerated self, through the struggle of Purgatory. He loves his new life, which is in conformity with the life of civilization and the Divine world-order, and he loves whatever deeds of his old life contributed to forming this new life. This is the bath in the stream Eunoe, which brings to memory the good deeds of the past life. The bath in Lethe is the death of the old life.

Moreover, there is a certain progress in the theoretical mind itself which Dante and his like well know that has an effect in raising the soul above sense and memory into the realm of the intuition of ideas. After any one has thoroughly mastered the scientific knowledge of a given province he abides by the general symbols that sum up his knowledge in the form of abstract ideas. These indicate to him not mere dead classifications and mere summaries of observation in the form of statistics, but concrete principles involving both energies and laws, so that they explain not only all the facts and phenomena that are collected in the science, but also furnish a permanent image of the eternal process manifested in the facts and phenomena treated of in the science of which he has become the master.

At this point of insight into principles and their energies and laws which produce the processes of nature and life, the mind contemplates what is essential and therefore necessary, and is thereupon released from the obligation to retain all the data of observation which had to be used at first in order to discover the principle. The facts and data are only a scaffolding useful while the temple was building. The principles, for example, of botany do not depend on the facts and phenomena which have furnished the botanists the data on which they have climbed up to laws and principles. Those data were only illustrations flowing from those principles, and not the causes of the principles themselves. The principles once established and in the mind, those data may drop away as so much scaffolding, for the temple is not built on the scaffolding but on its own foundation; and, although the scaffold is useful in the process of building, it is now no longer needed. So the facts and phenomena are the accidental illustrations of the principles which pointed the way to their discovery and now may be forgotten. The scientific mind bathes in the waters of Lethe and washes away the memory of facts that once imprisoned it in mechanical theories, or systems of classification, or statistical results.

III. THE "PARADISO."

§ 24. *The Ascent to Paradise.*

Dante gazes into the eyes of Beatrice¹ (symbolizing Divine Knowledge, Christian Theology, or Revelation), and now ascends to the celestial spheres. There are ten heavens in all, of which the lowest and nearest to the earth is the heaven of the moon, while the highest heaven is the Empyrean.

The doctrine already alluded to as the fundamental principle of Christianity—to wit, that God is pure form, pure self-distinction, pure consciousness, pure personality—is stated in the following discourse of Beatrice placed in the first canto of the "Paradiso":

¹ Beatrice may signify *perfecting grace*, as Philalethes thinks, or *Revelation*, as Scartazzini prefers. But Dante himself (in the "Convito," ii, 13) tells us that he imaged Philosophy under the form of a gentle lady and compassionate, and, after thirty months of study of Boethius, he began to feel the sweetness of this lady so much that his love for her chased away all other thoughts. In Chapter II of the second Treatise he alludes to Beatrice as the gentle lady of the "Vita Nuova," and in Chapter XVI he discourses at length on the fair lady Philosophy: "The spirit made me look on a fair lady, in which passage it should be understood that this lady is Philosophy; a lady full of sweetness, indeed, adorned with modesty, wonderful in her wisdom, the glory of freedom. . . . Whoever desires to see his salvation must look steadfastly into this Lady's eyes:

'Chi veder vuol la salute,
Faccia che gli occhi d'esta donna miri.'

The eyes of the Lady are her demonstrations which look straight into the eyes of the intellect, enamor the soul, and emancipate it from all fettering conditions."

If one understands by Philosophy what Dante expounds in his "Convito," it signifies the insight into a Divine Reason as First Cause without envy and full of goodness or grace. This doctrine is therefore the same as perfecting grace and the same as the substance of Revelation. For Reason is divine-human. In the "Paradiso," Canto xxxi, Beatrice leaves Dante, and St. Bernard takes her place. This, perhaps, means that Philosophy, daughter of God though she be ("Convito," ii, 13), does not suffice to reveal the mystery of the Trinity. St. Bernard as religious mystic expounds the White Rose of Paradise, symbol of the Invisible Church, corresponding to the Visible Church on the summit of the purgatorial mount. He also conducts him to the vision of the Triune God. It makes no difference whether Beatrice is interpreted as Philosophy if understood in the sense that Dante explains in the "Convito," or as Divine Theology as unfolded by St. Thomas Aquinas, or as perfecting grace if understood as the illuminating effects of this insight which is the vision of God, or as Revelation if understood as producing this same vision of God.

"All things, whate'er they be,
 Have order³ among themselves, and this is form,
 That makes the universe resemble God.
 Here do the higher creatures see the footprints
 Of the Eternal Power, which is the end
 Whereto is made the law already mentioned.
 In the order that I speak of are inclined
 All natures, by their destinies diverse,
 More or less near unto their origin;
 Hence they move onward unto ports diverse
 O'er the great sea of being; and each one
 With instinct given it which bears it on.
 This bears away the fire toward the moon;
 This is in mortal hearts the motive power;
 This binds together and unites the earth.
 Nor only the created things that are
 Without intelligence this bow shoots forth,
 But those that have both intellect and love.
 The Providence that regulates all this
 Makes with its light the heaven forever quiet,
 Wherein that turns which has the greatest haste."

—(Longfellow, Tr.), "Paradiso," Canto i, 103-123.

The lowest rests on the highest, and not the highest on the lowest. Things are substantial just in proportion to their degree of participation in the divine self-activity. The lack of self-activity appears as external impulsion and fate, to finite things.

The doctrine of ten heavens draws its artificial form from the doctrine of the pseudo-Dionysius concerning the Celestial Hierarchy, and will be considered under the subject of Dante's Mythology. For the present we will limit our attention to the ethical contents of the several heavens in their order.

³ Order is the technical expression for dependence of the lower beings on the Highest and for the revelation of the Power of the Highest in the lower. In the "Convito" (iii, 7) Dante quotes from the "Book of Causes": "The First Goodness sends His good gifts forth upon things in one stream." Each thing, adds he, receives from this stream according to the mode of its powers (*virtu*) and its nature. And, again (iv, 8), he quotes St. Thomas as saying "To know the order of one thing to another is the proper act of Reason." To perceive dependencies in nature is to perceive unity, and therefore to perceive the "Form that makes the universe resemble God."

§ 26. *The Heaven of the Moon, or the Ritualists.*

Beatrice fixes her eyes on the Sun—i. e., draws light from Theology ("luce virtuosissima Filosofia," "Conv.," iv, 1), and by this means elevates herself to the heaven of the moon, Dante following by the light reflected from her eyes:

"It seemed to me a cloud encompassed us,
Luminous, dense, consolidate, and bright
As adamant on which the sun is striking.
Into itself did the eternal pearl
Receive us, as water doth receive
A ray of light, remaining still unbroken.
If I was body (and we here conceive not
How one dimension tolerates another,
Which needs must be if body enter body),
More the desire should be enkindled in us
That essence to behold, wherein is seen
How God and our own nature were united."

—(L. Tr.), ii, 31-42.

They enter the substance of the moon realizing the fact that one dimension tolerates another. For in spiritual things all may participate without diminution of shares, while in material things there is exclusion and division. Dante beholds the outlines of faces prompt to speak, but they seem so much like reflections that he supposes them to be "mirrored semblances," and looks around to see the persons that are thus reflected. Beatrice corrects his error and assures him that these are real souls assigned to the sphere of the moon for the breaking of some vow.

They were forced by external influences to break their vows, but had their wills been firm unto death they would not have been compelled. This heaven of the moon, therefore, holds souls who have attained heaven, but with some defect of will. In a discourse on the nature of heaven, it is explained to Dante that everywhere in heaven is Paradise, and that each soul belongs to all the heavens, although he will behold the special heavens filled each with souls of a certain rank or degree, in order to teach him that there are different degrees of celestial growth, notwithstanding each one has access to all the heavens.

The moon was known to Dante to shine with reflected light and to be nearest to the earth. The moon also presents phases, wax-

ing and waning because of relation to another light. Moreover, it has dark and light spots on its surface. It, therefore, is a proper symbol for the heaven that contains those souls who have willed in conformity to the divine will, but intermittently and in a formal manner, or who have not willed supremely the divine. Hence they are fittingly placed here in the moon and appear as though reflections and not substances. Inasmuch as their obedience to prescribed forms and ceremonies of the Church is very nearly mechanical, and not from genuine insight, you can scarcely distinguish their actuality from the reflection of somebody else's will in which they appear. He who made the forms and ceremonies, and who taught them how to perform them, lives in them still as their reality—they manifest his will rather than their own freedom. If they happen to be derelict from lack of firmness of will, yielding to others who assume authority over them, their course resembles still more the inconstancy of the moon, as appears in its changes. The spirits of the formal order show inconstancy and instability, therefore, because they appear and disappear in the will of another, according as it interrupts or changes its relation to them by some external circumstance. And we must supply this natural inference to Dante's picture and see in these lunar souls not only the interposition of violent family authority, as in the case of Piccarda, dragged away from monastic vows by her brother, Corso Donati, but also the lunar variations of temperament, moods, and external conditions.

§ 27. *The Heavens of Imperfect Wills.*

The heavens of imperfect wills include also those of Mercury and Venus. We must keep in mind this distinction between true and spurious individuality. The true individuality energizes to produce for itself and within itself, and also on the world, the divine form of God's will. The more completely it does this, the more completely it fills itself with divine freedom, and thus becomes independent, or symbolically able to shine by its own light, for its own light arises from energizing according to the divine form. The spurious individuality arises from intermingling any kind or variety of selfishness between itself and the divine—or, in other words, from acting with partial or entire reference to itself instead of the divine.

In the moon the will does not cast life into the scale, but lets love of life determine its actions in a last resort. Besides, it acts wholly from another's insight even when it obeys the divine commands.

§ 28. *The Pusillanimous, the Procrastinators, and the Formalists.*

The correspondence between these spirits of the moon and the pusillanimous ones on the shore of Acheron will not fail to strike us. They had no choice of their own, but went where the wasps and hornets of chance and circumstance impelled them. The souls who have procrastinated repentance until the last moment likewise are placed on the outer terrace of Purgatory, and not allowed to enter St. Peter's gate. The pusillanimous, the procrastinators, and the mechanical formalists are found on the outer verges of the three worlds. But, although formalists, these souls sacrifice their inclinations for the service of the Church and are in Paradise, though immature in spiritual insight.

§ 29. *The Heaven of Mercury. The Love of Fame.*

In the Heaven of Mercury the love of fame prevents the perfect devotion of the hero to a divine cause. Perfect devotion would elevate him to Mars or Jupiter. The Mercurial saint does not abandon himself to the cause for itself alone, but only as moved by a love of fame.

Fame is the reflection, not of the deed itself, shining in us as inspired by the deepest conviction, but the reflection of the deed shining in the recognition of our fellow-men. This destroys or affects our freedom. We have not the true celestial revolution derived from the *Primum Mobile*, but a defective sort of orbit—an epicycle, in fact.

The planets Mercury and Venus move in epicycles. They drive out of their course in order to move round the sun as they pass through the zodiac. They never get far away from the sun, but pass through the zodiac only because the sun in his course carries them around it. They act, not from an independent purpose of their own, to complete the course of the celestial revolution of themselves. The sun is the great luminary of day, symbolizing the spiritual light as well. Hence it not improperly means fame for Mercury.

Mercury is usually eclipsed by the sun's rays, and is rarely ever seen because of its closeness to the sun. So, too, in case of the Mercurial saint, we cannot tell how much he is moved by his own insight into what is holy, and how much he is impelled by the fame attached to the cause that he engages in. It is his cause that ennobles him, and we do not know how much to subtract from him on account of his selfish ambition. The sun of his cause is to be accredited with much of his action.

The true hero who devotes himself with utter self-abnegation to his cause shines independently. We shall see this species of hero in the heaven of Mars. The cause shines in him and not he in the cause. He does not use it as a semi-external means of fame, but he becomes the cause itself, and his individuality widens to the greatness of independent subsistence. Ambition conflicts with Divine Charity in the heaven of Mercury.¹

§ 30. *The Heaven of Venus. Love as Limited to Special Spheres.*

The Heaven of Venus is also a heaven of imperfect will. It is that of lovers and includes the conjugal, the parental, the filial, and the fraternal, as well as the love of friends. Terrestrial love is connected with a limitation—devoted to a special object, parent, child, husband, wife, brother, sister, or friend. Such love is of the same nature fundamentally as celestial love or Divine Charity. But there is a particular limitation in the former which prevents its complete identity.

The planet Venus is not obscured by the sun's rays to the same

¹ Dante introduces Justinian in Mercury (Canto VI) in order to give the history of Rome and show its providential place in the world. It is full of conflicts between ambition and pure patriotism, and suits well to this heaven of Mercury. Under the Empire, vengeance was done on Calvary for the ancient sin in the Garden of Eden, and later, under Titus, another vengeance was done upon that vengeance by the destruction of Jerusalem. Providence having selected Rome as the residence of the head of the Church "will not change his scutcheon for the lilies." France must bethink herself of this. The allusion of Justinian to a just vengeance that could be justly avenged gives occasion (Canto VII) for a discourse from Beatrice on Incarnation and Immortality, in which Aristotle's doctrine of the goodness of God ("without envy") is used after the manner of the Schoolmen St. Thomas and Hugo of St. Victor. Divine condescension and human freedom are dwelt upon. Supreme beneficence lifts man into the rank of immortals. Here is the ground of the human desire for fame, infinite aspiration founded on the divine gift of immortality, and the divine election of man to a union with God.

extent as Mercury. It gives notice of the rising sun as Lucifer, and it follows the setting sun as Hesperus. It is "brightest of all the starry host," but is not independent of the sun. It reveals and celebrates the sun rising or setting—the friendly herald and disciple. It is dependent on the sun, moving in an epicycle round it. As represented in the charming Auroras of Guido and Guercino, it looks back lovingly to the King of Day.

But it is not the love of St. Francis of Assisi, not the divine charity displayed by the Poor in Spirit, devoted to the resurrection of the divine spirit in those who most need it—the dregs and scum of humanity. It is not willing to be crucified in order that it may save them.

The theory of Copernicus, to which we are accustomed, is, of course, very different from the astronomy of Dante, and, we may add, not so well adapted for the poetic use he makes of the solar and stellar systems. Dante deals with the starry heavens as they appear to actual observation. The theory of Copernicus exists only for our reason and is not a poetic matter. According to Ptolemy, the moon shines by reflected light, but not so the planets. Their phases could not be perceived without the aid of a telescope. The inferior planets seemed to Dante to revolve primarily around the sun and to accompany him around the zodiac, while the superior planets—Mars, Jupiter, and Saturn—seemed to revolve around the zodiac independently like the sun itself.

Terrestrial love moves in the direction of the divine love but in channels with high banks, so that it acts with regard to a few and intermits in regard to many. It is allied to selfishness in the fact that it is thus limited to those near it, or connected by natural ties. It is therefore imperfect in the manner symbolized by Dante. It possesses, like the planet Venus, an individuality, but an individuality that is ancillary—subordinated to another. Terrestrial love has so much of the true celestial individuality that it can appear independently (*i. e.*, shine by its own light), but its course is back and forth along the heavenly pathway and not always progressive.

§ 31. *The Heaven of the Sun. Theologians.*

The fourth heaven, or that of the sun, forms the transition from the lower to the higher order of heavens.

It is the heaven of theologians. The doctrine of the Trinity as taught by the Church is the dogmatic version of the doctrine of divine form laid down by Beatrice in the first canto. It is the doctrine that explains how an infinitely perfect being creates a finite, imperfect being.

The tenth canto begins with the doctrine of the Holy Spirit:

“Looking into his Son with all the Love
Which each of them eternally breathes forth,
The primal and unutterable Power
Whate’er before the mind or eye revolves
With so much order made, there can be none
Who this beholds without enjoying it.”

—(L. Tr.), x, 1-6.

Dante’s love of theology has led him to this heaven, and he is filled with gratitude to God for his goodness in raising him to this place.

In this great family of theologians he finds not only Thomas Aquinas and Albertus Magnus, but also Dionysius the Areopagite and the mystics, Richard of St. Victor, and St. Bonaventura. In this heaven St. Thomas narrates the life of St. Francis, who wedded poverty or humility. Poverty in Spirit had been a widow since the crucifixion. Afterward St. Bonaventura recounts the deeds of St. Dominic. St. Francis and St. Dominic are the two great reformers of Monasticism in the thirteenth century. They moved out to conquer the world, the Franciscans preaching to the poor and lowly, the Dominicans teaching the governing classes of society, and cultivating literature and theology. Each is celebrated here by the mouth of the other’s most eminent disciple.

In the heaven of the sun we hear from St. Thomas the wisdom of Solomon—the doctrine of the Word and the Spirit and the nine subsistences. All things are but the thought of God and created by him in love.

“That which can die, and that which dieth not,
Are nothing but the splendor of the idea
Which by his love our Lord brings into being;
Because that living Light, which from its fount
Effulgent flows, so that it disunites not
From Him nor from the Love in them intrined,
Through its own goodness reunites its rays

In nine subsistences, as in a mirror,
Itself eternally remaining One.
Thence it descends to the last potencies,
Downward from act to act becoming such
That only brief contingencies it makes;
And these contingencies I hold to be
Things generated, which the heaven produces
By its own motion, with seed and without.
Neither their wax, nor that which tempers it,
Remains immutable, and hence beneath
The ideal signet more and less shines through;
Therefore it happens that the self-same tree
After its kind bears worse and better fruit,
And ye are born with characters diverse.
If in perfection tempered were the wax,
And were the heaven in its supremest virtue,
The brilliance of the seal would all appear;
But nature gives it evermore deficient,
In the like manner working as the artist,
Who has the skill of art and hand that trembles.
If then the fervent Love, the Vision clear,
Of primal Virtue do dispose and seal,
Perfection absolute is there acquired."

—(L. Tr.), xiii, 52–81.

Herein we have a new statement of the Form which makes the universe resemble God. It is an account of the rise of finite, imperfect beings. In God, says St. Thomas, knowing and willing are one, so that his consciousness of himself—his knowing of himself on the part of "Primal Virtue"—creates another, the "Vision Clear." From these two proceed the Third Person, the "Fervent Love." The Trinity was denied by Sabellius, and on leaving this heaven of divine theology it is fitting that we have the great heresiarchs condemned by the mouth of St. Thomas. But a caution is added:

"Nor yet shall people be too confident
In judging, even as he is who doth count
The corn in field or ever it be ripe.
For I have seen all winter long the thorn
First show itself intractable and fierce,
And after bear the rose upon its top;
And I have seen a ship direct and swift

Run o'er the sea throughout its course entire
To perish at the harbor's mouth at last.

Let not Dame Bertha nor Ser Martin think,
Seeing one steal, another offering make,
To see them in the arbitrament divine;
For one may rise, and fall the other may."

§ 32. *The Heaven of Mars. True Heroes.*

In the fifth heaven are found the great Christian heroes and martyrs who have risked their lives from zeal for the true faith. These are arranged in the form of a cross stretched athwart the sky, on which Christ is flashing, symbolic of the spirit of self-sacrifice which is dominant in the character of these martial saints. These are not those heroes who were obscured by love of fame like the Mercurial saints, but the firm in will and deep in faith. Here Dante listens to the long discourse from Cacciaguida concerning the good old times in Florence (Canto xv-xviii). In this heaven of the true spirit of patriotism and heroic self-sacrifice for principle the poet naturally recurs to the subject nearest his heart, and through the mouth of his ancestor he describes the old order and the genesis of the new. The remedy for the evils of Italy in a firmly seated imperial power is prophetically indicated. Thus Dante comes again to the burning question ("Convito," fourth Treatise) at every possible opportunity. The subject is continued in the next heaven, to which we now arrive.

§ 33. *The Heaven of Jupiter. Righteous Kings.*

In the sixth heaven, that of Jupiter, we find the righteous kings arranged in the form of an enormous Eagle—symbol of the Holy Roman Empire.

As we rise from heaven to heaven in the Paradise we reach a more adequate state of devotion of the individual to the welfare of the social whole. Each one unites with his fellows to produce an aggregate social result. This is symbolized by the formation of great figures out of saints arranged as in Mars, so as to present a colossal cross, or in Jupiter, so as to spell out the words that express ethical principles, or to present a great Eagle, or, in the tenth heaven, the Rose of Paradise. This paradise is the state of those whose deeds re-enforce society.

§ 34. *The Doctrine of Salvation.*

The Eagle discourses of salvation by faith and touches on the important question of the salvation of the heathen:

"For saidst thou: 'Born a man is on the shore.
Of Indus, and is none who there can speak
Of Christ, nor who can read, nor who can write;
And all his inclinations and his actions
Are good, so far as human reason sees,
Without a sin in life or in discourse:
He dieth unbaptized and without faith?
Where is this justice that condemneth him?
Where is his fault, if he do not believe?'
Now who art thou, that on the bench wouldst sit
In judgment at a thousand miles away,
With the short vision of a single span?"

—(L. Tr.), xix, 70–81.

This, of course, shuts out the exercise of human reason. While it is true that our failure to comprehend the total system renders it impossible for us to condemn divine justice, in a single instance, yet, on the other hand, we are called upon to understand as far as possible the purposes of Providence and to see their supreme reasonableness. This we may do in given instances, and probably in all, if we ponder the subject sufficiently. Only our negative judgments are insufficient; where the divine decree seems irrational there we may be sure that we do not comprehend the case. If we are sure of the existence of the decree as a fact we are sure of its rationality on the same ground that Dante's philosophy assures him of the existence of God. Form and order—the dependence of all things in space and time—unite every thing to every other; it is the universal relativity of which we hear so much in natural philosophy. This interdependence proves the unity of the whole; and accordingly the whole in all its changes, in all its beginnings and its ceasings, manifests one sole energy—an energy of self-determination whose form is Reason—*Νόησις νοήσους*, as Aristotle calls it. Since the Absolute is self-related and can only be self-related, from its very nature its self-knowing will result in other creatures. Because that divine knowing in making itself an object, generates another like itself—the eternal Word as the eternal thought of the eternal Reason. This

is the doctrine of the Logos, and was understood by Plato and Aristotle, though not stated by the latter in the same terms as by Plato. It was seen clearly by these two philosophers that the necessary dependence (*ordo*) of things in space implies or presupposes an Absolute, that the relative presupposes an independent, self-related Absolute. It was seen, in the second place, that the Absolute has necessarily the form of self-activity or self-determination, and that self-activity in its perfect form is Reason, subject and object in one. Following this a third step, they saw that such an absolute Reason is perfect goodness or without envy (see Canto vii, "La divina bontà, che da sè sperne ogni livore"),¹ and this is explicitly stated by both philosophers ("Timæus," 29, and "Metaph.," Book i, ch. ii). In other words, this is the doctrine that Creation proceeds from God's grace. He desires to share his life with other beings without number ("Convito," second Treatise, ch. v, "He has made spiritual creatures innumerable").

¹ *Livore*, used in this passage (vii, 65), also used in "Purg.," xiv, 84, names envy by its livid hue. Without doubt this word is suggested to Dante by Boethius, who indeed suggests also this whole passage in regard to the divine goodness. In "The Consolation of Philosophy," Metrum ix of the third book, he speaks of "the form of the supreme goodness, devoid of envy, not impelled to create by external causes" (*verum insita summi forma boni livore carens*). To Boethius is due also the form of the "Vita Nuova," and especially that of the "Convito." For Boethius puts in verse the substance of a prose discourse in each chapter. Dante makes his prose discourse a commentary on the verse, while Boethius makes the latter a summary. In the old translation of Boethius "by the Right Honorable Richard Lord Viscount Preston" (London, 1695) is the following rendering of the first portion of Metrum ix:

"O thou who with perpetual Reason rul'st
The World, great Maker of the Heaven and Earth!
Who dost from ages make swift Time proceed,
And fix'd thyself, mak'st all things else to move!
Whom exterior Causes did not force to frame
This Work of floating Matter, but the Form
Of Sovereign Good, above black Envy plac'd,
Within thy Breast; thou everything dost draw
From the supreme Example; fairest thyself,
Bearing the World's Figure in thy Mind,
Thou formedst this after that Prototype," etc.

When we go back to Dante and to the Christian writers of earlier ages we find their statements taking on the technical terms in which this great doctrine of divine Goodness was stated by the philosophy of Plato and Aristotle. The creed had not at that time become a mere formula of words confessed to have no meaning that can be comprehended, but it was a "symbolum" or statement of the highest insight attained by the contemplative souls within the Church ("Symbolum est professio fidei," T. Aq. "Summa Theolog.," 2, 2, Article ix).

The doctrine of the Logos includes a further thought, and from this is derived the idea of creation and the procession of the Holy Spirit. If Divine Reason, in thinking itself as object causes that object to exist as its perfect other—an eternally and only begotten—it follows that the only begotten Logos is a perfect reason (*νόησις νοήσεως*) who also causes his own object to exist independently. The Logos in knowing himself has to know himself as independent and perfect, and also to know himself as begotten, as derived from the First Reason (not as *being* derived, but as one who has completed his derivation and become perfect). His knowledge of his perfection makes for its object the Holy Spirit, and his knowledge of his derivation creates a world of derivation or evolution containing all stages in it of growth and development, from chaos or unformed matter below up to the highest saint or angel above. Space and time are the forms of all finite existence; they condition matter. The universe in time and space is the *Processio* of the Holy Ghost. Nature is the process of creating conscious, rational souls who—being arrived at the doctrine of Christianity, “the good of the Intellect” (Aristotle), the doctrine of God as pure grace—set up charity as the highest principle and form an Invisible Church which is the “Rose of Paradise”—innumerable souls united through brotherly helpfulness, so that each prefers the welfare of all others to his own, and by such altruism becomes the recipient of the providential care of all. Such an Invisible Church, including all rational beings in all the worlds in space, and especially the infinitely numerous spirits that have passed through death to immortality, is celebrated in the Apocalypse as the “Bride.” This Invisible Church has one spirit, because mutual interdependence makes unity—it is an institutional Spirit—The Holy Spirit.

The form of this statement is different from that of Dante and St. Thomas and from that of the mystics, but is substantially their view. If one will take this view in its history, beginning with Plato and Aristotle and following it down to Philo and Alexandrian mysticism; beginning again with the New Testament statements of it by St. John in his Gospel and by St. Paul in Colossians (i, 13–20), trace its growth in the creeds through the conflict with Arianism, and finally through the conflict of the Greek and Roman churches—he will find this statement a clew to the entire movement and the mysterious principle that guided the church fathers

in defining their *symbola* as well as in building up their systems of theology. Interpreted by this, one may see the general ethical significance of the expression "faith in Christ," as a faith in the doctrine of grace and the recognition of Divine charity as the highest principle.

"It recommenced: 'Unto this kingdom never
 Ascended one who had not faith in Christ,
 Before or since he to the tree was nailed.
 But look thou, many crying are, "Christ, Christ!"
 Who at the judgment shall be far less near
 To him than some shall be who knew not Christ.'"

—(L. Tr.), xix, 103–108.

Interpreting this by the doctrine of the Logos as above stated, all beings in the world, conscious and unconscious, are created by the act of the Logos. He recognizes his derivation; whatever he knows as object He causes to exist as object. Man may think a thought without causing it to exist; his will is different from his knowing; this constitutes man's finitude; but in God will and intellect are one ("In Deo sit idem voluntas et intellectus," St. T. Aquinas, "Summa Theol.," I, q. xxvii, art. 3; see also "Contra Gentiles," lib. iv, cap. 19). Hence, whatever God knows derives existence, and whatever finitude exists, exists in the knowledge of the Logos. Individual existence is, therefore, derived from grace which gives separate subsistence to that which is finite and imperfect. But such imperfect or finite exists only in a state of change and genesis, for it is the thought of His own genesis that causes the finite to exist—it exists only in a state of becoming or evolution. Hence, it is said in theology that all improvement and growth in intellect and morality is a work of grace. Hence, too, it is said that Christ bears the sins of man; he thinks all their imperfections and does not annihilate them because of imperfection. He is the Mediator with the First Person because the First thinks perfection and generates a Perfect Logos. To think imperfection, God must find it in some way involved with His Being. The Logos, inasmuch as there is derivation or generation logically implied in His being, necessarily thinks imperfection, but only as a preface and procession toward perfection. He is perfection, and no imperfection remains in the Logos; but there is a logical implication that there was such imperfection in

the fact that he was begotten or derived from the First. This logical derivation necessary to the thought of His relation to the First becomes a real derivation in time and space. But the thought of finitude and imperfection must be looked upon as repugnant to the mind of the Logos, and to be endured only in view of what proceeds from it. In religious symbolism He is spoken of as redeeming finite beings through his incarnation and death on the Cross. This expresses symbolically the act of the Logos in Creation. For the sake of reconciliation or atonement, and the existence of the invisible Church of believers in divine charity, God creates matter and lower forms of being, and educes, from these, higher and higher forms of self-activity and freedom, culminating in immortal souls who may freely unite in institutions. Institutions enable each member to reap the united result of the whole. Philosophy must certainly agree with religion in this: that the existence of matter and lower forms of life—not only these, but the higher and highest forms of life and finite spirit—are evidences of benevolent goodness (grace) in the First Principle. Nature seems even to the scientist (illuminated by the thought of Darwin) to be a vast process of developing individuality. For the fittest survives, and the fittest is the most able to conquer by ideas. All matter struggles to assume the form of man, or,

"Striving to be man, the worm
Mounts through all the spires of form."

Souls may exist without this doctrine, but they are not in the Paradise and the Holy Spirit does not dwell in them. But they are subject to conversion by the spirits who have found the truth.

The voice of the spirit choir, seeming to proceed from the beak of the Eagle, continues its discourse, and Dante is informed that the supreme saints forming the eye are the supreme saints of this heaven, David the psalmist being its very pupil.

"Of the five who make me a circle for eyelid, he who is closest beside my beak consoled the poor widow for her son. Now knows he how dear it costs not to follow Christ by the experience of this sweet life and of the opposite."—(A. J. B., Tr.), xx, 43-48.

This was the Emperor Trajan, the story of whose justice so interested St. Gregory that he interceded with prayers for his soul, and having his bones disinterred, baptized him and thus brought

him into Paradise. This shows the power of the Church over the souls in the Limbo. But Dante carries it a step further by saving on his own authority the soul of Rhipeus, whom Virgil (*Æneid* ii, 426) has called the justest of all that were in Troy. Dante makes him one of the five supreme spirits in the eye of the Eagle.

"Who would believe down in the erring world that Rhipeus of Troy should be in this round the fifth of the holy lights? Now knows he enough of that which the world cannot see of the divine grace, albeit his view discerns not the depth. Like a lark which goes abroad in air, singing first, and then holds her peace, content with the last sweetness which sates her, such seemed to me the image of the imprint of the eternal pleasure, according to its desire for which each thing becomes of what sort it is. And albeit in that place I was in regard to my doubting as glass to the color which covers it, it did not suffer me to wait a while in silence, but with the force of its weight it urged from my mouth, 'What things are these?' Wherefore of sparkling I beheld a great festival. Thereafter, with its eye more kindled, the blessed ensign responded to me, not to keep me in suspense wondering: 'I see that thou believest these things because I say them, but seest not how; so that if they are believed, they are concealed. Thou dost as he who well apprehends the thing by name, but its quiddity he cannot see, if another sets it not forth. *Regnum colorum* suffereth violence of warm love and of lively hope, which overcomes the divine will, not in such wise as man has the mastery over man, but overcomes it, because it wills to be overcome, and being overcome, overcomes with its own goodness. The first life in the eyelid and the fifth make thee marvel because with them thou seest the angels' domain adorned.'"—(A. J. B., Tr.), xx, 67-102.

The principle of grace in the Christian religion contains infinite depths yet to be revealed in creeds and practice. The adjustment of the principle of grace to the principle of justice has furnished the most difficult of theological problems. It is the old question of Orientalism as against Occidentalism—*Asia versus Europe*. The Eagle says that "Rhipeus placed all his love below upon righteousness, being led by grace that distills from a Fountain so deep that never creature has been able to see its first wave; from grace to grace God opened his eye to our future redemption."

Then, with this example of salvation, he concludes with a warning against the sin of limiting in thought God's grace :

" O thou predestination, how remote
Thy root is from the aspect of all those
Who the First Cause do not behold entire !
And you, O mortals ! hold yourselves restrained
In judging ; for ourselves, who look on God,
We do not know as yet all the elect."

—(L. Tr.), xx, 130–135.

§ 35. *The Heaven of Saturn.*

The seventh heaven, that of Saturn, is the special place for the contemplative spirits—the highest mystics. But while we find St. Bonaventura and Dionysius in the heaven of the sun with Albert and St. Thomas, here are found only St. Peter Damiano and St. Benedict—and the former does not speak of highest and subtlest doctrines, but only inveighs against the luxury of modern prelates, while the latter complains of the corruption of the monks.

§ 36. *The Heaven of the Fixed Stars.*

The eighth heaven is that of the fixed stars to which Dante follows Beatrice, beholding the solar system at such a distance that the planets seemed to form a small cluster of stars. Here he beholds the Triumph of Christ.

Dante is now examined by St. Peter on the subject of Faith (xxiv), by St. James on that of Hope (xxv), and by St. John on that of Charity (xxvi).

One looks for a mystical interpretation for these three celestial virtues from Dante in this place, or at least for hints of such an interpretation. What he finds at first is the ordinary definitions taken in the ordinary sense. " Faith is the substance of things hoped for and the evidence of things not seen." In what sense can there be a substance (*ὑπόστασις*, or hypostasis) of things hoped for ?

Faith is not contrasted with knowledge of the higher order, but only with knowledge attained by experience. Faith is a higher order of knowledge—a knowledge founded on insight into what is necessarily and eternally true. We know phenomena by sense-perception, but we know noumena through insight into the pre-

suppositions of things that appear to our senses. We perceive things and events by our senses, but we perceive time and space by reflection. Things and events may or may not be, but time and space must be, and cannot be thought away. We may be said to know time and space by faith in this technical sense. Faith is not mere belief founded on probabilities, or on hearsay, though it is often taken in that sense. Probable knowledge does not go for so much as this true faith. Faith in mere hearsay relates to things of sense whose existence is not necessary but contingent. They exist at one time and cease to exist at another—to-day the lily of the field is, but to-morrow it is withered and gone. But the logical conditions of existence do not pass away, nor are they to be perceived or known by sense-perception.

But Christian faith is something else than mere insight into what is logically permanent. It is insight into the principle of grace as the source of all things, of time and space, as well as things and events. The Trinity is the supreme object of faith, and it is the object of highest knowledge and subtlest insight. Faith is the substance of things hoped for, inasmuch as it explains how human life is a part of an eternal life, a part of the Procession of the Holy Ghost, a career which begins here and ends no more through all the future. All things hoped for or worthy of being hoped for have, therefore, their substance and ground in this doctrine, as the deepest insight attained by the human mind. Faith is "evidence of things not seen" (*ἔλεγχος*, or "evidence," is proof or conviction) in the general sense of all *a priori* knowledge. All non-sensuous knowledge is of this order. It is not less probable but more probable than sense-knowledge. Sense-knowledge tells us that this or that object undergoes a change; insight tells us that if it undergoes a change there is a cause for it: and this is not a probability but a certainty. The observation of the change may have been a mistake, but the insight cannot be. Sense-perception looks for the cause of the change, say of the movement of a piece of matter, and finds it perhaps in an animal, perhaps in another body. But insight knows that a real efficient cause must be found in a self-activity, in a living being, plant, animal, or man, or in God. Sense-perception may be mistaken in identifying any being as cause; but insight, or faith in this high sense of "the evidence of things not seen" cannot be mistaken as to the fact of the existence of a cause of this change and of any change. Moreover,

although we may speak truly of plant, animal, or man as a cause, yet the causal energy is invisible and cannot be a matter of sense-perception, which is limited to effects. It sees limbs move, but not the force that moves them. Faith in this sense is, as St. Peter observes, correctly placed among the substances, and also among the proofs (*tra gli argomenti*). "Faith is that capacity of mind"—St. Thomas quotes this definition (ii, 2, qu. 4, art. 1)—"wherein eternal life begins in us, making our intellect assured of invisible beings."

The greatest of all miracles in the world is its adoption of Christianity, says Dante; for that poverty and the doctrine of other-worldliness should turn aside people enjoying this world seems impossible. But Christianity is not so ascetic as Buddhism or Brahminism, which hold more devotees to-day than Christianity. But miracle in religion has this deep sense as foundation of faith: All manifestation of force is ultimately the manifestation of self-activity. Self-activity is the opposite of mechanism and mechanical links in a chain of causation. The religious mind does not pause for a moment on the mechanical nexus, but flies at once to the efficient cause—a self-activity.

Dante repeats his "*credo*," but carries it only through the portion that relates to one eternal God in three eternal Persons, distinct as persons but one in essence, so that of them *is* and *are* may both be predicated.

"Hope is a sure expectation of the future glory which is the effect produced by divine grace, and preceding merit" is Dante's reply¹ to the holy catechist. It is not hope in the ordinary sense, but hope based on the faith or insight into the constitution of the universe—a faith based on the knowledge of God and the Final Cause of His Creation. It is thus, as St. Thomas explains it, "a sure expectation of future glory." It is to the will what faith is to the intellect (St. T. Aq., "*Summa Theol.*," ii, 2, qu. 18). With the inequalities of insight and the vicissitudes of life, Hope supports the soul during its nights and eclipses, giving steadfastness to the will.

The approach of St. John temporarily eclipses Beatrice by excess of light. To his catechist Dante defines the object of love as God, and affirms that he has learned this through Philosophy

¹ Quoted from Peter the Lombard, as Philalethes shows.

(Plato and Aristotle teaching him that the divine is without envy), and also from revelation. Love is the foundation of all Being. One may have faith (insight) or hope, and yet not admit the divine principle into his heart. But with divine charity he becomes filled with it and is it.

Dante now is permitted to see Adam the archetypal man, for he has fulfilled the course of human education, having passed his examination in this heaven of Saturn, highest of the planets or varying stars.

St. Peter, however (as a sort of favor to Dante ?), takes occasion to administer a violent rebuke to certain of his successors in the papal chair.

§ 36. *The Heaven of the Fixed Stars.*

Dante and Beatrice now leave the solar system and ascend to the heaven of the fixed stars—the *primum mobile*, or first moved; for motion is communicated to all the lower heavens by this heaven which is the crystalline sphere. The unmoved heaven, the tenth, is the Empyrean. Spiritual perfection (*ἐντελέχεια*) is all in all, and everywhere perfect. But that which is in space and time is sundered, so that it is not everywhere self-identical. But the imperfect desires to be perfect. It is part real and part potential; hence it moves in order to realize its potentialities. Hence change in the world is caused by desire on the part of that which is imperfect to realize all its potentialities and become perfect. This is Aristotle's theory of the movements and changes in the world, and especially of the stars. If each point in space could be all points at once, it would reach perfection. This it attempts to do through movement. (This thought of Aristotle and also of Plato—at first seemingly whimsical—will bear the closest examination. It is an interesting fact that Hegel adopts it in his "Naturphilosophie"). The *primum mobile*, or crystalline sphere, "desires" to touch the Empyrean in each and every part at once with all its own parts, and thus have perfect contact. Hence it moves with inconceivable swiftness, so that this contact shall occur with the least possible intervals of delay.

The Empyrean is all-living flame (symbol of pure self-activity). It is everywhere total and complete—just as the soul is everywhere present in the body in the act of feeling. "And this is why," says Dante in the "Convito" (second Treatise, chap.

iv, E. P. Sayer's translation) "that first moved—the *Primum Mobile*—has such extremely rapid motion; for, because of the most fervent appetite which each part of it has to be united with each part of that most divine heaven of peace, in which it revolves with so much desire, its velocity is almost incomprehensible."

Dante learns here of the nine hierarchies. Beatrice discourses also of the creation of the angels and of the fall of Lucifer:

"Jerome has written unto you of angels
Created a long lapse of centuries
Or ever yet the other world was made;
But written is this truth in many places
By writers of the Holy Ghost, and thou
Shalt see it, if thou lookest well thereat.
And even reason seeth it somewhat,
For it would not concede that for so long
Could be the motors without their perfection."

—(L. Tr.), xxix, 37-45.

The higher has its perfection in giving help and guidance to the lower, and hence is not without the lower.

"Nor could one reach, in counting, unto twenty
So swiftly, as a portion of these angels
Disturbed the subject of your elements.
The rest remained, and they began this art
Which thou discernest, with so great delight
That never from their circling do they cease.
The occasion of the fall was the accursed
Presumption of that One whom thou hast seen
By all the burden of the world constrained."

—(L. Tr.), xxix, 49-57.

In describing the angels the subject of angelic knowing (treated of elsewhere in this essay) is touched upon (xxix, 79). "They behold God's face direct, and therefore naught is hidden from them." For they look into universals and behold in the efficient and final causes the entire compass of effects. "Their vision is not interrupted by new objects, and hence they have no need to remember through partial concepts." They do not know by objects which, though real, yet are defective in that they do not exhibit all the possibilities of their species; for example, by the senses I see this oak, which is only one specimen out of a multi-

tude. Scientific knowing so re-enforces my sense-perception by the sense-perception of all men that I may come to see in this oak all oaks, or, rather, I may compare it with the species and note its defects.

Beatrice improves the occasion to reprehend vehemently that sort of theologians and preachers who have, through ignorance or avarice, substituted inventions of their own for the truth.

They now ascend to the highest heaven—the tenth—and Dante sees the river of light of the Empyrean and the White Rose of Paradise, in which all the souls of all the heavens find their place, the Paradise being symbolized by this perfect participation of each in the whole.

Beatrice takes up the question of the ignorance and avarice of the clergy, and also hints of the sale of indulgences, supplementing St. Peter's condemnation of higher dignitaries.

§ 37. *The Empyrean. The White Rose of Paradise. The Vision of God.*

In the tenth heaven Dante beholds the river of light:

“And light I saw in fashion of a river
Fulvid with its effulgence, 'twixt two banks
Depicted with an admirable Spring.
Out of this river issued living sparks,
And on all sides sank down into the flowers,
Like unto rubies that are set in gold;
And then, as if inebriate with the odors,
They plunged again into the wondrous torrent,
And as one entered, issued forth another.”

(L. Tr.), xxx, 61–69.

This river takes the form of the White Rose of Paradise:

“Thus into greater pomp were changed for me
The flowerets and the sparks, so that I saw
Both of the Courts of Heaven made manifest. . . .
There is a light above, which visible
Makes the Creator unto every creature,
Who only in beholding Him has peace,
And it expands itself in circular form
To such extent that its circumference
Would be too large a girdle for the sun. . . .

And as a hill in water at its base
Mirrors itself, as if to see its beauty
When affluent most in verdure and in flowers,
So, ranged aloft all around about the light,
Mirrored I saw in more ranks than a thousand
All who above there have from us returned."

—(L. Tr.), xxx, 94–114.

"Into the Yellow of the Rose Eternal
That spreads, and multiplies, and breathes an odor
Of praise unto the ever-vernal Sun,"

Beatrice drew him as if she fain would speak, and said:

"Behold how vast the circuit of our city!
Behold our seats so filled to overflowing,
That here henceforward are few people wanting!"

(L. Tr.), xxx, 130–132.

Dante compares his vision of the rose to the vision of a barbarian who has come from some remote region, and now "beholds Rome and all her noble works":

"I, who to the divine had from the human,
From time unto eternity, had come
From Florence to a people just and sane,
With what amazement must I have been filled!"

He turns round to question Beatrice concerning this wonderful sight, but she has vanished and taken her place as a petal in the great white rose, and Dante finds an old man robed in glory by his side, who has been summoned by Beatrice to aid him. It is St. Bernard. After explaining the blessed souls on their thrones in the Mystic Rosé of Paradise, St. Bernard addresses a prayer to the Virgin as symbol of Divine Grace to aid Dante, and he is permitted to have a glimpse of the great mystery of the Holy Trinity. He sees something that suggests the human image in the eternal light of the Godhead. If man is in God's image, there is something human to be discerned in the form divine.

IV. DANTE'S MYTHOLOGY.

§ 38. *The Angelic Knowing.*

According to scholastic philosophy, the human mode of knowing differs from the angelic through this: The angels know by

means of pure illumination, while men know by means of the symbolism involved in objects perceptible by the senses ("Paradiso," xxix, 79-81). At first this seems a mere idle distinction based on no ascertained facts and with a purely imaginary psychological distinction at its basis. But a careful consideration will discover an important thought in the definition.

It is readily granted that the growth of the human intellect is from particular facts to general truths. The immediate fact suggests to us presuppositions, and we learn to observe relations and to think an object in its relations. Moreover, we discover correspondences between one series of phenomena and another, and thereby enrich our language by means of trope and metaphor. The poetic faculty of man thus arises. We especially learn to express our internal states and conditions—the feelings, desires, volitions, and ideas of the soul by means of words that had originally only a material signification and applied only to things perceptible by the senses.

So, too, our scientific activity has a movement from particular facts to general principles. At first there is a feeble effort at mere classification, or a statistical inventory. By and by laws are reached, and then energies are inferred as operating through these laws. Finally, knowledge becomes so complete that it sees principles, and in them recognizes energies acting in the form of laws. A natural principle is an energy or force or cause that acts according to its own laws, or, in other words, according to its definite nature.

When the scientific mind has reached a principle it can deduce from it *a priori* the facts that will follow as results.

The application of science is called art. It is evident that the existence of art, properly so called, depends upon the possibility of guiding practice by a knowledge of principles.

In his philosophic activity man traces back all principles to one principle as fundamental presupposition. From this one principle thus found he descends by deduction along the line of principles, seeing the necessary causes and conditions that operate in the world, and comprehending the necessity of the general order and form of things and events.

Although man possesses and uses his capacity for philosophic knowledge, yet for the most part the activity of his mind is devoted to the inventory of particular facts and events, and to an

equally special practical activity of arranging, ordering, and producing particular things and events, useful or hurtful to human interests.

If man should ever become so well acquainted with principles that he habitually put his knowledge into the form of deduction from the first principle, he would know by "pure illumination" just as the angels are said to know. To see at a glance the consequences of the energy of the first principle creatively descending from the universal toward the particular is to have pure illumination. But so long as one's knowledge of principles is so imperfect that he cannot comprehend them in the double sense of energy and law, he cannot use them deductively. In this respect human science is constantly on the road of progress. Some species of knowledge, like mathematics, have been deductive since the dawn of civilization.

Mathematical applications, like astronomy and other branches of physics, have long been deductive and in a condition to predict results of combinations and processes. So, too, in the highest scientific minds in many departments of biology there are instances of men becoming so familiar with the principle of life in special provinces as to possess a ready intuitive knowledge which led them to numerous discoveries. They knew the whole from inspection of the part because they had become so familiar with the analogies of nature that a luminous principle had come to be seen, and they could "anticipate experience," to use an expression of the philosopher Kant. Their intuition was a sort of "pure illumination," and if they had been able to trace their principle back to the first principle so as to see vastly wider analogies, they would have attained to the veritable pure illumination which the schoolmen defined as the characteristic of angelic knowledge.

Human experience, therefore, is in the nature of a ladder which helps us to attain an elevation upon which we may walk securely without afterward needing the ladder. Of course I am aware that the empirical psychology of the present day does not take this view of the matter. It supposes that knowledge is firmly based on facts, and that it remains conditioned by them and can never soar on its own wings without losing the certainty of scientific knowledge. But in this I conceive it has not followed its own advice and examined carefully the state of scientific knowledge, nor accurately analyzed the practical action of the scientific

mind as it is actually employed in scientific questions. Rather than this, it furnishes us an example of what it condemns. It sweepingly concludes regarding the possibilities of knowledge and its necessary conditions, from supposed principles from supposed knowledge concerning the energy called mind and its laws of action.

But the poetic faculty of the soul which we have already mentioned is perhaps a more wonderful illustration of the distinction between the angelic and human modes of cognition, and of the ascent of the latter into the former. A great poet converts all things and events lying familiar about him in the world into tropes and similitudes, so that they lose their imposing airs of actuality and become transparent images of ideas and spiritual truth. If he accomplishes so much as this by means of his tropes and personifications, he accomplishes far more than this by means of his entire poetic structures, for the individual tropes are only the brick and mortar of the poetic edifice. What the scientific principle is to the isolated facts and events, the poetic structure is to the separate tropes and personifications. It organizes them into a whole. It connects them with a central unity which stands to them in the twofold relation of efficient and final cause. It is at once their origin and the final purpose for which they exist.

§ 39. *The Poetic Mythos—What it Embodies.*

It may be said that the supreme object of a great poetic work of art is the production of a myth. A myth furnishes a poetic explanation for a class of phenomena observed in the world. The mind that can see tropes in natural objects sees his way lighted by their converging rays to an underlying unity. Under tropes of small compass lie more extensive tropes, which unite the former into a consistent whole. And, as the poet's fundamental insight into the world is this, that the things and events of the world are means of spiritual expression, themselves moved and shaped by spiritual being, which they both hide and reveal, it follows that his combination of these poetic elements produces a whole structure that is spiritual throughout and a revelation of human nature such as the poet has conceived and fitted to the world he has created.

Most beloved among mortal men is the poet. He is eyes to the blind and ears to the deaf. He is intuition and reflection for all.

He furnishes his people a view of the world in which they can all unite. Hence he is the inspired Orpheus who builds cities and civilizations. His inspired mythos is recognized as the highest possession of the race, and implicit faith in it is demanded of all men. While it is permitted to deny the reality of existing facts and events, it is never permitted to deny the truth of the poetic mythos which unites a people in one civilization.

It is worth while, therefore, to study with all care the workings of a great poet's mind, and to note also what phases of nature he finds most available as vehicles for his myths. It has already been observed that the poet sees in the inanimate things and events of nature a revelation of rational will—that is to say, of spiritual being like himself and humanity. Conscious being is the key to the universe in the poet's hands.

Not only in poetic art, but in all art—sculpture, poetry, music, and architecture—there is a seeking after rhythm or after regularity, symmetry, and harmony, and a delight in them simply as such as though they constituted indubitable evidence of a rational cause identical in nature with the human mind that beholds it. What is consciousness but the rhythm of subject and object continually distinguishing and continually recognizing and identifying? In this is regularity and symmetry and also harmony. There is the repetition involved in self-knowing—the self being subject and likewise object—hence regularity. The shallowest mind, the child or the savage, delights in monotonous repetition, not possessing, however, the slightest insight into the cause of his delight. To us the phenomenon is intelligible. We see that his perception is like a spark under a heap of smoking flax. There is little fire of conscious insight, but much smoke of pleasurable feeling. He feels rather than perceives the fact of the identity which exists in form between the rhythm of his internal soul-activity and the sense-perception by which he perceives regularity.

§ 40. *The Sun Myth; its Significance as Physical Description of Mind.*

The sun myth arises through the same feeling, illuminated by the poetic insight. Wherever there is repetition, especially in the form of revolution or return-to-itself, there comes this conscious or unconscious satisfaction at beholding it. Hence especially cir-

cular movement, or movement in cycles, is the most wonderful of all the phenomena beheld by primitive man. Nature presents to his observation infinite differences. Out of the confused mass he traces some forms of recurrence: day and night, the phases of the moon, the seasons of the year, genus and species in animals and plants, the apparent revolutions of the fixed stars, and the orbits of planets. These phenomena furnish him symbols or types in which to express his ideas concerning the divine principle that he feels to be First Cause. To the materialistic student of sociology all religions are mere transfigured sun myths. But to the deeper student of psychology it becomes clear that the sun myth itself rests on the perception of identity between regular cycles and the rhythm which characterizes the activity of self-consciousness. And self-consciousness is felt and seen to be a form of being not on a level with mere transient, individual existence, but the essential attribute of the Divine Being, Author of all.

Here we see how deep-seated and significant is this blind instinct or feeling which is gratified by the seeing and hearing of mere regularity. The words which express the divine in all languages root in this sense-perception and in the æsthetic pleasure attendant on it. Philology, discovering the sun-myth origin of religious expression, places the expression before the thing expressed, the symbol before the thing signified. It tells us that religions arise from a sort of disease in language which turns poetry into prose. But underneath the æsthetic feeling lies the perception of identity which makes possible the trope or metaphor.

In the poetic mythos there is a collection of those phenomena which have astonished the primitive consciousness of the race and impressed on the soul a deep feeling of awe. Unutterable questions have made themselves dimly felt at the constant spectacle of nature's returning cycles. The activity of the mind with its regular and symmetrical recurrence or rhythm—the vibration between subject and object, its alternation of seizing an object at first new and unknown and then recognizing in it what is already become familiar, the alternation of subject and predicate—have not been recognized as the characteristics of mind, but these phenomena of return-into-self have excited its attention and suggested first the far-off questions of the cycle of the soul reaching beyond this life into the hereafter.

Of all nations, the Egyptians were the most inclined to study these analogies of nature. Because of the fact that the supreme natural circumstance in Egyptian life is the Nile, and its cycles of rise and fall alternating with seed-time and harvest, this attention to cycles finds its natural occasion and explanation. The calendar and the signs of the seasons of the year became objects of the utmost solicitude. By and by the poetic faculty seized on the phenomena and the doctrine of immortality was embodied in a *mythos* for mankind. There is the still world of *Amenti* where the good Egyptian goes to dwell with Osiris.

But the most highly gifted of all peoples in poetic insight were the Greeks. They possessed supreme ability in the interpretation of nature as expression of spirit.

They have countless mythoses to express the immortality of man and his after-life. Some of the more notable of these we must briefly consider.

§ 41. *Homer's Mythos of Hades.*

In the eleventh book of Homer's "Odyssey" we have the Greek mythos of the state after death. The great poet Homer understands human freedom and retribution, making this circle of the deed and its return, however, include the gods on Olympus¹ and the life of men on earth in one process. He does not yet conceive the return of the deed as directly the affair of human society and the individual, and hence does not punish in his Hades the wickedness of men, although he symbolizes from a distance this species of retribution by the examples of Orion, Tityus, and especially of Tantalus and Sisyphus.

Orion is hunting beasts in the meadow of Asphodel. Tityus, the son of the very renowned Earth, lies on the ground stretched over nine acres; two vultures gnaw his liver, and thus he expiates his violence done to Latona. Even Hercules, although delighted with banquets, is surrounded with a perpetual clang of the dead and is continually startled and on the alert. He holds his naked bow and an arrow on the string, looking about terribly,

¹ Mr. D. J. Snider, in his essays on the "Iliad" ("Journal of Speculative Philosophy" for April and October, 1883; for January, July, and October, 1884; and for July 1887) has shown clearly how this ethical process goes on—one part of it on Olympus and the other part around Troy.

always ready to let fly an arrow at some approaching monster. The atmosphere of earthly labors still envelops him.

"And I beheld Tantalus suffering severe griefs, standing in a lake; and it approached his chin. But he stood thirsting, and he could not get anything to drink; for as often as the old man stooped, desiring to drink, so often the water, being sucked up, was lost to him; and the black earth appeared around his feet, and the Deity dried it up. And lofty trees shed down fruit from the top, pear-trees, and apples, and pomegranates producing glorious fruit, and sweet figs, and flourishing olives; of which, when the old man raised himself up to pluck some with his hands, the wind kept casting them away to the dark clouds.

"And I beheld Sisypheus, having violent griefs, bearing an enormous stone with both his hands; he indeed, leaning with his hands and feet, kept thrusting the stone up to the top; but when it was about to pass over the summit, then strong force began to drive it back again; then the impudent stone rolled to the plain; but he, striving, kept thrusting it back, and the sweat flowed down from his limbs, and dust begrimed his head."—(Buckley's Tr.)

It is interesting to note that Homer in his "Odyssey" first suggested the selection of Minos as judge in the lower world.

"There I beheld Minos, the illustrious son of Jove, having a golden sceptre, giving laws to the dead, sitting down, but the others around him, the king, pleaded their causes, sitting and standing through the wide-gated house of Pluto."

§ 42. *Plato's Threefold Future Life in the "Phædo."*

In Plato's "Phædo" we have a much more definite picture of the future state, involving not only the punishment of the wicked, but their purification also. To Plato, therefore, is to be accredited the invention of Purgatory and the discrimination of three states in the future life.

"For after death, as they say, the genius of each individual to whom he belonged in life leads him to a certain place in which the dead are gathered together for judgment, whence they go into the world below, following the guide who is appointed to conduct them from this world to the other; and when they have there received their due and remained their time, another guide brings them back again after many revolutions of ages. Now,

this journey to the other world is not, as Æschylus says in the "Telephus," a single and straight path—no guide would be wanted for that and no one could miss a single path—but there are many partings of the road, and windings, as I must infer from the rites and sacrifices which are offered to the Gods below, in places where three ways meet on earth. The wise and orderly soul is conscious of her situation and follows in the path; but the soul which desires the body and which, as I was relating before, has long been fluttering about the lifeless frame and the world of sight, is, after many struggles and many sufferings, hardly and with violence carried away by her attendant genius, and when she arrives at the place where the other souls are gathered, if she be impure and have done impure deeds, or been concerned in foul murders or other crimes which are brothers of these, and the works of brothers in crime—from that soul every one flees and turns away; no one will be her companion, no one her guide, but alone she wanders in extremity of evil until certain times are fulfilled, and when they are fulfilled she is borne irresistibly to her own fitting habitation, as every pure and just soul which has passed through life in the company and under the guidance of the gods has also her own proper home.—(Plato's "Phædo," Jowett's Tr., p. 438.)

Plato, too, gives a minute description of the Infernal rivers which Dante makes so impressive. He mentions Tartarus, Acheron, Pyriphlegethon, Styx, Cocytus, borrowing from Homer, who uses all of these (in the "Odyssey," except Tartarus, which occurs in the "Iliad," Book viii), as well as *Erebus*.

He then continues his account of the processes of punishment and purification:

"Such is the nature of the other world; and when the dead arrive at the place to which the genius of each severally conveys them, first of all, they have sentence passed upon them, as they have lived well and piously or not. And those who appear to have lived neither well nor ill [or rather 'those who have lived average lives' (*οἱ μέσως βεβιωκέναι*); Professor Jowett's 'neither well nor ill' contradicts the 'evil deeds,' 'wrongs they have done to others,' and 'good deeds' spoken of below] go to the river Acheron and mount such conveyances as they can get, and are carried in them to the Acherusian lake; and there they dwell and are purified of their evil deeds—[here is Purgatory]—and suffer the penalty of the wrongs which they have done to others, and are absolved, and

receive the rewards of their good deeds according to their deserts. But those who appear to be incurable by reason of the greatness of their crimes—who have committed many and terrible deeds of sacrilege, murders foul and violent, or the like—such are hurled into *Tartarus*, which is their suitable destiny, and they never come out [this is the *Inferno*]. Those, again, who have committed crimes which, although great, are not unpardonable—who in a moment of anger, for example, have done violence to a father or a mother, and have repented for the remainder of their lives, or who have taken the life of another under the like extenuating circumstances—these are plunged into *Tartarus*, the pains of which they are compelled to undergo for a year; but at the end of a year the wave casts them forth—mere homicides by way of *Cocytus*, parricides and matricides by *Pyriphlegethon*—and they are borne to the *Acherusian lake*, and there they lift up their voices and call upon the victims whom they have slain or wronged to have pity on them and to receive them, and to let them come out of the river into the lake. And if they prevail, then they come forth and cease from their troubles; but if not, they are carried back again into *Tartarus* and from thence into the rivers unceasingly, until they obtain mercy from those whom they have wronged: for that is the sentence inflicted upon them by their judges. [Here we have *Purgatory* again, with the method of purification specified.] Those also who are remarkable for having led holy lives are released from this earthly prison and go to their pure home which is above, and dwell in the purer earth; and those who have duly purified themselves with philosophy live henceforth altogether without the body in mansions fairer far than these, which may not be described [Plato's '*Paradiso*'], and of which the time would fail me to tell."—(Jowett, "*Phædo*," 443, 444.)

§ 43. *Plato's Mythos of Er. The Purgatory.*

In the tenth book of his "*Republic*" Plato tells the story of *Er*, the son of *Armenius*, a *Pamphylian*, who was apparently slain on the field of battle but had really fallen into a trance and remained thus until the twelfth day. On reviving, he told the story of his visit to the other world, where he beheld the last judgment. The just were sent upward on a heavenly way with a seal of judgment on their foreheads (suggesting *Dante's* seven

p's?), while the unjust were commanded by the judges to "descend by the lower way on the left hand with the symbols of their deeds fastened on their backs." What is most wonderful in this story follows: For it seems that after judgment the souls go on journeys lasting a thousand years for each hundred years of their former lives (suggesting the period of the Procrastinators wandering on the lowest terrace). They come together, however, after the lapse of this period, both the good and the bad, and describe to each other their experiences, those who had gone below weeping and sorrowing at the recollection of their hard lot on their journey, and those who had gone above relating the delights and visions of beauty in heaven. After seven days of this reunion they set out anew on a journey to the place where they behold the spectacle of the universe with its eight heavens arranged like hollow shells around about the gigantic spindle of necessity that pierces through the universe as its axis of revolution. There is the outermost heaven (1) of the fixed stars, and then, arranged concentrically, the heavens of the planets, being as follows: (2) Saturn, next to the fixed stars; (3) Jupiter, second in whiteness; (4) Mars, reddish in hue; (5) Sun, brightest light; (6) Venus, whitest; (7) Mercury, like Saturn, both being yellowish; (8) Moon, colored by light reflected from the sun. Here is the suggestion of eight of Dante's heavens.

Each heaven moves at the song of a siren (Dante's Angels of the Hierarchy), and the music of all forms a harmony. Around about these heavens on the tripod of the universe sit the three fates, Lachesis singing of the past, Clotho of the present, and Atropos of the future. Clotho keeps in motion the heaven of the fixed stars, while Atropos guides the inner ones, giving them their various retrograde motions, and Lachesis assists at both. The journeying spirits, having arrived before Lachesis, now choose new lots of life, so that they may reascend to the earth. A prophet standing before Lachesis bids each choose his life freely and in view of his experiences on the long journey he has undergone: "Your genius will not choose for you, but you will choose your genius. . . . Virtue is free, and as a man honors or dishonors her, he will have more or less of her; the chooser is answerable—God is justified."

Plato informs us that those who had experienced one human life before chose wiser than the new souls who had never before

descended into bodies. The patterns of lives were spread out on the ground before the souls to choose from. Those who had reflected much and improved by experience and "had acquired an adamantine faith in truth and right" were not dazzled by wealth and other allurements, but chose virtuous lives, and consequently happy ones. Others chose bad lives. The great idea of responsibility is emphasized in the strongest manner in this myth of Plato. It had not yet been born in the minds of the Greek people (witness the Nemesis that repressed high aspiration—too much choice), and consequently we do not find it in the Greek religion. What we find in the Greek philosophy, however, gets realized in the mythos of succeeding ages. Note particularly in the myth of Er that it is the purgatorial idea that is uppermost. The present life is a probation, and the next life is determined at first by the present life. After a journey ten times the length of the present life and determined by the present life has passed away, a new life is to be chosen by the individual with opportunity to avail himself of all his earthly experience as well as his experience in Hades. But Plato introduces the genuine Inferno for the worst species of tyrants and murderers—punishing treachery and violence by depriving the sinner of the privilege of journeying and of profitable experience in Hades. There are frames of mind, saw Plato, in which the individual does not profit by his experience, and such dispositions are hopeless; they are in the Inferno and not in the Purgatory.

Er relates that Ardiæus the Great (tyrant and parricide of Pamphylia) and other like sinners, attempting to come out of the "lower way" to the place of new choice, were seized and carried off by wild men of fiery aspect (Dante's demons of the "Inferno"), who "bound them head, foot, and hand, and threw them down and flayed them with scourges, and dragged them along the road at the side, carding them on thorns like wool, and declaring to the pilgrims as they passed what were their crimes, and that they were being taken away to be cast into Tartarus."—(Jowett's Tr.)

The state of mind of those who choose the worst lots is well depicted by Plato. One chooses a life of the greatest tyranny. "His mind having been darkened by folly and sensuality, he did not well consider, and therefore did not see at first, that he was fated, among other evils, to devour his own children. But when he came to himself and saw what was in his lot he began to beat

his breast and lament over his choice, forgetting the warning of the prophet. For, instead of blaming himself as the author of his calamity, he accused chance and the gods, and everything rather than himself." This thought is adopted by Dante, we have seen, as a definition of the pervading frame of mind of the sinners in the "Inferno." "They blasphemed God and their parents; the human kind; the place, the time, and the origin of their seed and of their birth.—(Inf., iii, 103.)

Finally, when the souls had all chosen their lots in life they came to the Fates, who spun their threads and made them irreversible; external circumstance has no power to change the resolution of the free will. "They then marched on in a scorching heat to the plain of forgetfulness—*λήθη* (Dante's *Lethe*)—which was a barren waste destitute of trees and verdure, and toward evening they encamped by the river of Negligence (*ἀμέλεια*, lack of care or concern, general apathy and loss of interest), the water of which river no vessel can hold." [Plato makes *Lethe* a plain, while Dante makes it a river, following Virgil. Lack of interest is so near non-existence of character that no vessel can hold it. Not only the memory of the past is gone, but even all instincts and impulses, "organic memory"—all "karma," so to speak.] All were obliged to drink of this water, and those who were not saved by wisdom drank more than was necessary; and those who drank forgot all things. Now, after they had gone to rest, about the middle of the night, there was a thunder-storm and an earthquake, and suddenly they were all exploded, so to speak, like shooting stars, into the earthly life, and were born again as infants."

§ 44. Virgil's "*Æneid*." Descent of *Æneas* to *Orcus*.

In the sixth book of Virgil's "*Æneid*" there is another statement of the idea of the future life. It is full of hints which Dante has followed, but it is hardly an advance on the Platonic statement.

We might expect the Roman mind, especially given to the invention of legal forms and to the definition of the just compass of the human will with reference both to political and civil freedom—i. e., freedom of life, limb, and property, and freedom by means of the latter from thralldom to nature—we might expect that Virgil, a Roman, would give us a much more concrete and developed

view of the idea of retribution in the future life. We are not altogether disappointed in this expectation, although we are compelled to notice that even Virgil is far from realizing in his poetic mind the mythos of the completely independent personal will—the doctrine of perfect responsibility—he retains the doctrine of metempsychosis.

Æneas finds Charon the ferryman and the infernal rivers; he sees vast "prisons enclosed with a triple wall which Tartarean Phlegethon's rapid flood environs with torrents of flame, and whirls roaring rocks along. Fronting is a huge gate with columns of solid adamant, that no strength of men nor the gods themselves can with steel demolish. An iron tower rises aloft, and there wakeful Tisiphone sits watching." Here is evidently the suggestion of Dante's towers of the city of Dis, with its walls of iron heated to redness and guarded by the three furies. Cretan Rhadamanthus presides over this special realm of punishment of fraud, the furies being the ministers of justice. Below this extends Tartarus, wherein the Titan brood are punished. Again Dante has taken a hint for his lowest hell, making the giants encompass the pit of treachery. Treachery seeks the complete dissolution of all institutions. The giants even in Homer's "Odyssey" have this typical meaning. They do not live in villages, but isolatedly. Ulysses relates: "There are no assemblies for consultation among this people, and they have no established laws. They live on mountain summits in hollow caves, each gives the law to his own family, and no one cares for his neighbors." They have no arts and trades, no commerce, no civilization.

Æneas next comes to the walls of Pluto's realm and finds the Paradise of Trojan heroes—"regions of joy, delightful green retreats and blessed abodes in groves, where happiness abounds." Here are found those who died fighting for their country, also "priests who preserved themselves pure and holy while life remained; pious poets who sang in strains worthy of Apollo; those who improved life by the invention of arts, and, in general, those who by worthy deeds have caused posterity to remember them."

On inquiring for Anchises, Musæus replies: "None of us have a fixed abode; in shady groves we dwell, or lie on couches all along the banks on meadows fresh with rivulets," etc. This suggests Dante's thought, that each of the souls in the "Paradiso" belongs to all the heavens, although they appear in special heavens

to him. The interview with Anchises suggests that with Cacciaguida (Par. xv, xvi, xvii).

Here, also, Æneas learns the doctrine of purgatory :

"Meanwhile Æneas sees in the retired vale a grove situate by itself, shrubs rustling in the woods, and the river Lethe, which glides by those peaceful dwellings. Around this, unnumbered tribes and nations of ghosts were fluttering ; as in meadows on a serene summer's day when the bees sit on the various blossoms and swarm around the snow-white lilies, all the plain buzzes with their humming noise."

"These souls for whom other bodies are destined by Fate, at the stream of Lethe's flood quaff care-expelling draughts and lasting oblivion."

"The spirit within (*spiritus intrus alit*) nourishes the heavens, the earth, and watery plains, the moon, the sun, and the stars. The mind diffused through the limbs makes active the entire mass (*mens agitat molem*), and permeates the vast body of nature." This is the reason why the animals and man arise.

"This fiery spiritual principle is of celestial origin, but souls are clogged by the influence of the body which is hurtful to spirit ; material limbs and mortal bodies dull the powers of the soul.

"Hence they fear and desire, grieve and rejoice ; and, shut up in darkness and a gloomy prison [the body], lose sight of their native skies. Even when with the last beams of light their life is gone, yet not every ill, nor all corporeal stains, are quite removed from the unhappy beings ; and it is absolutely necessary [*i. e.*, it cannot be but] that many imperfections which have long been joined to the soul should be in marvellous ways increased and riveted therein [*i. e.*, should have become firmly fixed or ingrafted in the soul—*inolescere*]. Therefore [because these stains should be removed] are they afflicted with punishments and pay the penalties of their former ills. Some, hung on high, are spread out to the empty winds [the purification by air, the second element above the earthy] ; in others the guilt not done away is washed out in a vast watery abyss [the first element above the earthy] or burned away in fire [purification by the third element above the earthy]. We each endure his own manes [*i. e.*, suffer for our sins—or 'Karma,' as the Hindoos call it ; or, if manes refers to Plato's "genius"—*δαίμων*—then it means here the punishers or avengers]. Thence are we conveyed along [*i. e.*, into] the spacious Elysium,

and we, the happy few, possess the fields of bliss, till length of time, after the fixed period is elapsed, hath done away the inherent stain and hath left the pure celestial reason and the fiery energy of the simple spirit [*i. e.*, left it free from its stains]. All these [souls], after a thousand years have rolled away, are summoned forth by the God in a great body to the river Lethe; to the intent that losing memory of the past they may revisit the vaulted realms above [*i. e.*, revisit the surface of the earth], and willingly return into bodies.”—(Bohn’s Tr., with emendations.)

§ 45. *Metempsychosis versus Eternal Punishment in Hell.*

Metempsychosis—the doctrine of the transmigration of souls, or the return to earth of the soul after death and its reincarnation—we see is held by Plato and Virgil. This, too, although Plato makes the soul responsible for its choice of the lot in life that it shall lead.

It was necessary that Christianity should recognize the perfect responsibility of the human soul as well as its immortal destination. The mythos which should contain the idea of complete freedom of the will, or, what is the same thing, perfected individuality, would be forced to express this insight by laying infinite stress on the determining power of the individual in this life. Nothing else could bring men to realize the true dignity of the human soul and its exalted destiny. The individual soul is strictly responsible to God and to the visible body of the Divine Spirit here on earth—the Church—for his choice of his career and for his deeds.

The only form in which the due emphasis could be given to this doctrine of responsibility was that chosen by the mythos of Hell—“bitter, remorseless, endless Hell”—as the future lot of all who reject the proffered eternal life and refuse to enter the body of the Holy Spirit through union with the visible Church.

In translating the philosophical idea of essential or substantial into the poetic form of a mythos, it is always necessary to represent it by infinite time. The will, in determining itself, affects itself for all time. It determines itself completely in this life, and there is no probation in the next. This dogma alone could bring man to a consciousness of his independent personality—his ‘*substantia separata*.’ In this way the mythos expressed the

true and profound doctrine of the determinability of human destiny by the actual exertion of volition on the part of the soul itself, and of the utter non-effectiveness of vague postponement and reliance on external influences. External influences cannot initiate one's salvation either here or hereafter, is the doctrine of responsibility. The initiation lies always in free choice.

There is found no hope on the line of mortal sin—only alienation more and more profound. It is not a progress; sin is not a necessary stage on the way to growth, but a retrogradation. Nevertheless, it is not extinction—one can never reach that. Once immortality is reached, the individual remains a responsible being to all eternity. The negative will of the sinner builds up a wall of fate about him, it is true, but within this wall he ever holds his free volition, his absolute individuality.

Dante's poetic treatment of this mythos forms one of the few great works of all time.

§ 46. *Dante's Mythos of the Formation of the Inferno and the Purgatorial Mount.*

Dante conceives that certain of the angels fell immediately after creation ("Paradiso," xxix, 49). Before one could so much as count twenty, Lucifer fell. He struck the earth under Jerusalem and hollowed it out to the very centre, thus making the tunnel-shaped Inferno and raising on the opposite side in the southern Atlantic Ocean the mountain of Purgatory.

"On this side fell he down from heaven; and here the land, which erst stood out, through fear of him veiled itself with sea and came to our hemisphere; and perhaps, in order to escape from him, that which on this side appears, left here the empty space, and upward rushed."—(J. C., Tr.), Inf., xxx, 121.

The Mountain of Purgatory arises in the southern Atlantic Ocean; for the earth, according to his view, is not 8,000 miles in diameter, but only 6,500. (See for some of the passages in which Dante gives this item, "Convito," ii, 7; iii, 5.) In the Southern Hemisphere Dante knows the most remarkable constellation of stars there. He probably had travelled far enough south to see them with his own eyes. He knows, too, the Precession of Equinoxes by which the pole of the heavens changes so as to bring up the Southern Cross to the view of Europeans: "Seen only by the primitive peoples," says he.

The streams of sorrow, wrath, malice, fraud, and treachery that flow down into this region Dante explains as flowing from the tears of the human race, which he figures as a gigantic Man standing within the Idæan mountain of Crete and looking toward Rome. He borrows the external form of the figure from the vision of the Great Image in Daniel, which there prefigured the fate of the Babylonian Empire and the world-movement of nations that followed it—the rise of the Persian Empire under Cyrus, and possibly the final supremacy of Rome.

Daniel describes the King's Dream: "This image's head was of fine gold, his breast and his arms of silver, his belly and his thighs of brass, his legs of iron, his feet part of iron and part of clay. . . This head of gold is Nebuchadnezzar.

"And after thee shall arise *another kingdom* inferior to thee, and another *third kingdom* of brass, which shall bear rule over all the earth.

"And the *fourth kingdom* shall be as strong as iron; forasmuch as iron breaketh in pieces and subdueth all things, and as iron that breaketh all these, shall it break in pieces and bruise.

"And whereas thou sawest the feet and toes, part of potter's clay and part of iron, the kingdom shall be divided; but there shall be in it of the strength of the iron, forasmuch as thou sawest the iron mixed with miry clay. . . .

"And in the days of these kings shall the God of Heaven set up a kingdom, which shall never be destroyed; and the kingdom shall not be left to other people, but it shall break in pieces and consume all these kingdoms, and it shall stand forever. . . ."

Dante would think of the Roman Empire and the Christian Church as signified by this kingdom, which shall break in pieces all other kingdoms, but which shall itself stand forever. The Holy Roman Empire is, as we know, to Dante this kingdom. It was a stone carved out of a mountain, and it came to fill the whole earth, which clearly enough the Persian Empire never did, for it failed to conquer Europe.

§ 47. *Dante's Mythos of the Roman Empire.*

Under the guidance of Virgil's mythos of the Roman Empire, Dante had been in the habit of looking upon Troy and the Trojans as the ancestors of the Romans. Crete, too, was a still more

remote ancestor—the nursery of Zeus, the god of civil order and the father of Minos, the first king who made just laws and secured peace and harmony by their rigid execution.

Hence, too, Dante, in the "Inferno," shows so much bitterness toward the Greek heroes and statesmen, punishing, for example, Alexander and Pyrrhus in the seething purple flood of Phlegethon; Diomedes and the great Ulysses in the *bolge* of evil counsellors in the circle of fraud.

In the fourteenth canto of the "Inferno" Dante explains the origin of the rivers by this mythos of Crete and the Image of the Human Race, or perhaps, more accurately, the Image of Human Civil Government (as the reference to Daniel's vision seems to indicate):

"'In the middle of the sea lies a waste country,' he then said, 'which is named Crete,' under whose King the world once was chaste. A mountain is there, called Ida, which once was glad with waters and foliage; now it is deserted like an antiquated thing. Rhea of old chose it for the faithful cradle of her son; and the better to conceal him, when he wept, caused cries to be made on it.

"Within the mountain stands erect a great Old Man, who keeps his shoulders turned toward Damietta, and looks at Rome as if it were his mirror. His head is shapen of fine gold, his arms and his breast are pure silver; then he is of brass to the cleft; from thence downward he is all of chosen iron, save that the right foot is of baked clay; and he rests more on this than on the other. Every part, except the gold, is broken with a fissure that drops tears, which collected perforate that grotto. Their course descends from rock to rock into this valley. They form Acheron, Styx, and Phlegethon; then, by this narrow conduit, go down to where there is no more descent. They form Cocytus; and thou shalt see what kind of lake that is; here, therefore, I describe it not."
—(J. C. Tr.), *Inf.*, xiv, 94–120.

In Virgil ("Æneid," iii, 104) we find the suggestion which re-

¹ Virgil, "Æneid," iii, 104:

"Creta Jovis magni medio jacet insula ponto
Mons Idæus ubi, et gentis cunabula nostræ;
Centum urbes habitant magnas, uberrima regna
Maximus unde pater, si rite audita recordor
Teucrus Rhœteas primum est advectus in oras."

veals to us the idea in Dante's mind in its entirety: "Crete, the island of great Jove, lies in the middle of the sea, where is Mount Ida and the nursery of our race; they inhabit a hundred great cities, most fertile realms, whence Teucer, our first ancestor, if rightly I remember the things I have heard, was first carried to the Rhoetian coasts [promontory of Troas], and there selected the place for his kingdom. Ilium stood not yet," etc.

According to Apollodorus (iii, 1, § 1), Teutamius, the son of Dorus and a descendant of Deucalion, mythic founder of the Dorian race, came to Crete with a Greek colony. In the time of his son Asterion, Zeus came to Crete with Europa and became father of Minos, Sarpedon, and Rhadamanthus, who were adopted by Asterion upon his marriage with Europa.

Zeus, according to the Greek mythos, is the divine founder of civil order, and to be son of Zeus is to be a hero of civilization. Minos became the greatest king of the mythic heroic period, being the inventor of wonderful laws for the securing of justice. He freed the seas of pirates.

The circumstances of his obtaining his kingdom gave rise to feuds symbolized by the story of the wild bull of Crete—probably an independent freebooter who sought alliance with Minos. The Minotaur is the symbol of blood violence which Minos repressed by shutting up the monster in a labyrinth wonderfully constructed.

§ 48. *The Minotaur and the Labyrinth in the Light of this Mythos.*

In the myth of the labyrinth we have a symbolic description of the nature of feuds and blood violence and of the manner in which they are suppressed by a Jove-nurtured king. Within a labyrinth the avenues continually lead from one into the other without making any progress toward a final goal. One goes forward and forward, but after weary labors finds himself at length where he started, or even farther off from his goal.

So long as there was no kingly authority and no just laws, feuds arose; violence on the part of one led to retaliation on the part of another, and this to counter-retaliation. Each avenging of a deed was taken as a new case of violence to be avenged again.

Thus the island of Crete and the surrounding nations were in a

labyrinth of blood revenge. The Minotaur is used by Dante as symbol of blood revenge, and the labyrinth, which is not named in the "*Divina Commedia*," signifies the endless nature of feuds thus avenged.

But the labyrinth has also the meaning of a code of justice which imprisons the Minotaur; for when this system of blood revenge is throttled by just laws, the State steps in and, apprehending the first aggressor, makes a labyrinth of him by making his deed return upon him at once, and thus rendering unnecessary the blood revenge on the part of the injured one; hence the labyrinth in this sense is a device by which the endless progress of private revenge is stopped in its first steps—it is shut up and the labyrinth is reduced to a jail or prison conducted according to just criminal laws. Formerly all Crete was a labyrinth and all the neighboring islands of the *Ægean* seas and the main-land were infested by pirates and robber States continually at feud with each other. Minos, it is said, not only checked piracy about Crete, but made himself master of the Greek islands, and was able, it seems, to punish the blood violence and treachery even of a colony like Athens. His son Androgeus was assassinated at Athens on account of some jealousy or feud. Minos subdued Megara and compelled the Athenians to send every nine years or oftener a tribute of fourteen youths and maidens to be devoured by the Minotaur—that is to say, confined in the labyrinth as hostages, or perhaps executed for new deeds of violence done against Cretans.

It was the national hero of Athens, Theseus, also a law-giver, who slew this Minotaur, at least so far as the Athenian tribute was concerned—probably entering into a treaty by which he suppressed the blood violence of his own subjects and assisted Minos in his endeavors to suppress such violence everywhere, and thus put an end to the Minotaur altogether.

Wonderful insight, therefore, Dante displays in making the Minotaur or blood violence stand as guardian at the entrance of the circles of violence.

From this good law-maker, Minos, descends the Trojan *Æneas*, as Virgil asserts and Dante believes, and hence by direct descent the Roman Empire appointed by divine right to give laws to the whole world and suppress the complex of private revenge and feuds—a complex in the fact that each avenging deed is a new crime and thus forms a labyrinth out of which it is impossible to

extricate the state. Dante knew—bitterly knew—how this labyrinth of blood revenge extended over his native Italy; cities divided by factions and continually at war with each other.

§ 49. *Minos as Judge in the Light of this Mythos.*

The island of Crete has great significance to Dante for these reasons: He accordingly selects Minos, as the typical dispenser of justice, to preside over the court of the Inferno, following Homer and Virgil in this choice. Minos invented a code which secured the return of his own deed, or at least its symbol, upon the criminal. The sinner, on entering the presence of Minos, lay open their secret lives to him. His judgment is indicated by coiling about him his tail, "making as many circles round himself as the number of grades or circles that the sinner will have to descend." Minos symbolically indicates that the sinner's own beastiality has made its coil about him and that the sinner's own deed makes his circle of hell.

§ 50. *Other Mythologic Figures used by Dante.*

It is noteworthy that Virgil places in the gates of his Inferno Centaurs, Briareus, the Chimæra, the Lernean Hydra, Harpies, and the three-bodied Geryon—all indicating the instrumentalities that send men to their death. Dante uses most of these figures in his own way, always showing a profound insight into the capacity of the symbol for spiritual expression.

THE CENTAURS were nomadic peoples, without organized laws of justice, who marauded on the Greek civil communities and escaped punishment on their swift horses; hence also they are symbols of violence of a special kind. Dante employs them to guard the banks of Phlegethon and punish the violent. It is the fitting punishment of the violent that they make for themselves an environment of violence. The Centaurs were also teachers of the Greek heroes in the arts of single combat, medicine, and music—means useful to a life of roving adventure—but they were not teachers of laws; of the art of commanding armies or organized bodies; of anything specially useful to cities. Like the Cyclops, they symbolize man as individual apart from man as social whole—the little self over against the greater self.

THE HARPIES are placed by Dante in the doleful woods of the

suicides as symbolic of their hypochondria. The gloomy presage of coming evil causes suicide. These are birds, airy creatures, symbolic therefore of fancy and the future. They defile the feast of the present with forebodings of evil.

THE FURIES and THE GORGONS guard the sixth circle, from of old the symbols of all that is destructive in violence against civil order—discord, slander, mistrust, suspicion, and deadly revenge. MEDUSA the Gorgon paralyzes the beholder—is it hardened rebellion against God (as Carlyle thinks), is it atheism or petrifying scepticism regarding immortality (as Philaethes thinks), or is it simply panic terror which deprives one of all control of his limbs?—a significance which the Greeks may have given to the Medusa face. One may see the reflection of such panic fear—*i. e.*, hear of it at a distance, but he must not look upon it directly if he would escape its paralyzing effects.

GERYON is the well-described image of fraud in Dante's portraiture. The ancients did not thus specially characterize him. He was simply the three-bodied king of Hesperia, who owned the famous herd of oxen that Hercules obtained. Perhaps Dante confounded him with Cacus, the wily thief of those oxen in Virgil's story. He is represented with the face of the just man, mild of aspect. The fraudulent purpose is covered with a special appearance of conformity to law and justice—submission of the individual will to the general will of the community. But he has a reptile's body covered with knots and circlets like a lizard or a toad, the paws of a beast, and an envenomed scorpion tail. He seeks not, like the violent, to rob his fellow-men directly and attack the civil order with his individual might. But he seeks to use the civil order against itself, under a semblance of obedience to it to gain the faith of men and then abuse their confidence. This, of course, will weaken their confidence in civil order. While direct violence forces every one to trust civil order all the more and draw close to the protecting shelter of the state, Fraud, on the other hand, weakens the faith of the citizen in the power of the State to protect him. For, see, have not I been wronged under the semblance of mild-faced justice?

THE GIANTS in the lowest round have already been mentioned as typical of the entirely savage state of society, utterly isolated human life. The individual by himself must do all for himself. He cannot share with others the conquest of nature. It is his

own individual might against the world. The subduing of wild beasts, the cultivation of the soil, the arts of manufacture—in all these he is unaided. Worse than all, he is deprived of human intercourse and does not inherit the accumulated wisdom and experience of the human race. Homer, as we saw, has painted this state of savagery in the Cyclops.

CERBERUS furnishes a familiar type of greed in general. Dante, after Virgil, makes him the type of intemperance and gluttony.

PLUTUS, the ancient god of wealth, presides over the fourth circle of the "Inferno." The avaricious make property their god; it should be their means for achieving earthly freedom and leisure for divine works such as tend to the spiritual good of one's fellow-men and one's own growth in wisdom. The prodigal misuse their property and are always in want, or "hard up," as the slang phrase has it. Hence they are always trying to come at a little money to help them over a "tight place." Hence, too, they are always giving their minds to getting property, and are in the same hell with the avaricious. Both long for property in the same degree.

CHARON, the infernal ferryman, is likewise borrowed from Virgil, and is not found in the early Greek poets. His fiery eyes and wheels of flame—typical of the red-weeping eyes of mourners for the dead, or possibly a symbol of his keen watchfulness required to separate (in Virgil's "Inferno") the souls whose bodies are buried with due ceremony from those unseparated; or in Dante's "Inferno," to exclude the souls of the pusillanimous from his boat—this circumstance of the flaming eyes is also borrowed from Virgil.

§ 51. *The Mythos of Dante's "Purgatorio."*

The finest portion of the "Divina Commedia" is unquestionably the Purgatory, but it needs the "Inferno" to precede it for the sake of effect. It is filled with the light of the stars, the verdure of spring, growth of character, and the aspiration for perfection. In it the human will shows its true power to make the years re-enforce the days, while in the "Inferno" there is constant self-contradiction of the will and constant building up of Fate between man and society.

The mythos of Purgatory is more entirely Dante's work than that of the "Inferno." He found it a shadowy middle state of

the soul, and built it up into a systematic structure, definitely outlined in all its phases. It is *the* true state of man as a condition of perpetual education in holiness here and hereafter. All men who are struggling here in the world with an earnest aspiration for spiritual growth can find no book to compare with the second part of Dante's Poem. In climbing the steep sides of this mountain the air continually grows purer and the view wider and less obstructed. On the summit is the terrestrial paradise of the Church symbolizing the invisible Church of all sincere laborers for good on earth. The Church on earth holds humanity in so far as it lives in the contemplation of the divine and in the process of realizing the divine nature in the will and in the heart. Dante collects in a complex symbol the various ceremonial devices of the Church—almost mechanically, in fact. It is an allegory rather than a poetic symbol. But he adds dramatic action to it first by introducing the scene between Dante and Beatrice, secondly by the dumb show of the history of the Church—the tragedy of its corruption, its seizure by France, and its transfer from Rome to Avignon.

§ 52. *The Mythos of Dante's "Paradiso"—Gnosticism.*

The mythos of the "Paradiso" is constructed on a wholly new plan. There is no hint of it elsewhere except in the Platonic myth in the "Phædo" (the allusion to the complete disembodiment of the soul). The Mysticism of sixteen hundred years enters it as material.

Gnosticism represented the first attempt to reconcile Christianity with philosophy, as Neoplatonism represented a later attempt on the part of Greek Philosophy to reach the Oriental unity by transcending the first principle of Plato and Aristotle.

Gnosticism and Neoplatonism, accordingly, have substantially the same problem before them. Both systems agree in adopting the doctrine of Philo that God is exalted above virtue and knowledge, and even above good and evil altogether. Plato had identified God with the Absolute Good, while Aristotle had made him absolute reason.

From God, according to Gnosticism and Neoplatonism, there emanates Nous as His image, and then directly or after some interval the Psyche or Soul, from which emanates finally matter or

body from the soul as the soul's object, created result, or achievement.

These four cardinal points are common to all Gnostic and Neoplatonist systems; but great diversity exists in regard to intermediate steps and in regard to names and definitions. Gnosticism likes to use the word "æon" (*αἰών*) where Platonism likes the word "idea." By æon it means individual or complete cycle of activity—a self-determined being (*substantia separata*), in short. There may be many ideas or æons, or complete cycles of process, between the Nous or Reason and the Soul. There are, in fact, twenty-eight of these in the system of Valentinus (who came to Rome from Alexandria about the year 140 A. D.). He made thirty æons in all—wishing to symbolize the thirty years of Christ's life, as is said, somewhat as Dante wished to do this by the number thirty-three (the number of the cantos in each part of the "Divina Commedia"). These æons were yoked together in pairs, each pair being called a syzygy, such a syzygy being, for example: 1. Truth (*αλήθεια*). + 2. Reason (*Νοῦς*). These beget the second syzygy. 3. The creative word (*λόγος*). + 4. Life (*ζωή*). The Word and Life beget the third syzygy. 5. Man (*ἄνθρωπος*). + 6. Church (*ἐκκλησία*), and so on until one comes to Sophia (*Σοφία*) or wisdom, which is the youngest of the third division of æons and (we are curious to learn) is conscious of her remoteness from God, and hence flies toward God, the source of emanation. Wisdom proceeds to imitate the other æons by creating, but begets only chaos and confusion. In her grief at this dreadful result the other æons take pity and conspire with God to produce two new æons—Christ and the Holy Spirit, who redeem the world of chaos and confusion, acting as the Demiurgos or world-builder. Here we have a mythos of the fall into finitude—the lapse from the One to the Many, from the Perfect to the Imperfect, and the redemption from the latter.

In Proclus's system there are many unities issuing from the primal essence—all above life and reason and the power of comprehension. Then there are many triads corresponding to æons between reason and matter. Marcion of Pontus had no æons in his system of Gnosticism, but retained the Demiurgos or world-maker (as Jehovah of the Old Testament who is opposed to Christ as Savior).

The emanation theories of both Gnosticism and Neoplatonism

have the principle of Lapse as the principle of their philosophic method, and not the principle of self-determination, which is the true principle of philosophic method. The principle of Lapse finds only a descending scale and is obliged to introduce an arbitrary and miraculous interference into its world-order, in order to explain progressive development and redemption. The principle of self-determination shows us an ascending scale, all of whose steps are miraculous and yet none of them arbitrary.

In the later forms of Neoplatonism there is a slight trace of return toward the pure doctrines of Aristotle and Plato. The pupils of Plutarch of Athens seem to have learned from him that Plato and Aristotle substantially agree in their world-view. Syrianus and Hierocles, of Alexandria, the former the teacher of Proclus, both recognize this fact, and Hierocles insists that Ammonius Saccas, the founder of Neoplatonism, proved once for all the substantial agreement of the two great Greek philosophers. Proclus in his great work on the theology of Plato, treating chiefly of the dialogue of "Parmenides," has undertaken, however, to show that Plato himself holds the doctrine of a primal essence above reason in several of his works; such an essence would, of course, be unrevealed and unrevealable, and thus could not be the God of Christianity. Proclus lived a century and a half after Christianity had become the state religion, and the Neoplatonic school at Athens was closed in 529 by Justinian, forty-four years after the death of Proclus. The influence of the school continued into Christian philosophy and mysticism for many centuries, the chief channel through which this influence flowed being the writings of the Pseudo-Dionysius, about whom Dante readers hear so much.

§ 53. *The Mythos of the "Paradiso" developed in the Doctrine of the Celestial Hierarchies.*

The chief work of Dionysius, according to historians, must have been written after the year 450, because it contains expressions used in the Council of Chalcedon in 451.¹ Purporting to be

¹ The following is condensed from Ueberweg's account: "The writings that purport to be the works of Dionysius the Areopagite of Athens (Acts, xvii, 34), first Bishop of Athens, are mentioned first in the year A. D. 532. They were accepted as genuine and of high authority on account of the connection of their supposed author with Paul. They gained credit in the Church in the eighth and ninth centuries and after a commen-

written by the first bishop of Athens, a convert of St. Paul, the work exercised great authority. Its chief doctrine is that of the fourfold division of natures into (1) that which is created and does not create—matter; (2) that which is created but creates again, as, for example, souls; (3) that which creates but is not created, as Christ, the Logos; and (4) that which neither creates nor is created, as the Absolute One or the Father. Here is Neoplatonism in its most heretical form.

The highest cannot be called by a name, according to Dionysius. It may be spoken of symbolically only. It is above truth and above goodness; nor does it create.

Through the thinking of the Gnostics and Neoplatonists, using the results of Plato and Aristotle and endeavoring to solve the problems of Christianity by them, arose a new *mythos*—a mythos of symbolic thinking which came over into Christian Theology as the doctrine of the Celestial Hierarchy. On this mythos Dante has constructed his “Paradiso.” It is modified to meet the wants of Christian doctrine in such a manner that what were emanating *Æons* or *Ideas* become one hierarchy of Angels, consisting of nine separate orders, divided, according to office and participation in divine gifts, into three triads.

The highest triad behold God’s judgments directly and are called **THRONES**; but there are two grades of excellence above the common rank of these—to wit, **CHERUBIM**, who are filled perfectly with divine light, and hence *comprehend* most. The **SERAPHS** are filled more especially with divine charity and excel in *will power*. The common angels of this class are called **THRONES**.

The second triad are distinguished for announcing things divine, and are called **POWERS**, the common principle of all being this. But elevated to an extraordinary degree are **DOMINIONS**, who are supreme in ability to distinguish the proper order and fitness of what is to be done. Then, secondly, the **VIRTUES**, who are eminent in providing the faculty of fulfilling or in planning the means.

The lowest triad has the common function of arranging and executing the duties of the angelic ministry so far as it deals directly with men. **ANGELS** are the common principle, **ARCH-**

tary had been written on them by Maximus Confessor early in the seventh century. Laurentius Valla, about the middle of the fifteenth century, asserted their spuriousness, which was demonstrated afterward by Morinus, Dallæus, and others.”

ANGELS the superior, and PRINCIPALITIES the highest directors of this function of angelic ministry.

These bizarre expressions used to name the different degrees of celestial perfection arose in the interpretation of obscure passages in St. Paul's writings.

In "Romans" we have a passage speaking of "death, life, angels, principalities, powers, things present and things to come," and a still more remarkable passage in Colossians (i, 16, 17): "By him were all things created that are in heaven or that are in earth, visible and invisible, whether they be thrones or dominions or principalities or powers. All things were created by him and for him. He is before all things, and by him all things consist."

This passage is otherwise famous as the most important place in which St. Paul gives his version of St. John's doctrine of the Word or Logos, which was in the beginning and which made all created things.

§ 54. *The Heretical Tendency in this Mythos.*

It is essential to note that the hierarchy may be interpreted to mean that the highest, or the THRONES (Seraphim, Cherubim, Thrones), are of an angelic ministry more removed from mediation with what is below—more immediate in their contemplation of the divine. This is heretical when the mediation is denied—*i. e.*, when it is thought to be more divine to be above and apart from the world of humanity—but not heresy when it is held that "Thrones" *complete* their mediation perfectly, and come to use their power to elevate fallen humanity, and are not held aloof as through fear of contamination by contact with sinners. The Highest Logos goes down into the manger of Space and Time, and raises all up—as contemplative Cherub, the Logos pierces clear through the mediation of time and space intellectually and philosophically and sees the face of God. As Seraph it loves God through loving all creation, down to the lowest insect or plant or clod.

Seraph and Cherub are of the highest triad, because they make the deepest and completest mediation and see clearest the divine shining through creation. They can see the praise of God even in sin and evil. But the danger of heresy lurks in this doctrine. If it is held that the Cherubim see God directly face to face *with-*

out the mediation of creation, then mere quietism is reached. Buddhism holds that the highest states of perfection for its saints are most aloof from the world of man and nature.

"From the lowest to the highest stations of human activity, to serve as a servant who does menial work is everywhere necessary. For the lowest class of laborers, whatever they do is only a trade; for the next higher it is an art; and for the highest, whatever they do is to them the image of the totality."—(Paraphrase of one of Goethe's sayings.)

Hence it is not the angels, archangels, and principalities that make the human mediation most perfectly. It is to them a "trade." But the powers, virtues, and dominions are higher toward a perfect mediation and can go down lower into the depths safely to bring up the lowest. But the thrones can make the complete mediation from lowest to highest.

Dante has connected this artificial system (which refuses, even in the expositions of its greatest disciples, to take on a perfectly rational and logical form) to the heavens of the Ptolemaic system, and thereby fastened his degrees of spiritual perfection to astronomical distinctions observable by all men. In the "Convito" second treatise, Chapter xiv, he has stated in detail his astronomical theory.

That there remained a sediment of Neoplatonism, and hence of Oriental thinking, in Dante's mind, even after the chidings of Beatrice in the Terrestrial Paradise, and perhaps, too, even in the teachings of Beatrice herself in the twenty-eighth canto of the "Paradiso," may well be believed. But the main great points of his theology, founded on Aristotle as interpreted by the Schoolmen, will stand the scrutiny of all time.

The doctrine of the Divine form or the self-activity of the absolute involves the common nature of man and God—or God as divine-human. This is the great central truth (of which the doctrine of the Trinity is the symbol) on which all modern civilization is built as its open secret.

§ 55. *The Symbol of the Trinity embodies the Highest Philosophic Truth.*

God the absolute reason is perfect knowing and willing in one—what he knows he creates; for his knowing causes to be, that

which he intellectually perceives. His intuition of himself then contemplates the eternal Word—the Second Person—equal in all respects to himself. The Second Person, the Logos, knows and wills likewise himself, and thus arises a Third Person. But a difference makes its appearance here; the Second Person knows himself as having been begotten, in the timeless past of "The Beginning," as having arisen through all stages of imperfection up to the highest. This knowledge is also creation, and the Word creates a world of imperfect beings in the form of evolution from pure space and time up to the highest and holiest on earth—the "New Jerusalem"—the "City of God," the "Invisible Church" whose spirit is the Holy Spirit or the Third Person. The world of man and nature thus belongs to the *processio*—to the hypostasis of derivation or the genesis of the Eternal Word. The Logos, contemplating its own derivation, logically implied, causes it to be, as an actual creation in Time and Space. As the Holy Spirit proceeds from all eternity, it is not a generation, but a procession always complete, but always continuing. Here is the highest view possible of human nature; it is part of the procession of the Holy Spirit.

Man reaches perfection in the infinite, eternal, immortal, and invisible Church.

This is the river and the Great White Rose of Paradise.

The symbol of philosophy as the knowledge of the highest truth is Beatrice, and Dante has recorded his conviction that this highest truth is revealed and can be known in the following words:

"I see well that our intellect is never sated if the truth does not illuminate it, beyond whose circuit no truth exists. In that truth it reposes as a wild animal in its lair, as soon as it has reached it. And it can reach it, for were this not so all desire would be created in vain" ("Paradiso," iv, 124–129).

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